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As a result of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326   the authoritarian 
Hamidian regime was once again transformed into a constitutional-
caliphate/sultanate-parliamentary system. Although not the same as the earlier project 
of 1876/1293, nonetheless due to revolutionary zeal the constitutional experiment of 
1908/1326   was presented as a ‘renewal’ of the top-down constitutional project of 
1876/1293 and the ‘national will’ as the Ottoman devlet continued to present itself as 
a significant actor belonging to the political concert of ‘civilised nations’. As the sole 
bastion of the Islamic world, by and large free from physical colonial occupation, as 
well as being a European and an Islamic state, by reintroducing ‘modern’ political 
structures the Ottoman devlet attempted to fashion itself capable from its own Islamic 
traditions to be able to adapt to the modern political orders.  
Predominately, narratives regarding Ottoman constitutionalism had focused 
on the secular-western merits of the Ottoman constitutional efforts, paying very little 
attention to the Ottoman proclamations of the Islamic merits of their constitutional 
exertions. In particular the historiography reflected that the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1908/1326   initiated a political turning point that paved the way for the ‘natural 
process’ of the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic. Not only that, on 
March 31, 1909/Rabi al-Awwal 10, 1327, a rebellion in Istanbul based on the failed 
promises of the new Young Turk government was categorised as a ‘religious’ 
reaction to the ‘progressive’ revolution of 1908/1326. This dichotomous 
representation presented the ulema (the religious Muslim scholarly class), the focus 
of this dissertation, in opposition to the constitutional efforts of the revolutionaries of 
1908/1326. Yet, it will be shown that the ulema were part of the revolutionary 
activities of 1908/1326, and worked with the newly established government to 
maintain order in 1909/1327, as they were equally, if not more invested in the new 
constitutional order than the revolutionaries of the Young Turks. 
The spirit of the revolution and the relaxation of press activity presented the 
opportunity for the Ottoman ulema to present in their newspapers an ‘ideal’ that 




was inclusive of ulema participation and somewhat facilitated nominal inclusion for 
non-Muslim minorities in the parliamentary decision-making processes. As 
parliamentarians the ulema consolidated their political vision via the constitutional 
amendment process in 1909/1327. In the Muslim press, they discussed the 
compatibility of the populist French Revolutionary ideals of liberté, égalité and 
fraternité or in Turkish as hürriyet, müsavat ve uhuvvet (freedom, equality and 
fraternity with Islamic norms while at the same time ‘intellectualising’ Islamic 
traditional ideals such as meşrutiyet (constitutionalism), şura (consultation) and 
adâlet (justice). 
 This dissertation shall emphasise on the seminal moment of 1908/1326 and 
1909/1327 and the challenges the ulema faced in this short but hostile period as a host 
of political fluctuations took place, such as the ‘progressive’ Constitutional 
Revolution, parliamentary elections, Counter-revolution and the dethronement of one 
of the most symbolic authorities in Late Ottoman History, Sultan Abdülhamid II. As 
discussed on each issue the ulema have been presented as either docile participants or 
reactionaries. However, as shall be examined the ulema were neither docile nor 
reactionary but instead vociferous, self-determining and central to the changes. Their 
activities and intellectual ideas as a networked community resonated to the masses 
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On July 24th 1908/Jumada al-Thani 25, 1326 the Ottoman devlet1 underwent a vital 
political change where a group of young officers and their supporters under the 
umbrella of the forename the Young Turks, initiated a revolutionary movement to 
replace the authoritarian-monarchist/sultanate form of governance to be replaced by a 
constitutional-monarchist/sultanate system. Never before in its history, had the 
Ottoman devlet experienced such a revolutionary motion against the central 
government.2 The success of the movement, done in the name of a ‘Constitutional 
Revolution’3 changed the course of governance for the Ottoman devlet, which not 
only transformed Ottoman statecraft in practice but also held implications to the 
traditional Ottoman conception of the Caliphate system.4 The re-introduction of the 
constitution of 1876/12935, the expansion of the number of Ottoman parliamentarians 
(mebus) to reflect greater public opinion, provincial-wide elections and the relative 
freedom of press, all introduced an arrangement of statecraft that was perceived by 
academics as alien to Islamic political discourse, and an attempt to emulate European 
configerations of governance. In particular reflections in academia on the change in 
                                                        
1 While I am aware that most works use Ottoman Empire, I have chosen to replace this with Ottoman 
devlet as a way to indicating how the Ottomans referred to themselves. The term devlet while may 
refer to the word state in English, nonetheless, even this can at times not be reflective of the Ottoman 
governmental structure. The devlet in the Ottoman domains consisted of a host of authorities such as 
the military, ulema and notables of which the House of Osman was the main pillar. With authority not 
always being centralised, the devlet often rested on multiple stake-holders in the execution of authority 
in various provinces. It is my view that where words can be translated I have done so, but where 
meaning has been lost in translation I have chosen to use the Ottoman terms with explanation in a 
footnote. However, throughout this thesis I have tried to reflect views held by the ulema in regards to 
language and thus many words have not been directly translated but explained in footnotes. For a Post-
colonial account regarding the problems of using the word empire to descrive other non-western 
civilisations see Salman Sayyid, “Empire, Islam, and the Postcolonial,” The Oxford Handbook of 
Postcolonial Studies, September 1, 2013 
2 The Ottoman devlet had experienced revolts, mutinies and protests, but 1908/1326 was the first time 
inkilāp (revolution) was a commonly used term by the protagonists and academics alike. 
3  Nader Sohrabi, Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran, Reprint 
edition(Cambridge University Press, 2014). The common term for the revolutionary action in most of 
the literature have called the events of 1908/1326  as the ‘Young Turk Revolution’. However I have 
chosen to adopt the more current explanation of the events by Nader Sohrabi as the ‘Constitutional 
Revolution’ as it is more inclusive of other actors.  
4 There is an emphasis on the Islamic political system focused on autocratic governance as a style of 
necessity to maintain unity during moments of political difficulty, whereas emphasising Shūrā/Şura 
(consultation) also has a tradition in Islamic political thought but as an ideal form of governance. 
5 The Ottoman devlet first experimented in constitutional politics in 1876/1293, but abandoned this 




governance had tended to present the Ottoman Sunni ulema6, (singular: ālim) the 
traditionalist religious class of Islam as reactionaries to transformation and change.7 
Thus a dichotomy was presented between the agents of reform and change on the one 
hand versus the forces of resistance against progress in the guise of a reactionary 
religious class on the other. The historiography was presented as a series of victories 
by the reformist-modernists over a conservatist opposition. Significantly, the Ottoman 
devlet and Islam were reduced and squarly placed within the paradigm of modernity 
while the Sunni ulema were presented within the purview that their motivations and 
actions were either pacified to conformity by this point in history, or reactionary to 
the dominant political and intellectual trends of the time.8 However, this dissertation 
shall examine that these cases do not reflect the reality of the ulema, thus giving us an 
alternative reading of the late Ottoman devlet and its relationship with Islam and its 
interlocutors.  
The aim of this dissertation is to present that the Ottoman ulema have been 
unreseaonably written out of Ottoman history regarding the nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century. In particular it is the aim of this dissertation to present that in 
fact the ulema mattered to political transformation during the so-called key ‘secular’ 
milestones of reform during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This re-
examination of the Ottoman Sunni ulema is not simply an attempt to re-appropriate 
the role of the Ottoman ulema regarding Ottoman political transformation, but instead 
place them within the greater study of Islamic intellectual thought, as there continues 
to be a dearth of studies on the Ottoman ulema within the departments of Islamic 
studies regarding this period. As a result, this dissertation is not simply a reflection of 
Ottoman history, but of a larger discourse of late nineteenth and twentieth century 
                                                        
6 From this moment I shall refer to the Ottoman Sunni ulema simply as ulema. I make the case by 
categorising the ulema as the ‘Ottoman Sunni ulema’, as the ulema were not restricted to the Ottoman 
world, and the ulema transcended boundaries and space. I also stress on the Ottoman aspect of the 
ulema, because although there are similarities in tradition with ulema outside the boundaries of the 
Ottoman world as well as ulema of the past, nonetheless, the ulema of the Ottoman devlet by 
1908/1326  had transformed where although they had an identity based on tradition that tied them with 
the ulema of the past and outside the Ottoman domains, nonetheless they were distinct because of their 
role in the Ottoman politics. There is no doubting that this matter is far more complicated and nuanced 
than mentioned here, and that there are indeed exceptions to this point. Also it is important to make the 
case that the Ottoman Sunni ulema should not be restricted to the ulema of Istanbul or Anatolia. 
7  Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. (İstanbul : Maarif 
Matbaası, 1940); Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (New York : Routledge, 
1998). 
8 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. (London : Oxford U.P., 1961).Niyazi Berkes, The 




Islamic intellectual thought, which includes the Ottoman world - as its centre, Islam 
and its ulema. 
Accounts of the ulema of the late Ottoman devlet, especially in Istanbul, 
Anatolia and the Balkans have focused on a gradual decline of their influence and 
authority regarding transformation of the state structure (modernisation narratives)9 
that seemingly weakened ulema guidance due to the ulema’s inability to adapt to the 
transformation of state institutions and structure. 10  If it wasn’t their limitation 
regarding state transformation, intellectual decline was cited, more often than not, 
both. It was often explained that due to the rise of a new educated Muslim elite class 
that emerged  from the ‘new civil Ottoman schools’, that privileged spaces only the 
ulema had enjoyed, became contested in which the ulema became further 
marginalised. There is no doubting that new forms of learning, schooling, and 
opportunities did indeed create new spaces, which encroached upon areas that the 
ulema were a part of. Yet, what is worth of note, is not only did the ulema learn to 
adapt and embrace the new spaces the state created such as the parliament and 
journalism, but they also managed to curtial and co-exist with Ottoman intellectual 
activity within their traditionalist purview. There is no doubting there were tensions 
due to this new intellectual environment but it is also true that the ulema became 
exposed to intellectual ideas outside their remit, but managed to uphold the ideals of 
traditionalism to reflect a period of what one could term an amalgam of the tradition 
and ‘modern’ if such binary can be placed as hybrid ideas presented a period of 
intellectual transformation as much as state. It is worth to note as İsmail Kara has 
suggested that this was a period which one could deem where there was an 
‘intellectualisation’ of the ulema in the Ottoman devlet.11  
                                                        
9 The modernisation theory/narrative was constructed where it reflected that for a nation or society to 
progress it needed to evolve from its respective traditionalism to modernity. This placed modernity as 
progressive and tradition as the opposite. This shall be addressed throughout this dissertation. 
10 Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire : The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, 
Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton ; Guildford : Princeton University Press, 1980). 
11  Ismail Kara, “Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition,” ed. Elisabeth Özdsalga, Late Ottoman 
Society: The Intellectual Legacy, SOAS/Routledge studies on the Middle East ; 3, n.d., pp162–200. It 
is worth noting that Kara is not suggesting that intellectualisation is to reflet European idealism but 
rather the ulema becoming exposed to Muslim thinkers ideas and new spaces such as journalism. For 
an alternative reading on Muslim intellectualism see Jan-Peter Hartung, “What Makes a Muslim 





There is disproportionate literature favouring the ulema’s ‘reactionary’ 
attitudes regarding transformation.12 Rodric Davidson had suggested that the ulema 
were opposed to innovation13; Bernard Lewis viewed them as stagnant 14 , while 
Niyazi Berkes proclaimed that the Turkish Republic had rightly eliminated them.15 
With such positions it was not a surprise that there was a dearth of studies of positive 
protrayals on the Ottoman ulema in English as David Kushner conceded that the 
ulema indeed had been under researched to the detrement of Ottoman studies.16 One 
could assume, as Kushner did, that scholarly judgments focused on ‘priorities’ and 
that an intellectual taint attached to the study of religious matters had contributed to a 
dearth of studies related to Islam.17 That there was an ‘intellectual taint’ on the study 
of religious matters is also telling of opinions many earlier historians held. The 
majority of the literature popularised the notion that due to the challenges of 
‘modernisation’ the ulema became a declined entity/institution. This notion still 
resonates in contemporary literature that the narrative of the ulema has yet to recover, 
as common discourse of orientalist tropes continue to present a stagnation that affects 
the ulema up until today. It had been assumed that in the face of considerable and 
unrelenting changes in the ‘modernising’ world that the bastions of tradition - the 
ulema, had become redundant, and of little interest in contemporary Muslim societies. 
This decline has mainly been attributed of the ulema of the nineteenth century’s 
inability to adapt to the ‘progressive’ changes modernity brought with it. In 
particular, in the Ottoman devlet the ulema were presented to have lost their political 
authority after the destruction of the Janissary corps by Sultan Mahmud II18, in Egypt 
a similar narrative of decline was presented due to the centralisation policies of the 
powerful Egyptian governor Mehmed Ali Pasha; and in the Indian sub-continent 
weakening of ulema authority was depicted due to British colonialism. It would be 
fair to assume that each part of the Islamic-world had its own unique conditions, 
                                                        
12 Bayur, Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi; Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 1998; Lewis, The 
Emergence of Modern Turkey.  
13 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton : Princeton UP, 1963). 
p67. 
14 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. pp445-446. 
15 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 1998. p5. 
16 David Kushner, “The Place of the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire During the Age of Reform (1839-
1918),” Tırcica Tome XIX (1987): pp50–55. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Much of the scholarship restricted ulema political authority tied to Janissary authority. However, 
this narrative requires some attention as the ulema out survived the Janissary, suggesting that ulema 




including the ulema’s authority in each of these regions, yet narratives continued to 
be presented in uniformity, that modernity had weakened the ulema globally. As a 
result, ulema decline narratives somewhat became universal.  
In the Ottoman case- the focus of this thesis, this plain supposition of ulema 
political authority to be restricted to military strength negated alternate means of 
ulema authority in holding the Ottoman governing elite to account. Notwithstanding 
this, while the Janissary were destroyed the ulema continued to survive and later 
when the Ottoman devlet collapsed, the ulema have maintained their importance and 
centrality to Islam and Muslim society, therefore suggesting that it was their 
traditional scholarly authority and standing in Muslim society that were the key 
tenants to their influence in government, not simply reliance on military might.  
To misconstrue the role of the ulema is to misconstrue the role of Islam in this 
period as well as to the Ottoman devlet, so integral were they to Ottoman state, 
society and religion.19 It is from the perspective of the ulema that the legitimacy of 
state transformation can be accepted, especially since the constitutional movement 
was concerned with remodelling the traditional Ottoman conception of the Caliphate 
theory of governance that also had much theorisation from both traditional Ottoman 
and medieval Islamic political thought.20 In that sense, the ulema of the nineteenth 
century were theorising and applying a practice of a constitutional Caliphate with a 
parliamentary structure never implemented before in the history of Islamic societies. 
Whereas in the early Hamidian period the Sultan was cited as the protector of the 
constitution, during the advent of the Constitutional Revolution the ulema proclaimed 
that it was in fact the constitution that was not only to account the Caliph, but it was 
also protecting state and society from abuse of power. Thus pointing that documented 
constitutionalism had started to become institutionalised in Islamic thought and 
practice as a requisite for a good Caliphate system.  
Recently, there have been revisions in English of the importance of the 
Ottoman ulema and their significance to Islamic intellectual thought and the Ottoman 
                                                        
19 The ulema were one of the pillars of the Ottoman devlet. This included, the Ottoman household, the 
military and the ulema.  
20 It is worth noting how nineteenth century debates involved discussions that mentioned political 
debates of the first four Caliphs of Islam, the medieval scholars of Islam and of Ottoman politics of 
what Baki Tezcan mentioned as the Second Empire. Thus, Ottoman configuration of ‘Modern-Islamic’ 
statecraft was a reflection of these political theories that requires much attention of the discursive 
nature of Islamic politics by the nineteenth century, which this thesis cannot unfortunately give. See 
also Hüseyin Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought 




devlet. 21  However, these narratives have focused on individual ālims rather than 
examing the ulema as an institutionalised community/collective. 22   This is 
understandable as there is no doubting that exploration of the ulema, as a unit of 
analysis is indeed a difficult task. The difficulty of examining the ulema as a 
collective unit is based on the recognition that the ulema were never a homogenous 
block, such were the complexities of the web of factions the ulema belonged to that it 
was far easier to examine single ālims to reflect a larger trend or intellectual legacy. 
However, a prosopography analysis of a host of ulema works published in the Late 
Ottoman press and pamphlets during the Constitutional Revolution has provided the 
possibility of detecting certain ideological trends, relatable ideas and emotions that 
many historians have chosen to ignore. With matters to do with politics, power, 
orthodoxy and the tradition, trends and connectivity of many ulema can provide us 
with a far better analysis on the ulema as a community of scholars that represented 
the tradition of Islam as well as how they functioned as political actors. Thus, rather 
than examining one single ālim in late Ottoman history, this dissertation will present 
the actions and thoughts of a host of ulema and their ideas across the provinces to 
reflect how they were as a traditional-religious scholarly community, a consensus and 
mediatory community, important to Ottoman society, religion, and state 
transformation. More importantly, it will be shown how the upheaval of the 
Constitutional Revolution forced the ulema into political visibility due to a situation 
of crisis and opportunity for change, which was unique in late Ottoman history. It 
must be stressed that while the ulema published a host of works in this period on 
matters to do Islam, this study is not however a study on ulema legal history or 
theology. Instead, it will rather attempt to show how the ulema as an institutional 
body came to still be relevant in Late Ottoman history, thus this is both a political 
history and intellectual history of the Ottoman ulema. 
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It is important to highlight how the ulema are important to Ottoman history by 
revealing a host of functions they practiced as a collective. The first is to 
acknowledge the actions of the ulema as a consensus group, and how they helped to 
shape and influence not only Ottoman political statecraft but also Islamic political 
discourse from their traditional and scholarly perspective which is imperative as the 
Ottoman state was a Caliphate, Islamic and appealed to religious symbolism of which 
required ulema endorsement.23 As mentioned, I shall not focus on a single ālim but 
rather attempt to present the ulema as a consensus community, that were intellectually 
networked ‘translocally’/’transregionally’.24 While the Young Turks had attained the 
military muscle to re-instate the Constitution in 1908/1326, intellectually it seems 
evident, as shall be shown that they depended on the ulema across the Ottoman 
domains as much as they did their own intellectuals to construct and propagate an 
Islamicate constitution. This can also be seen during the First Ottoman Constitutional 
debates in 1876/1292, in which the Grand Vizier at the time Midhat Pasha also relied 
heavily on key ulema to push for the acceptance of constitutionalism as a form of 
governance in compliance with Islam.25 Transformation on these matters not only 
required a general intellectual consensus from the ulema but political influence and 
authority also. For this reason it is worth drawing on the interactions of ulema 
intellectual ideas, that constructed and legitimised political change. This also implied 
the importance of the ulema within the state structure over those outside of it, as those 
in positions of authority or close to it generally established general consensus, while 
ulema on the periphery of political authority often struggled to do so. It can be argued 
that this was one of the reasons why the ulema recognised the need to be a part of the 
state structure rather than be independent from it. This became further endorsed when 
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the ulema entred the Ottoman Parliament as the parliament became the most 
authoritative political apparatus from 1908/1326 onwards.  
 
Modernisation, Westernisation and Tradition  
 
Another focus of this dissertation is to highlight the intersection of ‘modernity’ in the 
Late Ottoman devlet on the one hand, and modernity’s impact on ‘traditional’ Islamic 
political thought and traditional/traditionalist Islamic agents, the Caliph and ulema on 
the other. It would be no understatement to suggest that the study of modernity is in 
fact the study of religion, in this case Islam and the Ottoman devlet. Earlier narratives 
frequently placed modernity and tradition within a binary paradigm, thus placing the 
actors of religion either on the side of modernity (progress, western or secular) thus 
shifting away from religion for progression, or the opposing side with tradition, thus 
reactionary. Rather than viewing the negotiations between what people perceived as 
tradition and modern, instead a distinct creation between what is tradition and modern 
was presented.  
This thus placed Islam and its actors solely within the paradigm of modernity, 
either in rejection to it, reactionary to it, or tacit and resigned acceptance of it. 
Transformation was seen as modernity and the terms associated with it were either 
seen as positively part of the reform process facilitating the secular, or in some 
Muslim circles as a betrayal by Muslim thinkers to the values of Islamic tradition. It 
came down to how people viewed modernity, but the impact of modernity as an ideal 
was neither question nor denied. State, educational and religious transformation was 
not perceived as discursively Islamic but rather discursively leading to the secular. In 
that sense Huri Islamoğlu and Peter C. Perdue were correct in suggesting that 
“paradigms determine the writing of history”.26 Thus it is fair to assume that most if 
not all of history writing is based upon a set of assumptions about the nature of a 
given society, regarding its past, present and future trajectory of development.27  
In particular regarding the modernisation of the Ottoman devlet Niyazi 
Berkes, Rodric Davison, Stanford Shaw and Şerif Mardin emphasised the clash 
between the promulgators of modernity influenced by the West against the vanguards 
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of Islamic tradition such as the ulema.28  But Ottoman historians have since attempted 
to challenge such notions by showing in fields of education, law and architecture that 
the distinction between what was to be deemed modern and what belonged to the 
world of tradition was unclear, thus indicating that the Ottoman world and its 
institutions were transformative.29 In particular historians attempted to show how 
modernity was distinct from Westernisation attempts by the Ottoman state and its 
agents, by highlighting that indeed the Ottomans were part of the evolving world, 
thus a part rather than apart. But while historians have attempted to draw distinction 
between the idea of modernisation being distinct from Westernisation, there can be no 
denial that the idea of being modern, progressive and reform minded still suggests 
Western notions of what it means to be modern. In that sense, being modern still 
hinges on comparisons to Western notions of modernisation. While academics have 
attempted to show that not all reform attempts were designed to emulate Western 
modes, nonetheless so heavily is the engrained idea of modernity synonymous with 
the idea of the West versus the non-West, that non-Western transformation is still 
perceived as belonging to a global hegemonic understanding of progress that still 
draws its legitimacy from Western notions of progress. It is thus worth considering as 
Mahmut Mutman has argued on how and who voices opinion on Islam, especially the 
politics of Islam. For Mutman, Islam entred modernity under Western colonialism, 
thus narratives of modernity and Islam are placed within the paradigm of coloniality 
and Western superiority.30  
In that sense, it is worth entertaining the idea of Olivier Bouquet who asks the 
question “Is it time to stop speaking about Ottoman modernisation”? 31, especially 
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since the earlier notions of modernisation paradigms placed modernity squarely 
within the framework of Westernisation. 32 While some may argue that the Ottomans 
were also European, hence they also belonged to the changes that were taking place 
in Europe. It is still quite clear that the language and set of rules with which 
modernity is established places the Ottomans within the non-West. As mentioned, if 
non-Western soceities and states did present forms that one could deem modern it 
was in comparison to what was deemed modern in the West, thus still not escaping 
the modernisation theory. It then begs the question whether making distinction 
between modernisation and Westernisation is simply an excerise in symantics.  
  It must be conceded that maybe the idea of modernity is so intermeshed with 
the manner we now see the world that to ignore the ‘modern’ is now an unrealistic 
expectation from the academic. As a result, in the last decade social scientists have 
instead started to argue against the idea of a uniformed modernity. In the case of the 
Ottoman domains how does one examine modernisation? The notion that all modern 
transformations lead to a uniform modern is problematic when examining the 
Ottoman world, simply because the Ottoman world in itself was not a unified cultural 
or intellectual block. Apart from the boundaries of which peoples of all faiths and 
ethnicities lived, the conditions of the Ottoman domains differed from province to 
province. ‘Modernity’ if we can’t find a better word to describe progress reflected 
rather different things in different provinces or indeed peoples, and so responses to 
the introduction of the ‘new’ varied from province to province and people to people. 
Some academics have coined this experience as ‘alternative modernities’ or ‘multiple 
modernities’.33  It goes to show the difficulty the Ottoman world experienced when 
the introduction of new ideas or the transformation of traditional ones took place, as 
reactions were never uniform as consensus building was the most effective 
mechanism for the adoption of ‘new’ ideas and technologies.  
It is also worth noting that while there were indeed differences regarding the 
provinces, there were also connections that should not be ignored nor relegated as 
insignificant. Muslim networks, fears, traumas, as well as intellectual trends point to a 
host of connections that require attention.  
On this point it is worth pointing out how Istanbul was indeed a centre of not 
only the Ottoman domains but the Muslim world by and large. It can be argued that 
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Istanbul was not simply an Islamic centre/city but ‘the’ Islamic city and centre of the 
Muslim world, and changes in Istanbul resulted in responses in both the provinces 
and the Muslim world as a whole. But while it is correct to argue as İsmail Kara has 
that in most academic works regarding nineteenth and twentieth century Islamic 
thought the centrality of Istanbul or in many cases the place of Istanbul in the larger 
debates have been either ignored, neglected or deliberately sidelined for more Arabist 
narratives 34 , nonetheless it must also be stressed that the relationship between 
Istanbul and the other provinces was not a linear relationship between authority in 
Istanbul and the provinces, but rather a reciprocal relationship of interaction from the 
imperial centre to the rest of the Ottoman domains and by extension the rest of the 
Muslim world and neighboring nations. The concern here is that while attempting to 
rightfully aknowledge the importance of what was happening in Istanbul within the 
narrative of nineteenth-twentieth Islamic thought a rather top-down narrative can be 
facilitated that could become rather Istanbul centered. Thus, seeing Istanbul as the 
centre and the rest as the periphery would be unhelpful. In this sense I argue centre-
provinces is a better way of understanding the Ottoman domains rather than centre - 
periphery. 
 As a result, as will be examined, the positions of Islam in general and the 
ulema in particular were rather complex, as the ulema, irrespective of their 
differences attempted to preserve and adapt tradition based on the rapid changing 
reality initiated by the Constitutional Revolution, the introduction of constitutional 
politics and Counter-revolution of 1909/1327.  
It may not be possible to be able to explain the complexities, but it is 
important for the reader to be aware that this endeavour of enquiry is indeed a 
process, and that this dissertation is simply part of a process, not an end. With this in 
mind it is significant to stress that there were a wide spectrum of ulema who were 
studied in this dissertation who were indeed products of their time, who changed 
positions for various reasons, who were in favour of reform and against, who changed 
opinions and positions and thus placing individuals within the purview of ‘Modern’ 
Islamic thought and tainting all with the same brush in itself is fraught with 
difficulties.  
                                                        





As a result, while it may not be possible to discard the term modern, and for 
the sake of this dissertation if we are to use the term modern to describe a period in 
history then I shall attempt to make distinction between the idea of an âlim being 
‘modern’ thus a product of what is deemed as the ‘modern’ period and an âlim who is 
a ‘modernist’ who subscribed to a reform process which attempted to emulate 
Western norms and practices. While both are products of the modern reality, thus 
neither being able to escape the rather subjugated position of Western superiority, 
nonetheless a distinction is needed to show how in my opinion some were rather 
more active participants of the reform process over others. As a result, I hesitantly try 
to make distinction by use of subtle difference between those ulema who managed to 
use the tools of the ‘modern’ thus can be categorised as ‘modern ulema’ who 
continued to work within their traditionalist purview, and those ulema who chose to 
reach outside of their purview of traditionalism of which we can call ‘modernist 
ulema’. The distinction becomes important as the ulema were either accused of being 
reactionary or modernists who facilitated the collapse of the Ottoman devlet.  
This study places ulema authority at the heart of this dissertation. I argue that 
ulema authority firstly should not simply be restricted regarding the ulema’s 
relationship with state institutions – although important - as alternative modes of 
authority ought to be considered. It is worth noting how authority and power is 
viewed. There is the age old saying that knowledge is power, and there is no doubting 
that in the Islamic world knowledge production and the tradition by and large 
required qualification from the sage (ālim). It is via this main institution of learning 
which the ulema took their authority that transcended into a host of structures and 
institutions of the Ottoman devlet.  
There is no doubting that by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
that the Ottoman ulema class were attached to the state structure as state actors, in 
fact one could argue as has been examined by Abdurrahman Atçil that this process 
began even earlier in the Ottoman conext.35 However, it is also worth noting that 
many ulema functioned outside the structures as non-state actors, but nonetheless 
integral parts of Ottoman society, which provided them an authority, that was harder 
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for the government to regulate. This is especially the case in certain parts of the 
Balkans, nomadic areas in the Arab provinces and Mesopotamia.  I emphasise firstly, 
the ulema were capable of adapting and acquiring opportunities in the novel spaces of 
authority the new state formations created and traditional methods continued to be 
applicable to ulema authority in both state and society. In this sense, it is also worth 
noting how the ulema were able to interact with spaces of tradition and modern that 
didn’t necessarily need to be in binary conflict to one another. This indicates that both 
Islam and the ulema were apt in adapting in discursive ways to the ever-changing 
world. 
This study is thus an attempt to understand Islam in the late Ottoman devlet, 
during a moment of great flux and change, but more specifically the ulema’s place 
within this narrative as guardians of the faith. Much has been written on the other 
leading actors during this period such as the military soldier36, bureaucrat and Young 
Turk intellectual37, but the narrative of the ulema is either secondary or absent. The 
concern of this study falls into both the fields of late Ottoman studies and Islamic 
studies. Both studies have given little attention to the late Ottoman ulema, only 
recently have studies attempted to use a multidisciplinary approach. However, when 
narratives did recognise this point they restricted the ulema to local narratives placing 
them within the frameworks of nation-state conceptions. These characterizations, 
however, succumb to nationalist accounts, which restrict ulema influence simply to 
their respective nation-state38, whereby their ‘translocal’ and even ‘transnational’ or 
‘transregional’ ability become neglected. In particular the ulema were not presented 
as the ‘Ottoman’ ulema translocally connected, instead the narratives were restricted 
to local conditions.39 The respective fields neglected the ulema as the Ottoman Sunni 
                                                        
36 Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks : The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-
1914 (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1969); Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, The Young Turks : Prelude to the 
Revolution of 1908., Khayats Oriental Reprints ; (Beirut : Khayats, 1965); Naim Turfan, The Rise of 
the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000); Erik Jan 
Zürcher, The Unionist Factor : The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish 
National Movement, 1905-1926 (Leiden : Brill, 1984). 
37 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition, Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York, 
N.Y.) (New York : Oxford University Press, 1995); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution : 
The Young Turks, 1902-1908 /, Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York, N.Y.) (Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 2001); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton ; 
Oxford : Princeton University Press, 2008).  
38 An example is Rashid Rida’s influence on Egypt and Syria, Hamdi Yazır and Said Nursi to Turkey. 
Very little mention has been given to the influence of their ideas to other parts of the Muslim world. 
39 An example is the ulema of the Arab provinces that were not placed within the greater Ottoman 
narrative of transformation, instead within the Arab context. The an-Nahḍa (Arab cultural renaissance) 




ulema for different reasons but nonetheless the implication on Ottoman Islamic 
thought and the ulema of the Ottoman devlet resulted in the same. Although it would 
be impossible to include all the ulema, and there is no doubting the local 
characteristic of the ulema outside the political centre, nonetheless I shall shift 
emphasis between the centre and provinces in an attempt to present the commonality 
the ulema displayed regarding their attitudes on constitutionalism, executive authority 
and the slogans the Constitutional Revolution brought with it.  
The increase of alternative actors who became part of the educated Muslim 
class due to the increase of education in the Ottoman devlet is also worth of note. The 
Muslim thinker would both critique the traditionalism of the ulema and the 
aggression of the West. As a result, narratives of ulema reactions towards the new 
Muslim educated thinker was restricted to defensive prostrations or apologist 
positioning. There is no doubting that there was an increase of Muslim thinking that 
challenged the ulema in an unprecedented manner during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century that had not challenged their intellectual position vis-à-vis Islam before. But 
just as the role of the Sufi Sheikh and ālim had become blurred in Islamic history, so 
too did the lines of differentiation between ālim and Muslim thinker/intellectual. This 
is what İsmail Kara has explained ‘by joining the opposition the ulema substituted 
their turban for the fez’.40 In some cases one was able to belong to ecclesial and 
intellectual space at the same time. This then begs the question whether an ālim can 
also be a Muslim intellectual and vice versa. It is also true that many Muslim 
thinkers/intellectuals also recognised that they still required ulema acceptance if they 
were to become participants in debating Islam and building Muslim societies. During 
this time of flux Muslim thinkers/intellectuals not only appealed to the ulema but 
worked with them, thus one could argue that while the ulema were becoming 
intellectualised 41 , the Muslim thinker was also becoming influenced by ulema 
traditionalism. The ulema as a consensus community continued to dominate what was 
to be embraced into Islamic tradition and no matter how unanimous the Muslim 
intellectual community was, it still neither had the authority nor the ability to 
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determine what concepts and ideas are to be accepted into the discursive Islamic 
tradition.42 What Muslim thinkers and intellectuals did were to introduce concepts 
into the intellectual space and public opinion, but adoption still required ulema co-
operation creating a unique relationship between Muslim thinker and ālim. As a result 
to simply view that the Muslim thinker/intellectual had weakened the ulema’s 
authority is to negate from the rather reciprocal relationship between Muslim thinker 
and ālim but also from appreciating the Muslim thinkers’ restriction regarding 
tradition that further empowered the ulema’s importance in the scholastic and 
religious sphere. As a result, it should come as no surprise that Muslim thinkers and 
ulema alike worked attentively together far more than the focus on their contestations 
suggest.  
It has seldom been adequately recognised, however, that it is not only Muslim 
thinkers or “Islamists” that have criticised tradition. As ulema too have been vigorous 
critics of particular aspects of tradition and important contributors to the debates in 
‘modern’ Muslim societies. 43 In the late Ottoman devlet the ulema held a critical 
position on the idea of the Caliphate stressing on the restraining of absolute authority. 
Without the ulema’s acceptance as a consensus community it is safe to assume that 
the introduction of constitutionalism would not have become a possibility in the 
Ottoman domains. Although this is not disputed in Ottoman studies, however what is 
presented is that the ulema either simply became agents to rubber stamp 
governmental decisions and/or were passive participants to the intellectual 
constitutional debates.  
Deep-rooted assumptions have indeed remained established in the case of the  
ulema, however gradual scholarship on ulema studies has started to address this 
lopsided interpretation of the ulema, their importance and authority in both Ottoman 
studies and contemporary Muslim societies. As Muhammad Qasim Zaman has 
pointed out the ulema, their transformation, their discourses and their religiopolitical 
activism can, indeed only be neglected at the cost of ignoring or misunderstanding 
crucial facets of contemporary Islam and politics.44 There is no doubting that religion, 
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not simply Islam continues to play a historical role worthy of not only interest but 
also renewed investigation. It should be noted that during moments of political unrest, 
especially during exceptional circumstances, the political stance of the ulema 
becomes of utmost importance in Muslim societies.  
Regarding Islamic law it is understood that ijma’ (consensus) of the ulema is 
practiced to provide validity. This debate however is not simply regarding Islamic 
law. But rather, the ulema as a community still continues to regulate mainstream 
Muslim society even at times when they are presented as marginal figures, as they 
continue to monopolise the intellectual capital whether as leaders of change or as a 
pressure group to being integral to any transformation in Muslim societies. Ijma’ is 
not simply consensus but a process of communal deliberation, discussion, 
disagreement and concurrence. The process is often complex and subtle that requires 
many voices to voice opinion based on the established tradition of which they belong 
to. Muslim speculative reasoning was qualified by calling for its subordination to the 
consensus of other ulema, both in the centre and non-centre.45 The consensus is not 
simply required to conform to one another but to confirm conformity with ulema of 
the past. As a result, the introduction of an ideal, such as the term freedom or 
constitutional theory requires wider consensus based on space and time. This 
encompasses the practice of procedure and also outcome, which requires discussion 
on tradition and modern. The consensus of the ulema was not bound by the number of 
ulema that agreed with a concept but rather as Farzana Shaikh has said, as ‘slowly 
accumulating pressure of opinion over a long period of time’. 46 
Consensus activity was not simply restricted to the ulema. The use of 
committees, councils and parliament are all structures reflective of consensus politics, 
however the ulema were part of all these processes. In some ways this points to 
extending the idea of consensus politics as a function that was inclusive to wider 
society, not simply Muslim either. In the case of Ottoman parliamentarianism 
consensus (Ijma’) and council/deliberation (Şura) became the two major tenants of 
representative politics in the late Ottoman devlet from 1908/1326 onwards. This 
rather suggests that the ulema cannot be deemed with exclusivity when framing them 
as a consensus group. While this is true on one hand, however, their inclusion as a 
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consensus group was instrumental  for consensus political and social practices to take 
place. As a result it is important to make distinction between consensus as a practice 
in a general sense, and the ulema as being a consensus group/community whose 
opinion and position is necessary for transformation.  
It has been argued that when general consensus politics was introduced to the 
Muslim world in the nineteenth century that this marginalised the role of the ulema as 
they became just one of the many factions in the coalition of voices. Added to that it 
can be argued that not only did Ottoman parliamentarianism marginalise the role of 
the Caliph but also the ulema by empowering other communities and agencies in the 
decision-making process. Although the role of non-Muslims was indeed troublesome 
for the ulema regarding political decision-making, it nonetheless legitimised that 
general opinion should be sought from every segment of Ottoman society to have a 
reflective public opinion47, of which the ulema were a part of, but matters of religion 
were solely the ulema’s remit especially if law was to be passed in parliament then 
ulema consent was required, and sought. The growing complexities of Muslim 
communities and regional differences did not invalidate a commonality of tradition, 
culture and civilisation. 48  The ulema thus became important as a consensus 
community within consensus politics. They were seen as a faction whose role was to 
achieve consensus based on being ‘just’ in accordance to Islam.   
It is also worth noting that the ulema were also a mediatory group between 
Muslim subject/citizen and state but also state/Muslim community and religion. As 
bastions of religion the ulema became the guardians of the religion, in doing so this 
complicated dynamic of religion, the state and ummah (Muslim community), meant 
that the ulema more often than not were required to mediate between state and society 
as representatives of religion. On some occasions the ulema had to mediate with both 
state and society regarding the religion. As a result the pulpits and mosques became 
their traditional spaces where they interacted with the masses. When the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326 took place and during the Counter-revolution 
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of 1909/1327 it was the ulema who were sought by mainstream Muslims of what 
course was the right one, either rebellion/opposition or upholding the status quo. 
Even here, while positions and opinions varied, it was the ulema as a consensus group 
that managed to sway the public as dissenting voices within the ulema ranks were 
marginalised for what the consensus dictated. How was this consensus achieved is a 
difficult question to answer, but in the case of 1908/1326 onwards the creation of 
official ulema organisations was one way that a unified voice could be presented. 
Unity was thus a central ideal for consensus, and for the sake of unity, dissenting 
voices were marginalised. The ulema as mediators became integral during the 
constitutional revolutionary period, as their importance to Ottoman officialdom 
seemed to increase rather than decrease in this moment. 49   
 
Historiography- The Role of Islam in the Late Ottoman devlet 
 
Hasan Kayali mentioned, ‘Ottoman literature has seldom given sufficient attention to 
the variety of ways in which Islam – be it local, national, modernist, reformist, or 
conservative – intermixed and interlaced in debates to preserve sovereignty’. 50 
Islamic thought and political expression formed a complex foundation from the 
inception of the Ottoman principality that emerged in Eastern Anatolia as a provincial 
power, up until the collapse of the devlet in 1922. Islam remained integral to Ottoman 
political, religious and intellectual discourse. Historiography of the Ottoman devlet 
regarding the so-called long nineteenth century 51  presented a narrative of the 
Ottoman transformation from the perspective of the rise in influence of Western 
secularism and scientific progression which ‘inherently’ led to the weakening of 
Islam and its actors. It was presented that religions in both social and political life had 
been in a state of steady decline by the time the Ottoman state ultimately collapsed in 
1922, justifying the formations of the new nation-states as successor states due to the 
consequence of the modernising world. Narratives by historians regarding the early 
twentieth century were written in a teleological fashion, which drew on this 
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historiographical account by attempting to establish an argument that religions had 
been in regression due to the impact of the secular West’s superiority (modernity), in 
particular since the influence of European Enlightenment, the French Revolution and 
its ideas. It was thus presented that the Ottoman devlet, unable to withstand the 
impact of the West’s hegemony progressively embraced the modes of ‘modernity’ 
which led to an increased ‘Secularisation’ that inevitably led to ‘Westernisation’ and 
the weakening of Islam in all forms of life, which successively led to the ‘anticipated’ 
establishment of the secular nation-states.52  
On closer inspection these narratives where not simply limited to the Ottoman 
devlet, as global history was presented in a uniform fashion where the nineteenth 
century came to be represented as one in which worldwide; religion, its actors, and 
institutions were under assault from the inevitable storm of the global wave of 
‘progression’ driven by modernity. However, more recent scholarship has gradually 
attempted to present a rather complex picture, starting to question these much-
ingrained assumptions. Sociologist José Casanova, in his study on the global 
revitalisation of religion in the twentieth century explained, religion is likely to 
continue to play an important public role in the on-going construction of the modern 
world. He continued by suggesting that it is important to examine the relationship 
between religion and modernity and thus begs the question if these points can be 
addressed to the nineteenth century also.53 It has alternatively been recently argued in 
relation to the nineteenth century that – at least in the social sphere - religion and the 
authorities of religion were in fact not in decline, but instead, religion and those who 
represented themselves as authorities, were further sought. 54 Religious actors and 
society on occasions responded to the challenges of modernity multifariously and 
more often religious actors were learning to comprehend the modes of the ‘modern’ 
in indigenous ways even as the world order was transforming. One could even argue 
that religious empires by and large had managed to both resist and embrace modes of 
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modernity on their own terms and it was not until the culmination of the First Great 
War when many of the world’s religious empires succumbed to the impact of the 
devastation, that the emerging new nation-states adopted the ways of the victors, thus 
the modern state and its system of secularism.  
It must also be worth asking how the Muslim world perceived itself and Islam 
and whether qualifying Islam as a religion within the modern secular context has been 
to the determent in understanding the complexities of Muslim political and 
transcendent configurations that incidentally reduced the understanding of Islam in 
the Ottoman world. I make special attention to the ideas of the anthropologist Talal 
Asad who argues that in understanding Islam as a religion is to represent European 
notions of Islam, which neither has the same configuration nor historical reality. This 
thus places the history of Islam, the Muslim world and the Ottomans once again 
within the purview of Western conceptions of what Islam was, is and ought to be.55 
Islam as a theist worldview intrinsic within a political system from its inception 
means that to view Islam, even in the late Ottoman devlet within a paradigm of 
Western notions of the world is to some degree skew state and religious relationships 
instead reflecting similarities with European counterparts. There is no doubting that 
this argument can also be presented regarding other religious systems, especially 
early-modern Christianity, Confucianism and so forth. It thus could be agreed upon as 
S. Parvez Mansoor has argued that it is in fact the “secularised consciousness” of the 
modern citizen who continues to view the past through the lens of his/her own current 
worldview rather than the worldview of the time. 56 
If one takes the premise that religious authority was further sought, a natural 
assumption would be to re-investigate the ‘decline paradigm’ regarding the ulema’s 
authority. As ‘din ü devlet’ (religion and state) were perceived as inseparable, by 
examining the challenges to political Ottoman authority we naturally require 
investigating the role of religious actors (ulema) and the reasoning behind their 
decision-making. This would include the changing circumstances and new challenges 
that penetrated Ottoman officialdom. If we are to assume, as the global historian 
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Christian Bayly points out, that there was indeed an increase in religious authority in 
relation to the social sphere from the nineteenth century onwards, it is then worth 
asking whether this had any impact on the role of religion in the political sphere. 
Bayly stops short of asserting this; however his assessment is thorough regarding the 
Muslim world. He asserts the commonalities between Muslim societies and their 
reliance on religious actors. But while Bayly has done great service in providing this 
alternate view, what he failed to do was examine the Ottoman domains in any great 
detail, often making assumptions that experiences, in say Muslim India under British 
occupation could be reflective of Ottoman experiences who were autonomous from 
British rule. While the ulema lost much authority in occupied territories, the Ottoman 
domains in this matter was indeed distinct. The Ottoman case is truly distinctive from 
the Muslim world in aspects of political matters, firstly because the Ottoman devlet 
was a Caliphate, therefore attached to an Islamic political tradition and secondly the 
ulema were contesting a Muslim central government not a Western occupying 
force.57 This suggests that the religious actors in the Ottoman devlet were far able 
than religious actors outside the devlet to negotiate with ‘modernity’ on their own 
terms.  
Nontheless, I have taken Bayly’s basic premise of the central role of religion 
regarding global history and have applied this framework within the Ottoman context. 
Bayly’s main thesis argument of the importance of religion in many ways resonates 
with the late Ottoman experience as has been also shown by Ottoman historians 
Butrus Abu-Manneh and Fredrick Anescombe.58 I would argue that the increased role 
of religious actors in the social sphere naturally commanded an increased role in the 
political. So intertwined were the two that to make distinction is somehow one-
dimensional. This more nuanced examination pointed to the idea that it was no fore 
gone conclusion that religion was in decline or that if the religious empires had 
survived the war, that religion would have been as heavily state regulated or 
delimited in the fashion the nation-states have done.  
In the case of the Ottoman devlet the introduction of new technologies, such 
as military weapons, the printing press technology, the telegram, steam ships and 
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trains were presented as exclusive attributes of the modernising world in which the 
Ottoman world was haplessly lagging behind. ‘Progress’ was presented from the 
prism of scientific advancement, and dichotomous relationships were assumed 
between scientific and technological advancement on the one hand, and religion on 
the other. More notably were the presentations of the ideas of the French Revolution, 
which reflected an assumption that slogans such as ‘Freedom, Liberty, Equality, and 
Fraternity’ were exclusive markers of Enlightenment idealism devoid of any 
religious influence. These characterisations, however, succumb to nationalist’s 
accounts which unwittingly restrict their influence to their respective nation-state, 
whereby their ‘translocal’ character become neglected. It thus must be stressed terms 
such as ‘serbesti’ and ‘hürriyet’, translated as ‘freedom’, may have had inherent 
indigenous meanings that may not have equated to the equivalent European 
conception of political freedom.59   
Additionally, in regards to executive authority, the introduction of 
constitutional discourse in the non-Western world, especially the Ottoman devlet was 
presented as a foundational establishment towards a democratic political system by 
some60 and as a reflection of the secularisation of Islamic political structures.61 What 
was often negated from these rationalisations was that although most democratic 
systems were indeed constitutional, not all constitutional systems required being 
democratic or needed to lead towards a democratic form of governance.62 Therefore 
suggesting the notion of whether non-Western societies actually sought democratic 
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governance at all.63 The Ottoman devlet, Iran and Russia respectively indulged in the 
merits of constitutional governance in variation, within the prism of their religious 
ideologies as shall be discussed in the Ottoman case in this dissertation.64 What is 
worth of note is the increased level of internal ideological connectivity that increased 
in this period where Muslim ideas regarding governance closely resembled one 
another more so than Western.65 It must be stressed that this is not to say that the 
Ottoman devlet or Muslim world did not learn from the West or feel the need to be 
part of it, our contention here is with the one-sided historiography. 
The printing press had created a greater connectivity to various parts of the 
world. The improved transportation services permitted many to travel freely, 
especially on the hajj and other pilgrimages. Students and scholars too had greater 
access to reading material as well as mobility. Technology was not weakening the 
Muslim world but connecting it, providing an even greater realisation of belonging to 
the fraternity of ‘ummah’. If the idea of ummah was in fact simply an ‘imagined’ 
abstract ideal, from the nineteenth century onwards this ideal started to become a 
perceived reality in the minds of Muslim thinker and layman. It is worth further 
investigating whether the Ottoman Muslim experience resonated the same 
experiences from the ‘print capitalism’ culture to establish newer national identities, 
or were these new mediums consolidating older identities. 66 Opportunities of new 
forms of intellectual connectivity and opposition increased owing to the greater 
association between Muslim thinkers and peoples due to the technological openings 
of the print culture, telegram and improved transportation means.67  
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Contemporary Muslim works are starting to present the argument that Islam 
and Meşrutiyet (literally meaning conditional but came to mean constitutional) are in 
fact compatible, and sight ideas such as Şura (Consultation) as a foundation of ideal 
Islamic governance, thus pointing to the possibility of Islam inherently containing 
democratic values.68 But this is too often presented from the normative position that 
Islamic constitutional discourse requires resemblance to progressive Western 
democratic states.69 Our contention is not with this argument, but rather the question, 
is this in fact how the Ottoman Muslim theorists and state were thinking? And if 
Ottoman attempts towards constitutionalism were in fact part of the secularisation 
narrative. Even now, modern writers on Islamic constitutional theory have chosen to 
ignore or atleast diminish by knowledge or by unfamiliarity the Ottoman experience, 
and chosen to instead focus on the ideas of the medieval scholars of Islam and their 
ideals of an abstract moral constitutional government. 70  The Ottoman case is 
somewhat perceived – one assumes – as a failure, and ‘Western’ orientated to derive 
merit or investigation. If Wael Hallaq’s work of the incompatibility between the 
modern state and a modern Islamic state render it impossible71, thus tracing this 
schism into the ‘modern’ Ottoman Period. Is it fair to equate a religious empire such 
as the Ottoman devlet’s interaction with the modern as an example of this so-called 
failure? It is my view that the theory of modernity in contrast with the nature of the 
multi-ethnic religious empire still requires much academic critique.  
It is worth making the argument that there has often been an inability to make 
distinction in academic works between the acceptability of borrowing from the West 
and ‘insecure’ blind imitation. There is no doubting that history writing is a political 
excercise and debates still continue and will continue to try to determine what is 
deemed Islamic and what is not. In that sense making distinction between the Islamic 
and Islamicate has starting to help frame the notion of borrowing and influence 
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regarding Muslim societies. 72  In regards to the Ottoman devlet the response of 
Muslim thinkers and Ottoman thinkers varied. Whereas some thinkers chose to 
entertain the endeavour of what could be or should be borrowed from the West, 
others positioned themselves to outright reject anything resembling Western. Muslim 
opinion was never hegemonic; such is the nature of pluralistic societies such as the 
Ottoman devlet. Debates at times were fierce, at times acts of violence occurred, as 
Islam was not only the state religion but also the rallying slogan of oppositional 
agents. Such was the multiplicity of actors of religion that no single person, office or 
institution could monopolise Islam or stake claim that they owned it – even though 
many did indeed try. The state’s policies were also neither linear nor homogenous. 
Changing circumstances meant that the state often acted organically and accordingly 
to the situation. At times the intention of the state was indeed sincere but the outcome 
flawed thus receiving a visceral response from the Muslim population. Islam and 
politics then should not be viewed in the same vain as matters to do with worship. 
The multifaceted interplay between the Sharia, jurisprudence, state, society, emotion, 
ideal and reality drew up a complex cocktail of probabilities that were possible to 
anticipate but never with any real certainty. The political was state and society 
interaction, in which Islam was the glue, but conflicting interpretations were 
probable, such is the case in the world of politics. 
I would stress that rather than assuming that religious-political 
transformations lent towards the secular, religious transformation to an alternative 
political order was not necessarily a betrayal of religious tradition and a directive 
towards the secular, but simply a formative restructuring.73 This leads to whether 
religious empires and tradition were/are capable in developing a transformative 
constituent and whether its espousal of aspects of the modern is not a perfidy or 
capitulation to a dominant West but rather a reflection of its ability to attempt to 
compete with the West and distinguish between aspects that are in line with its 
tradition and the rejection of those that are not. This would lead us to deliberate the 
point of contention whether the modern and religion have to be in a continual state of 
conflict and whether in the Ottoman case borrowings need to be placed within the 
dichotomy of ‘modernity’ vs. ‘tradition’.  
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A final point on this matter is regarding the actual role of politics and Islam. 
Some writers recognised the increased ‘use’ of religious language and symbolism74 
by the Ottoman authority and suggested that this was somehow to be understood as a 
cosmetic window dressing 75  or even further an attempt at the ‘politicisation of 
Islam’. 76  This narrative rather showed a strange paradox that on the one hand 
religious actors where loosing their influence but at the same time the state increased 
its use of religious symbolism and rhetoric as an act of desperation. What it does is 
make distinction between state and society regarding its internalisation of religion, by 
placing the state as a facilitator of using religion and the masses as docile emotional 
followers. I would stress as Benjamin Fortna has done that one needs to be careful in 
assuming that religion was simply being used as an instrumental tool by those in 
authority. 77  Emotions and symbols are in fact markers of religious societies, as 
symbolism is an outwardly expression of religion in society. The interplay with 
religion, state and Muslim society cannot be explained here but this relationship of 
negotiation is worth of note when reading this dissertation. This also points to the 
continued narrative that the ulema were simply bystanders to the changes taking 
place, and when they were involved it was simply to rubber stamp the state’s 
position.  
 
Revolution, Re-instatement and in Search of Renewal – The Relationship 
between the Revolution and Constitution 
 
The Ottoman devlet in its long history had witnessed mutinies, revolts, Janissary 
rebellions, and strong ayan who supported or opposed Sultans as a way of 
appropriating power. However, 1908/1326 was the first time that the Ottoman centre 
witnessed a rebellion in the guise of a revolution (inkılāp) to re-instate the 
constitution of 1876/1293.78 Revolutionary activity is possible to find in narratives 
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within Islamic history prior to the nineteenth century, and more so in Ottoman 
history, however, by the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth, revolutionary 
movements in support of constitutionalism had became a unique feature of this period 
in the Muslim world.79 The Revolution of 1908/1326 is of particular interest as it was 
presented in the historiography as a move for progression reflecting the French 
Revolutionary ideals. The role of Islam in the Revolution in 1908/1326 was perceived 
as secondary and the role of the ulema even more so. Ulema activity was perceived as 
responsive only once the revolution had succeeded, but very little has been written of 
the ulema support of constitutionalism.80 In April 1909, when disobedient forces 
threatened the newly established constitutional regime known as the Counter-
revolution, the protagonists were presented as religious reactionaries to the 
progressive revolution of 1908/1326. Thus, the Revolution of 1908/1326, with the 
slogans hürriyet, müsavat ve uhuvet (freedom, equity and fraternity) was presented as 
the revolution for progressive change (modernity) whereas the failed Counter-
revolution attempt as the binary opposite, a reaction by religious forces in the name of 
the Sharia. This narrative placed the ulema firmly outside the activities of the 
Constitutional Revolution, and equally in the place of reaction and more importantly 
against constitutional discourse. However, as will be shown ulema activity was 
indeed integral for the success of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326 added 
to that the consolidation of constitutionalism in the Ottoman devlet or the 
transregional Islamic world would not have been possible without the ulema.  
More importantly, from the early twentieth century constitutional movements 
and governance became a global phenomena where political polities instituted 
constitutional systems. 81  The Ottoman devlet, had a long-standing tradition in 
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practicing constitutional traditions82, Wael Hallaq has argued that in Muslim polities 
in the past the Quran was the primiary source of constitutional practice.83 Medieval 
Islamic political theory too has a long tradition of constitutional practice as an Islamic 
ideal, yet it wasn’t until 1876/1293 that the Ottoman devlet implemented a ‘modern’ 
constitutional governmental system, with a written constitution and parliament. 
However, the Ottoman experiment of 1876/1293 was not the first endeavour of 
constitutionalism in the Muslim world as constitutionalism was first implemented in 
Tunisia in 1861/1278. Although the Tunisian case was also short lived, it reflected the 
trend in the Muslim and wider Ottoman world of constitutional politics. Although 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worth noting how in the early nineteenth 
century in the Ottoman world, revolutionary activity as a way of renewing the ideal 
political practice as constitutional politics was gradually becoming the main political 
discourse for all peoples. By the twentieth century, Iran, Russia, Morrocco, Egypt, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tunisa along with the Ottoman devlet had experimented 
with applying some form of constitutional governance along the precepts of Islam. 
 
The Ulema- From the World of Tradition and into the Modern Period 
 
There is a sense of exclusivity regarding the ulema as a group of religious scholars of 
Islam. They belong to a tradition of religious learning that marked them as a distinct 
group from any other form of religious community of learning.84 As Ovamir Anjum 
explains the ulema perceived themselves as the “heirs to the prophets” – were, first 
and foremost, jurists (fuqahā’), practitioners of a growing body of fiqh and the sole 
guardians of the Shariah…..They were jurists, concerned with standardizing and 
formalizing the law as their principle obligation. Islam had now become primarily 
encoded in the law that they interpreted”.85 Thus, solidifying their role as traditional 
‘guardians of the faith’.        
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 There is unanimity within academia that the ulema were not and still are not a 
homogenous group. Although it is worth noting that the ulema are not a monolithic 
block, thus difference of opinion, interests and culture existed and continue to exist, 
nonetheless there is no doubting that the ulema class are a group of some form albeit 
a fluid one. The belonging to this community was based on a tradition of learning 
which meant that in order to become an affiliate one had to have been endorsed by 
one from the community either by accreditation or decleration. But the ulema were 
quick to recognise that they were neither a hierarchical class, nor a clergy. As Muslim 
societies transformed and developed, so did the role of the ulema. The ulema who 
later became an institutionalised entity consolidated within Muslim tradition, 
reflected the diversity of the community they served (ummah) and ideas that they 
propagated. Their role as agents of religious learning and interpretation established 
the ulema as a ‘mediatory group’ between community and religion. With government 
also acquiring its authority and legitimacy from Islam, the ulema not only mediated 
between Islam and community or Islam and state but also between the state and 
community. As a result, the ulema became involved in matters to do with power, as 
resisters, critics, advisors, collaborators and exploiters.86 Wael Hallaq continues by 
including the ulema’s authority as jurists by adding: 
The jurists and those whom they trained and, in one way or another, supervised were also the 
custodians of Muslim societies. They were the spiritual and practical guides of the umma (the Muslim 
community); they controlled the entire infra- and super-structures of legal education; they ran what we 
might term municipal affairs. They collected taxes and improved public works; supervised the affairs 
of the market-place and controlled and ran charitable foundations, the very foundations of their 
professional existence; and they functioned, inter alia, as guardians of orphans and other unprivileged 
social groups, administering their financial and other affairs.' The legal profession, with the jurists at 
its head, was therefore at once a religious, moral, social, and legal force. It is difficult to conceive of, 
much less write, the social, cultural and legal history of the Muslim world without due attention to the 
central role the legists played in it. In fact, there is little Islamic history to be written without Islam's 
legal profession and its contributions to its own civilization.87 
In order to apply pressure the ulema used various techniques, such as fetvas 88 , 
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protestations, and sermons in mosques, but they also gave council both to state and 
society. A significant device of authority exercised by the ulema was when they 
operated reciprocally as a consensus (ijmā) group. 89  Ulema consensus was an 
essential ideal in Muslim society for concepts to be embraced into Muslim tradition. 
Although individual ālims could command authority based on their knowledge of 
religion, prestige in Muslim society or position in the learned hierarchy, nonetheless 
consensus indicated confirmed agreement thus ijmā became an institutionalised 
practice. In particular ulema consensus regarding politics and constitutional theory 
was genuinely dependent – although not exclusively – on consensus activity. In this 
sense, by the nineteenth century consensus decision-making was not only integral for 
the ulema, but became a political practice of administration in the Ottoman devlet that 
gradually led to Ottoman Parliament as the main arena for consensus activity. 
 Scholars of Islamic studies and Ottoman studies have continued to attempt to 
categorise the ulema within the frameworks of their respective disciplines. As a 
result, the categorisation of who or what constitutes a member of the ulema class has 
often led - although not contradictory - conflicting assessments. In the Ottoman case, 
most academics attempted to frame the ulema within the framework of belonging to 
the Ottoman ilmiye system, and thus provided an official framework for the 
identification of the ulema network. In settings away from the imperial centre, 
especially the Arab provinces where the ilmiye was a moderately decentralised 
structure, the ulema were presented as a social group or as David Commins has 
defined as a ‘status group’, where specific social practices, clothing, prestige within 
society and inter-marriage networks qualified ulema distinction from the Muslim 
community.90 The status of the Sunni ulema always has been acquired through a 
process of reputation building rather than strictly institutional arrangements. The 
ulema in this sense are portrayed as a distinct group from mainstream Muslim 
society, but once again their portrayal as an intellectual group has rather been 
minimised. But while academics have continued to stress what constitutes belonging 
to the ulema class it is Muhammad Qasim Zaman who has accurately pointed out ‘it 
is a combination of this intellectual formation, their vocation, and crucially, their 
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orientation viz., a certain sense of continuity with the Islamic tradition, that defines 
the ulema as ulema’.91  
While not disagreeing with the basis of the definitions described, I shall add 
by arguing the importance of the ulema being a consensus group and a mediatory one. 
This doesn’t negate from saying that the ulema were not part of the ilmiye structure, 
nor that they did attempt to accomplish distinctive treatment as a status group, but it 
is worth examining the ulema as an intellectual and political group whose input in 
matters to do with Islamic transformation and interaction, whether that be legal, 
doctrinal, political or social, is not only important but integral to transformation in 
Muslim societies. The ulema’s agency came from the fact that their ideas, whichever 
end of the intellectual spectrum they belonged to, were considered and shaped Islamic 
discursive tradition.92 I am not simply restricting their ideas to law or jurisprudence, 
but rather general conversations in the public domain in Muslim societal and state 
formations, and it is this case with the re-introduction of the constitution in 
1908/1326, how their consensus as a group was not only integral to the adoption of 
constitutional discourse but as mediators they managed to facilitate the 
implementation of the new political order as well as uphold stability in moments of 
crises between state and society during the Revolution of 1908/1326 and Counter-
revolution attempt in 1909/1327.        
 The range of ulema authority intensified during the revolutionary period 
where the ulema in opposition, as state actor, as non-state actor, as activist, as 
religious figure, social figure, political figure, journalist, intellectual and 
parliamentarian were all visible regarding ulema identity. Whereas throughout 
Islamic history the ulema have been characterised as quietists, apolitical and 
compromising towards authoritarianism this attitude both in theory and practice is not 
reflective in the ulema’s intellectual ideas and conduct during the late Ottoman 
period. It seems evident that the ulema in 1908/1326 neither personified the romantic 
ideal of living a life above the intrigue of power, nor did they lack moral courage to 
criticize the Ottoman Sultan.93 Ulema interaction and involvement with authority had 
become inherent in Ottoman political statecraft. In this brief moment in Ottoman 
history the ulema were further consolidated in Ottoman political life rather than 
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diminished. Also, during this period the Caliphate as an idea and established Islamic 
institution would further evolve as a new tradition in Islamic political thought was 
introduced or re-appropriated - constitutionalism. 96  With the introduction of 
constitutional discourse historians argued about the ulema facilitating the 
secularisation of the Caliphate’s authority. The notion that Ottoman society had 
become secularised and laws and action were taken from alternative sources and not 
Islam is prevalent in Ottoman history, although this has now been challenged. 
Furthermore many historians argued that stressing on the Caliph as an executive 
authority and introduction of parliament as a representative governing structure 
diminished the authority of the Sultan as Caliph thus weakened it by separating 
responsibilities and secularising the political order. However, I will attempt to argue 
that ulema ideas and activity rather point to restraining absolute political power and 
attempting to create a political structure based on conditions that had precedence in 




The main objective of the dissertation is to examine how the ulema were still 
important during the late Ottoman devlet. In particular during the period of which 
much literature has pointed to otherwise, focusing on the secular proclivities of the 
Young Turks. This dissertation will thus focus on two key moments in the Second 
Constitutional Period, which is the revolutionary-phase of the Revolution of 
1908/1326 and so-called Counter-revolution of 1909/1327. Each chapter begins with 
a background explanation of key themes and ideas and then attempts to address 
historical examples. But it must be stressed that there is no intention to over play the 
impotance of the ulema at the detrement of the other key actors such as the Sultan or 
Young Turks. The emphasis on the ulema is simply to place them in the large corpus 
of work that focuses solely on the Young Turks, thus relegating the ulema as 
insignificant, which from this research feels far from what has been discovered. By 
placing the ulema as the central characters of the narrative it may seem that the other 
actors are being relegated as being of lesser importance. However, as mentioned there 
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is no need in this dissertation to replicate works on the Young Turks as much 
literature on the centrality of their role has already, and continues to be produced.  
The chapters are written to first establish a premise and then an examination 
of those points. The chapters are broken down into five main segments. Chapter one 
of this dissertation explores the historical context of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as being a period of secularisation. In particular, key milestones within the 
secularisation narratives shall be examined to determine whether the narratives are 
indeed reflective of this wideheld assumption that is consolidated much in Ottoman 
History. This is important because it is only once the historical context is established 
can one fairly place the ulema’s ideas and activities into context during the 
revolutionary phase and constitutionalism. Chapter two shall examine the role of the 
ulema in the Constitutional Revolution and linking how ulema actions during the 
revolutionary actions of 1908/1326 were as much to do with their historical activities 
of the late nineteenth century as they were regarding Hamidian rule. Much of the 
literature presents the ulema as either reactionary or bystanders to the wave of 
revolutionary activity, it is worth exploring whether this was the case. The chapter 
will also explore ulema contestations regarding the merits of constitutionalism. 
Chapter three is to examine the intellectual ideas of the ulema that manifested in 
1908/1326 due to the relaxation of the censorship laws after the proclamation of the 
constitution. It will be explored how the ulema helped to implement the constitution 
in 1908/1326 and how via the use of their proof pamphlet writing tradition along with 
their new role as journalists provide an intellectual basis for constitutionalism. The 
ideas of the ulema shall not be restricted to the imperial centre but also in other 
provinces to reflect the translocality of ideas and how constitutional discourse was a 
reflection of ulema thinking in other parts of the Ottoman domains at the time. This 
chapter shall also discuss ulema attitudes to the slogans that transpired during the 
constitutional revolution. The forth chapter shall explore how the ulema’s visibility 
increased during the aftermath of the revolution. It presents how the ulema used their 
traditional spaces such as the mosques and entred the new spaces for visibility such as 
journalism and parliamentarianism as ulema authority became ever more important 
during this important phase. And finally chapter five, the final chapter shall reflect on 







Much of the sources that have been used in this thesis have been based on the ulema’s 
own work and publication during the Constitutional Revolution period. These articles 
were either written in Arabic or Ottoman Turkish of which many were published in 
the Ottoman journals that exploded onto the public sphere after the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1908/1326. While there are indeed limitations on emphasising on the 
use of journals, the ideas in the journals do provide a valuable source when 
attempting to understand ulema ideas, as it was a main source used by the ulema after 
1908/1326 to attract the largest Muslim readership. Many articles have already been 
translated into Turkish such as in the case of the works of İsmail Kara and Asım 
Cüneyd Köksal, and now in English from authors such as Ahmet Şeyhun. While I 
have used these works, as they are indeed a valuable source, I have also attempted to 
verify the contents of these works via the originals. Overall however, I have found 
Kara’s contribution to be a thorough and detailed reflection of the ideas of the 
thinkers and ulema at the time. His contribution to the field is indeed significant. 
Ottoman archival sources have also been used as well as the host of British archival 
sources which have been a major source for academics regarding the Constitutional 
Revolution. Apart from that British newspapers, Ottoman memiors written at the time 
have also been used. However, due to time restrictions a thorough examination of the 
Ottoman Archives no doubt would have facilitated this thesis better. Since the 
completion of this dissertation a host of newer works have also been published in the 
















Chapter 1 – The Role of the Ulema Establishing a Discursive 
Islamicate Constitutionalism 
Historical Context  
 
In order to contextualise the role of the ulema’s activity regarding their involvement 
in constitutional politics during the late Hamidian period, it is worth examining the 
historical circumstances of their reasoning regarding the role of Islam in Ottoman 
politics in the late nineteenth century and then placing the ulema’s position vis-à-vis 
Islam within the state transformation process. In particular in order to place the 
ulema’s position regarding the ‘Constitutional Revolution’ of 1908/1326, their 
collaboration, participation and theorisation of the constitutional debates, their 
election to the Ottoman Parliament, as well as their immersion concerning the 
Counter-revolution or as is known in Turkish as the 31st March incident in 
1909/1327 98 , it is also worth noting that ulema interaction with constitutional 
discourse was not simply a reaction to Sultan Abdülhamid but deeply rooted in 
nineteenth century political transformation. 
The ulema’s activity has been framed either a reaction towards Hamidian 
‘autocracy’ or submissive to Young Turk ambitions for political change99, but the 
ulema historically, maintained a dual relationship regarding its role and level of 
independence in the state apparatus throughout Ottoman history from governance100, 
I would argue this continued even into the Hamidian period and then later in the 
period of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) who were aware of the ulema 
as a considerable pressure group. 101  Nurullah Ardıç’s recent study built on the 
established premise that both the Ottoman devlet’s role towards secularisation, and 
more significantly the ulema’s participation, facilitated a meta-discursive strategy 
towards the secularisation of the Ottoman devlet by evoking two discursive 
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strategies, the first, “invoking sacred Islamic texts”, and the second by “renewing the 
existing institutions in accordance with the rules of the Sharia”. 102  While a 
sociological analyses of ideas and not a historical piece of work, Ardıç’s study 
continues on the idea of reducing the ulema’s agency of independence, similar to the 
arguments by earlier historians, which requires further scrutiny away from the 
teleological narratives of decline that have plagued ulema studies of the late Ottoman 
devlet. It is this meta-narrative of presenting secular milestones as victories for the so-
called reformist of the state that placed the ulema in a paradigm they could not 
escape. This position requires some examination in understanding the interspersed 
relationship between the ‘temporal’ and ‘religious’ in Islamic discourse, especially as 
the ulema were important interlocutors of both ‘din and devlet’. Rather than simply 
alluding that the ulema were compliant or submissive actors to the political changes 
throughout the nineteenth century, it is first worth examining why the ulema 
throughout the late nineteenth century continued to support state transformation in the 
way of constitutional discourse, thus it is also worth examining the arguments of 
constitutionalism as ‘good’ or ‘ideal’ governance that became the main topic of 
discussion for all the Muslim thinkers in this period, for the ulema, technocrat and 
political class.  
The ‘constitutional movement’ in the Albanian provinces from where the 
revolutionary motion began during the late Hamidian period was a response to the 
rapidly changing conditions in the Balkans and heightened awareness on holding 
authority to account whether that be local or the imperial centre. Ulema support and 
responses to this movement were indeed a response to the limiting conditions of 
censorship and restriction to their authority that the late Hamidian period created, 
nonetheless, it cannot be also ignored that modern constitutionalism was likewise a 
natural deliberation as part of an Islamic discursive tradition towards contractual 
governace and accountable governance in Ottoman Islamic political thought and 
political traditions from the start of the nineteenth century that placed adalet/adalah 
(justice), şura/shurā (council), and meşveret/mashwara (consultation)’ as the central 
principles towards good governance over authoritarianism.103 On closer inspection 
this was not simply restriced to Istanbul or the Balkan provinces, Islamic political 
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thought was reflecting these ideals throughout the networked transregional Muslim 
world. Thus, rather than facilitating the secular, closer scrutiny points towards the 
ulema maintaining the Islamicate where the politics drew from Islamic ideals and an 
emphasis on the law.104 This was indeed just like at many other moments in Islamic 
history a dialectic negotiation between abstract ideals and reality. Within Muslim 
circles the earlier Hamidian period would become an apex of the debates, contestation 
and negotiation between fundamentally two Islamic political ideals; the first based on 
a strong Caliph as leader, and the second on placing consultation at the heart of 
governance. These two ideals both had their roots in Islamicate tradition, especially 
since the Quran presented no clear indication of a governmental structure, but rather 
on the establishment of general principals. 105 
While academics have presented the notion that Islam supports a political 
system based on a strong authoritarian leader, it is also true, as was the case of the 
Ottoman devlet, that Islamic political tradition additionally supported a constitutional 
tradition of governance with checks and balances to authority, with şura 
(consultation) at the heart of this style of governing.106 During the Hamidian period 
three models of Islamic governance came into fruition. During the short experiment 
in 1876/1293 a parliamentary constitutional monarchist system in which although 
constitutional, absolute authority was vested in the Sultan. This system placed the 
Sultan’s protection over the constitution and gave him the right to abrogate it. The 
second resembled what we can deem as authoritarianism, where the constitution was 
in place nominally but parliament was abolished as emphasis was placed on the 
Sultan’s mayben(close aides or advisors), but in which decision-making was solely in 
the hands of strong religious Caliph.107 Finally after the Constitutional Revolution of 
1908/1326 an inclusive parliamentary constitutional monarchy in which the 
constitution was consolidated as a requisite for the Caliphate. The Caliph could no 
longer abrogate the constitution, as he was subservient and accountable to it and 
parliament was given increased powers to hold the Caliph to account. 
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As mentioned, the discourse requires examining from the greater narrative of 
constitutionalism – placing conditions on Caliphal authority - in the nineteenth 
century and then specifically during the Hamidian period. In this chapter a historical 
context from the period of Mahmud II (1808/1316) up until the Constitutional 
Revolution (1908/1326) shall be briefly examined with the ulema’s role regarding 
constitutional discourse in mind. In doing so, it will be shown how ulema 
dissemination of constitutional politics firstly had a historical precedent of which the 
ulema had continued to be integral during the long nineteenth century, and secondly 
ulema contribution till the revolution was proof of the ulema’s involvement with 
Ottoman constitutionalism from the inception of the constitutional debates up until 
the end of the devlet.  
 
Mahmud  II – The ‘Just’ Autocrat? 
 
The Ottoman state-system has often been characterised as a political system that 
idealised the absolute authority of the Sultan, which lacked intermediary institutions 
between ruler and subject and limited the formations of appropriate checks and 
balances on executive authority.108 Hüseyin Yılmaz argues that the ‘Berkasian’109 
model attributed the beginnings of constitutionalism to nineteenth century 
modernisation but in fact the Ottomans practiced constitutional traditions prior to the 
conception of nineteenth century political modernisation. 110  Although Yılmaz’s 
argument of constitutional traditions and checks and balances pre-existing the 
nineteenth century is a worthy point, nonetheless from the nineteenth century the 
concept of constitutional discourse can be viewed as a transition from a constitutional 
tradition to a system moving towards documented constitutionalism which was 
indeed in line with the new world order of which Şerif Mardin claimed that the 
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constitutionalism of the nineteenth century was within the purview of the Ottoman 
Empire’s “first step towards a centralised modern state”.111 What is significant in this 
chapter is that constitutionalism from the nineteenth century onwards would become 
institutionalised as a written document, and parliamentarianism as a concept would 
gradually become extended to current formulations. The transformation of both 
concepts in the current form regarding Islamic political discourse have much to do 
with Ottoman conceptions in the nineteenth century than at any time before.  
On July 28th, 1808(Jumada al-Thani, 4th, 1223) Mahmud II had become 
Sultan and Caliph under precarious conditions. After surviving an assassination 
attempt with the help of the strong ayan (magnate) Ālemdar Mustafa Pasha, Mahmud 
decided to take an unprecedented decision of aggressive state centralisation and social 
transformation to reform the military and state institutions.112 But prior to Mahmud’s 
activities the Grand Vizier Bayrakdār Mustafa Pasha convened a meeting in Istanbul 
in which he invited a number of ayans and leaders who enjoyed virtual autonomy in 
most of the provinces in the Ottoman domains. Most of the ayan, the Grand Vizier 
and Şeyhülislâm and the ağas of the Janissary all prepared a meeting of a consultative 
nature in which a proposal was presented on state reform. An agreement was reached 
in a seven-point document signed by all including a reluctant Sultan titled the Sened-i 
İttifak. The objective was to attain a general consensus that under attack that Sultan 
would be protected, and nobody would oppose him. Article four recognised the 
absolute vicegerency of the Grand Vizier, article five regulated the ayans and article 
six gave protection of the subjects from extortion and oppression. The constitutional 
significance of the Sened-i Ittifak was the first step towards curtailing the Sultan’s 
authority in the nineteenth century.113 
However, Mahmud’s policy of centralisation would take on a different turn. 
Although the concept of reform remained central, nevertheless this period was on the 
one hand an accelerated effort for reformation, but hastened reforms intensified the 
fractures by the aggressive nature the government executed its policies. Mahmud’s 
government decided the best method to restore authority into the hands of the palace 
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was to eliminate possible oppositional forces that would threaten Sultanic authority. 
In essence Mahmud decided to breach the agreements made in the Sened-i Ittifak.  
Upon securing his authority Mahmud executed a host of actions which would 
attempt to strengthen his hold on government as he chose to centre authority on the 
idea of a strong Sultan. Thus, Mahmud had the strong ayan Ali Pasha of Yanina 
(Janina/Ioannina) executed in 1822 /1238, the Janissary mainly in Istanbul abolished 
in 1826 /1241 that was later called the ‘Auspicious Incident’ 114 , and then the 
Mamluks in Iraq destroyed in 1831/1247, as he pitted ayan against ayan in the Arab 
provinces as a way of maintaining authority. The ulema gradually withdrew their 
visibility in the imperial centre, as they too were to face the effects of Mahmud’s 
activities by losing control of the evkaf.115 His rhetoric was presented as Islamic, and 
support was given by his Şeyhülislâm Yasincizâde Abdülvehhab Efendi116 to centre a 
policy on authoritarianism, based on a strong central figured leader of state. By 
centring his policy on the symbol of the strong Caliph, Mahmud’s strategies were to 
alter the traditional ‘constitutional’ checks and balances of Ottoman political practice 
of holding authoritarianism to account.117  By eliminating any faction that could hold 
Sultanic authority to reason, especially the destruction of the Janissary and 
withdrawal of the ulema in Istanbul, Mahmud believed that this would secure his 
position as Sultan, and smoothen the way for wide-scale state centralisation.118  
The shifting from the politics of decentralization, and instead endorsing 
antagonistic centralisation to place authority strictly into the hands of the sultan, was 
a change in style of governance that eventually led to fissures between the Ottoman 
government and the provincial ayans. In 1831/1247 the consequence of this 
ultimately led to the rebellion of the powerful Egyptian wali/vali (governor) Mehmed 
Ali /Muhammad Ali Pasha against Mahmud II and his forces. The rebellion marked a 
fundamental turning point in the legitimization of rule in the Ottoman domains as it 
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altered the character of political culture and nature of law. 119  Many like Mehmed 
Ali, had practiced traditional politics with vigour and loyalty, he was indeed loyal to 
the Sultan as Caliph, had provided many resources, and conquered lands.120 But the 
attempt to subjugate the Pasha for centralising authority to the palace not only spelled 
a threat to Mehmed Ali’s ambitions but altered the traditional political culture. So 
devastating was the internal clash between the devlet’s two most powerful forces that 
Mahmud sought outside assistance in the guise of the British and Russians. Receiving 
assistance from the enemy not only compromised the sovereignty of the devlet but 
also provided a moral setback to the sentiments of Muslims both in governance and 
the mass. Authoritarianism had its benefits for quick decision-making with minimal 
amount of resistance, especially as decentralsaition had created many local abuses of 
power. Mahmud was to learn however, by eliminating the very forces that held his 
authority to account, were the very forces that could have repelled Mehmed Ali’s 
advance. This brought to the fore, the problem of absolute authority as the political 
elites and religious class attempted to rectify this issue.  
As a result of the conflict between the Ottoman Sultan and powerful governor 
of Egypt, the Ottoman devlet was to plunge into political chaos and much moral 
retrospection. 121  During this conflict both Sultan and Mehmed Ali turned to the 
ulema, to attain legitimacy for their claims. Although it is hard to substantiate the 
facts over these possible religious contestations what we can deduce is the importance 
of the moral role of religion and the ulema, as an official consensus was presented by 
the ulema with the technocrats of the devlet in the form of an edict called the Gülhane 
(Rose Chamber)122 of 1839 (Sha’ban, 25th, 1255) to address the fissures created by 
the conflict. The document was to address the ills of Mahmud’s reign and was 
promulgated after the timely death of Mahmud and the accession to the throne of his 
young son Sultan Abdülmecid I.123 
 The Gülhane would become the basis of an institutionalised attempt of 
holding central governmental authority to account in documentation that first 
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indicated the shaping of a ‘modern’124 constitutional based government, which started 
to become the model of the future Ottoman political structure. It was at this time that 
prior to Mahmud’s death the Meclis-i Vukela (Council of Ministers) was 
established.125 Soon after an irade was written that established the religious basis of 
the Gülhane.126 Although an Ottoman Constitution didn’t draw closer to realization 
until 1876/1293, however the first signs of placing conditions on the authority of the 
Sultan to the public was being established as a public relationship between 
government and the individual started to become visible in the guise of the Gülhane 
of 1839/1255. The edict was the first of its kind in Ottoman history in which a 
Sultan/Caliph was to hold himself and his government nominally responsible to the 
populace regarding his role as ruler. Although medieval Islamic theological 
discussions have inferred of the need of a ruler to uphold the concept of justice127, 
nevertheless the declaration of accountability in the public domain in such a manner 
was unprecedented in Islamic history. This was clearly an attempt by the political and 
religious class to outwardly attempt to connect the ruler with the ruled by defining the 
relationship between the two.  
The Gülhane had firmly placed the ulema’s scholarly tradition at the heart of 
political statecraft, while it has been argued that the ulema had become weakened by 
the actions of Mahmud, the Gülhane decree points to either a rapprochement by the 
state, miscalculation on the part of historians on ulema decline, or that the ulema’s 
position as a consensus and mediatory community continued to be at the heart of 
change in late Ottoman devlet and they continued to be integral agents of political 
statecraft. Whereas some have argued a diminished role of the ulema due to the 
abolishment of the Janissary, what the Gülhane indicated was with its central theme 
of Islam as the ideal and source of governance that the ulema’s intellectual and 
traditional authority continued to be sought, in the form that not only was it required 
for governmental policy but also to hold authority to account of which the ulema 
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were primary, and it was this authority that would continue to drive ulema authority 
in both state and society. Butrus Abu-Manneh presents the position convincingly that 
the ulema were central to the construction of the Gülhane. He showed that in an 
irade, which was perceived as a draft prior to the promulgation of the Gülhane, out of 
the 32 names signed on the irade, 19 were members of the ulema who were active in 
the ilmiye. Of which the Şeyhülislâm Mekkizâde Mustafa Âsım Efendi was integral. 
In early 1839/1255 the Sultan met the Şeyhülislâm in a meeting with the Meclis-i 
Şura in enacting the spirit of the Sharia regarding the irade of 1839/1255.128 But 
more importantly a meeting in the office of the Şeyhülislâm was held regarding the 
matters on the conflict with Mehmed Ali, of which from the 70 people 33 were 
ulema. And again four members of the ulema out of the ten-man committee were 
elected to the extension of the Council of Judicial Ordinances. 129 As Abu-Manneh 
has comprehensively indicated the ulema were integral during this process of 
governmental accountability, more significantly the construction of the Gülhane and 
its implementation. 
This change in style was an invocation to Islamic ideals and Ottoman political 
traditions of the past and a novel attempt to depart from the style of governance of 
Mahmud II by displaying greater accountability of governmental action. 130 
According to Yılmaz “[The] Ottoman Empire, heralded by the decree of Tanzimat in 
1839/1255, was thus as much a sequel to Ottoman constitutionalism as a recreation of 
contemporary Western ideas and structures”. 131  The theme of accountability and 
justice would require a qualified body that oversaw holding government to account 
by the religious law, as the ulema would continue to stress in the nineteenth century 
their centrality to this process. It was the authoritarian nature of Mahmud’s reign that 
was questioned, as his son, the young Sultan transferred much of his own 
prerogatives to the office of the Sublime Porte as the initial phases of the Tanzimat132 
period reflected greater political inclusivity. The Gülhane initiated the first 
recognition of the importance of ‘public opinion’ to the political class, and set in 
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motion the idea of an alternative to authoritarian politics of Mahmud. The Tanzimat 
would not necessarily shift away from authoritarianism as a practice, but a precedent 
had been set which would continue to be discussed during the Tanzimat up until the 
Hamidian period. As a result, it is worth examining the Gülhane and how an edict 
that emanated from a period of much internal turmoil would become institutionalised 
as an ideal for future Ottoman governments. 
 
The Gülhane – In its ‘Spirit’ of Justice we Trust! 
 
The promulgation of the Gülhane decree introduced the period of what is known as 
the Tanzimat (Reform 1839-1876/1255-1293). State transformation was a continuous 
feature of the Ottoman State, but the Gülhane edict can been viewed as a milestone in 
the style in which the edict was presented as it emphasised on a ‘just’ application of 
principles of Islam in politics. The edict both in spirit and in form reflected Islamic 
political idealism by stressing on the Sharia as law and its spirit of justice. The 
Gülhane decree also preluded to a greater initiative of reform presented in a style by 
government that was to be viewed as a shift from the reign of Mahmud II as increased 
administrative responsibility was introduced and accountability of authority was 
placed as a key tenant for public consumption in all forms of leadership, especially 
provincial. State reformation was also to facilitate a new bureaucracy class that would 
become a key feature in the difference between the Tanzimat state and the Ottoman 
devlet of the past. Such were the conditions upon the death of Mahmud that on a rare 
occasion all political factions including the Sublime Porte, the Palace and the ulema 
were in agreement of the policy shift and collaborated together to safeguard state and 
society with new vigour.133  
The document presented as Islamic was built on a set of Islamic principles 
rather than any real detailed justification of government accountability from the fiqh 
(jurisprudence). But its uniqueness was the manner the document attempted to 
address the subjects of the devlet regarding the role of government and the 
governmental conception of enacting justice. ‘Justice’ in the Gülhane derived from 
the Sharia, that is not to say that Mahmud didn’t evoke that his implementation of 
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justice was not Sharia inspired. But justice was no longer in the hands of the 
interpretation of the Sultan as Mahmud had laid claim to. 134   Justice had to be 
determined by the ulema and political statesmen within the new political culture. True 
justice could only be derived by the Sharia in which God’s agent (Sultan/Caliph) 
should enact upon earth, but his agency was determined by an agreed consensus 
established in the Gülhane. In that sense the Gülhane was dealing with this 
conception of justice, one in which sovereignty was based on the Sharia, political 
ethics from its spirit, as the Caliph was simply the agent to implement it, in which 
prosperity and peace may prevail in the domains.   
 It seems evident that there was no distinct departure of the implementation of 
neither the Sharia in the Ottoman law courts nor the change in its practice in 
mainstream Muslim society. What was different in the Gülhane was to emphasise on 
the Sharia and its conception of justice and moral governance at the heart of political 
activity, stressing this point to the Muslims in the Ottoman devlet became significant. 
It was assumed by the Ottoman central authority that by proper administration, and 
sincere practice of the Islamic basis of governance that all subjects of the devlet 
would provide loyalty to the government. As a result, all people were subjected to 
equity in the eyes of the law and all people were entitled to the right to the protection 
of ones life, intellect, property and honour via Islamic political thought of what was 
subscribed to what is now deemed as the principles of the Maqāsịd Al-Sharīʻah Al-
Islāmīyah (objectives of the Islamic Sharia) transcribed. 135  The essence of the 
Gülhane emanating from Islam and the outwardly expression of Islamic terminology 
and rhetoric of the Gülhane indicated as Abu-Manneh has thoroughly explained that 
the Gülhane was not simply a cosmetic construction of using Islamic forms, but in 
actuality Islamic in form, content and meaning, which was heavily influenced by the 
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ulema and Islamic political idealism. 136  Abu-Manneh’s argument was central to 
question the common narrative that placed the Gülhane as simply an edict that was 
emulating Western political norms to appease the Western powers.  
Also, historians have at times not fully rationalised the importance of 
Mehmed Ali’s role in the predicament that contributed towards the promulgation of 
the Gülhane.137 His military power along with his appeal to the Muslim population 
was a primary reason why allegiances started to shift away from the Sultan from the 
Muslim masses, ulema and state governors. Mehmed Ali’s actions were not simply a 
power grab by the ambitious governor of Egypt. Instead his actions should be viewed 
as a protestation appealing to consensual Muslim support. His march till Konya in 
Anatolia, and his easy defeat of the Ottoman troops, doesn’t simply point to the 
superiority of his modernised army nor his ascendancy as commander. But points to 
the possibility of the Sultan’s troops unwillingness to confront the Pasha and that 
Muslim public opinion was averse to resisting the governor both in society and 
militarily due to the ill effects of Mahmud’s policies, a point possibly understood by 
the architects of the Gülhane. The declaration of the Gülhane was not simply an 
attempt to improve the state bureaucracy and reform the various aspects of the devlet, 
but was also an attempt to improve and recover Muslim morale and attain the respect 
from all the subjects of the Ottoman devlet, thus present a degree of governmental 
responsibility. 138  The ideals of loyalty, identity, prestige and ideology were re-
emphasised and became essential during the Tanzimat period.   
 Ottoman statesmen started to work on first strengthening their social base by 
rallying as much of the Muslim population around a common cause. The project was 
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to also appeal to the large segments of the non-Muslim population and attempt to 
integrate and utilize their skills for the state. The promulgation of the decree was not 
simply a piecemeal to silence dissatisfaction, it seems that there was a sense of 
sincere humility from the part of government, technocrats and ulema that the distress 
caused by the existential conflict needed to be publically addressed.139 Hence, the 
project became an attempt to organize the state, present a declaration of responsibility 
from government, address Mehmed Ali and the sensitivities regarding his conflict 
with central authority and to enforce social alliances based on shared values. The 
decree was therefore an attempt to initiate a process of reformation but within a set 
value-system where principles were extracted from Islamic political thought. 
 Whereas there was no open apology or declaration that would subjugate the 
sultan to the status of a mere mortal, it did however imply to the Sharia functioning as 
the heart of governmental political activity of which every actor including Sultan was 
subjugated too.140 In doing so the Gülhane had set a precedent that the Sultan’s 
authority came from his responsibility towards his subjects, he was legitimate so long 
as he, his government and his people were ruled by the justice inscribed in Islam. The 
Gülhane had also emblazoned equity among all subjects in the sense of the 
guaranteeing of rights, thus openly attempting to create a more homogenous loyal 
Ottoman subject as the first signs of an official state sponsored inclusive identity was 
being formulated as Osmanlılık or Osmanlıcılık (Ottomanism). It was this concept of 
equity that would continue to become a highly contested issue for the Ottoman reform 
efforts throughout the late Ottoman devlet. The ideal of equity in principle should 
have invoked a sense of collective loyalty towards belonging to a communal Ottoman 
citizenry; however, it also created new paradigms of discontent and identity politics 
that shall be discussed later.  
However, a rise of a new bureaucratic class managed to attain the reigns of the 
Sublime Porte and shifted the policy away from the premise of the Gülhane. The first 
phase of the Tanzimat period was as Abu-Manneh has suggested between 1839/1255 
till 1854/1271 and the second between 1855/1272 till 1871/1288.141 In 1856/1273 a 
new edict, the Hatt-ı Hümayun, was seen as a capitulation to Britain and France due 
to their assistance against the Russians in the Crimean war of 1853-1856/1270-1273. 
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The edict seen to be influenced by the Western powers was perceived to be a total 
capitulation that provided absolute equality to the non-Muslims within the Ottoman 
Empire. Equality in the eyes of the law was not a novel concept, but the Hatt-ı 
Hümayun went further than anytime before in Ottoman history as it was felt that the 
edict was designed solely for the Christians of the Empire. In Istanbul with a society 
composed of the ulema, Sufi Sheikhs and officers, some started to secretly organise a 
reaction to the edict in 1859/1276. The incident came to be known the Kuleli 
incident. The incident was called a reactionary one by earlier historians due to the fact 
that the leader was a Sheikh (Sheikh Ahmed). But it’s worth noting how those who 
were not part of the conservative class viewed the revolt. On closer inspection Namik 
Kemal and Hungarian Arminius Vambéry both praised the conspiracy and even 
attributed constitutionalist thoughts to the agitators – this however could have been a 
re-writing of the events.142 While in the past opposition was in the guise of Janissary 
support, during the Tanzimat this was no longer possible as the ulema and those 
against the Sublime Porte used conspiracy and protest as a form of opposition – the 
politics of resistence came in many forms. In this second phase of the Tanzimat the 
Sublime Porte was to face a series of challenges from the agents of religion. The 
opposition continued to be motivated by the Sharia against absolutism, only this time 
of the Sublime Porte.  
The actors of the Kuleli incident felt betrayed by the Sublime Porte, as they 
had fought in the war against the Russians, and many of the ulema had campaigned in 
favour of the war against the Russians calling it a jihad. In 1853/1270 outside the 
Şehzâde Camii an official petition was signed by 35 members of the ulema to support 
the Ottoman war effort.143 Sheikh Ahmed who was the leader of the opposition was a 
champion for the devlet, he supported reform and was close to the state. He stressed 
during his trail that he simply wanted to carry out the statues of the Sharia, the state 
itself conceded he wanted to introduce the ulema to express their thoughts more 
freely in society.144 Nonetheless, Sheikh Ahmed was to be executed by the state, thus 
the Sublime Porte as a result started to lose much credibility.   
But opposition did not stop against the Sublime Porte as a new class of 
Ottoman thinkers inspired by the new conditions created by the Tanzimat attacked the 
                                                        
142 Florian Riedler, Opposition and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire : Conspiracies and Political 
Cultures, SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East ; (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : 
Routledge, 2011). p12. 
143 Riedler., p19. 




Sublime Porte in journals. These new thinkers were later to be known as the Young 
Ottomans who started a journalistic campaign to discredit the autocracy of the 
Sublime Porte, but presenting their knowledge of the new tools of the devlet such as 
journalistic activity and amalgamate this within the rethoric of Islamic oppositional 
culture. The Grand Viziers Ali and then Fuat Pasha were labelled as tyrants and 
adopters of Western values over the Sharia. It was argued that they had lost their ties 
with the past (possibly the Gülhane) and the principles of the Sharia. In one article in 
the Hürriyet, Ali was accused of once again being a tyrant and that a fetva/fatwa was 
obtained suggesting that it was legitimate to kill a tyrant. This Kisas145 literature 
would once again be used as a style against Sultan Abdülhamid II.146 The Young 
Ottomans had centred much of their ideas and opinions within the prism of Islam and 
started to frame concepts of constitutionalism and parliamentarianism within the 
purview of Islam. During the earlier Tanzimat period both Muslim intellectualism and 
ulema scholarly traditionalism intermeshed, and interacted with one another on equal 
footing. An example was Namik Kemal’s concepts of Şura or his appeal to the 
Quranic verse such as washawir hum fi’l amri and wa ta’muru baynakum bi 
ma’rufina which doesn’t indicate that Namik Kemal was simply coercing the 
ulema,147 but in fact recognising the framework of traditionalism. Along with Young 
Ottoman activism, awareness against Sublime Porte authority, and the weakening of 
the Sultanate, as well as constitutional practice in Tunisia, constitutionalism started to 
become a central theme amongst the minds of the ulema and Muslim thinkers in the 
Empire. 
  
The Gülhane’s Centrality to Constitutionalism  
  
The ‘Spirit of the Gülhane’ created a premise where future Muslim thinkers of the 
Ottoman devlet and the Muslim world felt the need to adhere to the main principle of 
what the Gülhane proposed.148 The impact of the war between Mehmed Ali and 
Sultan Mahmud II forced much introspection and soul searching across the Ottoman 
domains. Mehmed Ali’s advance meant that he had occupied Syria and parts of 
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Anatolia up until at least Konya if not Kütahya. His advances into the Sudan and his 
wars for the Ottoman government in both Greece and then the Hijaz against the 
Wahabbis should provide us a complexity of not simply viewing the Pasha from 
nationalist notions regarding the Egyptian nation-state but the impact he had on the 
thinkers of the Ottoman domains. 149  Upon his withdrawal back to Cairo, Arab 
thinkers and ulema started to also examine the idea of Sultanic authority. European 
thinkers, had continued to reflect the Ottoman Sultan as a despot, thus producing a 
response from Muslim thinkers to address in their opinion this Eurocentric 
understanding of Ottoman politics. After all, some European thinkers recognised that 
the “Turkish government was fixed in Europe”.150 As a result Egyptian scholar by the 
name Khalīfa ibn Mahūmud under the supervision of the âlim and his teacher Rifā’a 
al-Tahtāwī produced a translation and commentary of a European work written by the 
Scottish historian William Robertson, entitled A View of the Progress of Society in 
Europe, which had certain notions of European constitutionalism and so-called 
Ottoman despotism.151        
 Khalīfa first presents his position that European states only have recourse to 
laws against the tyranny of Kings because they do not possess the Quran and Sunnah 
which is the divine law. He continues that the political laws of Muslims by definition 
must be just for they are from divine sources. 152 He adds that the Sultan far from 
being able to act freely, must abide by the judgement of the diwan, his Council, and 
the mufti, the supreme authority on religious law who is a powerful member of the 
diwan. He then continues to explain how the Ottoman government was indeed 
constitutional by saying ‘all of the Sultan’s actions’, ‘are limited by the Quran and the 
Hadith (maqsura ‘alā). ‘These are the source of his power and respect among his 
subjects, if they obey him, that is only because of the orders of the praiseworthy 
Quran’. If the Sultan ceases to follow the Quran and Sunna, ‘he has transgressed the 
bounds (ta’addā al-hudād), and the hearts will fly from him […] Great Sultans have 
been killed for the transgressions of the laws of the state (qawānīn al-dawla) and the 
Sharia.153 What is worth of note is that not only is Khalīfa attempting to dispel 
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European generalisations of Ottoman governance, it is also possible that this is also 
an address to the Muslims in the region in understanding the reasoning of why the 
likes of Mehmed Ali may have gone to war against Sultan Mahmud II. It is evident 
that the ulema class in Egypt either had or were trying to explain the conception of 
good Ottoman rule. It is also noteworthy how Khalīfa uses the term Qawānīn the 
plural of Qanun and in Turkish Kanun, which is what was understood as laws of the 
constitution. He also further endorses the diwan and the mufti as important checks on 
Sultanic authority. He later continues that the Sultan is not ‘absolute (mutlaq al-
tasarruf) but restricted, if necessary, by the law’ (qawānīn). He continues “If the 
Sultan follows the Quran, Sunna and the Sharia, injustice [zulm] cannot be imputed to 
him anyway – Allah forbid that our Sharia should be unjust [zālim]!”154 Later his 
teacher Tahtawi also mentions that the Sultan follows the Quran, the Hanafi Sunna, 
and indeed the prevailing custom (al-āda al-jariya).155 Looking at these works one 
draws two main conclusions, the first being that the ideas of the Gülhane were not 
restricted to the imperial centre, thus pointing to a far more connected intellectual 
develt, and secondly that maybe as Fredrick Anscombe has pointed to that Mehmed 
Ali’s advance was more in line with Islamic ideals of governance than simply a 
power grab.156          
 In the Beylik of Tunisia two works published very closely to each other 
reflected that trend of the influence of the Gülhane on Muslim thinkers and Islamic 
political thought. These were Ahmad ibn Abi Diyaf a historian and ālim and 
Hayreddin Pasha/ Khayr al-Dīn Tūnisī 157  who was the principle writer of the 
Tunisian constitution of 1861/1278, Tunisian Prime Minister in 1873/1290 and 
briefly Grand Vizier of the Ottoman devlet during the Hamidian period in 1877/1294. 
Both Abi Diyaf in his book Ithaf Ahl al-Zaman hi Akhbar Muluk Tunis wa ‘Ahd al-
Aman (Presenting Contemprories the History of the Rulers of Tunis and the 
Fundamental Pact) and Hayreddin in his book ‘Aqwam al-masālik fī maʻrifat ahẉāl 
al-mamālik’ (The Surest Path) asserted the basis of the Gülhane being Islamic and the 
ideal for good governance. Hayreddin’s work aimed at the ulema and Muslim 
intellectual class was to evoke Muslim emotion and thought, and endorse 
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reformation. He explained the need for the ulema to become politically active yet fell 
short of endorsing ulema involvement in policy and decision-making. 158   The 
centrality of the Gülhane to Hayreddin’s reformation effort, points to how ulema 
thought and intellectual framework impacted upon Muslim thinkers and technocrats 
in the Muslims world. For Hayreddin, state, society and religion were all 
interconnected. He pointed to the idea that the Gülhane was the basis of the state’s 
administration and the edict was in fact a noble effort. He continued to stress the 
Islamic nature of the decree as he attempted to convince his readership that the edict 
was not Western. As a Muslim thinker, Hayreddin recognised his ideas would not be 
received without ulema recognition. In fact Hayreddin himself worked closely with 
the ulema in Tunisia to construct the Tunisian constitution of 1861/1278. 159 
Regarding the Gülhane he quoted the nineteenth century Ottoman theologian of 
Damascus Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abidin al-Hanafi (1783–1836/1197-1252) that 
“there is no harm in imitation of that which is linked to the good of the believers”.160 
The Gülhane would become in ‘ideal’ central to future formations of constitutional 
governance in the Arab and Ottoman speaking world. More importantly, Muslim 
thinkers and politicians recognised the importance of the ulema, and continued to 
appeal to them and worked within the scholarly tradition of the ulema for acceptance. 
According to Leon Carl Brown, Abi Diyaf used his ulema education to write his work 
while with Hayreddin, there was no doubt in Brown’s mind that it was a collective 
effort in writing the ‘Aqwam al-masālik with the ulema.161 We see once again how 
the ulema were a part of the state building processes but also sought regarding the 
intellectual ideas in relation to political re-configiration.     
 It wasn’t only statesmen such in Tunisia who proclaimed the turning point in 
Islamic political thought regarding the Tanzimat, for the Young Ottoman thinker Ziya 
Pasha the Gülhane was in no way outside the scope of the Sharia. Even after the 
Tanzimat Sultan Abdülhamid II felt that “the hearts of all of the subjects might have 
been filled with love and loyalty toward their sublime sovereign through the diligent 
implementation of the laws and regulations that [were] enacted after the promulgation 
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of the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber [Gülhane]”.162 In the Egyptian al-Manar 
press in 1908/1326 the author wrote ‘that the Gülhane was in accordance with the 
Sharia and laid down the laws that we have today. It was in fact the deviation from 
the haq(truth/rightousness) that has led to the sad state of affairs [in the Hamidian 
period]’. 163  The spirit of the Gülhane would become infused with the future 
constitutional constructions in the Ottoman devlet. Although the constitutions would 
be far more comprehensive, the basis of what the Gülhane represented is worth of 
note. Many historians conceived that it was the ‘secular’ nature of the Gülhane built 
upon Western idealism that influenced Ottoman constitutionalism in the late 
nineteenth century while suggesting diminishing ulema authority in the intellectual-
political realm. However Ottoman borrowing infused with traditional indigenous 
practices go some way in explaining the adoption processes of political structures as 
the Islamic basis of ulema traditions was infused in the Gülhane, ever present in 
Ottoman constitutional formations.        
 Political debates such as the compatibility of Islam and constitutional theory 
become prominant by the end of the Tanzimat and early Hamidian period as good 
governance would take its ideals from Islamic discourse, but would borrow structures 
from the rest of the world. From the discussions regarding the constitution, Muslim 
thinkers discussed the institutionalising of other Islamic political concepts such as the 
idea of the Beyat (the process where the people who loosen and bind, elect the 
Caliph), 164  Şura as parliamentarianism, 165  Meşveret as consultation 166  and 
application of the Islamic law (the Sharia). By the time Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-
1909/1293-1327) was to come to the throne the Ottoman devlet would take note from 
the constitutional experiments from the region and attempt their own journey towards 
                                                        
162 Feroze Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy : Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888, Studies 
on Ottoman Diplomatic History ; (Istanbul : Isis Press, 1996). 
163 al-Manar, p425. 
164 Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, The Surest Path. The political treatise of a nineteenth-century Muslim 
statesman. A translation of the Introduction to The Surest Path to knowledge concerning the condition 
of countries by Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, editor, Brown.C, Harvard University: Center for Middle 
Eastern Studies 1967. Khayr al Din attempts to explain the need to institutionalize the process of the 
people who would ‘loose’ and ‘bind’ (ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd) when giving the allegiance of electing a 
Caliph (Bay’a). This process was a contract or an outh between the ruler to the representatives of the 
ummah to obide by the Sharia and the law.  
165 Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. The Young Ottomans debated the nature of the 
Parliament as a process of şura. 
166 Iqbal Singh Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal : Islam and Nationalism in Late 
Colonial India (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2012). p53. Iqbal discusses the 
idea of institutionalizing the parliament so that it became a form of Ijma’a (Consensus) among the 




constitutional-monarchism with a parliamentary system that to some degree 
transcribed the ulema ideals invested in the ‘spirit of the Gülhane’.  
 Although historians and academics will continue to argue the political nature 
of Islam167, the point of contention is to highlight Ottoman self-perception. Islam in 
the late Ottoman devlet was inherently part of a worldview that included politics and 
religion as dependent, inseparable, and driven by the Sharia especially in matters to 
do with the law regarding governance. The Sublime Porte chose to marginalise 
inclusive participation of a host of actors, such as the ulema, Muslim technocrat and 
the Palace. The perceived shift away from the Gülhane’s principle by the Sublime 
Porte not only shocked many Muslims but also forced many Muslim thinkers and 
ulema alike that excessive authority in the hands of the Sublime Porte required 
addressing. 168  While Mahmud’s governance reflected the problems of an 
authoritarian Sultan, the Tanzimat period reflected weakened Sultans and 
authoritarianism now practiced by the Sublime Porte. The mismanagement of 
resources, the weakening of Sultanic authority, and a feeling of contempt by many 
Muslims regarding the intentions of the policies and policy makers of the Sublime 
Porte during the late Tanzimat period, facilitated a culture of desiring increased 
consensus deliberation, the inclusivity of further political actors, and a clear 
accountability of governmental responsibility.  
 
The Ottoman Constitution of 1876/1293 
 
We have two main books on the Ottoman Constitutional process of 1876/1293. These 
are Robert Devereux’s work in English written in 1963/1383 and Selda Kaya Kılıç’s 
study written in 2010/1431 in Turkish.169 There is also Aylin Koçunyan’s PhD thesis 
which examines the negotiation of the Ottoman Constitution and looks at the 
potential sources of inspiration for the first Ottoman Constitution.170 Both Devereux 
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and Kılıç provide great insight and detail, however Devereux’s work -the more dated 
- focuses more on the dichotomous narrative of a contestation between Sultan 
Abdülhamid II and the then Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha, in the end concluding that 
the constitution of 1876/1293 resulted in Midhat overcoming the obstacles from the 
Sultan to promulgate ‘Midhat’s Constitution’. Focusing more on the personality 
politics of the Sultan and Grand Vizier, Devereux’s work although detailed somehow 
neglects from discussing the religious debates surrounding the process of deliberation 
that took place at the time. Whereas although a smaller work, Kılıç’s more recent 
book has recieved little attention mainly due to the fact it is written in Turkish which 
provides a far more detailed narrative of the different factions and debates that started 
during the reign of Sultan Murat V and then conclude during the the coming to power 
of Sultan Abdülhamid II, lending way to a more consultative process. In addition we 
also have İsmail Kara’s general work on Islamic thought and the constitutional 
debates which has more of a focus on the Second Constitutional Period but nontheless 
provides great insights on the thoughts of the Young Ottomans in 1876/1293 during 
the constitutional debates, along with the classical work of Şerif Maridn. Nurullah 
Ardiç has recently also added to this debate, but his work seems to be a general 
overview of works before. Recently works by Abdülhamit Kırmızı have shed more 
light from the perspective of senior Ottoman statesman Ahmet Midhat and the 
possibility of establishing an authoritarian constitutional form of governance in line 
with the other major monarchists powers at the time. 
 
The Constitutional Debates Begin 
 
By the late nineteenth century the first wave of constitutional politics materialised in 
the transregional Ottoman domains.171 There can be no doubting that the Ottomans 
learnt from their environment and it would be now safe to suggest that the factors 
were both external and internal. 172  While earlier historians focused on Ottoman 
attempts to emulate the Belgian and Prussian constitutions, it is also worth of note as 
Koçunyan has shown that the Austrian modal of governance was closely examined as 
it was perceived by Midhat Pasha that the Austrian multi-ethnic empire was the 
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closest to the Ottoman domains.173 It is clear that the Ottomans were careful in their 
process towards moving towards constitutionalism. Zafer Tunaya even goes as far as 
suggesting that the Ottoman thinkers examined up to one thousand books. While 
Tunaya’s assertion can’t be proven, the point here worth noting is the extent to which 
the Ottoman establishment went in drafting their own constitution. 174 
While much has been shown how the Ottomans in form attempted to contruct 
their constitution like other nationsespecially European, further investigation points to 
important Muslim experiments. Tunisia was the first Muslim government to 
implement a constitution in 1861/1278, the Ottomans then together with the 
Armenian community approved the Armenian National Constitution for the 
Armenian millet in 1863/1280. By 1876/1293 the Ottomans had also attempted 
constitutional governance and then Egypt in 1881/1298. In this first phase of Muslim 
constitutions three key locis of Muslim authority and transformation in the region 
such as Tunis, Cairo and Istanbul were all reflecting similar notions, indicating a 
connectivity that requires further investigation. All the projects resembled one 
another in form, with consultation and consensus being at the heart of the political 
practice. Apart from the Armenian effort175, all the constitutions stressed on Islamic 
conceptions of justice and consultation, however religion in all the cases was the ideal 
at the basis of the constitutions. It cannot be denied that the Gülhane had established 
a precedent on constitutional politics in the region. In 1876/1293 the Ottoman devlet 
for the first time in its history promulgated a constitutional government with a 
parliament, as Sultan Abdülhamid II became the first constitutional-monarch of the 
Ottoman devlet. But prior to the promulgation of the constitution much debate took 
place regarding its compatibility with Islam and in particular the role of non-Muslims 
in the new political system.  
Upon the promulgation of the Ottoman constitution there was a level of 
hesitancy on the part of Sultan Abdülhamid II. This should come as no surprise, as 
the previous sultan, Sultan Murat V himself was also hesitant towards the 
implications of constitutionalism, and what constitutionalism entailed regarding 
Sultanic authority. The hesitancy either by the Sultan, ulema, or upholders of the 
status quo, has been viewed within the binary of constitutionalists against anti-
constitutionalist, or liberals against conservatives with the ulema generally presented 
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as the group that either reacted negatively to constitutionalism or hampered efforts for 
its implementation. 176 This can be reflected in the views of Christian Arab writer 
who later converted to Islam al-Shidyaq who was an eyewitness to the promulgation 
of the constitution in 1876/1293 in Istanbul and explained that there were two camps, 
those in favour of constitutionalism who were the technocrats and those against who 
were the religious students. He explained: 
 
When the news about the state’s attempt to constitute a parliament erupted, many [scholars and civil 
servants] in Istanbul expressed their opinions on this important issue. There were those who said that 
establishing parliament contradicts the pure shariʿa, and there were those who said that shariʿa imposes 
a government based on consultation [hukuma shu ̄riyya] and not on autocratic rule [hukuma 
istibda ̄diyya]. That is why the people of Istanbul divided into two opposing camps, and it is not a 
secret that this division embedded a harmful situation for the state. While one camp consisted of 
[religious] students [.talabat al-ʿilm] opposed to the establishment of the council, the other requested 
that we publish in al-Jawa ̄ʾib the introduction of aqwam al-masa ̄lik [Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi’s 
book].177 
Another Arab writer Rizq Allah Hassun interpreted the new political environment by 
indicating the conflict was between two groups: supporters of the constitution, and 
those who opposed it arguing that it was against religion. Hassun contended that the 
difference between the two groups was not political and was not concerned with any 
kind of political opposition. According to him it was related to competition between 
those who had government positions and those who did not.178  But while many 
outside observers placed the ulema firmly in the camp of opposition, Ahmed Midhat 
an Istanbul insider presents a rather more diverse view of the two camps. As 
Abdulhamit Kırmızı’s examination of the Ottoman intellectual explains: 
 
He [Ahmet Midhat] categorized the political positions in society toward the Kanun-i Esasi, the 
constitution, into two parties, hilafgiran and tarafgiran, the adversaries and the adherents, both divided 
into two subsidiary groups. A part of the hilafgiran saw the constitutional monarchy as bidat ,an 
innovation or novelty without roots in traditional practice. According to them, the representation of 
non-Muslims in the parliament was irreconcilable with Islam. Another part of the hilafgiran did not 
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see the constitution as a bidat, but politically harmful (siyaseten muzr). The tarafgiran, on the other 
hand, who favored the parliament’s use of power within the limits of the constitution, were also 
divided into two groups. One group thought that a constitution was something not to be granted by the 
state, but to be realized by the people. Therefore, the constitution and its supplementary laws had to be 
realized by the people, not decreed by the statesmen. The second group of the tarafgiran, with 
whom Ahmed Midhat identified himself, argued that the Ottoman constitution could not be compared 
with European constitutions because it was granted by the state; therefore, naturally, the laws had to be 
prepared by the state, too.179 
 
As Ahmet Midhat was an insider his opinion represents a better explanation of the 
discussions although he has been accused of being a Hamidian supporter, his reading 
nonetheless seems to be one of direct experience. He didn’t single out the ulema and 
explained that three out of the four sub-groups accepted the permissibility of 
constitutionalism even if they disagreed of its usefulness and method of 
implementation. Those in opposition along religious grounds were a minority. The 
positions were indeed diverse as Ottoman thinkers and the ulema were not simply 
willing to transform or negotiate to necessity of outside intervention, but much 
internalisation to the Ottoman polities own traditional frameworks of Islam, the 
Ottoman political traditions and political practice were debated. By 1876/1293 the 
Ottoman Empire would finally implement its first endeavour with constitutionalism 
of which the ulema would like during the construction of the Gülhane become 
integral.   
The Young Ottoman’s Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi explain some of the 
reasons opposition was faced. They explained as follows, that opponents were not 
sure if the tebaa(people/subjects) were apt in electing representatives. The new 
consultative method would create complexities on the perogatives of the Sultan to 
make decisions. The people of the devlet in general had no skills for this form of 
government. The current Ottoman law courts were not ready for such complexities of 
legal details, and finally the cost of such a venture was not affordable to take from the 
state treasury. 180   While these consideration seems to present no real religious 
argument, on closer inspection the objection do concur with concepts that have been 
written by ulema of the past. The idea of the Sultan being the Imam/Caliph meant that 
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it was indeed important to determine what his authority actually was, any restriction 
undermined his authority to rule. Arguing that mainstream socity and political class 
were not ready once again placed much emphasis on the qualifications of the Sultan 
as head of the government and state. And more importantly as will be explained, the 
role of non-Muslims in being part of the deliberation process of electing the Caliph 
also has religious undertones that should not be ignored.181     
 Devereux explains that On July 15th 1876/Jumada al-Thani 22nd 1293 when 
discussing the key issues regarding the constitution six points were proposed for 
discussion of which five were in regards to some form of equality and representation 
of non-Muslims in the devlet. These were as follows, firstly, absolute equality 
between non-Muslims and Muslims in the eyes of the law, second, the eligibility of 
non-Muslims for all state offices including Grand Vizier,182 thirdly the creation of a 
national assembly that composed of four deputies of each province, but twelve from 
Istanbul, with each religious representative being represented proportionally, fifthly 
the abrogation of the Sharia provision which repudiated the testimony of Christians 
and Jews in favour of Muslims, and finally to secure tenure of judges of state and 
officials in absence of any malfeasance. Some members of the ulema at the time had 
objected to the proposals of equality with non-Muslims while others contested 
whether non-Muslim representation in parliament was permissible in accordance to 
the Sharia. 183  The idea of equality was not only questioned by some ulema as 
members of other minority groups also asked the same. As a result, additional 
discussions took place as it was proposed that a commission on the principles of 
responsibility be organised of ulema capable of applying and reconciling the 
constitution with the Sharia. The draft was to be studied by the Council of 
Ministers.184 The commission consisted of eight members of the ulema with a further 
two added on Sultan Abdülhamid’s request.185      
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 The two issues of contention for the ulema were the permissibility of the 
constitution, and the role of non-Muslims and their representation in the Ottoman 
Parliament in the decision-making process of an Islamic government. On the matter 
to do with the constitution itself, Midhat Pasha and Seyfeddin Efendi a Kazasker, 
expressed that Islam and the Quran were not against such a reform and in fact in 
favour of it.  
Seyfeddin explained at length by akli (rational) and nakli (textual) evidences that meşveret 
[consultation, which he interpreted as parliament] was perfectly in accordance with Islam. To the 
delight of the constitutionalists who interpreted meşveret in their own way. Seyfeddin supported 
Midhat Pasha with a number of hadith and the Quranic injunctions such as washawir hum fi’l amri and 
wa ta’muru baynakum bi ma’rufina (and consult with them upon [conduct of] affairs [111:59]); and 
(consult together in Kindness.) 186 
 
While discussions continued the new reality of permitting non-Muslims into 
parliament was still being debated by the ulema as some continued to be unconvinced 
if this was in violation with the Sharia or not. In particular Muhyiddin Efendi ex-
Kazasker of Rumeli and Gürjü Sharif Efendi ex-Kazasker of Anatolia rebelled and 
were sent into exile with all the ulema in their group stripped of their ranks and titles, 
a move agreed upon by the Şeyhülislâm,187 but perceived as rather harsh by Ahmet 
Midhat Efendi.188 The draft committee of 10 members of the ulema of which at least 
three were of Kazasker rank (military legal authority), with the addition of Namik 
Kemal of the Young Ottomans and ālim Cevdet Pasha, pointed to the importance the 
ulema and Islam featured in the decision-making process. The group in principle 
reached a consensus that the Ottoman constitution was permitted by Islamic law and 
worth initiating in the hope that the devlet’s fortunes could improve. The 
constitutional governmental system was as much to do with administrative 
structuring, the qualification of powers and governmental responsibility as it was 
regarding Islamic idealism. In this sense, the change was not simply a cosmetic one, 
its manifestations of the future course of governance and state institutional 
reconfiguration with Islam being at the basis of political ideology and the ulema as 
being key stakeholders in the deliberation of the transformation, the introduction of 
the new change as the guardians of the Islamic basis of governance, points to an 
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Ottoman ulema who were still integral to the process of governmental accountability 
and state transformation.  
There are some notes worth attention in Kılıç’s work also. She explains that 
the debates over the constitution were extensive and began prior to Abülhamid II 
coming to the throne. On the 16th of June 1876/ Jumada al-Awwal 23rd 1293, a 
commision under the name Meclis-i Meşveret conveved to discuss the need and 
merits of a constitution. It must be stressed that the suicide/murder of Sultan 
Abdülaziz had created fissures within the political class regarding the urgency of the 
constitution as the contestation between the Palace and Sublime Porte reached an 
apex that resulted in the death of the Sultan. Thus, a need for deliberation was 
required so that the internal wranglings did not bring the central authority to its knees. 
During the discussion process, the officials’ discussions were not recorded, as the 
delegation was not gathered to make decision but rather debate the merits of the 
constitution. 189 According to Kılıç there were five different versions of the draft 
constitution, one written by Midhat Pasha, one by the then Grand Vizier Ruştu Pasha, 
another by Suleyman Pasha, Cevdet Pasha and finally by Namik Kemal. Of which 
Namik Kemal’s and Cevdet’s are still not found in the Ottoman archives. 190 
She notes that when Ruştu Pasha and Suleyman Pasha got into a disagreement 
the fetva-emine Halil Efendi expressed his concerns regarding the constitution citing 
that the masses were not ready for freedom. Cevdet Pasha was initially of the same 
thinking but both he and the Şeyhülislâm showed much indecisiveness regarding the 
matter. 191  On the 15th of July 1876/22nd Jumada al-Thani 1293, as mentioned 
earlier Midhat with the backing of Seyfuddin Efendi  pushed for the idea of Meşveret 
as being an Islamic principle. However, there seems to be a stalemate regarding the 
role of Christians in the political process. By now Sultan Murad was removed as 
Sultan Abdülhamid II was to entre the thrown and on the 17th of August/26th of 
Rajab the draft of Midhat Pasha was preliminarily accepted and given to the various 
parties to delibirate over. It seems in Istanbul among the educated classes they 
favoured a constitutional government, as the culmination since the reign of Mahmud 
II had come to endorse a constitutional document.  While Kılıç’s work provides more 
details on the whole both for her and Devereux the ālim Seyfeddin’s intervention did 
                                                        






much to sway the ulema in favour or at least not being able to contest the idea from a 
theological viewpoint.   
It wasn’t simply ulema who held objections to new constitutional experiment. 
Those in favour were also pragmatic in recognising that a more reasonable and 
gradual approach was the best suited fort he conditions and reality that had ensued. It 
is for this reason that we see that when Hayrettin moves from Tunisia to Istanbul to 
become Grand Vizier and then removed after the suspension of parliament, he  
nonetheless continued to remian a supporter of Ottoman state and continues to 
mantain a close relationship to the Hamidian government, recognising the practical 
complications of such a significant political restructuring. From the Young Ottomans, 
Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi also were cautious, even though they were strong 
supporters of the constitutional project.192  
However, while much deliberation was sought to implement the 
constitution,within two years the constitutional experiment was abandoned, partially 
due to the belief that a stout leader was more efficient than the experimentation of 
constitutionalism and parliament, and also because during the Tanzimat period so 
much of the Sultanates’ authority was stripped away by the Sublime Porte, as a result 
once the Porte was weakened the Palace decided to re-centre authority back into the 
hands of a strong Sultan mainly in charge of decision-making.  
The Ottoman devlet was to become embroiled in a costly war with the 
Russians in 1877/1294 in which losses in the Balkans were blamed on the dithering 
of the new parliament. The Ottoman loss convinced the Palace that the autocratic 
system with authority remaining in the hands of the Sultan, and decision-making in 
the hands of the few, was still the best form of governance. The Hamidian regime’s 
main point of contention were not down to the constitution being contrary to the 
Sharia, nor the involvement of non-Muslims in parliament, but instead of 
safeguarding Ottoman suzerainty in the Balkans and Sultanic sovereignty in the 
capital. Continual Sublime Porte infringement in the running of government was the 
central cause of Ottoman discontent during the Tanzimat, as a shift of authority back 
into the hands of a ‘just’ and ‘pious’ Sultan was thought to suffice in addressing the 
ailing issues of government and its authority. Young Ottoman and ulema critique had 
pointed to the weakness of the palace during the Tanzimat period which by default 
handed authority to the bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte, mainly the Grand Viziers 
                                                        




Fuat and Ali Pasha.193  Thus, the strengthening of authority of the Palace was a 
position held by many. The emergence of the constitution would also indicate this, as 
the constitution itself provided the Sultan much authority in 1876/1293, it was this 
authority which allowed the Sultan to suspend the constitution and disband the 
parliament. The Hamidian state was to emphasise on the premise of the Gülhane of 
placing Islam once again as the centre of governmental politics, but after the 
weakening of the Palace during the Tanzimat period, the Hamidian regime assumed 
that the constitutional component -which Şerif Mardin called a semi-constitutional 
charter 194 - of the Gülhane was not necessary so long as the Palace was strengthened 
and practice of appealing to the Muslim social base revived.  
According to Feroze Yasemee from this moment onwards the Hamidian 
regime’s policy can be attributed to four key principles: autocracy, conservatism, 
reform and Islam. 195  However, as mentioned earlier, Islam as an ideal was 
continually contested throughout the Hamidian period as it had been done throughout 
Islamic history. Yasemee continued Sultan Abdülhamid was not an ideological 
politician, he espoused no ‘theory’ nor did he believe in earthly utopias and in general 
treated government as a political act.196 Nonetheless, the increased symbolism, the 
Friday selamlik197 and culture of veneration espoused by some of the Sufi tarikats 
around the seat of the Caliphate198, often presented the Sultan as an enigma, who took 
much blame for the culture of Sultan-veneration that came into existence during his 
reign.  
Thus, in 1878/1295, the first constitutional project was forsaken by the 
Ottoman State, to be re-implemented when the people and political polity were ready, 
however that time simply never came, as the efficiency of authoritarianism was once 
again the preferred choice of governance, especially as it was a method well 
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understood. The nineteenth century witnessed much state transformation. While 
Mahmud’s reign focused on aggressive centralisation and dismantling much of the 
old regime, the Tanzimat period initiated a period of increased bureaucratic and 
administrative transformation where authority shifted from the Palace to the Sublime 
Porte. During the Hamidian period, the bureaucratic state remained an important 
feature from the Tanzimat, but authority shifted back to the Palace. While on local 
administrative levels inclusive governing was practiced where ulema and non-Muslim 
participation was an accepted pattern, and indeed experimentation of 
constitutionalism and inclusive decision-making structures were endeavoured, 
nonetheless the tried and tested model of authoritarianism/autocracy remained the 
main feature of central government at this point.199 
  The Hamidian state decided rather than placing emphasis on a new structure 
of governance that instead the ideals of the governance required more attention. The 
Hamidian state further emphasised the role of Islam in the public sphere, and the 
Sultan himself embraced the lifestyle of a pious Sultan200 in the belief that if the 
Muslims ‘returned’ to the ideals and values of the past that the Muslims could 
improve their fortunes once again. 201  This policy succeeded in one way, by 
solidifying the Muslim base, by increasing the bond between Sultan and the Muslim 
masses, and by increasing Islam’s outwardly appeal in Ottoman life.202 However, the 
mismanagement of governance, the demand for responsible governance, and the 
continual appeal for more inclusivity in the decision-making processes, meant that a 
gradual increase of oppositional activity, including high-ranking ulema, amplified in 
favour for the re-introduction of constitutional politics.  
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Islam - A Symbol of Governance and Opposition, Authoritarianism and 
Constitutionalism 
 
Sultan Abdülhamid II was granted more time in authority than many of his 
predecessors. The ulema quite naturally were also in agreement with the emphasis of 
Islam in the political culture of the Ottoman devlet. However, that didn’t negate from 
many becoming frustrated with the management of Hamidian policies. Şerif Mardin 
has argued that: 
 
In light of the forgoing it may be stated that upon his accession to the throne Sultan Abdulhamid was 
faced by an alliance of propagandizers of libertian ideas (the Young Ottomans), ministers, generals and 
members of the Ottoman religious institutions [ulema]. What this amounted to was alliance against the 
Sultan by the ‘cream’ of the traditional Ottoman estates of ‘the men of the sword’, ‘the men of the pen’ 
and ‘the doctors of Islamic law’, a formidable array of social and political power.203 
 
 Ulema opinion and positioning wasn’t binary to those who supported the Sultan 
versus those against, but rather diverse and ever changing. It is true that many high-
ranking ulema supported the Hamidian regime and policies implemented by the 
Sultan for different reasons.204 It is plausible to assume that the traditional culture of 
not wanting to facilitate political unrest, especially when the Hamidan state did 
indeed achieve relative stability was also a reason of much ulema inactivity. One 
could argue that in fact it was stability, which convinced the ulema that political 
change was possible as the ruptures would not be detrimental, but by the last decade 
of Hamidian rule ulema discontent visibly increased. To attain the various ulema 
positions on Sultan Abdülhamid would be an impossible task. The reasons for 
opposing the Sultan were also many, however a common theme of ulema discontent 
similar to the Young Turks was the need for the re-introduction of constitutional 
politics based on consultation and council.205  
As mentioned in the last decade of the Hamidian regime, along with the 
Young Turk intellectuals in exile, increased oppositional activity by some members 
of the ulema in favour of constitutional discourse was ever-mounting. A constant 
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theme throughout Ottoman history, or Islamic history in general is that the ulema 
have perceived to see themselves as ‘guardians of the faith’. Muslim politics involves 
competition and contestations over both the interpretation of symbols and control 
over the institutions, formal and informal that produce to sustain them.206  Conflicting 
interpretations of Islam became a feature in the last decade of the Hamidian period, in 
an increasingly political environment. The balancing of powers is not a case of 
political harmony but in fact of continual flux, contestation and juxtapositioning. The 
ulema would contest the Sultan regarding his authority, they would contest the CUP 
and they would have internal inter-ulema contestations. Balancing of power meant 
the continual struggle among all these elements, such is the nature of authority and 
the sharing of power within Muslim politics. The new challenges of growing political 
consciousness by Muslims and new social tensions made it exceptionally difficult for 
the Hamidian regime to accommodate everybody. Some members of the ulema 
supported oppositional activity in parallel to the efforts of the Young Turks, some 
may have even joined them as members, and the continual call was for the Sultan to 
re-instate the constitution may not have been opportunistic but in actuality genuine. 
Michel Foucault explained, “Legitimacy struggles don’t often aim to critique the 
institution of power, or a group or elite but rather emphasise a technique or form of 
power”. 207  In this case the critique while in opposition was aimed at Hamidian 
İstibdat (authoritarianism). However, while Young Turk opposition was gaining 
momentum, ulema opposition had the capacity to de-legitimise the Islamic basis of 
the Hamidian regime and the understanding between the Young Turks and the ulema 
to support constitutionalism was a worrying turn of events for the Sultan. 
 Upon the closing of parliament the Hamidian regime purged Midhat and his 
supporters from the imperial centre and decided to change tact in regards to 
safeguarding the fortunes of the devlet. One of the first acts in 1878/1295 by the 
Sultan after the suspension of the parliament was to appoint Uryânîzâde Ahmed Esad 
as Şeyhülislâm. After serving as Kazasker in Rumeli as well as Anatolia, Esad Efendi 
served as Şeyhülislâm from 1878/1295 till 1889/1306. He was a strong believer in 
absolutist Sultanic authority as well as the Sultan’s non-involvement in the running of 
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the religious affairs such as the courts, medressa system and overall matters to do 
within the jurisdiction of the ilmiye.  
Upon the death of Esad Efendi, the Sultan was to face a series of challenges 
from segments of the ulema around the devlet. Throughout the years 1889/1306 to 
1892/1310 there were repeated reports in the British press of conspiracy among the 
ulema. 208  Upon the death of Esad Efendi, Bodrumlu Ömer Efendi’s reign as 
Şeyhülislâm would only last a year as he was implicated in colluding to undertake a 
coup d’état in 1891/1309. Upon his dismissal Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi would 
become Şeyhülislâm and would eventually oversee the Young Turk revolution in 
1908/1326. If Cemaleddin Efendi was a constitutionalist, he certainly did not make it 
evident in the earlier part of his time in office. However there were rumours of 
Cemaleddin on one occasion sitting with Mûsa Kâzım Efendi and Kalender Hasan 
Efendi speaking against the Sultan.209 Mûsa Kâzım has always been viewed as a CUP 
advocate and would later become a key member of supporting the constitution in his 
writings. As for Cemaleddin, he would later become an integral figure during the 
revolution and constitutional debates in 1908/1326 where he would declare his 
intentions in favour of constitutionalism. But prior to that Cemaleddin Efendi didn’t 
publically declare his opinions on constitutionalism as he held a non-commital stance 
against upsetting the Sultan. It seems that Cemaleddin Efendi’s time in office was one 
of balancing the perogatives of the Hamidian state whilst also listening to ulema 
complaints. Although there were suggestions of doubt regarding Cemaleddin Efendi 
as the Sultan was careful of the Meşihat. Nonetheless Cemaleddin Efendi was much 
trusted by the Sultan also.210  
 While changes were taking place in the seat of the Meşihat in Istanbul an 
increase of the student population in the medressa system became a cause for concern 
for the state apparatus. Growing tensions between the medressa students and the 
military came to a head when complaints were made that students were avoiding the 
military draft by extending their time in the medressa, as medressa students were 
exempt from military service. In 1892/1310 in Istanbul students ranging from the age 
of twenty to twenty-five from the provincial areas of mainly Anatolia were seemingly 
forced onto ships back to their provinces for military service. Administrative failings 
and aggressive police tactics inferred to many of the students that the Sultan was 
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punishing them. Although, within three days the Sultan cancelled the policy, 
nonetheless, the damage had been done.211 By the end of the year the first placards 
were posted in Istanbul by the students in the theology department against the 
Sultan’s rule.212 In response to this, two thousand students were exiled to various 
parts of Anatolia. This became what Şerif Mardin called a ‘cause celebre’ in the 
1890’s which contributed considerably to an increasing unease towards the Hamidian 
regime from members of the ulema class.213 The senior ulema were aware that as a 
result of this the ulema would be perceived as being backwards. Some ulema rejected 
the stereotyping of the medressa students as a projection line of ignorant persons and 
squaring responsibility on the ulema. Hocazâde Mehmed Ubaydullah Efendi would 
example a detailed attack on those who criticied the medressa students, and in 
1908/1326 would later reject what he highlighted as arrogance towards ulema.214 
The startling development regarding ulema discontent pointed towards ulema 
disobedience never witnessed before during the Hamidian period. A central idea of 
the Hamidian regime’s Caliphal authority was based on loyalty obtained from the 
Muslims and ulema alike. So long as the Sharia was implemented and the Sultan 
didn’t abuse his prerogatives as the one responsible for the protection of the subjects 
of the devlet, he felt he deserved loyalty from his subjects, no matter how vague his 
prerogatives were. But a transformation in ulema thought started to transpire of 
opining that the Sultan was simply an executive authority and he too required being 
held to account by the Sharia.  
Sheikh Yusuf al-Nabahani was an out spoken defender of the Sultan’s status, 
part of the Sultan’s mabeyn and a qadi where he held posts in the Mesopotamia, 
Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut. After spending time in the Hamidian court he also 
was appointed head of court in Latakia in Syria and then Jerusalem. Much of 
Nabahani’s political polemical activity was to discredit the Salafiyya and Wahabbi 
movements in the Arab provinces. In May/June 1895/1313 he published a pamphlet 
titled al-Ahadith al-arba’in fi wujub ta’at amir al-mu’minin (Forty Hadith Related to 
the Leader of the Believers) regarding the position of the Caliphate. The 
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interconnectivity of the Sufi movements along with the readership tradition among 
ulema circles would suggest that the ideas within conservative Sufi circles had some 
level of conformity. The opening of the hadith collection was a verse in the Qur’an 
[Oh you who believes, obey Allah, the Prophet (SAW) and those in authority among 
you].215 The collections of Nabahani’s work circulated around the idea of obeying the 
ruler, as well as obedience to Allah and his Prophet. As early as 1895/1313 Nabahani 
stressed that although disagreement was allowed what was unacceptable was 
disobedience or revolt. Nabahani also stressed that if a ruler was even oppressive; so 
long as the Sharia was being implemented then the Muslim community was not 
allowed to violate their allegiance with the ruler.216 The state was well aware of the 
complaints being made against it, not only that but the delegitimising ability of the 
ulema’s complaints meant that the supporters of Abdülhamid’s policies continued to 
stress on the conception that the Caliph as the absolute authority irrespective of 
conditions. For the likes of Yusuf al-Nabahani, the manner of ones coming to 
authority, as well as the nature of ones authority are secondary so long as the basic 
tenants of the implementation of the Sharia was practiced. In doing so he was placing 
a position within a traditional chain of thought that the Caliph as the guardian of the 
ummah should be trusted in his decisions and authority. This chain of thought focused 
on unifying the ummah around the patriarchal Caliph, differences of opinion or even 
increasing decision-making to multiple actors would compromise authority, or further 
more the devlet. Unity was based on obedience, as obedience was heavily entrenched 
in hierarchy and trust in authority simply due to the notion that leadership by default 
requires trust and obedience. But trust and obedience could not simply be given on 
the basis that the Caliph by default deserves it because he is in authority. Obedience 
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The Emergence of the Young Turks 
 
In 1889/1307 military medical school students established an oppositional movement 
that manifested into what later became the Young Turk movement. The movement’s 
establishment coincided with ulema oppositional activity, as increasing momentum 
was gathering against the Sultan and reinstatement of the constitution. The 
movement’s main objective was to force the government to re-instate the Ottoman 
constitution of 1876/1293. By 1896/1314 ulema objections became ever present in 
pamphlets that gradually started to question the idea of obedience to the Sultan.217 
More importantly, a visible trend from this moment was the conceptualisation of 
consultation as the most fundamental principle of legitimate power. In 1896/1314 
both movements activity gathered much momentum as the Young Turk’s 
collaboration with the ulema provided them with the traditional religious legitimacy 
they lacked. İsmail Kara mentions that one would be surprised that the positivist 
cadres cooperated with the ulema as its often assumed that the relationship was one of 
convenience. The ulema had formed their own oppositional groups, even before the 
overt activities of the CUP. Although there were open supporters of the CUP from the 
ulema class such as Ubaydullah Efendi, however the ulema chose to remain 
independent. 218  For varying reason, members from different ideological leanings 
were either working in collusion or in parallel to one another attempting to re-
establish constitutional rule. But as Köprülülü Şeyh Aliefendizâde Hoca Muhyuddin 
Efendi explained during his visit to the Paris Conference of 1902/1320: 
 
I cannot claim that all of them[Young Turks] are experts in Islamic law, but their aims are based on a 
council of consensus and on liberty and are in conformity with the canonical laws of the religion of 
Islam. Even if it were not so, an order for a return to religious legality would be acceptable.219 
 
Hoca Muhyuddin Efendi was of the belief that the aims of the Young Turks and their 
intentions didn’t contradict the aims of the ulema in opposition nor their ethical 
stance. In 1896/1314 the formation of an ulema organ – Cemiyet-i ilmiye-i Islâmiye 
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was formed in order to enable that the din was being correctly administered in the 
devlet, in particular the organ’s objective was to hold the government to account in 
regards to the precepts of Islam. The organ also committed to working with the CUP 
to establishing this goal. In 1908/1326 in the Beyan’ül-Hak a new organisation 
possibly playing off the Cemiyet-i ilmiye-i Islâmiye called itself Cemiyet-i ittihadiye-i 
ilmiye once again stressed that they would work closely with the CUP to ensure that 
good governance may prevail.220 It seems that at best, up until 1909/1327 the ulema 
didn’t view the CUP movement as a whole as a positivist organ, but one that had the 
interests of din and devlet in mind and one they could guide. Hoca Muhyuddin Efendi 
a founding member of the Cemiyet-i ilmiye in the late nineteenth century although 
worked with the CUP had stated that he was not a member.221  
The formation of the Cemiyet-i ilmiye formally organised the oppositional 
ulema. Whereas dissention and opposition was sporadic, the Cemiyet-i ilmiye not only 
managed to focus their call but also vocalise above the action of random agitations. 
During this moment the ulema and the Muslim intellectual class worked collectively 
as the Muslim intellectual class in opposition to the Sultan’s authority appealed to the 
ulema by and large to heed to the cause of joining the Young Turks in establishing a 
constitutional government. 222  Hoca Muhyuddin Efendi himself would appeal to the 
ulema by association, addressing the ulema in a pamphlet titled Kanun-i Esasi 
(Fundamental Law – Constitution) where he says Ulema-yı Din-i Islama Davet-i 
Şer’iye (An appeal to the ulema) to address the issue of constitutionalism. This 
twelve-page petition demanded the constitution from the position of the ulema in the 
Cemiyet-i ilmiye. By organising themselves into a organ the Cemiyet-i ilmiye 
presented themselves as a de facto consensus group who represented the interests of 
the religion, state and ulema. The fact that the journal itself was titled the constitution 
was an attempt of the ulema’s demand for constitutionalism not simply as an ideal but 
a desire for its implementation. The ulema’s appeal and understanding of 
constitutionalism was far deeper entrenched in a scholarly culture than the rhetorical 
appeal made by many Young Turks. The publication of the Kanun-i Esasi journal 
was published in Egypt, and begs the question who supported the cause? The appeals 
made were not simply in Turkish but in Arabic and Hindi too, the authors although 
sometime anonymous also were not simply from Rumeli or Anatolia but were Arabs, 
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as the Cemiyet-i ilmiye’s appeal was wide-scale. Between the years of 1896-97/1314-
15 alone publications and appeals intensified by the Cemiyet-i ilmiye in support for 
constitutional government. İsmail Kara’s study on the ulema in opposition to the 
Sultan is the most detailed study of their role and provides a host of pamphlets and 
articles written in that short period of time.223 The activities of the Cemiyet-i ilmiye 
were not simply to appeal to the ulema in the imperial capital but was a strategy to 
build consensus among themselves in favour of a constitution. The pamphlets varied 
in style and rhetoric but the appeal was consistent. From this moment onwards the 
Cemiyet-i ilmiye had brought to the fore discussions in the public domain on subjects 
such as the Caliphate, the constitution, obedience versus opposition and the status of 
the Sultan.        
One such article was written by Hoca Şakir in Geneva: Ulema-yı İslâm 
enarellahu berahinehum Tarafından Verilen Feteva-yı Şerife (Sacred Fetvas 
[religious decrees]. In it were a series of fetvas answering anonymous questions about 
the concept of whether retribution was acceptable if person X (in this case called 
Zeyd meaning the Sultan) had committed a crime, and if it was lawful for him to be 
killed. The cleverly contructed set of questions, implied by using generic life 
examples to represent the rule of the Sultan. In fetva 3 it says ‘If Zeyd, encourages 
people to kill, who should be punished, Zeyd or the person who commited the 
crime?’ the answer read as follows’ Zeyd should be punished as even if his command 
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is not direct, his decision as a form of coercion is binding’.224 In another fetva it 
ligitimised a non-Muslim killing Zeyd, so long as the victim who was a Muslim was 
present. 225  Fetva 12 asked if the Muslims were in a sorry state due to Zeyd’s 
leadership and policies do the Muslims have the right to overthrow Zeyd? The answer 
once again was ‘Yes’.226 Fetva 13 asked if the Muslims were living in hardship, 
which is worse, to live in hardship or to overthrow the ruler as both are undesirable in 
Islam. The answer given was to overthrom the leader.227 The style of the fetvas was 
indeed an alarming use of legitimizing the killing of the Sultan, a style simirlarly used 
by the Young Ottoman Ziya Pasha who had written in the Hürriyet in 1869/1285, 
“According to the most reliable Islamic sources, the tyrant and those that help him, 
should be killed. This is an obligation. And Ali Paşa is that tyrant”.228 It is worth of 
note that while in the Tanzimat period such suggestions would never have been aimed 
at the Sultan, by the Hamidian period much had changed. Although the universal 
issue was so-called state oppression, nonetheless, this was indeed a unique stance 
held by Hoca Şakir. However, it is quite clear that killing the Sultan was not what the 
fetva were actively endorsing, instead the attempt was simply to deligitimise the 
Sultan. It is not clear how these pamphlets were internalised, however one must 
assume that both ulema in exile from Istanbul and the Arab ulema must have 
resonated with one anothers opinions.  
There were many ulema exiled from Istanbul to Egypt as Cairo became a hub 
of ulema oppositional activity, which also included Arab ulema. What makes Cairo 
also a point worth noting is that the Egyptian ulema themselves were weighing up the 
merits of constitutional discourse due to the firstly the impact of the conflict between 
Mehmed Ali and Sultan Mahmud II and then later the events of the Urabi revolt in 
1881/1298 as the likes of the Mufti of al-Azhar Muhammad Abduh had been in 
favour of constitutional governance. In various articles Abduh praised a ‘certain 
Cemaat-i Kerime’(The Noble Party) for working courageously to realise the unity of 
Islam, supporting the principles of justice and the Sharia, and spreading the idea of 
freedom. Abduh mentions in one of his articles that this Cemiyet-i Saliha (The Pious 
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Association) had began to publish a newspaper in support of the constitution. In 
1908/1326 this newspaper according to Muslim thinker Mehmed Âkif Ersoy was one 
of the newspapers published by Hersekli Hoca Kadri Efendi, a member of the CUP in 
Egypt and Âkif’s teacher.229 Another âlim, Ubaydullah Efendi for example travelled 
abroad and was critical of the Hamidian regime. In 1898/1314 he returned to Istanbul 
after making his peace with the Hamidian authorities, yet renewed his activities and 
was once again sent into exile, this time to the Hijaz. After five years there, he 
managed to escape to Egypt where he joined the ulema in opposition there.230  
The translocal connection between the ulema should not be ignored, as 
although it is difficult to substantiate what type of impact the acts of Hoca 
Muhyuddin Efendi or the pro-constitutionalist ulema and the like had, it mustn’t be 
discarded that the ulema as a networked group were debating, discussing and 
influencing one another. The fact can not be denied that constitutionalism was ‘in the 
air’ within ulema circles not only in oppositional circles but the Ottoman devlet and 
Muslim world as a whole, as a debate which would have probably been internal were 
now being made public, via traditional means of pamphlets, petitions and circles.  
 It seemed that to some degree the ideas were indeed resonating with ulema 
within the Ottoman domains. In Egypt in 1896/1312 it was said a pamphlet was 
circulating in religious circles arguing the lawfullness to depose the Sultan.231 In 
Damascus in 1896/1312 Sheikh Badr al-Dīn al-Hasanī headed a circle of religious 
students and young sheiks, some of whom also published in a journal titled Haqā’iq. 
Badr al-Dīn was implicated in what came to be known as the mujtahid’s incident of 
1896/1312, when his alleged denunciation of Ottoman rule led to the governor 
suspect that the local ulema were campaigning against the Sultan.232  In 1898/1314 
the Mufti of Gaza, his son and brother were arrested and sent into exile for their 
positions against the Sultan.233 In 1899/1315 the Sultan sent a telegram to the British 
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Ambassodor to Egypt telling him that wicked persons have formed a committee 
there.234 
In 1901/1319 news was reported that a CUP volunteer and ālim named 
Cudizâde Sabit Efendi was arrested in Adana.235 In the same year in Damascus, 
Abdulhamid Zahrawi an ālim from Homs was arrested and imprisoned. Zahrawi who 
would become a supporter of the Young Turk movement and an elected member of 
parliament in 1908/1326 was publishing a clandestine newspaper called al-Munir 
which was secretly being published to support the Young Turks. Zahrawi would once 
again be arrested for penning an article in al-Muqattam ‘containing a violent attack 
on the Sultan and a denial of his rights to the Caliphate’. However, in front of a 
council Zahrawi would deny the claims suggesting that it was not his denial of the 
Sultan’s right to the Caliphate but an indictment of his Majesty as a person unfit to 
hold the august and sacred office of Caliph’. This was another harsh attack on 
Abdülhamid, a tactic that was being executed in order to humble the central authority 
for leverage. Sheikh Rashid Rida himself a close ally of Zahrawi was hesitant at times 
regarding the nature of Zahrawi’s attack as Rida felt that this could have had counter 
productive consequences, especially as the masses also required protecting from ideas 
they had very little knowledge of. It was claimed that the CUP branches in Syria and 
Egypt were supported by a considerable number of ulema.236  Whether as David 
Commins explained this was the influence of Midhat Pasha’s time as governor of 
Syria, is hard to know, but what can not be disputed is that ulema ideals were 
resonating with one another in the region.237 In 1906/1324 Zahrawi would flee to 
Cairo where he took a public role publishing articles regarding his ideas on the 
devlet.238 In 1905/1323 in Beirut the British Council reported that an ālim, Hadji 
Muyuddin Hamady was suddenly arrested on orders of Istanbul because the 
vali(governor) alleged, he was connected with an anti-Turkish party in Egypt and 
suspected of being in league with his relative the Mufti of al-Azhar Muhammad 
Abduh. To support his contestation, the vali declared that commentaries of the Quran 
by Abduh were found among the arrested man’s papers. In Baghdad in 1905/1323 
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ālim Mahmud Shukri Alusi who also would become a CUP member in 1908/1326 
was arrested along with his cousin and a madressa teacher Abdul Razzaq Efendi of 
the A’zamiyya School and deported for allegedly supporting Wahabbist ideology.239 
In 1907/1325 it was written in the al-Manar journal that a certain Sheikh Rashid 
Rafiq al-Azm had established a political organisation called the Jam’iyat al-Shura al-
Uthmaniya (The Ottoman Consultation Society) whose objective was to bring all 
Ottomans together.240 The very idea of obedience to the Caliph was started to be 
questioned by the ulema as obedience in itself would weaken the concept of absolute 
authority of the Caliph. It seems that throughout the late Hamidian period, there was a 
sense of oppositional activity that was ever increasing within the ulema circles. Even 
within the Iranian context, Shi’i ulema were reflecting similar ideals to their Ottoman 
counterparts regarding constitutional theory and inclusive governance to reflect an 
efficient state structure that would shore up authority and restrict outside influence, 
with the Iranians going through a revolution of their own in 1905/1323. 241 
Constitutional governance had crossed seceterian lines and was being debated across 
the Muslim world. Although many others may not have rebelled against the Sultan, 
but by 1908/1326 their open support once the political conditions had changed 
suggest that ulema sympathy from within their own traditional scholastic framework 
was starting to facilitate a new transformation of political authority. This point is 
worthy of mention as what the Ottoman devlet along with the ulema were doing were 
to uphold their traditional conception of a Caliphate system and amalgamate it with a 
constitutional parliamentary one. In doing so although much conflict took place 
between practice and theory, the discussions in opposition as well as gradual state 
transformation had set the groundwork for the constitutional debates of the 
revolutionary period.    
By July 1908/1326 the oppositional activity would come to a heed, as a group 
of young army soldiers as members of the Young Turks would rebel against the 
central government. Using Islamic symbolism in the name of justice and slogans 
resembling French Revolutionary ideals, the Albanian provinces were to create a stir 
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that was to become irreversible. The ulema’s positioning would become instrumental, 
and it seems that ulema oppositional ideas resonated in the ideals of the ulema in 
support of the constitutional regime, thus suggesting there was indeed a link between 


























Chapter 2 – The Constitutional Revolution 
Alternative Actors - The Ulema Matter 
 
Historians have overwhelmingly presented the Constitutional Revolution of 
1908/1326 as the milestone moment in which the re-introduction of the Ottoman 
Constitution once again became actualised in late Ottoman history. The narratives 
often centred on a revolution initiated by the Young Turk officer and his desire to 
demand change for an inclusive system of governance that included increased 
political freedoms and the re-introduction of a parliamentary-monarchist system. 
While there is no doubting this, the role of the Ottoman ulema has somewhat largely 
been ignored in these interpretations. Since much of the revolutionary activity was 
achieved due to Muslim support both in the Macedonian provinces242 and Istanbul, it 
is worth asking whether the ulema had any role in supporting the revolution or 
whether they resisted.  
Through out this thesis there has been an attempt to show the connectivity of 
ideas and activity throughout the Ottoman domains, rather than simply focusing on 
Istanbul. As a result a main point of this chapter is to examine how provinces in the 
Balkans were the catalyst for change in the centre. This feeds back to my initial point 
in the introductionary chapter on viewing the Ottoman devlet as centre -provinces and 
not centre-periphery. Furthermore, the ulema in both the Balkan provinces and centre 
became important actors for change. 
As a result, in this chapter I shall focus on the role of the ulema during the 
Constitutional Revolutionary movement of 1908/1326 as it is my contention, as shall 
be presented, that without ulema participation the actualisation of the return of the 
constitution would not have been possible, which included the ulema in the provinces 
as well as the centre. Such widescale ulema involvement could refer to largescale 
conspiracy from the religious establishment, but on closer examination it rather 
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explains how the Hamidian regime had simply become embroiled in a changing 
Muslim world in which a consciousness within the Muslim educated class had now 
favoured a constitutional style of governance over an authoritarian one. This was not 
unique to the Ottoman devlet as ideas on Islamic/Islamicate constitutionalism were 
promoted as the ideal throughout the Muslim world, as the modern modes of 
connectivity such as the printing press, telegrams and improved modes of travel made 
the networked Muslim world far better connected, as ideas resonated and reflected 
greater accountability from its leadership throughout the Muslim world at the time. 
This chapter shall be divided into the three main junctures regarding ulema 
activity during the Constitutional Revolution in the summer of 1908/1326. These 
three phases not only highlight the ulema’s importance regarding the success of 
political change but also how the ulema in a variety of ways supported the political 
change whether that be as provincial actors in the Balkans, official state actors in the 
imperial centre or social activists throughout the domains as can be seen once the 
decleration of the reinstatement of the constitution was made. It shall be shown that in 
all three junctures the ulema’s actions were instrumental for the successful change to 
be realised and that the success of the revolution was not simply due to Young Turk 
military support, but co-operation by the religious establishment. 
 The first juncture shall examine the role of the ulema in the Macedonian 
provinces, especially their activities in the famous meeting that took place in the 
Ottoman Albanian province in the city of Firzovik (Ferizaj in Albanian, 
or Uroševac in Serbian), which was the largest Muslim gathering in the Balkans in 
late Ottoman history. As shall be explained it was this gathering that swung 
momentum in the favour of the Young Turks of which ulema involvement was in fact 
central for Young Turk success. The second juncture was the role of the Meşihat (the 
office of the Şeyhülislâm, who was the highest ulema official of the Ottoman State) in 
the governmental centre and how integral this office became towards compelling the 
Sultan to reinstate the constitution. The final juncture will present the role of the 
ulema in consolidating the revolutionary aims of the constitutionalist after its 
promulgation of which they were an important part.  
Although much of the material written on the constitutional revolution focuses 
on the Young Turk officer as the key protagonist, placing special attention to the 




mentioned of the importance of the ulema.243 This is not to suggest that the ulema 
were central to the revolutionary activity or to suggest that the Young Turk’s activity 
was not indeed dominant to the political change, as the overwhelming evidence points 
to the centrality of the Young Turk in Macedonia during this period. However, ulema 
activity was indeed vital for the success of the ambitions of the Young Turk to be 
realised. Without the ulema the probabilities of accomplishment were minimal or at 
worst, bloodshed was the likely outcome, especially as this was a turbulent moment 
of much uncertainty in the Hamidian period. Hence, the point of contention is to 
present an inclusive narrative of participation during the constitutional change not 
simply restricted to the narratives of the Young Turk and in fact it could be argued 
that the two constitutional checks of Sultanic authority – the military and ulema- had 
once again formed an alliance to restrict so-called Sultanic authoritarianism. 
In regards to the ulema, during moments of flux and crises in Muslim 
societies the Muslim community often seeks ulema mediation. The Constitutional 
Revolution was such a moment, as the Young Turks appealed to the Muslim 
sensitivities of the Albanians and in particular sought ulema involvement, recognising 
their authority to attain the support of the Muslim masses and being the only authority 
to deligitimise Caliphal authority. It is thus pertinent to evaluate whether Young Turk 
success was facilitated by the ulema, as the revolution initially agitated Muslim 
sensitivities, and the demands were for a constitution that derived from Islam that 
would safeguard the devlet, save the Ottoman Muslim community and revive religion. 
Although the proclaimed slogans during the Constitutional Revolution reflected those 
of the French Revolution of liberté, égalité and fraternité or in Turkish as hürriyet, 
müsavat ve uhuvvet (freedom, equality and fraternity), nonetheless these 
proclamations of belonging to a progressive European world would have 
circumvented many of the Muslims the Young Turks tried to instigate. Instead 
additional traditional Islamic slogans rooted in ulema discourse such as âdalet 
(justice) and meşveret (consultation) reflected a revolution of multiple slogans 
attempting to resonante with multiple audiences. As a result, ulema involvement in 
the narratives should provide an alternate presentation of the Constitutional 
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Revolution and the complex debates regarding inter-Muslim contestation over the 
symbols of authority, legitimacy and faith. 
It is also worth noting that while much of the works on basis of Ottoman 
Constitutionalism have pointed to the earlier intellectual debates of the Young 
Ottomans’ invocation to Islamic political ideals within a modern context, what must 
be stressed is that the ulema were not adverse to such ideas nor were they detached 
from the Muslim thinkers during the Tanzimat period. In many ways they were part 
of the intellectual geneology of both the practice and theorisations of Islam being 
central to constitutionalism, which is testimony to their religious and intellectual 
authority along with the Young Ottomans throughout the mid-nineteenth century.  
Likewise ulema opposition to Hamidian istibdat was not simply due to Young 
Turk influence but once again points to the ulema having their own agency and 
belonging to a lengthy political and scholastic tradition that pre-dated nineteenth 
century activism. Thus, although ulema actions during the Constitutional Revolution 
were as much to do with the conditions of the Hamidian period, nevertheless their 
solicitation to the calls of justice, consultation, council and the Sharia had much to do 
with their own long history of intellectual tradition and their political role within 
Ottoman state and society. Furthermore, while in rhetoric the Young Turk affiliated 
himself with the ideologues of the Young Ottomans or even Grand Vizier of the First 
Constitutional experiment – Midhat Pasha, in reality it was ulema connectivity to the 
Young Ottomans that continued a geneology of constitutional thought and practice 
from the Tanzimat to Second Constitutional Period with members of the ulema such 
as Mûsa Kâzım Efendi and Molla Sahib Efendi as just some examples, who were 
close to the Young Ottomans and also supported the revolution, unlike the Young 
Turk officer who neither met a Young Ottoman thinker nor Midhat Pasha. The point 
of stress is that the ulema as a traditional class were an age-old established institution; 
their centrality to constitutional tradition was far deep rooted in Ottoman history than 
the newly formed movement of the Young Turk. That is not to say that neither the 
Young Ottoman nor the Young Turks had no influence on the ulema, but is to stress 
first that the ulema had always been part of the constitutional traditions of Ottoman 
statecraft, and secondly that the intellectual relationship between the ulema and 
Muslim thinkers/activists should be viewed as a reciprocal relationship where 
influences and activities intermeshed, were shared and there was far more interaction 




of the Constitutional Revolution in 1908/1326 as both past and present came to a 
head in order to protect the future. 
 
The Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326 – The Revolutionary 
Narratives  
 
Revolutions are copiously plentiful for history writing, for narrative, especially for 
the creation of champions, myths and legends. Revolutionaries are presented as 
heroes, idols and symbols who embody the new, the change, who save nations or in 
this case a devlet from a so-called ‘despotic’ regime. Revolutionary narratives are 
often entrenched by euphoria, confusion and chaos, by multiple narratives and actors, 
and yet narratives are often told of the few, in most cases from the perspective of self- 
projected heroes. It comes as no surprise when historical narratives of revolutions are 
restricted to the reflections of the protagonists of the official historiography, as the 
victors of the revolution attempt to navigate legitimacy regarding their aims. The 
narratives of the victors become the official narrative that dominates the possible 
alternatives. In the case of the constitutional revolution, it was deemed as a Young 
Turk revolution, the first ‘revolution’ of its kind in the Ottoman world, which 
introduced the French revolutionary ideals of liberté, égalité and fraternité to the 
devlet. Upon inception of the constitutional change the Young Turks had already 
started to document their accounts and memoirs as the official narrative was 
presented from their point of view.244  
The narratives of the Revolution of 1908/1326 have seldom accounted for 
actors behind the scenes as the soldier with the musket was paraded as the hero, and 
very rarely did the man with the pen or turban find space for his story to be told. The 
manner in which the celebrations of the revolution were enclosed were shrouded by 
the symbolism of the military personal of the Macedonian provinces, especially the 
imagery surrounding the actions of the two military protagonists Niyazi and Enver 
Bey.245 But recently an addition to the studies on the Constitutional Revolution have 
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started to provide a rather complex and detailed account of the Revolution from the 
perspective of alternate actors and peoples. Recent studies on the position of 
minorities have further enhanced our understanding of the multifarious nature of the 
revolution of 1908/1326. The position of Jews, Greeks, Armenians and Arabs have all 
come to light, thus contextualizing the impact of the revolution upon the various 
minorities of the Ottoman domains and their involvement in the endeavour.246 What 
it indicated was an inclusive association that although had mixed result was initially 
supported by the various minority groups with varying degrees of participation. 
Nader Sohrabi also fittingly placed the Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326 
within a series of revolutions around the world such as Iran and Russia as part of a 
second-wave of global constitutional movements in the early twentieth century, 
which have no doubt contributed fruitfully, adding to our understanding of the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326 within a global context.247  
Additionally, it is indeed worth asking how revolutionary ideals evolve after 
and during a revolution. Teleological readings of revolutions are often based on the 
success or failure of revolutions. If successful such as 1908/1326 they are presented 
as positive revolutions for change, yet failure such as the so-called Counter-
revolution of 1909/1327, they are then presented as revolts, this is mainly because the 
victors are the ones who establish the narratives. There can be no doubt that 
revolutions create disorder and this can be seen in the Ottoman context where the 
CUP had actually destabalised local and central authority. When examining the 
historiography of different revolutions worldwide they show the idea of continuity 
between ideas, their diffusion and political change is an established assumption to 
conceive revolutions. But on closer inspection revolutions at the time are far more 
erratic experiences. 248   
Yet, most works continue to focus on the official of the Young Turk mainly 
within the meta-narrative of the Constitutional Revolution being inspired by the 
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French Revolution. Scholars of different assumptions established links to the 
Enlightenment, especially when works were examined from European archives. 
European diplomats for examples not only stressed such points but simply 
emphasised on the military aspect of the revolutionary movement, reducing ulema 
or/and civil activity. 249 Very little mention is given to the importance of the role of 
Islam as a mobilising factor, nor of the ulema that held the highest moral agency 
regarding such an emotional period of religiously inspired rhetoric and symbolism.250 
While the slogans of liberté, égalité and fraternité, nonetheless the Islamic slogans of 
justice (Adâlet), consultation (Meşveret) and the Sharia were also proclaimed, 
creating a space for multiple slogans and symbols to be used in the public sphere. 
According to Şükrü Hanioğlu the Young Turks and their ideas reflected a 
syncreticim. On the one hand they endorsed the ideas of Darwin in understanding 
social life, Gustave Le Bon’s on the psychology of the masses and at the same time 
the mottos of the “liberty, equality and fraternity” on the other. In addition the 
concept of “justice” was also used, derived from Islamic rhetoric in an attempt to 
move the Muslim masses.251   François Georgeon explained that in the wake of the 
Revolution the Young Turks used the four-word slogan ‘Freedom, Equality, Justice 
and Fraternity’, thus inserting justice, a notion rooted in Islamic image, in French 
revolutionary triptych, because they had to justify their actions to rally the Muslim 
masses. 252 It must be added however, that reducing this type of language to simply 
ideals generated by Young Turk activits at the time might negate from how these 
terms had already become interlaced within Tanzimat idealism thus negating away 
from ideals that had already been known by some Muslim sectors of Ottoman society. 
Ālim Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır would later express how these ideals had already existed 
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in the Mecelle which was written in 1876/1293. 253  The interplay and mesh of 
multiple symbols and ideals, some perceived as Islamic and others Western, 
constructed hybrid spaces and paradigms of contestations that exploded into the 
public domain once the relaxation of freedom of speech was introduced in 1908/1326 
after the reinstatement of the constitution. While slogans of freedom were being 
espoused for internal Young Turk consumption and possibly outside utilization, it is 
clear that the average Muslim neither understood nor cared for French Revolutionary 
idealism, instead what motivated them needs further investigation, as it seems more 
practical concerns were on their minds. It is assumed in a period where Western 
ideals became the predominant discourse that the Islamic simply became secondary 
only to reveal its ‘reactionary’ head during the failed Counter-Revolution attempts of 
1909. 254  Yet, the revolutionaries of 1908/1326 didn’t shy away from exploiting 
religious sentiment during the revolt of 1908/1326, in which without some form of 
Muslim co-operation, the success of the revolution hung in the balance.  
It is understood by Şükrü Hanioğlu, Zafer Toprak and Eric Jan Zürcher that 
the Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326 was a Turkish nationalist one, which was 
at the core of the CUP programme. They argued in different ways that the Turkish 
nationalist alternative was the only alternative for the survival of the Ottoman state. 
In particular Hanioğlu’s point that Turkish officers who “had learned to admire the 
nationalist movements against which they were fighting “ requires investigation as 
the revolutionary movements were in the Balkans, 255  especially the Albainian 
Muslims which points to a more complex picture of Albainian Muslim identity 
concerned with thier local struggles as well as the role of the Caliph and Sharia. Thus, 
while Zürcher has gone some way in coining this feeling as “Muslim nationalism”, 
nonetheless on closer inspection, nationalism in this period from the Muslims in the 
Balkans, and the ulema is still not evident either in action or their works and this 
could be a re-reading by historians who have focused on Turkish studies.   
It is also worth viewing the revolutionary activity of 1908/1326 not simply as 
the actions in the three weeks of July in the Macedonian provinces. In many ways the 
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revolts in the Balkan provinces led to a more profound attempt to re-shape the 
governmental structure and society, thus it could be argued from this point that the 
revolt was in fact a revolution. In that sense, the impact of the revolt and manner in 
which the constitution was reinstated subsequently led to the ‘Counter-revolution’ 
due to the fissures created by the CUP’s policies. I argue that the ‘Constitutional 
Revolution’ 256  in July 1908/1326, the resulting celebrations and festivities, the 
reinstatement of the constitution and parliament but now in a different guise to that of 
1876/1293, and the resulting resistance to CUP policies as a counter-revolution that 
led to the dethronement of the Sultan and hurried constitutional amendment, lends to 
the idea that the revolution was a prolonged phase rather than a solitary three week 
moment. Furthermore I reject the implied dichotomy of ‘secular nationalist’ 
revolution of 1908/1326 and ‘Islamic reaction’ of 1909/1327. This is because Islamic 
language was used on both occasions, Muslim actors moved on both occasaions. 
What we instead see is a Muslim movement in 1908 against the Sultan, and then a 
reaction to failed promises by the new government that spiralled into a ‘Counter-
Revolution’ by the disenfranchised factions. Thus, the Constitutional Revolution of 
1908/1326 encompassed processes up until the undertakings of 1909/1237 as well. As 
a result it is worth viewing this is mind as revolutionary activity includes post-
revolutionary activity, contestation and reaction. Revolutions are processes and the 
Constitutional Revolution was no different.   
The Revolution of 1908/1326 also raised issues of terminology at the time, as 
the idea of revolution was indeed somewhat novel for the mass Muslim audience. As 
a result outward celebration of subjugating the Sultan were avoided. Nor was there an 
attempt to antagonise the Islamic sentiment of the large Muslim public. Ottoman 
writers felt it was worth pointing to their readership that the constitutional movement 
was a necessity for state transformation, but not a revolt. In the Ottoman context the 
word used to describe the activities of the revolutionaries was inkılāp, which in its 
literal meaning meant transformation. So problematic was the possibility of this idea 
that in the Arab provinces Unionist and later elected parliamentarian of Jerusalem 
Ruhi al-Khalidi would write a booklet titled “Asbab Al-Inqilab Al-Uthmani Wa-
Turkiyya Al-Fatah“ [The Reason of the Revolution of Young Turkey] that would also 
                                                        
256 If we are to call the revolution of 1908/1326  a constitutional revolution as Sohrabi has, then it is 
my contention that the contestations of the constitutional aspects within the late Hamidian period 
eventually achieved its revolutionary aim by deposing the Sultan, strengthening parliament and 
amending the constitution. Thus the constitutional revolution should be in my view be seen from the 




be serialised in the al-Manar differentiating between the terms thowrā and inkılāp , 
with thowrā257  being presented as a revolt but inkılāp as a transformation from 
istibdāt(authoritarianism) to meşrutiyet(conditional).  Khalidi stressed that the 
Young Officers enacted an inkılāp in order to save the devlet and this was to 
safeguard, religion and state.258 The Arab provinces displayed much loyalty to the 
Sultan as Caliph and the idea that Islam, the Caliph or the Sharia were in threat from 
a revolution was a dangerous prospect. However, just like Khalidi many ulema also 
stressed on the merits of the Young Turk officers and praised them openly as shall be 
explained.  
Revolutions in Muslims societies have rarely, if ever called for a rejection of 
Islamic governance, or to remove Islam from society. One could argue that Islamic 
societies throughout Islamic history have a tradition of ‘revolutionary’ activity, or at 
least a revolutionary component. However, the component is often framed within the 
Islamic paradigmatic structure, not outside of it.259 It is a significant proof of the 
surviving revolutionary resolve of Islamic societies that the great revolutionary 
movements in the Islamic Empires were all movements within the Islamic framework 
to ‘restore’ Islam not to replace or remove it. The rhetoric of July 1908/1326 was no 
different, as the revolutionaries not once antagonised the Islamic emotions of the 
masses. Much of Ottoman society, the political establishment and elites were Muslim, 
and Islam was an integral part of society and political identity. But this question 
becomes of some note simply because of the constant portrayal of the positivist 
inclinations of the revolutionaries, especially framed with the Western values the 
Young Turks idealised.  
One could argue that the Young Turks used the universal appeal of the 
slogans of freedom, equality and fraternity to appease as many audiences as possible, 
both outside and within the Ottoman domains. There is no doubting that the Young 
Turk officers had also internalised the slogans as they eulogised about belonging to 
the civilised world. But to what extent even the Young Turks adoration for French 
idealism resonated with the essence of the revolutionary zeal of the French revolution 
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is vague at best. If anything one would have to assume that their reading of the 
French Revolution was more of a nineteenth century re-reading of the French 
revolutionary past. The problem with rhetorical slogans is that although they can be 
used as a tool to galvanise large peoples based on elusive meanings which every 
sector could take meaning from, they also establish contrary responses as different 
actors, who internalise such slogans for their own meanings adopt them in diverse 
ways. It is then worth asking if the slogans of freedom, equality and fraternity in the 
Ottoman context equated to the same as Western discourse or did the Young Turks 
working within a religious environment adapt its meanings to something palatable to 
the Ottoman world and themselves.  It is also worth asking if the average layman 
understood such terms in the same vain as the Young Turk, or the ālim. It seems 
evident that all within the Ottoman world did not universally understand these 
concepts alike. As these concepts became intellectualised and interacted with the 
traditional class, these concepts started to evolve to more localised meanings rather 
than inherently Western. 
Furthermore, the Young Turk has not been presented as one interested in the 
Islamic but rather in the secular. It has been presented that Islam was simply a tool for 
the Young Turk, an identity perhaps, but not a way of life, a tradition possibly, but 
not a solution. Yet, although studies on the ideals of Young Turk ideologues may 
render one to assume that these perceptions are true, in reality the Muslim Young 
Turk indeed also identified with his Islamic identity and this identity was in continual 
flux and transformation. The Young Turks indeed like the ulema were not a 
homogenous block, nor was their identity. Although the CUP had much influence on 
policy and reform during the Second Constitutional Period, nonetheless, they had to 
deal with the eclectic band of ulema, Muslim intellectuals, and religious oppositional 
forces in the Ottoman domains as well as their own organisation. While ones 
religiosity as an individual may be questioned, it is virtually impossible to attribute 
ones religiosity or lack of religiosity to government policy. The Ottoman devlet’s 
political structure, culture and traditions were far more robust than to attribute it to 
the religious inclination of those simply in governance, this point can be attributed to 
Sultan Abdülhamid as well.   
What makes the Revolution of 1908/1326 further noteworthy is that both 
official state ideology and oppositional activity evoked Islamic language, symbology 




positions. In that sense Islam remained the legitimizing factor for government, 
governance, truth, justice, the good and evil, emotion, public opinion, the past, 
present and future. The Hamidian state had succeeded on fashioning a culture in 
which Islam was the framework of expression within political culture. The 
Revolution rather than diminishing this view had extenuated this culture as the ideal 
sometimes presented was greater than that of the Hamidian regime. One’s religiosity 
became a subject of debate, meritocracy coupled with Islamic idealism was to trump 
Hamidian patronage, good Islamic character was warranted in theory, and bad Islamic 
morals were advocated to remove governors from positions of authority. If the Young 
Turk was going to judge the Sultan and his agents by Islamic language, he too was 
then to be judged by the same yardstick. This was to create an environment in which 
the so-called positivist was to continue to survive in an Islamically sensitive world. It 
is with all this is mind that the revolution must be placed, as the role of religion and 
the blurring of lines provided greater scope for alternative agents bar the Unionists to 
be invested in the constitutional revolution, especially the ulema. 
 
Advent to the Revolution – The Importance of the Muslims of the Balkans 
 
There have been a host of explanations regarding the reasons why in the summer of 
July 1908/1326 the revolution had come into being. The events in the Macedonian 
provinces had become central in the establishment of constitutional rule once again. 
Although oppositional activity to the Hamidian regime was organised, it was also 
sporadic throughout the Ottoman domains and in Europe. It is important to 
investigate how the events in the Balkans in particular were organized, consolidated 
and managed, so that success was achieved. It was the conditions in the Balkans that 
had actualised the change that remarkably held the Sultan to ransom in introducing 
change.260 The Albanian provinces’ impact on the imperial centre was to become 
fundamental to the constitutional change in the Ottoman domains. Young Turk works 
point to a revolution in the making, but a culmination of a favourable environment, 
and the support of Muslim majority in region deciding to eventually support the 
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callers of constitutionalism helped the opposition to achieve the goal it had long 
yearned for. Furthermore ulema support for the constitution across the Empire made 
it possible to curtail Muslim agitation regarding the call for constitutionalism. There 
can be no denying that an element of planning had indeed taken place, even if it 
wasn’t by the intellectuals in exile but rather the activists on the ground in the 
Macedonian provinces. However, there is also a strong case of opportunism, and 
integral regional Muslim support – mainly Albanian – that had made triumph 
attainable. There was indeed surprise from the agents of the Sultan and the foreign 
powers regarding the revolution, indicating that the revolution was an event of 
opportunism, thus this high-risk strategy depended on many variables in favour of the 
insurgency.  
The Ottoman state had attempted to manage the problems in the Balkans 
inherited as protracted from the centralizing attempts of Sultan Mahmud II. The 
competing interests in the region had made the Balkans an area of much contestation 
and conflict. The European powers throughout the late Ottoman period were 
perceived to be interfering with Ottoman suzerainty in the region, becoming a 
principal threat to Ottoman authority. 261  The Macedonian provinces were 
undoubtedly the most heterogeneous in the devlet with diverse internal ethnic and 
confessional identities, along with competing governmental interests of the Austrian-
Hungarians, the Ottomans and Russians as well as the British. After 1878/1295  
Russian influence continued to penetrate the region as not simply Ottoman 
administered regions but Austro-Hungarian too. There was an endeavour to 
indoctrinate the local orthodox Slav populations against the imperial governments as 
a way to strengthen Russian influence. Moreover, the newly established Serbian state 
used the region to smuggle weapons to pliable allies within Ottoman lands. Hamidian 
state policy did indeed emphasise on Islamic symbolism, however, the Austrian-
Hungarians stressed on religious symbolism also, as it increased its influence by 
establishing a network of churches and monasteries that served to disseminate 
Hapsburg Catholic propaganda.262  It should then come as no surprise that religion 
was central to both local identity and imperial ideology.  
 The fate of urban Muslims in the Balkans changed dramatically with the rise 
of predominately ‘Christian’ nation-states who regarded them either as foreigners 
                                                        
261 Anscombe, State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands., pp 90-95. 
262 Isa Blumi, Reinstating the Ottomans : Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800-1912 (New York, 




worthy of expulsion or “as renegade members of the dominant national group who 
needed to be brought back into the fold.” This was a period of much migration, re-
integration and thus led to a trauma that shouldn’t be understated when examining 
Young Turk discourse. Consequently, Balkan Muslims were facing very different 
pressures, stresses and choices than Muslims in the other provinces of the Ottoman 
devlet, as more often Muslims were not usually a majority in the region. The 
emergence of the nation states with ‘Christian’ identities placed the peoples in the 
remaining areas in the difficult position of building distinct identities for themselves, 
as their primary identifications were not national, as religious identification was the 
principal marker. This general situation was complicated further in Macedonia where 
Ottoman loyalty was resilient but changing conditions made some Muslims willing to 
embrace alternatives. As Ellis Burcu has explained about later Balkan Muslim 
identities “the choices facing Muslim minorities were few and all untenable; whether 
they sought territorial unity with a border state, assimilation with the non-Muslim 
majority or with the larger Muslim population with the stronger national identity, 
migration to another country, or seclusion and enclosure in their own worlds, Muslim 
minorities had a difficult time sustaining their vitality”.263 These positions were at 
their formative stage from the nineteenth century onwards. 
By way of emphasising a stronger regionalism by use of religion, the effort 
was to stem European colonial expansionism and strengthen loyalty to the imperial 
governments. The world in 1908/1326 continued to be one based on religious ideals 
and beliefs. It was accepted that the Ottoman State and the competing powers 
invested in mobilising society based on religious ideals to secure through mass 
politics and polity capable of surviving the external and internal challenges of the 
twentieth century. For Ottoman intellectuals and thinkers there was an alarming 
erosion of Ottoman authority in the Balkans in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. Although the Hamidian regime had managed to stem this trend, nonetheless 
during the last decade of the Hamidian regime local conflicts agitated by outside 
agents as well as an increase of banditry activity was common in parts of the Balkan 
region. As a result, when news first broke of the skirmishes in the hills of Resna, the 
Ottomans centre’s response was not one that indicated that they were dealing with 
revolutionary activity as skirmishes and banditry was seen as the norm and was never 
imagined to transform to revolutionary change.   
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In June 1908/1326 news of a meeting being held in Reval between the British 
King, Edward VII and the Russian Tsar, Nikolai II to deal with the Macedonian 
question had agitated Ottoman observers especially in the Balkan provinces. 264 
Continual involvement of foreign powers in the region created an environment of 
much discontent, particularly among the Muslim populations. The gradual loss of 
Greece and Serbia, as well as the nominal position of Bosnia had left the peoples in 
Macedonia to believe that their fate was now in the hands of the foreign powers. The 
late period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans was one of great distress and forfeiture. As 
a result, the support for those willing to emphasise on internal suzerainty was to 
indicate an act of pride and initiative. Both the Ottoman and Austrian regimes felt 
discomfort to the meeting in Reval as Russian and British interest were to further 
complicate Ottoman and Austrian rivalry for local authority in an ever increasing 
unstable region. 265  The Ottoman response was also conflicting; the central 
government although agitated by the meeting and possibly aware of British interests 
in the region, nonetheless took the position of waiting. However, members of the 
Unionists in the region were frustrated by the tepid response and sought greater 
governmental action. The added fear was that the news of British and Russian activity 
would consequently provoke a reaction from Austria.266  Local Muslim sentiment, 
primarily of Albanian Muslim ethnicity, but not solely, was greatly disturbed by 
Austrian encroachment. Thus when news was spread of possible Austrian activity in 
Firzovik, the agitation gathered much pace. 267 
The Sultan himself was in a precarious political dilemma, acceptance of the 
Reval plan would have further alienated the centre from the Macedonian provinces 
and consolidated the fear that the central government was no longer adept to 
safeguard the Ottoman subjects in the Balkan areas. However, rejection of the plan 
would have provided an opportunity for the foreign powers to once again intervene in 
internal Ottoman matters. With a host of genuine perceived threats, those in 
opposition to the Sultan’s regime managed to generate an activism that succeeded to 
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influence doubt in the minds of the Muslim population regarding the centre’s ability 
to fittingly govern in the region, more importantly that the current form of 
governance had not reaped the benefits of safeguarding the interests of the peoples of 
the region and only a constitutional government would suffice. Initially oppositional 
activity mainly evoked the Muslim emotion regarding foreign non-Muslim 
aspirations in these provinces in an attempt to gain popular support they so 
desperately craved. There is no doubting that this was not simply a propaganda 
campaign but a movement that was projecting its own fears to its main constituent. 
Years of oppositional intellectual activity had failed to subjugate the Sultan’s 
authority, but this was soon to change, as fear and scaremongering became the 
rhetorical device to delegitimise the nature of government.   
On July the 3rd 1908/1326, Niyazi Bey took to the hills citing that a 
neighbouring band was in the locality. While the Muslim population was attending 
the Friday prayer Niyazi managed to pilfer some money and ammunition, and mutiny 
against the authority of the Ottoman government for three weeks moving from village 
to village making the claim for change. Along with him Niyazi had taken Hoca 
Cemal Efendi the Mayor of Resne (Belediyesi reisi Hoca Cemal), Tahsin Efendi the 
local tax inspector and Tahir Bey the police commissioner as well as approximately 
200 civilians.268 Niyazi had managed to convince the men of his intention and in 
return they were to administer the proper collection of tax and administer justice.269  
At the same time, while Niyazi had rebelled against central authority, Major 
Enver Bey also took to the hills. Whether coordinated or simply coincidental, it 
created the perception that a movement was being initiated in the Macedonian 
provinces. It is not clear whether Niyazi had been instructed or in fact acted upon his 
own judgment for such a drastic move. According to his own testimony Niyazi Bey 
was disillusioned by the possibility of obtaining support from the Unionists at the 
time and hence took matters into his own hands.270 Starvo Skendi explains that the 
uprising had developed spontaneously as the news was diffused from one unit to 
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another.271 Niyazi had stressed on the Islamic element of the call to gain Muslim 
support also addressing local non-Muslim fears that this was in fact a move against 
the Hamidian order not one against the non-Muslims of the Balkans. Niyazi’s action 
had begun as a revolt, however it was from this moment that the revolution had 
begun. 
 
The Meeting of Firzovik 
 
While much of the discourse has focused on the activities of Niyazi and Enver Bey, it 
must be added that the mass meeting at Firzovik was in fact the turning point that 
forced the Sultan’s hand in re-instating the constitution.272 Firzovik had shifted the 
position of the revolt into the reality of a popular rebellion, as thousands of Muslims 
gathered to discuss the importance of Ottoman governance in the region. It was the 
involvement of the large audience of Muslims and more importantly Muslim 
notables, ulema and tribal leaders at Firzovik that initiated discussion regarding the 
reinstatement of the constitution. With the debates infused with Muslim sentiment 
regarding the fears of the Muslim populations in the regions, the role of the Sharia, 
the meaning of the constitution and loyalty to the Caliph as the protector of the 
Muslims, there is no doubting that the role of the ulema is worth investigating. The 
contestations for Muslim public opinion at Firzovik would become integral for the 
future direction of the reinstatement of the constitution and it is for this reason this 
matter requires much attention.   
Word had spread that a special Austro-German school for children of foreign 
railway workers in Skopje organised a rail excursion and picnic at the garden of 
Hajnilah, near Firzovik.273 Rumormongering had insinuated that this was in fact an 
attempt by outside forces to continue to encroach on Ottoman territory. In actuality 
there was no real proof of the origins of the children and it is probable the Unionists 
exploited the atmosphere of fear. Firzovik, became a centre for what was to transpire 
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as the largest mass gathering in the Balkan regions. A meeting was planned for the 
leading figures that involved mainly the religious leaders, primarily Muslims in 
Prizren to calm the rising tensions that were mounting between Muslim and non-
Muslims.274   
General Şemsi Pasha on authority of the Sultan had collected a large number 
of Albanian troops to address the revolt of Niyazi Bey in Resna. The troops were by 
and large dependable to Abdülhamid II, and Şemsi known for his loyalty to the Sultan 
also represented the ideals of the late Hamidian state ideology. Thus, the initial 
congregation at Firzovik was twofold, the first was a group of disenfranchised 
Muslims who were concerned about Austrian ambitions and the second were troops 
and men of religion and nobility invited to discuss the mutiny with Şemsi Pasha.275  
The situation in the region was starting to become tense, as non-Muslims feared that 
revolt would consequent against them, as they starting to worry that foreign 
encroachment was to compromise their position. In fact it was the scaremongering 
that had turned a perceived threat into an actualised reality, which gradually gathered 
momentum.   
Just as the Sultan assumed the issues in the region would be dispensed, it was 
the Sultan who was to face a heavy blow. There was good reason for the Sultan to 
feel a sense of assurance. Şemsi Pasha was a well-respected officer in the region; he 
was also known to be able to deal with activities such as Niyazi’s revolt. It is almost 
certain that with the troops he had assembled and with the hesitant position of the 
Muslims in the region to move against the central authority, that Niyazi would have 
almost certainly been defeated. As Isa Blumi points out ‘the revolt in Kosovo, as 
much as those surfacing throughout Macedonia, suggests that this was the perfect 
example of the uncommitted majority waiting on the side-lines to see the results of a 
conflict between a local contingency of rebels and the state before taking sides’. 276 
As a result, by the behest of the Unionists in Monastir a decision was made to 
assassinate Şemsi Pasha. A young officer by the name of Akif Bey had nominated 
himself in the name of ‘liberty’ and the ‘fatherland’ to undertake such a task.277 
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Şemsi Pasha was killed by the only bullet that had hit him and was 
pronounced dead an hour later. A loyal servant and symbol of the Sultan’s regime had 
been murdered in broad daylight in front of a whole assembled unit - it was a 
remarkable achievement. The Sultan had indeed lost a key member of his regime, but 
more importantly were the manifestations of what were to transpire from Şemsi’s 
death. It was Şemsi who was given the task to deal with the possible tensions in the 
region and it was Şemsi who was to deal with the revolt and defeat it if required. This 
would no longer happen. Şemsi had assembled both local leaders and military 
personal at Firzovik but with Şemsi now dead and news not arriving of his death, the 
stationed personal at Firzovik became restless. With the crowds growing further and 
further, this was turning into a problematic situation for the Sultan.278 Upon Şemsi’s 
death a telegram was sent to the Palace, the Sultan surprised by the assassination first 
telegraphed Ibrahim Pasha, commander of the Third Army in Salonika, asking if he 
could defeat the rebellion, Ibrahim’s answer was negative as he resigned from his 
position along with the Inspector General for Rumeli, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, followed 
by the vali of Monastir.279 With a last throw of the dice the Sultan turned to another 
member of his loyal unit Mahmud Şevket Pasha to deal with the rising tension 
growing in Firzovik.  
The Unionist however didn’t stop people from coming, whereas many were 
kept in the dark the Mufti of Monastir was aware of the assassination. The Mufti, 
Receb Cûdî Bey said he received news of Şemsi’s assassination but he along with 
many other Albanians were still asked to come to Firzovik. A nervous group asked if 
he was to work for the success of the nation disregarding the dangers. He continued 
that the desire for those gathered at Firzovik was to strengthen the supremacy of the 
state and nation, and elevate religion and the state.280 The Unionist recognised that 
obtaining ulema support was essential for swaying public opinion in their favour as 
Muslims continued to arrive to Firzovik.  
After the death of Şemsi Pasha the Ottoman centre decided to work to calm 
the situation by attempting to negotiate with the crowds rather than crush the revolts 
around the areas. This was a change in style as a policy of deliberation was sought 
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over military action. On July the 8th Mahmud Şevket Pasha who was the governor of 
Kosovo, was asked to deal with the mounting tensions in the region. Şevket, another 
senior statesman of the Hamidian regime and military man was the Sultan’s best hope 
in salvaging the situation. Warnings by the Unionists were sent to Şevket Pasha 
regarding his attempts to side with the Sultan. It is also claimed that this was a time 
when the Unionists had also sent warnings to the ulema to refrain from supporting the 
Hamidian regime in attempting to pacify the callers of constitution.  
Sevket Pasha sent a delegation on July the 8th to attempt to appease the 
masses. He assigned Colonel Galib Bey as the leader of the committee to disperse the 
crowd that had gathered at Firzovik especially as there was no clear pattern of which 
way the crowds were going to sway. The committee comprised of a host of notables 
and members of the ulema. This included the ulema such as Mehmed Arslan Efendi 
the Mufti of Üsküp, Hacı Şaban Efendi, Ipekli Hassan Fehmi, Hafız Receb Efendi 
and Hacı Veysel Efendi of Petrovica. Along with them were Unionists Necib and 
Ferhad Draga  as well as Bajram Curri, Emin Bey of Kalkandelen, Receb Efendi of 
Presova,  Ferhad Bey, and Şerif and Yahya Efendi from Prizren.281   
On the 12th of July the Chaplain (Alay Müftusu)282 who had discovered the 
activities of Niyazi was also assassinated while boarding a train on its way to 
Istanbul. The fact that a senior official and then a member of the religious class were 
murdered were indeed drastic actions that were uncommon during the Hamidian 
period. These were also clear statements of intent, the Unionists were willing to kill 
to achieve their objectives. It would then come as no surprise if Şevket Pasha would 
act in hesitancy before showing his hand on what to do next.  
A further pouring of thousands of Albanian Gegs from the neighbouring 
towns and villages continued to disembark upon Firzovik. As the crowds continued to 
grow the delegation attempted to calm the situation. However, with a sense of 
confusion surrounding the atmosphere the crowd refused to listen. It took much 
persuasion and the use of the religious authority of Hacı Şaban Efendi to convince 
some of the crowds to disperse as the people of leadership and authority attempted to 
address the unrest. It seems with much of the crowd being religious Muslims from the 
Vilayet of Kosovo that if the crowd were to listen to anyone it was only to the ālim as 
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they informed him that more people from the other districts were coming.283 The 
central government itself had asked the ulema to council the people in the Albanian 
provinces. 284  With the absence of Şemsi Pasha, the crowds had now turned the 
gathering into a meeting at Firzovik among them mainly Albanian speaking and 
Muslim tribal notables, ulema and bureaucrats attempted to discuss the future actions 
of the Albanian provinces, as genuine agitation started to increase regarding foreign 
designs for the region. This conference would last 12 days and by mid July 
approximately 6000 people from the neighbouring provinces gathered in Firzovik to 
debate their position concerning the changing political climate of the region. 285 The 
assassinations had shaken the centrality of control of the Sultan’s regime, and unable 
to regulate the telegrams and attain who was a loyal supporter of the Sultan, 
Abdülhamid was in trouble.  
Galib Bey was supposed to quell the crowds but reports suggested that it was 
in fact Galib and the delegation sent by Şevket Pasha that were inciting the crowd 
towards the constitution. Discussions had ensued regarding the situation in relation to 
the picnic, but the crowd then decided to take a besa286 to prevent interethnic killings 
in Kosovo. However, the delegation of which many were Unionists were starting to 
change the type of besa that was going to be taken in line of reinstating the 
constitution. According to Nathalie Clayer, Albanian leaders were in fact manipulated 
by members of the Young Turk.287 
While momentum was gathering in favour of the mutineers, the Sultan unable 
to gain the type of support from his rank and file turned to another source, the local 
leader Isa Boletin. Isa Boletin, a strong local leader and supporter of the existing 
status quo evoked that the constitution equated to disloyalty towards the Sultan.288 
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Such was the environment during the Hamidian reign that the Sultan was perceived as 
the ‘deputy of the faithful’. It would be no understatement to suggest that this 
sensibility resonated with many Muslims who attached themselves to the emotional 
symbols and languages evoked from Islam emphasised during Abdülhamid’s reign. 
This intertwining of the executive with the sacred further touched mass Muslim 
feelings of loyalty towards the Sultan as Caliph.289 A policy during the Hamidian 
period that made it distinct from his predecessors was the appeal of veneration of the 
seat of the Caliphate, a spiritual attachment was placed on the position, one ensued 
with religious rhetoric. Debates ensued, of which, the idea of the return to 
constitutional rule was attached to the safeguarding of the region. The future elected 
parliamentarian Necib Draga, a known Unionist from Üskup/Skopje along with his 
brother Ferhad Draga as well as Bajram Curri argued for the restoration of the 
constitution as a means of addressing the concerns of the population.290 The gathering 
was aimed at the representatives of the people, the Muslim tribal leaders, the notables 
and ulema as the constitution was aimed at their sensibilities to save the ‘ailing’ 
devlet as well as deal with the grievances and disgruntlement of the Muslim public 
opinion that had emerged during the latter part of the Hamidian period.291  
Boletin was an astute local leader and mindful of the emotions that would be 
agitated if a personal attack on the Sultan were to be made.292 Attacking the Sultan 
was presented as tantamount to attacking the sacred, a point that could have had 
serious implications for the pro-constitutionalists. However, the crowds continued to 
gather, as momentum and news was spreading in the provinces of the ideas being 
discussed in the gathering of Firzovik. With Muslim emotion reaching fever pitch it 
took the Mufti of Prishtina, a man according to the British to be of much influence to 
ask the crowd to disperse peacefully.293 The Albanians started to believe that the 
fatherland and religion were in danger.294While discussions were taking place the 
ulema along with the notables had become central to the next course of action that 
was to be taken.   
                                                        
289 Attack on the Sultan was presented as an attack on Islam. 
290 Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution., p277. 
291 Sohrabi, Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran. p40. 
292 Ibid.,p152. 
293 1909 [Cd. 4529] Correspondence respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908. 1909: 
No. 1 (Turkey: Constitutional Movement: Numbered Papers) Vice-Consul Satow to Consul General 
Lamb,Uskup, July 11 1908. The British started to become aware of the idea of a Meclis, but assumed it 
was simply restricted for the Albanian provinces. 




The Unionists continued to devote their time and energy on the Muslim 
sentiment, mainly Albanian which made up a considerable part of the Muslim 
population in Macedonia. Without their support, success was impossible. The 
Muslims gathered at Firzovik, were deeply attached to Islam, its prestige and moral 
authority, and rather than turn to the Unionists they appealed to the notables and 
ulema for council. Many opinions circulated, some were willing to take a besa in 
support of Sultan Abdülhamid, many more were torn between the merits of 
authoritarianism and disloyalty to the Sultan on one hand and support for the 
constitution and possible survival promised with it on the other. 295  Hoca Veysel 
Efendi first encouraged on behalf of the notables to obtain a besa on behalf of the 
Meşrutiyet and Şura.296 Hacı Şaban Efendi, an Albanian elder of great influence, 
persuaded the masses on religious grounds that it was time to reintroduce the 
constitution. He said “[T]o ask for Meşrutiyet (conditional governance) is to ask for 
Meşveret (Consultation)” and he continued it was to ask for the book of Allah 
(Quran).297 He continued in the mosque in Firzovik “the best way to stop the pain 
was ask for a constitution.298 His role became key and it has been suggested that his 
oration had convinced the Muslim public to support the constitution.299 
It was Hacı Şaban Efendi’s decisive action which turned the tide. He argued 
that the constitution explained the rules of the Quran regarding governance and that 
the Meşrutiyet was fully in conformity with the Quran. He further stressed that even if 
people were not convinced nonetheless the Meşrutiyet was good for the people.300 At 
that point another senior ālim Hoca Şerif Efendi required some convincing. They 
continued to debate as Hacı Şaban Efendi laid out his claims. After much deliberation 
Şerif Efendi said he was satisfied, and with that in the mosque of Firzovik where the 
meeting had taken place the committee and the people finally agreed on freedom and 
the Meşrutiyet.  
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According to George Gawrych there seems to have been a division between 
the town notables and ulema, on one side and other chiefs and people on the other.301 
But the assumption that the ulema and notables were against the idea of a constitution 
would indeed be misleading, instead it was as Gawrych has mentioned the ulema and 
notables who were in favour. An attack on the Sultan by the pro-constitutionalists 
was very much avoided and instead most blame was aimed at the Sultan’s mabeyn 
(Office of the Palace).302 Hesitancy seemed more so from the Muslim religious class, 
as maintaining the Sultan in authority and the upholding of the Sharia were the main 
contentions of the discussion.  
After much discussion, Boletin hesitantly backed down; 303  the 
constitutionalists had managed to convince those that were gathered on the merits of 
constitutional discourse, the safeguarding of the Sharia and the position of the Sultan. 
In the end, the Albanians who had gathered to protest against Austrian aspirations, 
which subsequently could have led to internecine killings agreed to take a different 
besa.304 After the prayers in a crowded mosque, brandishing the Holy Quran before 
the crowd it was claimed by the British a local ālim,305 probably Hacı Şaban Efendi 
declared in Firzovik mosque demanding the restoration of the constitution was 
equivalent to demanding the Sharia. On July 20th 1908/1326, following Hacı Şaban 
Efendi’s oration, a telegram from Firzovik, demanded the restoration of the 
constitution.306 Everybody in the Firzovik mosque seemed fascinated that the day 
‘freedom will be proclaimed, [will be the day] where everywhere will be heaven’307 
and it was claimed that intoxication had swept public order. 308  The rest of the 
Albanian notables and ulema present confirmed such a claim, and it was decided to 
take a besa for the restoration of the constitution. 309  Thus, the Kosovar 
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Albanians/Muslims eventually gave a general besa for the restoration of Midhat’s 





It said:  
 
As a result of the meeting assembled on behalf of the people of Kosovo, with the aim to avoid and 
abolish the calamity and devastation that is approaching at present, we concluded that for the 
preservation of the majesty and the power, continuity of the glory and reputation of the country as well 
as the assurance of the prosperity and welfare of the servants of the country, there are no other options 
apart from reenacting the system of consultancy which is a part of the Sunnah and also legitimated by 
Kanun-ı Esasi (The Ottoman Basic Law) which was approved and announced by the imperial edict of 
the Sultan in 7 Zilhicce 1293. As a result of this decision, we decided to request from the Sultan the 
assembly of a national congress in The Gate of Happiness (İstanbul). 
 
Hence, while we are hopeful about the acceptance of our legitimate request, we desire and await the 
acceptance of our honest petition, which will confirm our fidelity, reliability and good will, by the 
imperial decree of the Sultan. By all manner of means, the ultimate judgment belongs to the Sultan.311 
 
It is worth of note that on the last statement the respectable petition professed that the 
final judgement was the Sultan’s. This position would later change once the 
constitution was re-instated. It was signed by all the notables and ulema present, 
which included, Hassan Fehmi, as well as the Mufti of Üsküp, and the other ulema 
such as Hacı Şaban Efendi, Hoca Veysel Efendi, Hoca Adem Sirri, Hoca Abdulbaki 
Efendi, Hoca Mahmud Kamil, and Hoca Abdulahad to name a few.312 In total at least 
180313 people had signed the besa, the Sultan could no longer ignore the events in 
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Macedonia as it was said that from noon to dusk telegrams kept arriving asking for 
the constitution.314  
This was a noteworthy endorsement for the constitutionalists as promptly two 
telegrams were sent to Istanbul, one to the Albanian Grand Vizier Avonyolu Ferid 
Pasha and the other to the Şeyhülislâm, Cemaluddin Efendi, to be forwarded to the 
Sultan.315  The tone of the demands of the “very strong besa” was written in a highly 
respectful tone and adopted a markedly Islamic tone.316 The besa was depicted as a 
patriotic act done in defence of the Sultan, Vatan (fatherland) and out of Muslim 
motivation. They claimed to speak ‘in the name of the devoted people of the Kosova 
vilayet, and to be motivated in the Islamic terms of ‘religion, faith and honour” (din 
ve iman ve namus).317 They further demanded that the promise was made to respect 
the old privalges with regards to taxation, the adherence of the Sharia, the Albainians 
would remain in possesions of arms, and they accepted the inviolability of the 
Sultan.318 Added to that the Albainians stressed on the return of the constitution and 
the application of  “the principle of consultation” and the opening of the 
parliament. 319  The Council of Ministers agreed that due to the degree to which 
conditions had deteriorated it was imperative to restore the constitution without delay. 
According to Tahsin Pasha the news from Firzovik constituted an open threat320, and 
according to the Albanian ex-Grand Vizier İsmail Kemal Bey, the telegram from the 
Albanian provinces produced a great impact upon the Sultan.321  
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Figure 1 - The ālim with the CUP members in this photograph is Hasan Fehmi. This was taken straight 
after the Constitutional Revolution. 
As Crowds started to cheer for the life of liberty and Sultan, Niyazi bey 
publically inaugurated the reign of liberty and fraternity, under the constitution in the 
presence of everybody. The ulema were the first to offer prayers and speeches were 
made to call for unity. 322  In an environment where much of the Muslim public 
reflected devotion to the Sultan, there is no doubting that the significance of the 
ulema’s role in convincing the masses and notables that the constitution was not in 
contradiction with Islam holds sway. Years of ulema oppositional activity found its 
way into the minds of the ulema in the Balkans. The style of governance and its 
merits to religion were an important factor, added to a host of other factors so often 
cited. The turban class from the Albanian/Macedonian provinces had decided to join 
the constitutionalists for the restoration of the constitution, ‘consultation’ and 
parliamentary rule, as the Sultan adopted the last throw of the dice by asking to quash 
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The Meşihat ‘s (Office of the Şeyhülislâm) Role Becomes Important 
 
While the ulema of the Albanian provinces had clearly agreed upon by consensus that 
they were now supporting the implementation of the constitutional order, events in 
the imperial centre needed to go in the way of the Unionists if they were to succeed. 
In the centre there were neither agitators nor military presence that could coerce the 
men of influence. Their dependency was on the basis that their activities in the 
Macedonian provinces would provide the necessary pressure that would force the 
Sultan to re-instate the constitution. They had not yet marched their way to Istanbul, 
and their claim of the re-instating of the constitution rested in the hands of a few 
within the capital.  
Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha had been informed as early as May of 1908/1326 
that there was a conspiracy taking place in Macedonia, but with the absence of the 
evident facts to prove this point, he decided to first attain the relevant information. 
Upon receiving the telegram from Firzovik, Ferid turned to the Sultan to tell him to 
re-instate the constitution, but to no avail as the Sultan still clutched to the hope that a 
reform package presented in the region would suffice. 323   Ferid subsequently 
resigned324 , as the Sultan offered the position to Kamil Pasha. However, Kamil 
placed conditions deemed unacceptable for the Sultan, hence the Sultan then turned to 
Said Pasha who now took office from Ferid, as the Sultan hoped that Mahmud Şevket 
Pasha would thwart the rebellion. The Sultan sent council from ex-Grand Vizier 
İsmail Kamil Pasha, another Albanian from Avyon on his thoughts, İsmail concurred 
for the Sultan to embrace the constitution. 325 The Sultan still hesitant waited on news 
from Şevket, but if the Sultan was expecting positive news from Üsküp/Skopje he 
was to be disappointed. One by one, the close aids of the Sultan were confirming that 
the reinstatement of the constitution was the only solution to the problem at hand. 
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  In an attempt to quail the march towards Istanbul the Sultan applied for a fetva 
to crush the rebellious forces. The Sultan asked for the Third Army corps stationed in 
Salonika to be ready. But there was hesitancy from the political advisors and religious 
class as they became concerned with Muslim upon Muslim conflict within the 
Ottoman domains. The fetva-emini326 Nuri Efendi was sent a request by the Palace to 
deal with the problems in Macedonia. The fetva-emini asked for clarification before 
simply rubber-stamping a fetva in favour of the Sultan, as the situation was complex 
and Nuri was probably aware of the telegrams being sent from the Albanian 
provinces. The question put forward by the Sultan’s office was as such: “Is war 
justifiable against Muslim soldiers that rebel against the sovereign authority?” The 
question needed to be addressed delicately as initially there was an attempt to 
categorise the rebellion in the Macedonian provinces as an insurrection. The offence 
of baghy327 had legitimacy in Islamic law for a serious punishment. But unlike the 
Wahabbist action that was crushed by Mehmed Ali Pasha during the earlier part of 
the nineteenth century, the constitutional movement was no longer deemed such an 
action. When the actions were simply of Niyazi and Enver’s revolt, the Sultan and his 
office could have pressed the argument, but after the public declaration in Firzovik 
this could no longer be the case in law. There was a long tradition within Islamic 
discourse regarding the treatment of a state towards a rebelling party. There is 
generally an emphasis in the juristic culture on political obedience. This was also the 
case during the Hamidian period, and so a resistance on the part of Nuri Efendi would 
suggest that the office of the Meşihat was conspiring against the Sultan. However, on 
closer inspection there is also a culture within Islamic tradition recognising the 
complexity of rebellion and Nuri’s insistence on obtaining the facts was evident that 
he was a serious practitioner of the law.328  
Once again the fetva-emini’s court asked for a statements of facts that 
included the demands of the discontented before providing a decision. If the Sultan 
felt confident that the decision was to go his way, he was in for a surprise as the fetva-
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emini deemed that the Sultan was not permitted to send troops to crush the rebellion 
based on their demands, which was mainly the return of the constitution.329 It seems 
clear that the telegrams from Firzovik had made their impact and accusation of 
conspiracy from Nuri as a Unionist would be unfounded as Nuri in 1909/1327 was 
reluctant to write a fetva supporting the deposition of Abdülhamid. It seems fair to 
suggest that Nuri Efendi was indeed a loyal servant of state and religion, and applied 
the law how he saw fit. Sir Edwin Pears expressed about Nuri Efendi the fetva-emini 
by saying: 
 
I had the pleasure of knowing the Fetve Eminé at the time. He is usually a judge occupying a lofty 
position and a man of ability and character. The actual occupant had the confidence of all Moslems in 
Turkey on account of his piety and independence…….He was a very old man, probably eighty-five, 
but was universally respected as one who cared nothing for the judgment of men, be they Sultans, 
Ministers, or paupers. Accordingly, when Abdul Hamid asked for the fetva, both sides held their breath 
in expectation of what the decision would be. After he had obtained the demands of the troops and 
fuller explanation of the facts, he gave his answer. Substantially it was that the demands for reforms 
for the redress of grievances and for government by Representative Chamber were not against the 
Sacred Law, and consequently if the demand for a fetva were pressed it could not sanction the war by 
Moslems against Moslems.330 
 
While the advisors of the Sultan such as Ferid Pasha had told the Sultan to reinstate 
the constitution, Abdülhamid still remained hesitant, but the office of the Meşihat was 
now resonating the same message. The Sultan had always been aware of the nature of 
the office of Meşihat. Traditionally the ulema had often supported constitutionalism 
over authoritarianism. It is true that his first Şeyhülislâm Esad Efendi had supported a 
more authoritarian position but the next Bodrumlu Ömer Efendi was more of a 
constitutionalist. When Cemaleddin Efendi came to the office, although there were 
rumours of him supporting constitutionalism, nonetheless as Şeyhülislâm he managed 
to balance his roles without antagonising any of the factions. When news of the 
telegrams and then the request for a fetva arrived, both the Unionists and Palace held 
their breath in waiting which way Cemaleddin would sway. His often non-committal 
style of leadership would later receive much criticism, but it is testimony of his own 
ability that he was the longest serving Şeyhülislâm during the Hamidian era. 
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According to Tahsin Pasha, Cemaleddin was one of the strongest Şeyhülislâm’s 
during the Hamidian era who used to inform them of the affairs of the Meşihat prior 
to becoming Şeyhülislâm. Although Tahsin Pasha questioned his qualifications, he 
nonetheless accepted that Cemaleddin’s ability to hold the post for 17 years was 
testimony of his competency. He also pointed that even though his position was 
always under threat nonetheless the Sultan trusted him.331 As the sides waited for his 
verdict it is said by Sulaiman Bustani who quoted Cemaluddin Efendi, when asked by 
the Sultan to issue a fetva against the insurgents he answered on the contrary ‘grant 
them the constitution because it is compatible with the honoured Sharia’.332 
The office of Meşihat had made a stand and both Cemaleddin Efendi and Nuri 
Efendi made a decision less so on political aspiration but more so on religious and 
practical grounds. One foreign journalist went even as far as suggesting that: 
 
One thing is certain, and must be set down to his credit. It is largely due to this man [Sheikh-ul Islam 
Cemaleddin Effenid] that the Revolution was bloodless. When the Committee’s ultimatum reached the 
Sultan, all the possibilities of the desperate situation were eagerly considered by the Council of 
Ministers. Things were looking bad for the despotism; yet, if the interpreter of the Sacred Law could 
have been prevailed on to accuse the rebels of a breach of that law, all might yet be saved. Against 
men branded with the charge of impiety it might be easy to raise up a popular reaction; to stir the mob 
of Stamboul, to appeal to the Arabs of the Hedjaz and the Yemen, to drive the fierce Albanians, in 
spite of the Committee’s tampering, down from their hill-fortresses upon the plains of Macedonia. I do 
not believe that, if the Sheikh’s momentous decision had gone against the liberal moment, it would 
have ushered in the Revolution in a dawn of sanguinary conflict, and left behind it a legacy of hatred 
and danger. The Sheikh did not hesitate; he did not compromise; he came out boldly with this decision 
that liberalism and the law of Islam; and the Sultan gave way.333 
 
Sheikh Rashid Rida of Damascus in his journal publication al-Manar on July 28th, 
1908/1326 also noted: 
 
In this context, the role of the Şeyhülislam Cemaleddin Efendi, the foremost Muslim official in the 
devlet at the time, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution was paramount, indeed, some reports 
credited the Şeyhülislam far more than the Sultan. According to various accounts, Cemaleddin was 
extremely supportive of the new constitutional order and personally conveyed his ruling to 
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Abdülhamid II that the constitution was congruous with Islamic law, the Sharia. Public reports cited 
Cemaleddin as telling the Sultan that the day of announcement of the constitution would be “engraved 
on the bosom of each shaykh and priest. 334  
 
Realising his precarious position it is said that the Sultan turned to his close confidant 
and spiritual advisor Sheikh Abu Huda al-Sayyadi for counsel. But such was the 
current and support for the constitution that the Sheikh from Aleppo tentatively 
himself provided a fetva suggesting that the constitution was in the spirit of Islam.335 
The ‘Constitutional Revolution’ didn’t simply lie in the strength of the movements 
military might, nor their ideological position. In essence, a real perceived threat from 
foreign powers, a possible course of chaos, and an insistence that the status quo of 
both the Sharia and Sultan being mainstays of the current regime, meant that many of 
the old guard that included Mahmud Şevket Pasha, Ferid Pasha, Kamil Pasha, İsmail 
Kamil Pasha, Cemaleddin Efendi and Nuri Efendi as well as the ulema and notables 
in the Albanian provinces who had supported the Sultan throughout his reign, were 
willing to attempt a different course of action. On July 22nd the battalions sent to 
crush the revolt instead joined them. The Sultan’s resistance was futile; the writing 
had been on the wall. His reform package rejected, his ability and right to crush the 
rebellion also rejected, the Sultan was left with no real choice.336 
The Sultan finally yielded expressing his desire for the constitution to be re-
instated. After the promulgation of the constitution, the construction process began. 
Both Niyazi and Enver became symbols of the military struggle against the Sultan’s 
regime. The narrative often presented by historians is of such, simply due to the fact 
that the Young Turks themselves reconstructed so many of the memories of the 
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‘revolutionary’ activity. On closer inspection however, Muslim support in the 
Macedonian provinces, military mutiny due to arrears in pay, and fundamental loss of 
support from key personal had in fact allowed the revolution to become reality. This 
was then neither a popular revolution nor a military coup. In fact it was a dramatic 
unravelling of the Sultan’s authority by those although sceptical still willing to 
support the rhetoric of constitutionalism. Force was not going to stop the mutiny, 
neither were concessions for reform. The ulema too had played their part, both in the 
Macedonian provinces by providing their support for the constitutionalists, and in the 
centre, by curtailing and advising the Sultan towards accepting the change. The 
constitution was restored, but now the public reaction was to be determind.  
 
The Constitution Restored – The Ulema Show their Hand 
 
During the first few weeks of celebrations, behind the scenes many members of the 
ulema were coming to terms with the new reality that was unfolding in front of them. 
It was natural that there was a level of hesitancy from the ulema and wider society. 
For 33 years all that many had known was the authoritarian rule of the Hamidian 
regime. A sudden wave of euphoria had several caught up in the theatrics of the 
festivities. There were a host of ulema at the time that genuinely viewed the CUP as 
the saviors of the devlet, vanguards of a new political structure, and moved to either 
join the CUP on its membership or at least openly praise the bastions of the 
revolutionary order and the constitution. There was no real reason to critique the CUP 
as suggestion that the CUP where either secularists or against Islam weren’t evident 
in their public declarations.337 Ālim Mustafa Sabri publically thanked the CUP for the 
re-instatement of the constitutional order, and suggested that the ulema’s role should 
be to practice “their duty to guide the executive branch of government”.338 In the 
ulema journals such as the Beyan’ül-Hak, Sırâtımüstakīm and al-Manar we see 
similar sentiments from ulema members praising the CUP for reinstating the 
constitution. Ālim and Naqshabandi Sheikh, Ömer Ziyâeddin Dağıstânî although a 
conservative supporter of the Sultan also wrote in the muhtira (memorandum) section 
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of his pamphlet titled Hadis-i Erbain fi Hukuki’s-Selatin (Forty Hadith on the Rule of 
the Sultan), written just after the revolution in 1908/1326, praising the proclamation 
of the constitution, opening of parliament and formation of freedom, justice, equity, 
fraternity, and the opening of the Şura-yi ummet (Council of Ummah) by the grace of 
the CUP and the noble Ottoman nation. He first praised and thanked Allah, then the 
CUP, then the opening of the new institutions and then the Sultan.339 Sheikh Mûsa 
Kâzım hailed the success of the revolution which had been presented as a success for 
the Ottoman people, religion and the Sultan. The vanguards of this success were the 
Young Turks, mainly the ‘noble’ military personal who risked all for the safeguarding 
of the devlet. Mûsa Kâzım stressed on the inclusivity of all Ottomans as he further 
professed the merits of equality.340 During the inception of the constitutional success, 
the Young Turk’s actions were celebrated across the Ottoman domains. Sheikh 
Abdullah al-Alami from Gazza would also praise the CUP in his work Azam Tidhkar 
lil-Uthmaniyyin al Ahrar aw al Hurriyya wal-Musawa wal Mabuthan min Ta’alim al-
Quran [The most Significant Commemoration for the Free Ottomans for Freedom, 
Equality and the Parliament are from the Precepts of the Qur’an] by saying: 
 
Thanks to the works of the CUP, keenness of the triumphant Ottoman army, and the acceptance of his 
highness our victorious Sultan Abdulhamid, the Ottoman nation has attained the bless of a constitution, 
ergo became in those aforementioned gentlemen’s debt and served to them in a manner that whenever 
it is mentioned, should be rightfully thanked. And while serving the people is one of the greatest 
services, and that every human being should have a share in this regard (the sentence is grammatically 
incomplete). Yet, I have never been one of the sword bearers, nor one of the pen holders. I pleasantly 
chose to offer a service—of what feeble person like myself can afford. So, hopefully, may I have one 
bucket out of those buckets. Therefore, I created this tablet (meaning letter in this context) showing 
that equality and freedom are from the wise teachings of the Book, and explaining the meaning of 
freedom which has triggered misunderstanding not from a handful of people, but from the large 
masses. And this is an objective that the worthless worshiper cannot aim to fulfill.341 
 
There was a general consensus by ulema of different inclinations to praise the efforts 
of the Young Turks. But as one scholar has pointed out that CUP supporter Sheikh 
Mûsa Kâzım was quick to remind the CUP of the authority of the Caliphate and in 
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particular the Caliph.342 Ömer Fezvi too had mentioned that some of the ulema were 
concerned of the role of the CUP.343 There is no doubting that although the success of 
the Young Turks actions had brought in the reinstatement of the constitution, 
however it had also brought in a sentiment of uncertainty as the Young Turks were 
still an unknown quantity who had never served in government. 
During this period of relative freedom, the CUP enjoyed great support from 
the general ulema ranks. In Syria and Egypt it was said that the Syrian branch of the 
CUP had considerable support from the ulema in those regions. 344  In Istanbul, 
Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Mustafa Âsım Efendi, Hamdi Yazır fulfilled their vow as 
members of the ulema association to support the CUP and became members of the 
parliamentary group of the CUP, this was also reflected by senior ulema Mûsa Kâzım 
and Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı Efendi, who would also be elected senators in the 
Meclis-i Ayan in 1908/1326. In the Balad al-Sham region Abdulhamid Zahrawi 
would immediately make his way to his home city of Hama in Syria on the CUP 
ticket, as many members of the ulema at this initial stage believed the merits of the 
revolution, the return of the constitution and the CUP as the bastions of positive 
change. In Damascus Sheikh Jamaluddin al-Qasimi and in Palestine Sheikh 
Muhammad Shakir Diaby al- Baytuni all proselytized on behalf of an Islamic 
constitutionalism in the mosques and town centres345 and in Beirut vows were made 
to uphold the constitution. 346  The constitution was quickly being constructed to 
becoming the foundational text of the religious context of freedom. In the Arab 
provinces the constitution was being talked of in religious terms in which it was 
referred to as the precious constitution (al-dustur al-kerim) and the holy constitution 
(al-dustur al-muqaddas).347 The Şeyhülislâm himself was quick to point to the new 
found constitutionalism were for the new conditions of the devlet as he stated in an 
interview to a British reporter: 
 
The Constitution of to-day is a different thing altogether from the Constitution of 1876. That was a 
sham; its authors did not mean it to last. This is a reality. The people are ready for it; it will remain.” 
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The reporter asks “But is a real constitutional government permitted by the law of Islam?” 
 
The Sheikh ul-Islam replies “Permitted? It is more liberal than the Constitution itself.” 
 
The reporter continues,  “Then the influence of the Church [Here means Meşihat] will be in its 
favour?” 
 
The Sheikh ul-Islam responds, “Certainly. Our Law, rightly interpreted, is in accordance with the 
principles of representative government. The wisest men, chosen by the people are to direct the ruler, 
and if he rules without their consent he is going beyond his power. I go further and say that, now that 
this principle has been embodied in the law of the Constitution, that the law itself is included in the law 
of Islam. It becomes binding upon those who profess Islam. Especially those who are called to lead, 
our ulema, are bound to help actively in carrying out the Constitution.348 
 
According to Zafer Tunaya the ‘Islamists’ 349  had access to the state/Islamic 
institutions and were able to mobilise better than any other faction within Ottoman 
polity. For Tunaya ‘there can be no doubting that their positions were instrumental in 
formulating local, social, religious, domestic and foreign policy’. 350  A foreign 
journalist at the time spoke approvingly of the ulema of Istanbul by saying “It is they 
who have achieved the remarkable feat of convincing themselves and many other 
countrymen that the best theoretical sanctions for a Constitution is to be found in the 
Koran, that despotism is a flagrant violation of the teachings of that principle, and 
that the spirit of Islam is in power of the democratic government”.351 Some scholars 
have argued that after the revolution the official state Islamic hierarchy took a leading 
role in supporting and propagating the revolutionary principles. As we have seen, this 
attitude begun with the top tier; the Şeyhülislâm, who repeatedly stated, “the law of 
Islam is more liberal than the constitution itself” and the constitution was binding 
upon those who profess Islam”.352 In the Balkans Manastarli İsmail Hakkı Efendi was 
asked to lead a committee and return to explain the merits of the constitution. In 
August 1908/1326 the CUP for the purpose of founding branches in Albania also sent 
Hoca Vildan Efendi from Dilber. The next day Hoca Vildan attacked the old regime, 
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praised the constitution and union amoung Albanians, Muslims and Christians.353 
Even in the Kurdish regions large crowds gathered to listen to Said Nursi explain that 
the constitution was in conjunction from Islam and that it would provide equality and 
freedom to all.354 
Istanbul was now becoming a hub where members of the ulema from around 
the provinces were arriving to the imperial centre to determine the nature of the new 
change in regime. Invitations were made to the masses and ulema alike to listen to the 
senior ulema explain in the mosques of the merits of the constitution.355 While some 
may have been in favour of the constitutional change others feared that a shift in 
political culture to be a situation of concern that required immediate attention. Ömer 
Ziyâeddin Dağıstânî was one such scholar who would leave his post in Edirne to 
arrive to the centre to see the happenings that were taking place, many just like him 
would do the same as the ulema presence in the city increased. Although Western 
journals were often quick to call the ulema reactionaries, one article in the Times 
pointed to the idea that the ulema were ‘proving themselves the sanest and most 
liberal politicians of the Empire’. The reporter continued: 
 
I said to myself: All is up with constitutionalism in Turkey. Those turbaned priests will never allow 
that the Christian dog is their equal. Since that time, I have learnt that there are no priests in Islam, and 
furthermore, that the hodjas, mullahs and dervishes, who are generally grouped for convenience sake 
under that familiar designation, are the sanest and most liberal politician in the Ottoman Empire. In a 
great meeting which took place in the mosque of Sultan Ahmed, Stanboul, just before the parliament 
opened, the two most advances orators were mullahs. 
 
“You have been told, my children”, said one old white-bearded ulema, whose green turban proclaimed 
him a descendent of the Prophet; “You have been told that we ecclesiastics are the enemies of liberty. 
Whoever says so, lies”. 356 
 
On the first week of August a first meeting took place in the Beyazit mosque in 
Istanbul, open to all in which the ulema discussed and argued about constitutional 
theory and the issues concerning the ulema of which Mustafa Sabri was a key 
protagonist. It had taken almost three weeks since the proclamation of the constitution 
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when the ulema in the Beyazit meeting decided to establish an association called the 
Cemiyet-i ittihadiye-i ilmiye (The Unionist Association of the Ulema).357 A second 
and larger gathering in the following week on August the 13th was attended by 
hundreds of ulema and medressa students, where administrators were elected for the 
association and its newspaper organ and mouthpiece Beyan’ül-Hak.358  
 
The Times of England explained of this event: 
 
“A large body of the ulema and softas met yesterday at the Beyazit mosque and drew up a report to the 
effect that the Constitution of 1876 in in entire conformity with the Sacred Law. I understand that all 
the ulema and softas have taken an oath to the constitution and declared their complete agreement with 
the ideas and the actions of the Committee of Union and Progress”359 
 
An accompanying circular proclaimed the association’s full support of the revolution 
and its conformity with the Islamic law and constitutionalism. It seems that although 
much euphoria had taken place on the streets, yet behind the scenes thorough debates 
were being undertaken within the ulema circles. The newly found ulema organisation 
emphasised it would work with the CUP towards the promotion of religious laws, 
constitutional principles and Islamic morality.360 Mehmed Fetin wrote in the first 
edition of the Beyan’ül-Hak journal the three main aims of the Cemiyet were firstly, 
political and patriotic and directly associated with the Osmanli ittihad ve tarraki. The 
association would follow the path of the CUP to create an environment for all 
Ottomans for mutual happiness. The second was regarding the ilmiye so that they 
could work on the medressa in Istanbul and the provinces to improve them. And 
finally - religious (diniye) where the association would work to provide information 
on Islam to the Muslim public and in some towns they would have circles to educate 
the people as they felt there was a misconception regarding Islam and they [ulema] 
would work to address it.361 But the role of the Cemiyet would not only attempt to 
establish the implementation of these three points, it seems quite evident that the 
Cemiyet was also attempting to create an organisation that would work as a check on 
the authority of the institution of the Meşihat. Although Cemaluddin Efendi had not 
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been aggressively tarnished for blame for Hamidian ‘autocracy’, nonetheless there 
were many in the ulema ranks who took exception to the Meşihat’s inactivity to 
adequately address the needs of the ilmiye system, thus in this moment of 
administrative transformation in the Ottoman devlet, the Cemiyet came into existence 
as an alternate powerbase in the capital regarding ulema authority.   
In the Syrian Arab provinces on August the 6th, the Arab Renaissance Society 
lauded that the only speech that came to them was by Salah al-Din al Qasimi entitled 
“the Turkish Firman” in which he celebrated the new age of freedom, justice and 
progress based on constitutional government.  Salim al-Kuzbari, a prominent Sheikh 
invited leaders of the CUP and fellow ulema and notables to his home. According to 
David Commins the list of invited ‘read like a dictionary of Damascene notables’. 
With all in attendance, Qasim al-Qasimi read a speech written by Jamaluddin al- 
Qasimi titled “The status of the constitution in religion”. The speech was designed for 
all those including the ulema that were sceptical or had spoken against the 
constitution on the grounds that it would abrogate the Sharia and institute laws of 
human invention. Instead Qasimi argued that the constitutional government would 
harmonise with Islamic principle. Qasimi began by stating that the constitution 
resembled precepts of jurisprudence in that both are derived by ijtihad and extracted 
from the Quran and Sunna, ijmah and qiyas. To support his position, he cited recent 
authorities that had written that religious precepts could underpin constitutional law. 
For the sake of the ulema in the audience, Qasimi referred to classical authorities that 
had used general principles from religious law and considered the welfare of the 
people and attested harmful things. For Qasimi the constitution would provide a way 
to uphold these general principles. He finally closed his speech to the ulema and 
notables by telling them to adhere to the religion of Islam with resolve, “for by 
religious success is strengthened and salvation completed”. He continued that the 
notables and ulema to join in common effort to strengthen and advance the 
homeland.363  
Leading from the front the Şeyhülislâm Cemaleddin Efendi was one of the 
first to enact in this symbolic gesture of presenting that the Constitution was not only 
Islamic but its designs were not to marginalize any other Ottoman subject but to bring 
all Ottomans closer together, in loyalty to the Ottoman State. Sheikh Rashid Rida 
                                                        




would continue to facilitate the atmosphere of festivities both in his actions and words 
when he said: 
 
They say that France is the mother of liberty and equality, yes and no, but the Ottomans are worthier 
than the French in the glory of equality. France is one nation, one race, one religion, one sect, one 
language, and one civilisation. So what is strange in the demand of their workmen for equality between 
their individuals, after honouring what their government demands and what they owe it and [that] they 
will agree on its unity? 
 
But we Ottomans have already united from the different nationalities in a way that has not yet 
happened in any other kingdom. We are different in race, descent, languages, religion, sect, education 
and culture, or we can say we differ in everything that people can differ in, but despite that we demand 
equality and celebrate its granting in general covenant and in places no doubt and no doubt in this 
magazine.366  
 
Rida, recognised the complexities of the Ottoman project, but believed that both 
Muslims and non-Muslims could co-exist and rather better than the French 
experience. Supporters of the new constitutional change also viewed the Western 
powers arrogance towards Ottoman success with real contempt. This was indeed a 
reflection of the elation of revolutionary euphoria, but while Rida shared his 
optimism with the Young Turks, other ulema attitudes held a position of caution. 
Emphasising equality and fraternity were not to forge an identity to replace existing 




                                                        





Figure 2: Picture of an ālim waving an Ottoman flag after the decleration of the constitution in 


















Chapter 3 – The Ulema’s Intellectual Arguments Regarding 
Constitutionalism 
 
The Opening of Pandora’s Box  
 
This chapter shall examine the ideas and theorisation of the ulema regarding 
constitutionalism from the perspective of their scholarly traditionalism. The ulema 
not only became visible and integral to the changing political conditions as social and 
political actors, but were also central to the consolidation of constitutional theory in 
theorising the merits of constitutional discourse within their own tradition, public 
consumption and political structure. What makes the ulema significant is not simply 
their role in the ilmiyye but in fact their authority regarding Islamic 
intellectual/legal/theological ideas that come from the Islamic tradition. Furthermore 
their belonging to a class that had its own culture of learning, also made them distinct, 
with this chapter placing special attention to this aspect of the ulema’s identity. While 
works still continue to focus on the secular367, it seems evident that the ulema were 
not simply justifying political ideals but inherently believed in them as part of a 
transformative process arising from their own traditions.368 It was during this period 
that no longer was there a contestation of istibdat vs meşrütiyet; as by now 
constitutionalism having become fully institutionalised- or atleast accepted in 
rethoric, instead a contestation took place regarding the conditions or style of the 
constitution. This is because there were supporters of an autocratic constitution who 
argued that indeed a constitution may be adopted, but where unwilling to give up on 
the political status quo. As Kara has explained, meşrütiyet was being discussed as a 
political concept as well as a form of governance.369 Thus, the ulema used the various 
platforms provided to institutionalise the idea of constitutional theory, in which many 
publications were made regarding this matter. The publications themselves indicate 
how Ottoman public opinion became an important tool for the political and religious 
class. To what extent the masses were invested in the project of constitutionalism is 
hard to tell. One may argue that the images of celebrations could point to the feelings 
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of the masses, however one needs to be a little sceptical of such constructed hysteria. 
Nonetheless it could be argued that a perception from the educated class along with 
the environment from the revolutionary emotions and symbols created a perception 
that public opinion was indeed important. 
This chapter shall be broken down into three main components. The first 
section shall focus on the theorisation of and contestation over the conception of 
constitutionalism itself within the works of the ulema. Upon the reinstatement of the 
constitution of 1908/1326, the ulema’s thoughts and ideas became available to the 
public, as part of a greater initiative under press freedom. While ulema thoughts in 
the Hamidian period were restricted, the plethora of ideas during the post-
revolutionary phase point to the constitutional debates that were not simply reflective 
of the revolution but also of the earlier Hamidian debates from 1895/1312 as these 
ideas across the devlet could not have simply been formulated during the short 
months after the revolution- in fact it is also worth arguing that these arguments had a 
discursive nature that went beyond the Hamidian period itself. However, we can 
safely say that these ideas emanated during the Hamidian and then evolved and 
manifested into a plethora or ideals due to the conditions of the revolution. What is 
also worth of note is that these ideas didn’t soley reflect the modern as Malcolm Kerr 
has assumed 370 , but as mentioned maintained their links to a traditional juristic 
culture of ulema political ideas that went farther back than the nineteenth century.371 
This section of the chapter shall represent how the ulema’s ideas maintained an 
attachment to Islam being a discursive tradition of which political transformation are 
a part, as these ideas transformed as the devlet’s political and social conditions did.  
The second part of the chapter is to examine the revolutionary ideas inspired 
from the French Revolution such as freedom, equality and fraternity as well as the 
Islamic ideal of justice. While there is no doubt that these ideas resonate with the 
French Revolution, nonetheless the ulema’s ideas regarding these new conceptions 
were in fact to curtail and regulate the meanings, to the conditions of religion and the 
political requirements of the Ottoman polity. In particular the Ottoman Constitution 
would be presented as a consensus of the Ottoman political polity to regulate the 
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revolutionary slogans to ideas that were more inherent to Ottoman traditions and 
Islam.  
Lastly the final section of this chapter is to examine the Muaddal Kânûn-ı 
Esâsî ve İntihab-ı Mebûsân Kânûnu, which was the draft constitution presented to the 
parliament for deliberation in 1909 after the failed “counter revolutionary” attempt. A 
recent study by Susan Gunasti has done much to enhance the importance of both the 
document and the deliberation process. 372 Indeed, Gunasti’s contribution has done 
much to support this part of the chapter. However, in this chapter rather than 
restricting the process to the ideas of the ālim Hamdi Yazır as has been done in 
Gunasti’s case, it shall be explained how the thoughts of the document were reflective 
of a wider ulema trend across the region regarding Ottoman Constitutionalism. It will 
be explained how the drafting process of the Muaddal Kânûn-ı Esâsî was indeed a 
culmination of ulema influence and the centrality of the ideals of Şura and Meşveret.  
Further more a point worth noting in this chapter is that while some academics 
have spoken of a modern Islamic constitutional process or indeed parliament as 
abstract ideals devoid of any historical precedent373, others have located its basis in 
nineteenth century Islamic political thought, but neglected the Ottoman ulema’s 
efforts in the imperial centre and the greater Ottoman narrative. The narratives were 
not merely neglectful but also restricted nineteenth and twentieth century ulema 
formations to Arabist reformist ulema such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid 
Rida374, or to the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent such as Muhammad Iqbal375 or 
Abu’l-Kalam Azad.376 However, scholars and thinkers of the Arab world and Indian 
sub-continent were indeed products of the Muslim transnational/transregional world 
of which the Ottoman devlet - the last Caliphate - was the centre. While it is true that 
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ideas such as consultation and consensus have been examined by the likes of Rida,377 
or Iqbal, what hasn’t been presented is that the Ottoman ulema had actively initiated 
the process in 1908-1909/1326-1327. These practices where not simply theoretical 
but actual, as the academic Khaled Abou el-Fadl expressed that constitutionalism is 
not an abstract ideal but requires practice.378 If the constitutional amendments are 
placed within the ulema ideas and practices of 1908/1326 one may realise that the 
ulema of 1908-1909/1326-1327 were not simply theorising ideas but were putting 
them into practice as well. In this sense this chapter shall focus on the theories behind 
constitutionalism, the ideas of the French Revolution, and the attempt to place these 
ideas into practice thus placing the ulema’s thoughts within the greater purview of 
their own traditionalist scholastic culture, at the same time placing the Ottoman 
ulema’s constitutional effort at the centre of the constitutional debates in Islamic 
constitutional thought and presenting a historical example that can complement 
abstract theorisations by modern Islamicists, ulema379 and Islamist alike.380  
 
The Constitutional Ideas of 1908/1326 
 
Once the Constitutional Revolution had achieved its objective and the atmosphere of 
freedom was declared, within the printing press a host of articles in support of the 
new constitutional order began to be published across the devlet. The printing press 
allowed the ulema to use the tools of the ‘modern’ world and reach out a wider 
audience. In this sense one could safely argue that the ulema were indeed part of the 
changing world not reactionary to it. However, distinction should be made between 
saying that the ulema were modern ‘and’ modernist ulema/thinkers.381 The ulema 
from all spectrums used the printed press as the new era of freedom provided much 
space for open debate throughout the devlet. As Muslims and non-Muslims rejoiced 
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and endeavoured to appreciate the slogans of the revolution, it was in the printed 
press, combined with the traditional avenues of the public squares, coffeehouses, 
classrooms and mosques that discussions regarding the Islamic merits of the 
constitutional order were being declared to the populace. One could argue as many 
academics have that the Young Turks were not as strictly observant regarding their 
practicing of Islam, thus attempting to draw attention to their Islamic policies as 
being cosmetic. Yet even the diverse nature of the Young Turks couldn’t deny the 
environment or its influence upon them. Just as one can aptly argue the influence of 
European thought on the Young Turks, it can equally be argued that Islamist thought 
also influenced them.  The ulema too would become exposed to the new ideas of 
constitutionalism being openly discussed by the various segments of Ottoman society 
and would interact with the various interpretations and interests groups which had 
been restricted from expressing opinion openly during the earlier part of the 
Hamidian reign. While much of the ulema class and intelligentsia may have discussed 
these thoughts, the public by and large were disconnected from this type of 
expression. It seems ironic that the constitution, presented as the ‘national will’, 
represented a nation that knew very little about the constitution it had just helped to 
reinstate.   
The constitutional process in 1908-1909/1326-1327 was unique from the first-
wave of constitutionalism in the region, as in the second-wave; revolutionary activity 
formed much of the basis of the ideology of the constitutional documents in the 
region.382 The first constitutional experiment in the Ottoman devlet in 1876/1293 was 
a top down approach, ‘permitted’ to the masses on the ‘behest’ of the Sultan and his 
advisors. However, on the second occasion it was presented that the constitution was 
demanded as a ‘right’ by the people, re-introduced due to an enforced transformation 
in 1908/1326. While Ottoman constitutional practice was not novel, its revolutionary 
reinstatement nonetheless represented a ‘renewal’ of a new political order. Although 
based on the project of 1876/1293 and indeed the long tradition of pushing towards 
government accountability in the nineteenth century, the constitutional epitomes of 
1908-1909/1326-1327 would nevertheless propose ideals different from those of 
1876/1293 or even the nineteenth century. The constitutional practices of the Second 
Constitutional Period were far more ideological and were entrenched in revolutionary 
idealism. 
                                                        




When revolutionary activities and regimes proclaim their triumph by 
instituting a constitution, the constitution is presented as ‘new’(cedid/Jadīd) or a 
‘renewal’(tecdid/tajdīd). The idea of renewal attached the Ottoman Constitution both 
to the traditional past and at the same time the present. It is thus, from this point that 
we can argue as Talal Asad has explained about Islam being a discursive tradition 
with the constitutional debates being a part of this during the late Ottoman 
period.383Whether one wants to call the constitution Islamic or Islamicate as simply 
down to a choice of words, but how the ulema viewed it at the time, was one that was 
Islamic, which should be noted.  In the Ottoman case this appeal was both to the 
constructed glorious past of 1876/1293 as the Young Ottomans and Midhat Pasha 
were celebrated as heroes, as well as to placing Niyazi and Enver Bey as the new 
heroes of the present in the same light, creating a projection of saving the future. 
While Midhat and the Young Ottomans were presented as the fathers of 
constitutionalism, Niyazi and Enver were presented as the revolutionaries who 
actualised it once again. The appeal to the constitution of 1876/1293 was necessary to 
legitimise the demand of the ‘right’ of the people for good governance in the guise of 
the constitution, which legitimated the revolutionary zeal of the constitutionalists. It 
cannot be doubted that the euphoria indeed facilitated the hallmarks of declaring the 
‘new’, as it pitted the ‘new’ Meşrutiyet against the ‘old’ İstibdat. It also placed the 
constitutional activity within the Islamic framework of tecdid, in which Islamic 
renewal was presented for the new constitutional conditions.  
New celebratory coins were designed, as were revolutionary flags and musical 
anthems. But more importantly the constitution in practice, ideology and structure 
was presented as a renewal of Islamic forms of Ottoman traditional practice, for 
public consumption and the recognition that the Constitution of 1876/1293 could no 
longer stand in accordance with the new political conditions. Although the debates 
had revolved around Meşrutiyet against İstibdat, nonetheless, a general consensus 
within the ulema circles was starting to become apparent where both supporters, those 
in support of a strong Caliph and those in favour of greater representation all accepted 
the new tentative constitutional conditions – albeit for different reasons. The 
contestations would no longer be within the traditional conception of İstibdat with 
İstibdat now becoming a pejorative term.  The arguments remained within the 
constitutional purview where traditionalists argued that the constitution was a 
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prerogative of the Sultan provided to the masses, while the other group insisted that 
the constitution was above the Caliph and thus the Caliph had no authority to 
abrogate it. Constitutional contestations now began to take place regarding what a 
constitutional order should reflect.  
The constitution was being amalgamated to becoming synonymous with the 
‘national will’, while the slogans that surrounded the constitutional order would be 
integrated within the constitution as articles in order to enunciate what those concepts 
meant.384 The slogans of freedom, equality and fraternity, as well as consultation and 
justice were not necessarily important in the mode they were expressed, but in the 
way that they were understood. The ulema and the Ottoman political class started to 
recognise that the euphoria of the slogans was now beginning to create confusion, and 
so the concepts of freedom, equality and fraternity were to be understood in the 
manner they appeared in the constitution. Said Arjomand describes that the 
ideological constitution’s central goal is not simply to limit government but to 
transform society in accordance to the revolutionary ideal.385 Freedom, equality and 
fraternity were to be understood on how the constitution described freedom, equality 
and fraternity. A host of publications thus were published throughout the Ottoman 
domains explaining such, as can be seen in the works of the future Şeyülislam Mûsâ 
Kâzim who titled one of his first articles after the revolution as Hürriyet-Müsâvat. 
These terms were being constructed within the culture of law as the constitution was 
understood as the ‘fundamental law’ (Kanun-i Esasi).  
Khaled Abou el-Fadl mentions that although in the past the idea of 
government limited by the law was well supported in the Islamic tradition, this did 
not necessarily amount to the principle of limiting government to the rule of law. 
However, by 1909/1327 this was indeed taking place, as Susan Gunasti has shown 
during the constitutional amendments the ulema had appropriated the constitution as a 
requisite for the Caliphate in which ālim Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır mentioned that the 
new government structure was the constitution, the constitutional government and the 
Islamic Caliphate in that order.386 It is evident that Hamdi Yazır and the ulema who 
thought like him were of the opinion that the conditions of the government were a 
requisite for the government. The Sultanate was an accepted style of governace, but 
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the Caliphate was an ideal that had conditions that needed to be met. Many had 
started to venerate the seat of the Caliphate from the start of the Tanzimat reaching its 
peak in the Hamidian, which became problematic for many ulema thus what was 
paramount for the ulema was the need to help people understand what the 
government actually was and separate a host of myths such as the concept Sultan 
veneration and create a more accountable political system that in essence represented 
an ideal Caliphate.  It thus seems that a reading of Hamdi Yazır was that he was 
rather interconnecting the Ottoman Caliphate to a constitutional system which would 
make future Caliphates inseparable from the ideal of constitutionalism and which 
consolidated that the constitution a requisite for ‘just’ governance, responsibility, 
consultation and accountability as it was an attempt to create a conditional 
government that would be held to an ideal and reduce governmental abuse. This was 
consolidated when Sultan Abdülhamid II was asked to swear an oath declaring such. 
What is thus worth of note is that many ideologues within the Muslim world had 
convinced themselves that the constitutional project was a modern representation of 
the Caliphates of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs.  
The impact of the Ottoman effort should not go unnoticed as up until today 
Islamic revivalist movements have accepted the same premise of the constitution as a 
required requisite of Islamic governance.387 Much of Islamic historical writings have 
eulogised the personalities of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs in the literature of the 
ulema throughout Islamic history, however much emphasis on that period has focused 
on the establishment and formulation of the institution of the Caliphate which 
mention the systems of election, consultation and accountability. Narratives of the 
Four Rightly Guided Caliph’s while emphasise on their character, thus suggesting 
they were rightly guided, more significantly emphasise more so on their political 
activity.  
İsmail Kara has suggested that in the Late Ottoman Period the ulema in 
opposition to Sultan Abdülhamid II emphasised on the Rightly Guided Caliphs as an 
attempt to de-legitimise the Hamidian regime by suggesting that istibdat had entred 
the Islamic governmental structure from the period of the Ummayad dynasty, as a 
way of making distinction between the idea of a Sultanate and an ideal Caliphate. 
                                                        




However, this trope in Islamic thought is not unique to the Ottoman thinkers during 
the late Ottoman devlet and can be seen in earlier works of Muslim scholars.388  
Additionally there is also ample works of constitutional traditions and 
practices that are also presented in ideas of thinkers regarding Ottoman history prior 
to the Hamidian period that also must be taken into account when examining ulema 
criticism towards the Hamidan regime and its form of governance. The likes of the 
Young Ottomans such as Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi point to the divan and 
Janissary as being reflections of consultation and constitutional checks in previous 
Ottoman governments.389 Al-Diyaf in his work had mentioned that the Qanun along 
with the ulema and Janissary had held the Sultan to account to his commitments in 
previous Ottoman governments also. 390  Furthermore earlier nineteenth century 
works such as al-Diyaf, Hayrettin and the Young Ottomans also discuss the idea of 
the first four Caliphs in Islam as being an ideal, but while Sultanic authourity became 
the norm nonetheless other Caliphs and governments throughout Islamic history had 
used principles of consultation and had conditional governments within a framework 
of istibdat. Thus, we must be careful in essentialising the ideas of the Islamic thinkers 
of the late Ottoman devlet as simply re-inventing tradition to remove Sultan 
Abdülhamid II from power. It is clear that there is a large corpus of literature and 
traditions that continue to point to constitutional practices as well as istibdat. It is thus 
this paradox that suggests that once the Sultanate system was introduced to the 
Muslim world from the Ummayad dynasty facilitating the notion of istibdat on the 
one had while on the other Islamic political history being littered with examples of 
constitutional traditions and consultation. This does not need to be seen as a 
contradiction if one views that much of Islamic history is a balance between idealism 
regarding narrative and pragmatism regarding actual governance.  
It is my view that the Second Constitutional Period would thus present a 
formulation of constitutional Caliphate that has yet to be explored properly as much 
of the narrative has been placed within a defensive secularisation paradigm that has 
not allowed the examination of late Ottoman Islamic political theory to stand along 
ealier Islamic political works  leaving much modern theorisation simply abstract. It is 
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true that in the Ottoman case there was a political reality that facilitated an 
intellectual environment, nonetheless, the fact that the idealisations and practices of 
the late Ottoman Constitutional experiment are not being viewed as an attempt by the 
ulema of political restructuring but rather facilitating the conditions of the secular 
Turkish Republic is rather telling not of the reality of the time but of the state of 
Ottoman studies and the impact of secularism on the late Ottoman narrative.  
 
Autocratic Constitutionalism, Istibdat or Meşrutiyet – Remnants of 
1876/1293 
 
From the treaty of Küçuük Kaynarca and then more so from the Tanzimat period 
onwards the Ottoman claim to be the rightful Caliphate became ever more visible in 
the ceremonial symbols of the imperial centre. Coins were minted in the name of the 
Ottoman Sultan as Caliph, and letters and edicts were signed by the Ottomans as 
custodians of the holy cities. The Hamidian state extended that mode further and 
made outwardly appeals to the seat of the Caliphate to strengthen the bond between 
Muslim subject and Sultan. During the three decades of Hamidian rule, the seat 
gained even further significance as the regime’s aim to venerate the Sultan as Caliph 
was hoped to fortify the house of Osman as the heirs of the exalted office of the 
Prophet, his shadow on earth and hence further strengthen the bond between Sultan 
and his subjects. Attaining support from the various Sufi tarikats, the seat and the 
community became embroiled in much emotive symbolism. This was not new in 
Ottoman history, and the Caliph expressing himself as the shadow of either Allah or 
the Prophet was an accepted practice. However, by 1908/1326 a consciousness 
among the ulema would critique this idea as well. 
Apart from the brief spell of constitutional governance in 1876/1293, the 
Hamidian period was now being tainted by the rule of İstibdat. 391  While the 
Hamidian structure was not very different from the political structures of Ottoman 
governments in the past, the Hamidian state’s abolishment of the parliament of 
1877/1294 and marginalisation of the constitution meant that proponents of the 
constitutional call pitted the return to Meşrutiyet against ‘Hamidian İstibdat’. In 
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particular, callers of the new constitutional order thus constructed a dichotomy of 
Hamidian İstibdat against a new progressive and inclusive Meşrutiyet. As mentioned, 
during the inception of the revolution the ulema presented the constitutional order as 
the ideal form of governance, similar to the governance of the first Four Rightly 
Guided Caliphs of Islam. 392  The discussions thus centred on the nature of the 
constitutional government and how Şura became synonymous with the parliament. 
The criticism towards İstibdat was not solely a phenomenon of the Second 
Constitutional Period as discussions on an ideal government had even been 
deliberated during the Tanzimat period. During the Tanzimat, the Arab 
ālim/intellectual from Tunis Ahmed al-Diyaf mentioned three forms of governance: 
an absolutist monarchy which brings injustice, republicanism which ignores Islam, 
and Islamic constitutionalism. He continued that in the old regime, Sultanic Kanuns, 
the law and edicts equated to parliamentarianism. 393  When mentioning Islamic 
constitutionalism, al-Diyaf insisted on the necissity of the Imam for Muslims in 
regards to their governance, never moving away from the concept of a single ruler. 
For al-Diyaf this was a necessity implored by revelation not reason. He argued that in 
previous times the Quran and Sunna acted as constitutions.  Diyaf accepted that 
Western governments had by their own rationality and established a good political 
system of what one could call a Republican system. However, he stresses that for the 
Muslims they have the advantage of both using their rational and the sacred text to 
have a form of government that could use the benefits of a modern political 
government that was in harmony with both reason and revelation. When it came to 
representative governance and istibdat, al-Diyaf often referencing Ibn Khaldun 
argued that absolute rule only belonged to Allah, and if humans, who are flawed and 
limited attempted such, this would lead to authoritarianism of the negative sense.394  
What is also worth of note is al-Diyaf mentions the need of a Grand Council as he 
argues that this is a guardian council of the ‘Ahd al-Aman (Those that loosen and 
bind) and the constitution and that the ulema should be involved. But al-Diyaf’s point 
of view was not an innovation simply a reconstruction as he believed that the 
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principle of reprentative governance, consultation and the rule of law were somewhat 
in place in the Islamicate world.395  
These ideas were prevalent in Young Ottoman thinking as well as in 
Hayreddin Pasha’s political thought. What had changed by the Second Constitutional 
Period was that these concepts were no longer the ideas of a select few, but became 
widespread and continued to be consolidated in the political thought of the ulema. Of 
them in 1908-1909/1326-1327, the ālim İzmirli İsmail Hakkı Efendi would also later 
discuss the different types of governance. He too stated that there were three types of 
governance: absolute, constitutional and republican. Similar to the ideas of al-Diyaf, 
he stressed that in an absolutist regime the leadership of the government is hereditary. 
The ruler is not restricted by any regulations and administers solely his own opinion. 
The people submit to the rule of the ruler.396 Also a critic of an absolutist form of 
government İsmail Hakkı Efendi would go on to add that Islam, however can never 
accept an absolutist government. In Islam the leader cannot govern as he pleases 
[arbitrarily]. He is bound by the Sharia and must lay down the principles of justice, 
protecting the rights of the people and assure public interest. The government’s duties 
were to execute consultation and responsibility. The peoples were to order the lawful, 
prohibit the unlawful, invite to the good and conduct their affairs in a moderate 
manner. This was not simply a critique of the Hamidian regime, but more so laying 
the foundations of a future government in the Ottoman devlet. For İsmail Hakkı 
Efendi the constitutional government takes its legitimacy, beauty and superiority from 
this quality thus pointing to a constitutional form of governance as the best form of 
governance for the devlet and thus for İsmail Hakkı this is the Islamic government.397 
 A further explanation of this thought can be seen in the works of ālim İskipli 
Âkif Efendi, who mentions that there are four types of governance also, 
Meşruta(Consultation), Cumhuriye(Republicanism), Mutlaka(Absolutism) and 
Hilafet (Caliphate). He argued that in the absolutist regime the rights to be head of 
state belongs to one family and is hereditary and the ruler is not restricted by any 
laws. The ruler rules arbitrarily and has the power to legislate. In the Meşruta it is still 
hereditary but the ruler has to consult and legislative power is used by the nation and 
ruler in corporation. But it is his catogorisation of the Hilafet (Caliphate) which he 
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calls Hilafet-i Kamile ( The Ideal-Caliphate)  that is worth of note for us. İskipli Âkif 
Efendi went a step further than İsmail Hakkı Efendi by adding the Caliphate as a 
distinct category from the concept of Meşruta (Consultation) thus leaving the door 
open for two distict styles of government. He argues that in a Hilafet-i Kamile the 
ruler is not limited to a dynasty, anyone who meets the requisite of Caliph can be so, 
so long as he is elected by the ummah. The elected Caliph continues to rule and use 
his powers unless there is a case or situation where he needs to step down, dies or 
needs to be removed from power.398 This suggests that it is not the institution of 
consultation that is of most important but rather the institutions of electoral 
representatives as a way of establishing a relationship between the ruler and the ruled. 
However, İsmail Hakkı Efendi hasn’t said that Meşruta can not be part of the 
Caliphate form over goverment either.  
Both ālim Mustafa Sabri and ālim Mûsa Kâzim Efendi also gave opinion with 
Sabri saying that the system in which the government is restricted or bounded by 
certain rules or conditions about how to rule is called Meşrutiyet. On the other hand a 
system that rules the people without any restrictions or limitations is called a system 
of istibdat. Mûsa Kâzim argued that actions of a government are limited by rules of 
law which means all action conform to the laws and that the government doesn’t do 
anything againts the law. The oppositie of this is istibdat. İstibdat is not being limited 
or bound by the laws. 399 
 
İstibdat – Autocracy, Authoritarianism or Despotism? 
 
 
Mûsa Kâzım Efendi would later publish a pamphlet in a form of his biography that 
was also to be a critique on the concept of İstibdat.400 It was an attempt to explain 
why the ulema had criticised the Hamidian state. The concept of İstibdat became so 
maligned that while authoritarianism was considered the norm in past 
governments401, by 1908/1326 it was difficult to find usage of the term in a normative 
light. He would stress: 
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For some ages now the nightmare of despostism has come to be throughout the Islamic world with 
astonishingly destructive results for the people of Islam everywhere and in every situation, so [that 
they] remain behind other peoples. For this reason, many Islamic governments have come to an 
end…It is despotism, not religion, that has held the Muslims back on the late years of Islam’s 
history.402 
 
Conservative Sheikh Said Nursi also spoke in similar terms when addressing a 
gatherining on the merits of constitutionalism. He said: 
 
Despotism is oppression. It is dealing with others in an arbitrary fashion. It is compulsion relying on 
force. It is the opinion of one person. It provides extremely favourable ground for exploitation. It is the 
basis of tyranny. It annihilates humanity. It is despotism that reduces man to the most abject valleys of 
abasement, has caused the Islamic world to sink into abjection and degradation, which arouse 
animosity and malice, has poisoned Islam- and in fact sows its poison everywhere by contagion, and 
has caused endless conflict within Islam by giving rise to its deviant sects…403  
 
Mûsa Kâzim extended the idea of istabdat to social fears also. He argued that people 
under istibdat can never be free of zulüm (oppression) and can never experience 
welfare and happiness.  
In the works of Said Nursi he explained “[T]hat an oppressor does as he 
wishes, as one persons opinion is bound to lead to mistakes. Zulüm is the destroyer of 
humanity…we did not know İstibdat was such a poiseness killer. Thanks to Allah it 
is destroyed’.404 As mentioned, for Nursi domination, arbitrary action, use of force all 
connoted to istibdat to reflect despotism.405 It seems that both Mûsa Kâzim and Said 
Nursi were accepting that İstibdat had been the normative way of ruling in the 
Muslim world but not the ideal. Thus, in order to promote constitutionalism they 
chose to critique any form of authoritarian governance. Nursi also accused scholars 
who were unable to accept a divergence of opinions in scholarship as favouring 
İstibdat. 406 Mustafa Sabri Efendi wrote in his first article in the Beyan’ül-Hak ‘that 
demolishing İstibdat was the duty of the ulema but due to the fact that they were the 
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most oppressed it was not possible to achieve this without the help of the CUP and 
soldiers’. 407 Similarly, during the 31st March Incident the Sırâtımüstakīm journal 
called ‘those 15 days as a second period of İstibdat’ as any criticism towards any 
segment of authority would be called İstibdat.408 While İstibdat was still open to 
debate on meaning authoritarianism, autocracy or despotism during the Hamidian 
period, by the Second Constitutional period it came to echo more pejorative 
undertones. This was not the first time in ulema tradition that İstibdat was criticised, 
as earlier scholars of Islam have mentioned that a consultative system as the ideal. 
The medieval ālim al-Ghazali had said ‘[D]espotic, non-consultative decision-
making, even from a wise and learned person is objectionable and unacceptable.’409 
  
Those in Authority Amongst You 
 
There was a discourse within Muslim tradition of veneration of leaders and scholars 
as a sign of respect, love and loyalty, especially in the matter of obedience towards 
those in authority. While Islamic idealism pointed towards consultative governance, 
on many occasions pragmatic tolerance of authoritarian governance was accepted as 
long as the law was implemented and the interest of the subjects was safeguarded. 
However, the culture of veneration was heavily criticised as the Arab Sheikh Rashid 
Rida complained in his al-Manar newspaper “[T]he people of Anatolia believe that 
the Sultan has been created differently than other people. They think his beard is 
green and his face flowing with light and radiantness. These are naïve people.”410  
The discourse aimed at stripping the aura of veneration from the Caliph and 
making the case for placing authority into the hands of the masses or at least the 
parliament. While in opposition to the Sultan during the late Hamidian period prior to 
the Revolution the ulema had published much material attempting to do such. On one 
instance Hoca Şakir Efendi in a publication of a series of fetvas delegitimising 
İstibdat was asked, ‘if the ummah were in a dire situation due to the policies of the 
ruler, what should the ruler do?’ The answer was “he should abdicate”.411 In another 
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fetva he was asked if there was any distinction between Muslims, his answer was no, 
thus attempting to deconstruct the concept of hierarchy between Muslims placing the 
Sultan as the same as the average Muslim.412 The alternative discourse against total 
obedience was firstly to make no distinction between Muslims, be that the Caliph or 
average layman. The second was that there was no hierarchy in Islam. No Muslim in 
principle was to be better than another, except in the eyes of Allah. This was to 
address the concept of authority as one that was not restricted to the Caliph and that 
only communal decisions were acceptable. 
The contestation was over the concept of the Quranic injunction to “obey 
those in authority from amongst you”[4:59].413 Supporters of Sultan Abdülhamid 
throughout the Hamidian period had stressed on the meaning related to the 
prerogatives of the Caliph. Although supporters of this position would in the 
constitutional period adapt themselves to accepting constitutional governance, 
nonetheless, they still continued to stress on obedience to Abdülhamid due to him 
being the Caliph. 414   In many ways they were upholding the Caliph above the 
constitution not that the constitution was a requsite for the Caliphate. Hamdi Yazır 
was quick to address this claim by explaining that the Caliph was bound by the law, 
and if the Caliph should transgress the law, the notion of national sovereignty goes 
into force to limit his action for only Allah should be obeyed unquestionably. He 
would explain further later in his Quran tafsir that this injunction doesn’t necessitate 
blind obedience as in the verse where it says ‘those in authority’ was not immediately 
followed by ‘and obey’, which according to Hamdi Yazır meant disobedience was 
permitted.415 He qualified this by explaining that obedience was linked to the leaders 
commanding the good. He pointed that the appointment of the ulū l-amr (authority) is 
the outcome of the contract between the ummah and the Imam (Caliph), which is a 
social contract, and the Imam was bound by certain conditions of the contract. 
Although this view may be perceived as being modern it did have medieval Islamic 
undertones. As medieval ālim al-Bāqillāni had explained: 
 
He [the Caliph] is not the people’s Lord so that he could possibly do without [their assistance]; and he 
is not Allah’s Prophet, acting as their agent to Allah. But he and the people are partners who [must] 
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cooperate for the welfare [of the people] in this early life and the Hereafter. They [the people] must 
help him, and he must help them. The Imam (leader) is charged to apply the laws expounded by the 
Prophet and recognised by the nation, and he, in all that he does, is the nation’s trustee and 
representative, and it [the nation] is behind him, correcting him and reminding him…and removing 
him and replacing him when he does what calls for his removal.416 
 
There still continues to be theological debates surrounding who ‘those in authority’ 
are in the Quran, but in this period it was clear that its interpretations were moving 
away from the Caliph and closer towards the elected parliament. The contestation was 
not a new one as Islamic scholars of the past had also contested the meaning of the 
verse. Medieval scholar Fakhr al-din al-Razi had already stressed that the people in 
authority were the ulema417, a view that was later endorsed by Mustafa Sabri Efendi 
in 1908/1326. The Egyptian Muhammad Abduh had argued that the verse was in 
relation to the ahl al-hall wa’l-àqd (People who loosen and bind), a common position 




Those in authority are the Muslims who loosen and bind. And these are the rulers and the governors, 
the ulama, the military commanders, and all those leaders and notables to whom people turn to in need 
and in matters concerning the common good (al-masalih al-àmma). When they all agree on a matter, it 
is necessary that they are obeyed, provided [the following conditions are satisfied]: that they be from 
amongst us: that they not contravene a command of Allah or the [most authoritative of] the reported 
teachings of the Prophet…; that they be unconstrained in the discussion on the matter [in question] on 
in their agreement on it, and that what they agree upon is itself a matter of the common good and one 
that those in authority have the required authority and knowledge to rule on…419 
 
But while positions started to point towards providing decision-making to include the 
ulema in 1908/1326, Ömer Ziyâeddin Dağıstânî, a conservative supporter of the 
Caliph, had repeated the claim that this verse was related to the Caliph only, even 
though by now it was clear that the general position on this verse was pointing 
towards parliamentarianism. Dağıstânî’s view was similar to Yusuf al-Nabahani in 
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1895/1312 who insisted that the verse was regarding the Caliph. 420 It can come as no 
surprise that both al-Nabahani and Dağıstânî were strong advocates of Sultan 
Abdülhamid II and his style of governance.  
Ālim Kocali Abdülaziz provided an alternative and more balanced view by 
accepting the need to obey authority by citing the following verses to argue for the 
necessity of obedience to authorities (ulü’l emre itaat), but then he followed with a 
condition which was ‘that rulers need to consult the ummah: [Nisa, 4/59], [Al-i 
Imran, 3/159], [Şura, 42/38].421 He thus expressed authority not simply to the Caliph 
and placed a condition that appealing to the ummah was required, thus placing the 
ummah as a political institution above the Caliph. It must be added that consulting the 
ummah reflected consultating the parliamentarians who were the representative of the 
ummah. Although the authority belonged to the ummah, they nonetheless would need 
to show obedience to those in authority who were elected to represent them and could 
safeguard their interests in this case the parliament. Furthermore he implied that the 
leader would also need to consult the parliament, as that was him consulting the 
ummah.           
 The parliament came to represent not only the “people who loosened and 
bound” (ahl al-hall wa’l-àqd)  but also the people who would represent the interest of 
the ummah. When the draft proposal was presented to the parliament in 1909, it stated 
that ‘the Caliph is subject to the supervision of “the people who loosen and bind” (ahl 
al-hall wa’l-àqd) in the general assembly’.422 In 1911/1329, Mustafa Zihni Efendi, an 
ālim and governor in Iraq maintained and consolidated that in the twentieth century 
this verse reflected the conditions of the Ottoman Parliament.423 By 1909/1327, the 
parliament’s members had agreed on this point and this would later become 
institutionalised as the official position of the state, even though individual ulema 
would continue to contest this point as the rapidly changing conditions of the devlet 
continued to place much focus on authority and its changing nature. In 1908/1326, 
during the advent of the success of the revolution, Rashid Rida was asked to give a 
public speech in Cairo, with fellow ālim from al-Azhar Sheikh Hussein al-Ghazi 
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which he would publish in the al-Manar, where he also explained to the masses the 
idea of those in authority. He said: 
This day is an Eid for the Ottomans in general and the Muslims in particular. It is Eid for the 
government of shurā with which the Ottomans are basking in its benefits, all of them and all the 
ethnicities and races. The government of the shurā which Islam approves by what Allah says ‘wa 
amruhum shura baynahum’ and when he says ‘wa ithma ja’hum….. The issue of security and fear 
from the general matters are related to the siyasa of the ummah and her administration and the Quran 
assigns the matter to the Prophet alone and he is the infallible imam, and the owner of the Sharia and 
His [Allah’s] conveyor. He made the matter of this issue to the people of authority from amongst the 
ummah. They coordinated according to the shurā between them. Who are the people of authority? 
Some of them, the distorters or who are wool gathering say the people of authority are the kings and 
sultans. This allegation is false because the Prophet did not have with him kings and sultans when the 
ayats were revealed. He[the Prophet] was rather consulting the people of authority and the dignitaries 
of the people of the ummah, they are the ones who are known as the ulu’l amr, the people of authority 
without dispute. So have you ever seen this hidayah (guidance) to the government of the Sharia and 
the authority of the ummah? Is there any confirmation in the Sharia or any religion which is more 
eloquent than this? If the Lord of the universe did not agree for the seal of his Prophets and 
Messengers to be independent in conducting the affairs of the masses to the exclusion of the people of 
opinion from amongst his ummah how could he allow anyone else to legislate for anyone else amongst 
his followers to do so. 424  
Rashid Rida, clearly inspired by his mentor Abduh and the Ottoman effort, would 
explain again in 1920/1338 that those in authority may well take the form of the 
elected representatives of the people, comprising a consultative or legislative body 
that has been delegated to them to decide things on their behalf. He believed on the 
principle of the Islamic government being consultative which had been the 
philosophical basis of Islamic rule.425       
 While the Ottoman effort was moving towards the instituting of the 
parliament as the ‘people in authority’ and ‘those who loosen and bind’, most 
positions included the ulema as part of this group, thus placing the parliament and 
ulema in it as the ones who should be obeyed. The general consensus was pointing 
towards parliament’s authority over the Caliph’s traditional perogatives. It was 
evident that during this period, the opinions restricting this definition only to the 
Caliph were quickly becoming marginalised. Any reading that restricted it to Sultan 
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Abdülhamid would start to be openly challenged. In 1909, during the constitutional 
amendment process, the Muaddel Kânûn-i Esâsî was not simply a consolidation of 
the parliament as the ‘people in authority’, but it was also a practice of consensus of 
which the parliament was the body and the ulema were an integral part.   
 The Hamidian state had created problematic conditions for itself, as by 
introducing a host of emotive symbols around the ‘ideal Caliph’ to bond with the 
Muslim community, it had facilitated an environment of much emotion. Religious 
communities, as Jan Peter Hartung has explained, are ‘emotional communities’ and 
can be regulated and moved by religiously inspired symbols from religious 
authorities. 426  The Muslim community showed much loyalty to the seat of the 
Caliphate as a spiritual office, but some ulema complained the seat was also a 
temporal one, and needed regulation and to be held to account.427 As a result, on the 
one hand was much of the community, driven by the Sufi movements and the policies 
of the Hamidian regime to revere the seat of the Caliphate as a religious duty, and 
then there were members of the ulema and political actors who viewed political 
activity as a material act, and whose main objective was simply to safeguard the 
implementation of the law and interests of the people.428     
 The Sultan’s regime eventually struggled to balance normative Muslim 
expectation and the difficulties of tangible realities. In the midst of this the ulema 
took on special significance as inter-Muslim politics debated the nature of what the 
Caliphate meant and where to situate the new political culture of constitutionalism. 
The Constitutional Revolution was an act of defiance and - some might even argue - 
rebellion against the Sultan who was presented as the sole authority of the devlet. 
Constitutional discourse had not only introduced a culture of governmental 
accountability and demand for responsibility, it also ushered in an inclusive 
parliamentary political culture in the guise of consultation. It had reduced the culture 
of Sultan veneration, in which leadership could be criticised openly and nobody was 
off limits, whether it be Şeyhülislâm or Caliph.429    
 This new culture made those who supported the Hamidian regime anxious of 
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the possible implications to the authority of the seat and their own standing in 
Ottoman society. The general trend among many Muslim reformers in the nineteenth 
century was to regard Islam and modernity as adaptable so long as the efforts were in 
conformity with Ottoman practices and tradition. However, within conservative 
circles this was at times perceived as a compromise to the ideals of ‘Christian’ 
Europe, which would consequently – according to the conservatives themselves – 
lead to detachment from Islam. But while the conservative elements where resistant 
to ‘Modernity and reformation’, nevertheless, even they came to terms with the 
Islamic merits of constitutional governance to some degree. Their concern was with 
the nature of the Caliphate itself, and the implications for the conservative spaces in 
the devlet, which had received much assistance during the Hamidian period. 430 This 
was a nervous time for people of a conservative supporters of the Sultan as the 
Unionist purge of the Sultan’s mabeyn meant that many conservatives either religious 
or political lost their posts, were arrested or sent into internal exile. Furthermore, 
earlier oppositional ulema activity during the Hamidian reign would now enjoy the 
position of legitimacy, as many ulema of the new generation found spaces in the new 
possibilities that the Meşrutiyet ushered; the tide was changing and so was the 
devlet.431  
 
Conservative Response – Constitutionalism or a Reformulation of the 
Old? 
 
It was probably in such an environment that Sufi Sheikh Ömer Ziyâeddin Dağıstânî, a 
senior ālim residing in Edirne arrived in Istanbul in haste to examine the climate in 
the imperial centre and appeal to the Muslim population at large regarding his 
‘Sultanic-centered constitutional’ interpretation of the Caliphate and constitutional 
rule. The conservatives became curious and concerned with the change in 
environment as ulema and laymen alike made their way to the imperial centre to hear 
and voice their opinions and demands. Added to that, the abolishment of the spy 
network and freeing of political opposition from the prisons meant that Istanbul 
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transformed into a vibrant hub for diverse intellectual activity as well as much protest 
and unrest never witnessed before.       
 As soon as Dağıstânî arrived to Istanbul he promptly published two pamphlets 
in quick succession. The first was titled Hadis-i Erbain fi Hukuki’s-Selatin (Forty 
hadith on the rule of the Sultan), in which Dağıstânî stressed the importance of the 
Caliphate and the House of Osman as heirs to the Caliphate. He also emphasised the 
sacredness of the Caliph as the leader of all Muslims, both in the Ottoman domains 
and outside, as had been attested in the constitution of 1876/1293. The second 
publication was his Mirat Kanun-I Esasi (Reflections of the Constitution). Both 
works were published in 1908/1326 and were probably a conservative response to the 
changing conditions in the capital.432 The Mirat Kanun-i Esasi was serialised in the 
conservative journal the Volkan. Dağıstânî and the Volkan press indicated that there 
was still a large constituent that maintained the conception that the Sultanate, in 
particular Abdülhamid II, was the absolute ruler of the Ottoman devlet. The ulema of 
Dağıstânî’s ideological inclinations had professed their support for a constitutional 
government but their understanding of constitutionalism reflected the conservative 
document of 1876/1293. It is ironic that conservatism was against the constitution of 
1876/1293, even though much of the document catered for their demands, as those 
who opposed the constitution of 1876/1293 now supported its strict interepretation. 
However, supporters of constitutionalism had evolved and now demanded the 
1876/1293 document be changed. Constitutionalism was hence no longer a heavily 
scrutinised ideal, as constitutionalism as an idea and practice circulated widely within 
ulema circles by the time the revolution was executed. The question now was which 
constitution as supporters of the Sultan pointed to the constitution of 1876/1293 while 
supporters of a new constitutional order demanded amendments.    
 Dağıstânî’s rapid publication of the two pamphlets with the first on the loyalty 
towards the Sultan and nature of the Caliphate from his scholarly endeavour, and the 
second on the Ottoman Constitution in line with Islamic precepts, indicates that these 
two works were part of a larger connected discourse in which Dağıstânî was 
constructing a conservative view of the constitutional Caliphate system. In Hadis-i 
Erbain Dağıstânî attempted to consolidate the Sultan’s traditional position as the stoic 
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Caliph along the precepts of the constitution of 1876/1293. Dağıstânî, a known 
muhadith, emphasised on hadith literature to make most of his claims. He pointed to 
the constitution in his work by suggesting that article four, five and seven, made the 
point that the Sultan was Caliph of all Muslims, a position taken from the treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca. In the fourth article the Caliph was referred to as the ‘protector of 
the religion of Islam’ whereas article seven exclaimed that everyone is obliged to 
obey the rights of the Sultan by law(Kanun), in the same way they were obliged to 
obey the rights of the Sultan with regards to the Sharia. 433  He continued by 
mentioning a hadith of the Prophet that anyone who would see the Caliph would 
naturally love him, and he stressed on the Caliph as Allah’s shadow on earth 
(Zillullah fil-arz).434 Traditional conceptions of the Caliphate endorsed the Caliph 
either as the Shadow of God or of the Prophet, endorsing their special status. Whether 
of God or the Prophet, the position was still pointing to some form of veneration. 
Dağıstânî’s constant insistence on obeying the Sultan and criticism of those who 
disobey him being worthy of punishment in the next life and disgrace in this was 
problematic. The revolution was indeed disobedience towards the Sultan, and even 
though Dağıstânî was using an old tradition of stressing on loyalty, he was also tacitly 
criticising the revolutionaries’ actions. Dağıstânî followed these evidences with a 
famous hadith most often used regarding obeying authority. It says “Whoever obeys 
me (The Prophet) obeys Allah, and whoever disobeys me, disobeys Allah, and 
whoever obeys the ruler I appoint, obeys me, and whoever disobeys him, disobeys 
me”.435 It was clear that Dağıstânî was implying that disobeying the Sultan was 
tantamount to disobeying both Allah and the Prophet. Dağıstânî had made a bold 
claim, in an environment where religious opinion was shifting towards consultation, 
and no doubt would rile the ulema who had supported the revolution. The ulema were 
centrally involved with the revolutionaries in many stages; what was clear is that the 
supporters of the Sultan were willing to accept the status quo and only responded 
with a rapid reaction to the changing circumstances.     
 Dağıstânî had started the Hadis-i Erbain by praising the CUP but in his 
content he was clearly undermining their position. 436  It was hadith seventeen 
suggesting that if one sees a Muslim ruler doing something he disapproves of, he 
                                                        







should be patient, for whoever becomes separate from the ummah even from a hand 
span and then dies, dies a death of jahiliyyah.437 The position that Dağıstânî was 
holding was the common position of obeying Allah, the Prophet and those in 
leadership from amongst the Muslim community. This well-established ideal pointed 
to the idea that the Caliph was the absolute authority and that he should be listened to, 
and rather than attempting to abdicate or critique him, one should practice patience 
and give advice. Dağıstânî’s ideas resonated with those of Yusuf al-Nabahani, when 
Nabahani had criticised those who were in opposition to the Sultan in 1895/1312. 438  
With the serialisation of his work on the constitution in the Volkan and then with him 
being rewarded by the Sultan with gold coins for his works439, Dağıstânî did not find 
himself in good position with those in opposition to the Sultan.   
 It is not clear if Dağıstânî was in fact aware of the precarious position of the 
Sultan but his opinions seem to attempt to address those that wanted to question the 
sacredness of the Sultan’s authority. There was a clear agitation from the Young 
Turks as they gradually started to realise that the constitution of 1876/1293 was a 
rather politically conservative document. With the Sultan claiming that it was he who 
granted the constitution, it generated fear that the Sultan could once again suspend the 
constitution or at least abrogate it if he deemed to do so.440 The Tanin newspaper had 
argued that the fifth clause in the constitution to be problematic as it had stated that 
the Sultan was sacred (mukaddes) and without responsibility (gayr-I mesul) thus 
making the Sultan unaccountable and allotting him status above the law. 441 
Dağıstânî’s concerns when writing about his support of the Caliphate centred on the 
nature of what the authority of the Caliph would become. However, if Dağıstânî was 
to assume that he would be supported by the ulema, he would soon realise that 
opinions were diverse within the ulema. In an article written in 1908/1326 in the 
Beyan’ül-Hak, Hamdi Yazır stated: 
 
On the one hand, the Caliph holds the title of representative of the community, expressing allegiance to 
him, but on the other hand, he, like his subjects, is charged with and is obliged to follow the law, since 
he acts as regent and executor for the legislators. He never can, by despotic judgment, suspend law. If 
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he does, he will face deposition based on the will of the people. Therefor the Islamic Caliphate is no 
more than the executive arm of canonical law; it has no resemblance to spiritual leadership.442  
 
Sheikh Mûsa Kâzım Efendi would also later complain how during the Hamidian 
period the Caliph was elevated to the rank of deity. 443 Ahmed Midhat would suggest 
that some bigots found it problematic that when Mûsa Kâzım used to teach that he 
questioned the idea of absolute obedience in his lessons. As a result according to 
Ahmet Midhat, Mûsa Kâzım was accused of teaching kufr (disbelief) and spy reports 
were written against him to disrupt him. 444  But what would have been further 
damning for Dağıstânî were the views of Said Nursi, a fellow writer in the journal 
Volkan. Nursi’s positions on İstibdat were evidently related to the Hamidian period. 
While Dağıstânî was stressing on the absoluteness of the Caliph as the protector and 
unquestionable Imam of the Muslims, he had clearly missed both the prevalent mood 
and the Sultan’s ability to wield his authority. The dominant factions had shifted to 
implement a constitutional monarchy with a representative system. Dağıstânî’s 
proposals, although endorsing constitutionalism, reflected an authoritarian 
constitutional system or at least placed much of the authority in the hands of the 
Sultan, a position which the constitutionalists had fought tirelessly to weaken. 
Authoritarianism had become maligned and with Dağıstânî simply presenting a 
transition from an authoritarian political order to an authoritarian constitutional 
political order, meant that many of the ulema who supported the Hamidian state with 
increased powers would soon come under intense scrutiny.  
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On closer inspection, the Sultan had indeed practiced a mode of governance 
he and his advisors thought natural for the time. But as Nader Sohrabi has shown, the 
world, and in particular the transnational Muslim worldview was changing. In that 
sense, what is more telling of the Muslim worldview at the time is the Shite ālim 
Muhammad Husayn Na’ini’s view, who resided in Ottoman Iraq and had a viewpoint 
on both the Ottoman and Iranian revolutions and constitutional efforts. He stressed: 
 
 With Allah’s benevolent support, the retrogressive trajectory of the Islamic world has been halted and 
slavery under the imperious passions of dictatorial rulers has been terminated. [He meant both the 
Iranian revolutionaries in 1906/1324 and the Young Turks in 1908/1326]. He further continues that 
‘the Muslim community has, thanks to the superb guidance and reasoning of its ulema, became aware 
of the true requirements of its religion and its God-given freedoms. He finally said ‘the momentous 
edicts of the of the Ja’fari religion [Shi’I Islam] in the city of Najaf and the subsequent edicts of the 
elders (ulema) of Istanbul who unanimously declared the struggle for these holy and legitimate goals 
[constitutionalism] as a necessity of religion, exonerated Islam from acquiescing to such tyrannical and 
irrational rules. These were clear historical documents concerning the position of the Islamic 
leadership on the issue, thus silencing critical tongues.445 
 
For Na’ini the ulema (both Sunni and Shiite in the respective areas) in both the 
Iranian Revolution and Ottoman were integral in guiding the revolutionaries at the 
time. He stressed that the objective were in fact holy on which there was enough 
evidence in Islamic history to prove this. It is worth noting that many works regarding 
constitutional discourse did indeed reflect a similarity when examining works of both 
Sunni and Shiite ulema of what is now Iran and Iraq. In this sense, although out of the 
scope of this dissertation is it worth examining how these ideas impacted upon one 
another transregionally, and there is no doubt that the region of Iraq and Iran has yet 
to be explored in regards to its intellectual impact on the imperial centre. 
 
 The Quran Points to Consultation - “Wa Shawirihum fi al Amr”   
 
Consultative governance became the mode of direction the Ottoman devlet would 
take after the Revolution of 1908/1326. Although throughout the Second 
Constitutional Period much debate would surround the temporal nature of the Caliph 
himself, nonetheless, a bifurcated parliamentary structure, with the Meclis-i Ayan 
(House of Senate) elected mainly by the Sultan and the Meclis-i Mebusan (House of 
                                                        




Representatives) elected by the public would attempt to curtail absolute authority in 
any single office, be it Sublime Porte or Palace. In the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, much contestation of power had taken place between the Porte and 
the Palace, and the new constitutional government with a parliament would see to 
address this power struggle by distributing the decision-making authority of the 
executive order.  
The Young Ottomans have been credited with rationalising a parliamentary 
political system stressing on the ideal of consultation. During the nineteenth century 
Namik Kemal pointed to the Quranic injunction in his article “Wa Shawirhum fi al 
Amr” in which he declared that only a constitutional regime would restore the 
strength and prestige of the Ottoman devlet.446 While the Young Ottomans deserve 
much recognition for their journalistic activism, in reality the Young Ottomans’ 
conceptions were part of a general discourse towards accountability and modern 
consultative structures within the Muslim world. Kazasker Seyfeddin Efendi had also 
pointed to the same Quranic references during the actualisation of the constitution in 
1876/1293. During the debates this verse became integral for endorsing 
parliamentarianism. This Quranic injunction was the central ideal in curtailing the 
Caliph’s authority in favour of a parliamentary system.  
In 1908/1326 there was an intensification of articles and proof pamphlets 
written by the ulema aimed at explaining to the masses how the basis of 
parliamentarianism emanated from the Quran. Mufti Berzencizâde Ahmed Faiz from 
Edirne argued in an article related to consultative governance titled El-Hablü’l-Metîn 
Fî Tatbîki’l-Kānûn-ı Esâsî Maa’ş-Şer“i”l-Mübîn about the importance of 
consultation by indicating the Quranic verse [Al- Imran, 3/159] that Allah commands 
the Prophet Muhammed to consult with his ashab (Companions) as issues such as 
warfare and worldly matters were not directed by the revelations from the Quran. 
Moreover, he mentioned that if one consults, one would be able to take advantage of 
their knowledge and experience. He then cites a hadith of the Prophet Muhammed 
which says: “Someone who consults will not lose (zarar etmez)…As it is evident in 
the Quran and hadith, consultation is legitimate.” 447   
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Ālim Hüseyin Hazim a member of the Cemiyet explained in Beyan’ül-Hak 
how the consultative government was better suited to the devlet than the previous 
regime. According to Hazim good governance that included consultation was not 
simply rationally sound but would also bring greater reward in the next life for those 
in authority. Whereas, although decisions without consultation are not sinful, one 
would attain no reward [sevap] for making a decision without it.448  “Those who have 
reason without applying Meşveret, is deemed unacceptable for this person to make a 
decision. This is because Allah says “Wa Shawirhum fi al Amr”.449  
Hazim continued that although the Prophet had no obligation to consult due to the 
fact that he was a Prophet, nonetheless he always did. While not stressing on the 
Quran, the Prophet’s exemplary character and as a qualified leader of state 
consolidated and supported what the verse had indicated. It was not simply that 
consultation provided good governance; Hazim continued that it also removed the 
right to be accused of being biased, as the consensus of people of different factions 
would be required. He continued by pointing to the idea that consultation would also 
minimise mistakes. He then provided the opinions of the Second Rightly Guided 
Caliph Omar who stressed: 
 
1. Discuss/compare opinions for establishing soundness 
2. Ask the masters of consultation and their opinion.450 
 
Hazim argued that if one thinks that his opinion is correct but fails to apply 
consultation, then he would be rewarded less, in the eyes of Allah. If one is enforcing 
one’s opinion even if it is true, but without consultation, the act becomes purely a 
material act thus attaining no reward. Hazim stressed that the pious Umayyad Caliph 
Omer ibn Abdulaziz said that if one applies meşveret (consultation) and münazara 
(debate/discussion/dispute) it will not harm the objective of one’s opinion as to have 
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council is to have hidayet (to be divinely guidance).451While Hazim took acting alone 
in decision making simply as a material act, Said Nursi had insisted that this was in 
fact arbitrary.452  
Finally Hüseyin Hazim chose a different consideration by pointing to the great 
empires of the past, the Greeks and the Persians who accepted consultation as a 
principle of governance.453 By doing so Hazim placed consultation as a core principle 
of the nature of human beings, one that applied natural law, a common theme at the 
time regarding political theory in ulema thought, which placed Islamic civilisations of 
the past in a line of other great political civilisations. Hazim continued, because every 
master of opinion provides an explanation of an issue, whether he [one in authority] 
supports an idea or disagrees with the opinion, he could nonetheless examine every 
single detail, open for exhibition. He points that the Fourth Rightly Guided Caliph Ali 
said that consultation should be applied as via this the truth would be clearer.454 
Hüseyin Hazim concluded that “Those who have reason but do not apply 
consultation, then this decision is not acceptable to make ……If one thinks his 
opinion is correct but doesn’t accept consultation, he will have less reward”. The four 
basic principles of the consultation require: reason [aql], deen [religion] and taqwa 
[God consciousness], proof, and the freedom to voice opinion without any fear or 
duress.455  
Islamic history had pointed to two systems of governance, one authoritarian 
and the other consultative. Hüseyin Hazim writing for the Beyan’ül-Hak, and a senior 
Mufti from Edirne Berencizâde Ahmed Faiz expressed that the constitutional 
government was the most desirable456, but while they had provided choice, Mûsa 
Kâzım would later hold a more radical position. According to Mûsa Kâzım in Surah 
al-Imran [3/159] Allah indeed points to the idea of consultation. In the first verse 
however Allah ‘commands’ His messenger to consult with the ummah. Unlike the 
other scholars who said that Allah had given the Prophet(SAW) choice, Mûsa Kâzım 
points to this being a divine commandment of which the opposite would imply its 
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prohibition. This non-constitutional act with the community would therefore 
constitute a violation of a Quranic precept. Mûsa Kâzım continues that the second 
verse clearly states that Muslims have an obligation to consult one another on 
important issues. The next verses are regarding justice and equity which follow the 
concept of consultation. He then stressed that the Prophet always consulted before 
making important decisions on public matters. The suggestion that the Prophet’s 
method of consultation was similar to a parliamentary system requires some 
discussion.457  
The concepts of Şura were not simply restricted to the ulema in Istanbul. The 
work of Abdullah al-Alami, an ālim from Gazza, was probably the most 
comprehensive when it came to explaining the consultative nature of the parliament. 
Written in Arabic, in 1908/1326, his work was in response to some of the more 
conservative critiques of the new political changes that were taking place in the 
Ottoman world. Alami’s substantial work requires some thorough treatment here, as 
much of the Arab and Ottoman historiography has neglected Alami’s contribution to 
the discourse, instead paying more attention to the journalistic activities of the al-
Manarist press.458 And yet, Alami displays himself to be a fine scholar who made a 
notable contribution through this pamphlet, even though he may have shunned 
visibility, like many others like him. Alami decided to write his work by stating in his 
own words “I have witnessed a lot of people asking about the consultative Mab’uthān 
Council; whether it is legal or not”.459 He continues by saying “And I found in a 
speech given by some eloquent folks that Islam was ‘created’ along with absolute 
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authority, may Allah safeguard it against this abjectness. This is why, I am compelled 
to pen a letter explaining to the dignified readers that all kinds of freedom and the 
consultative Mab’uthān Council are legitimate according to the glorified 
Book’s[Quran’s] verses and that Islam was created along with authority restricted by 
the glorified Book which is a divine law and obligatory consultation.”460His work 
cited twelve verses in the Quran that pointed to the merits of the consultative nature 
of governance. He starts by saying: 
 
In the Glorified Book, which is the first evidence, ( and those who answered their Creator’s call, 
performed their prayers, take their decision according to a consultative process and spend what we’ve 
blessed upon them). Their decisions are taken according to a consultative process; they set up a 
meeting whereas each and everyone of them participates in a manner that helps the ‘Ummah prosper 
and achieve success.   
 
The book bestows four praises on them. The first one is faith. The second is performing prayers which 
is as important as the head to the body. The third one is consultation next to which Islam was sitting at 
its left and the sacred Quran at its right. And both its hands were right. Consultation was one of its 
eyes, whereas the Quran was the other. And the Islam was dependent on these two hands, and its light 
radiated from these two eyes. The fourth praise is about its expenditure on the ‘Ummah in a way that 
remedies its instability, prevents its fall and rectify its perversion and puts it on an equal footing with 
the great nations, high-headed so that they can benefit the ‘Ummah materially as well as morally 
through consultation. Consultation is thus the origin of all benefit, and the source of every good, 
material- and morality-wise. 
 
Allah has praised the believers for that since they were convening for consultation, and has made it the 
third praise after the praises of faith and prayers and before the fourth praise for expenditure (the praise 
of expenditure on his children) as the master of speakers has said “people are the children of Allah.” 
And this goes for glorifying the importance of the consultative council among the wise from the 
‘Ummah’.. 
Dear reader, contemplate the naming of the “Consultation” chapter in the book of Muslims because 
this, after the verse mentioned in it, is the greatest indicator of the seriousness of the matter and its 
importance for the lay people. Because He named it that to warn and remind people of how dignified it 
is to form that supreme council.” 
 
And there is a message to the prophet (PBUH) in the holy Book that states“ With God’s mercy your 
heart has softened for them and if you were rude, cold-hearted, God forbids, they all would go away. 
Then he clarified the things that if he had done, they wouldn’t have gone away, and the things that if 
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he hadn’t done, they would have. Thus, he said “pardon them,” regarding matters that have to do with 
you, “and forgive them,” regarding matters that have to do with Allah, “and consult them,” regarding 
matters that have do with public policy of the Ummah. “When you will, put your trust in Allah.” Thus, 
combining work with hope. “Allah loves those who put their trust in Him.”461 
 
The constitution and the parliament as a tool for Şura were becoming institutionalised 
as the ideals for an efficient Islamic government. The ulema had instilled the 
constitution as a necessity to protect the ummah from government. Throughout the 
late Hamidian period oppositional ulema cited governmental and administrative 
abuses for the reasons behind the need for a constitution. Ulema supporters of the 
constitution would continue this line of argumentation. The parliament was cited as 
an arena where the ummah’s interests and grievances could be heard by those in 
authority through the representatives of the ummah in the guise as parliamentarians. 
In this sense, the concept of the Caliphate as a religiously derived political concept 
was being superseded by the constitution (Meşveret) and parliament (Şura) from the 
perspective of a second religiously derived political concept in Islamic thought and 
from the inception of Islam. But more importantly, with an increasing awareness of 
the concept of public opinion, thinkers and ulema were gradually stressing the point 
that the main function of the Caliphate was to safeguard the interests of the Shari‘a 
and the ummah. The ummah and the law were presented as the pillars of Islamic 
politics and the Caliphate came secondary to these. The ulema and the law would 
now be used as concepts to curtail governmental authoritarianism. 
 
Authority to the Ummah or Mebusan? 
 
Abdullah al-Alami stressed that the Quran proves that authority in Islam “is bound by 
the Sharia and Şura” and that even the Prophet Muhammad was required to resort to 
consultation as the Quran commanded ‘wa-shawirham fil-amr’. Alami stressed how 
the Parliament was indeed consultation and that the Mebusan (representatives) of the 
assembly were not only a necessity but that their legitimacy came from the Quran and 
did not contradict the Sharia. Alami on this verse explains: 
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Dear reader, please contemplate this verse which we—Muslims— think that it’s Allah’s words whom 
we believe there is no god but Him. And that it’s the best word, sent down with the angels to the best 
Prophet in the best era in the best milieu. It orders him to consult, study and exchange ideas with the 
Ummah and its wise elders. And it didn’t allow him to take any decision until doing this deed. That’s 
why, after he was ordered to consult with the people, He said “when you will, put your trust in Allah.” 
If you did what I have commanded you to do by seeking advice from others, with that leading to 
fearlessness or reluctance and silence, then your confidence to succeed should be put in us because he 
is the angel of happiness and success.462 
 
Like Alami, Mûsa Kâzım also pointed to the importance of the ummah and 
consultation. He had made the needs of the ummah central to his argument of political 
discourse. For him the governmental structure was a service to the ummah. Mûsa 
Kâzım mentioned that two main commandments regarding worldly matters are that 
we should be ‘just’ and ‘equitable’ when dealing with other people and consult with 
the members of the ummah and ask their advice on every important issue. 463  Mûsa 
Kâzım stressed on three main points regarding the new constitutional order. These 
where: 
 
1. Consulting the ummah in every matter –national will 
2. Respecting ‘justice’ and ‘equity’ in every matter 
3. Entrusting the affairs of the state and interests of the ummah, which is a divine 
charge, to a qualified person.464 
 
From point one and three we can see that Mûsa Kâzım was applying an alternate 
reading of political authority by suggesting that the emphasis of authority should be 
in the hands of the ummah and that competency was a requirement for the leader of 
the state. The idea of being a qualified person indeed is vague, and as with any ideas 
regarding political authority, can be open to interpretation. But what mustn’t be 
ignored here is how competency was being discussed in the late Ottoman ulema 
circles. This idea of qualification was demanded in all administrative positions and 
the ulema would later make the charge that their positions as guardians of the faith 
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depended on their qualification as experts in matters to do with religion and 
legality.465  
The point of consulting the ummah is of great significance here. The questions 
of how the ummah were to be consulted and whom from the ummah should be 
consulted, leave this matter open to much debate and theorisation. It seems clear that 
what Mûsa Kâzım was alluding to was the matter of consultation and representation. 
It is also noteworthy why the matter of including the ummah facilitated the possibility 
of restricting the absolute authority of the Caliph. The theory of absolutism required 
total obedience, as those in leadership were perceived as the competent in the 
decision-making process. However this ideal suggested that the ummah did not have 
the capacity to make decisions, and nor did they have the ability to hold leadership to 
account. Ali Hayder Amin mentioned in the Beyan’ül-Hak that the constitutional 
order needs to abide by four principles. Those were the Kitab(Quran), Sunna, Icmā-i 
Ummet (Consensus of the Community) and Aql (Reason), while reason also needed 
to be practiced freely so that one could provide advice and opinion.466   
The ideas of Dağıstânî and the Volkan press stressed that the importance of 
obedience to the Caliph and the structure of hierarchy was far more important than 
inclusion. This would later lead to qualifications of the ideal of the revolutionary 
slogan ‘freedom’ within the Islamic context. What Mûsa Kâzım however was 
pointing to was to stress that the Caliph was no more than an executive, who of 
course had a divine charge, but whose role was not to trespass that of guardian of the 
Muslim masses, thus, any decision regarding the interest of the community required 
them [the ummah] to be consulted. 467  In this period it was done either by the 
journalists or the parliamentarians. Said Nursi would later explain: 
 
The new regime is established on certain foundations. There is strength in numbers. Might and power 
were used to rule the world, but now it is science and ilm. People can govern themselves as education 
has increased. The Sultan carried this burden but now the people rule through the Meclis-i Mebusan 
which has become the heart of the nation.468  
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An objective of the Caliphate was to provide safety, security to all subjects/citizens 
under its domain, which would later become theorised as the protection of din, 
intellect, property, lineage and honour. As the Caliph was a Muslim and his 
governorship was based on the implementation of the Sharia within the legal 
structure, it was also natural to assume that the unique bond between a Muslim ruler 
and Muslim subject placed certain expectations upon the latter. If the Caliph was the 
nominal sovereign, the point Mûsa Kâzım was alluding to was that ‘authority’ 
belonged to the ummah on the basis that it was they who volunteered to accept the 
contract of leadership of the bayah by legitimating the one holding the office. While 
not every person can elect the Caliph, Mûsa Kâzım was suggesting that the ummah’s 
‘authority’ was being transferred to the elective representatives - the parliament.469 In 
theory, authority belonged to the ummah and would traditionally be transferred to the 
Caliph. Now, the parliament became the intermediary between the ummah and the 
Caliph, whereby the elected representatives would be vested with the ummah’s 
authority instead. Consulting the ummah in every matter then points to 
parliamentarianism. The collective of the ummah in the guise of the representatives 
was more important than the sole authority of the Caliph. To assume that the 
authoritarian system did not believe in this would also be misleading, but whereas the 
authoritarian style of governance heavily placed the issue of trust and competency in 
the hands of the Sultan as Caliph, the system of consultation attempted to provide 
more of an ascendency – at least in theory- to the masses, and their representatives, 
thus suggesting that decision-making processes should be in the hands of the 
collective rather than the individual. What was not taken into account was the 
possibility of party politics, where a single party like the CUP would later use the 
parliamentary system to dominate decision-making processes. Such importance was 
placed on the role of the parliamentarian as the one who shouldered the burden of the 
masses and shared this burden with his fellow parliamentarians and Caliph. It was 
once again Alami who provided the most detailed explanation: 
 
And it has also been mentioned in the Glorified Book that “the believers who believed Allah’s and his 
Prophet’s message and agreed with him on a unifying matter” for people for the sake of consultation 
“did not leave” the consultative community “till they took his permission. Those who take your 
permission are those who believe in God and his prophet. Thus, if they asked your permission 
                                                        




regarding some of their issues, give it to those you want and forgive them. Allah is forgiving and 
merciful. Do not make the prophet’s supplication like that of some of you.” 470 
 
The unifying matter is the one for which people assemble to consult each other regarding serious 
issues and highly important matters. If they took turns to discuss an important issue on a bleak day, 
then that is a day people assemble for. And it’s a well-attended day. 
 
1. We learn from the verse that the monarch has to have a circle of sagacious people from among the 
Ummah’s wisest to explicate to him their opinions, knowledge and experiences.  
2. We learn from the verse that the Prophet (PBUH) was intentionally calling on people to consult 
with them, and they were aware of the necessity of doing that. 
3. We learn from the verse that whenever the Sultan invites people of knowledge and the Ummah’s 
elders to the Mab’uthān Council they should answer his call. 
4.    We learn from the verse that whenever statesmen and philosophers convened at a place overseen 
by the Sultan to look into the matters of the Ummah, it is not permissible for any of them to leave the 
convention and abandon their responsibility unless they submit a request for leave to the monarch 
along with an acceptable excuse.  
5.   We learn from this verse that whoever gives an excuse and sets out to leave the consultative 
council, even if their excuse is accepted as the wise book commends “forgive them,” offends the 
council by leaving it as he doesn’t show respect for his presence in the council. 471 
 
So serious was the charge of parliament that it was presented as a religious duty, one 
which was not to be taken lightly and one that could not be abandoned because the 
greater good of the affairs of the state, ummah and religion were more important than 
individual considerations. İzmirli İsmail Hakkı would later point to the Quran when 
explaining about the divine charge of the parliamentarians when he said “ [A]nd let 
there be from you a people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and 
forbidding that which is wrong/evil” [Al-Imran 3/104].472 This point was stressed 
also by Bereketzâde İsmail Hakkı in his article ‘The principles of consultation in 
Islam’.473 Alami words are of worth as he provides detail to this point and would 
continue to add: 
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It is been mentioned in the glorified Book that (there should be a group of you who advocate goodness, 
command good service and prohibit the evil: those are the successful.)474 
 
The glorified Book has clarified the function of the Ummah Council and its duties. It said “to advocate 
goodness,” This can be done, for instance, by remedying the state of the kingdom; bettering its policies 
by establishing vexilla of knights that can help these politics advance and flourish; establishing offices 
to transport the soldiers and the provisions; improving the state of Ottoman Bosnia and sending off 
fleets to visit foreign territories; inviting millions of foreigners to establish industrial enterprises; 
looking into the reasons that can help stabilize and ensure the security and welfare of Yemen and El-
Hijaz; establishing financial national companies; improving the kingdom’s capital and its conditions. 
 
While some ulema argued that this verse in the Quran about enjoining the good 
referred to the ulema, by 1908/1326 this verse was now being presented by most of 
the ulema reflecting the new parliamentarian structure towards the elected 
representatives. It was argued that the ulema in 1876/1293 were split into two camps 
regarding constitutionalism, with the liberal followers of Midhat Pasha in favour and 
the conservatives against. Such simple dichotomies could not be made regarding 
ulema in 1908/1326, nor was it easy to substantiate that the ulema were in opposition 
to the constitution at all, as a general consensus was established in favour of 
constitutionalism and a parliamentary system. In 1908/1326 Mustafa Sabri Efendi had 
alluded to the idea that Ottoman constitutionalism was not an emulation of the West 
but that the West had learnt this from Islam.475 By using the printing press the ulema 
argued that the ummah and Ottoman polity were now ready to initiate consultation in 
the semblance of a parliamentary constitutional Caliphate system. 
In the Sırâtımüstakīm, ālim Bereketzâde İsmail Hakkı Efendi would address 
an article in the Tanin explaining that the Ottoman devlet was unable to implement a 
constitutional system. Edurad Saharo, a director of the orientalist branch at Berlin 
University claimed that the diversity in the Ottoman world nearly rendered it 
impossible for the Ottomans to be able to implement a constitutional system. He also 
went further by claiming that this was a new concept for the Ottomans. Bereketzâde’s 
response was harsh in tone in which he first rejected the claims outright by saying 
that the Ottomans were indeed practicing constitutionalism and questioned how a 
man [Edurad Saharo] could understand the complexities of the Ottomans, in which he 
would need to understand the Sharia, rulings in Islam, Islamic morality and society. 
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He stressed that “we know what Meşveret is and it is not new for us”.476  Ālim 
Mardinîzâde Ebu’l Ulu felt that constitutionalism in the Ottoman context was so 
obvious that it wasn’t even worth discussing. 477  
In another account the senior ālim Zeynalâbidin Efendi argues in a rethorical 
style that the meşrutiyet is the contract between the government and the nation 
(millet), in this contract the nation can hold the government to account where even 
the most powerless individual is able to do that and defend his own right. In this 
system, instead of giving the government anything it wants whether legitimate or not, 
(the individual) is able to object without any doubt or being powerless and helpless to 
the extent that they become a slave or captive, instead of the this maybe the 
government officials will either be rewarded or punished depending on their 
performance, because they are nothing more than paid employees who have been 
hired by the nation. 478 The point of Zeynalâbidin of even the individual can hold 
authority to account is a worthy one as in some ways in an devlet where the concept 
of a modern citizen was being introduced and the right of the individual to uphold 
even the government and its officials to account was to once again empower the 
masses.  Furthermore the Ottoman thinkers including the ulema were attempting in 
creating a space for a modern citizen regarding the right of the individual. But it is 
difficult to ascertian this claim, as with a teleological reading one could now argue 
that a secular discursive activity was taking place to sepearte the Ottoman Sultanate 
from the Caliphate by the ulema. On closer inspection the works present a more 
scholastic tone of informing the masses about the various forms of governmental 
choices. What is fair to suggest however is that the ulema to some degree had laid the 
foundations for such debates both at the time and for future Islamic revivalists 
regarding the nature of a modern Islamic-constitutional-Caliphate.   
Zeynalâbidin would go on by providing the example of an Imam leading the 
congregation by saying the core of the meşrutiyet is defining the rights and duties of 
the government and the nation by establishing and balance between them. He 
continues the Imam is the leader of the prayer but the congregation needs to give 
consent. The Imam can also not transgress against the general rules of namaz/salat. If 
the Imam has a deficiency or makes a mistake then the congregation should not 
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follow him. Thus, first the Padishah should obide by the law so that the nation should 
obide by the law of Islam and the Shariah.479 
From their actions in the opposition to the Hamidian regime, involvement in 
the revolution and series of publications supporting the constitutional order, it was 
conclusive that by 1908/1326 the ulema had become instrumental in the safeguarding 
and consolidation of the constitutional ideal and regime during the Second 
Constitutional Period. One could even say they were more so than the Young Turks, 
as the ulema from their traditional scholarship and their continual support of the new 
order suggests that they were more constitutionalist than the Young Turks were. In 
1909/1327 the ulema led by the Cemiyet would make the draft amendments of the 
constitution and present it to parliament, thus further indicating their involvement as 
theorisers, political actors and practitioners of constitutional theory.  
 
Hürriyet/Hurriya (Freedom)  
 
The expression of freedom was immediately felt in the activities of the Ottoman 
press. One of the first actions reflecting this new culture was the increased 
publication of the Ottoman Constitution in a variety of languages in the various 
ethno-linguistic newspapers. The explosion of printing activity during the earlier 
years of the Second Constitutional Period was nothing short of remarkable. Mustafa 
Sabri remarked, “Without the inkılap the freedom to express ideas was not possible 
and that if ideas cannot be freely expressed or discussed, how could one know of the 
truth?”480  Mustafa Sabri had later complained again regarding the limitations of free 
speech during the Hamidian era prior to the revolution.481 This type of sentiment was 
reflected in the ideas of Jamaluddin al-Qassami in Damascus, as David Commins 
explained in response to the restrictive environment of the Hamidian period.482  We 
see this sentiment by some members of the ulema such as Omer Fezvi Efendi and 
Mehmed Fetin Efendi expressed in the Beyan’ül-Hak. Omer Fezvi wrote:  
 
Because of our revolution the Muslims were happy; everyone shall now talk about their religion and 
worldly matters freely. The Muslim’s happiness will be from the religion (din) and the manner they 
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enact consultation (from Islam). The type of government will be religious and from the Kanun-I Esasi 
(constitution). The type of government is based on the religion of the state (Islam) and the rules will be 
based on the Sharia and nobody will continue their jobs without any rules. The rules will be religious 
rules that everybody will follow.483 
 
 
Mehmed Fetin explains:  
 
In the past there were some dark clouds [members of the old regime], as there were many problems, 
now we have relative justice. There are still people who want to apply this [despotism] but it is 
impossible as the people are already wearing the shirts of freedom.484 
 
He continued: “The ulema will support the truth and in one hand will be the sword of 
the Sharia and in the other the truth” 485  
The ambiguity surrounding the concept of freedom was not simply a Muslim 
or ulema issue. Non-Muslim communities themselves were concerned regarding the 
need for qualification for freedom. During the Tanzimat period conservative 
Christians along with Muslims stressed that freedom equated to the right to vote, the 
right to protection, education, to practice one’s religion as well as the freedom of the 
press. But freedom could not equate to materialism or, more importantly, 
republicanism in the political sphere. 486  In 1908/1326 most articles in the Arab 
provinces asked questions such as “What is freedom?” “What is meant by freedom?,” 
and “How should we use freedom?”. Many in the Arab provinces cared less about 
freedom but rather asked for the application of justice, probably attributed to good 
local governance. Indeed, in some parts of the Ottoman provinces, not paying 
taxation was assumed to be freedom. The Ottoman case was not simply one of 
euphoria, recognising that freedom was a positive thing; many thinkers were also 
aware of the problems freedom could create.487 There was also a concern of large 
gatherings of peoples, especially now that a host of organisations were being formed, 
some that had the potential to become a challenge to the CUP. The Ulema had 
stressed that freedom cannot be used in an individual manner. It’s thus worth 
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stressing that freedom didn’t suggest individualism. Freedom should be used so not to 
injure collective freedom (hürriyet-i umumiye). Thus, meetings could be held 
provided public order was not breached.488 With this culture of caution in mind, the 
ulema attempted to explain the merits and possible concerns regarding the ‘freedoms’ 
that were available to mainstream society.  
Hürriyet (freedom) did exist in the works of the ulema prior to the nineteenth 
century. But the term in the books of jurisprudence was largely in relation to the 
subject area regarding slavery. The new concept of freedom was subject to the will of 
the rule of law, morality, and customs of the group/community. On closer inspection 
the concept of freedom had continued to be viewed in the Ottoman Muslim world 
simply as having the right to voice one’s opinion in the political sense.  
During the nineteenth century, it was evident that the newly introduced slogan 
of freedom had become an attractive slogan to many, as publications by factions of 
opposing ideological positions used the term hürriyet as a motto, and attempted to 
domesticate the term.489 It is with this in mind that one could assume that the ulema 
also attempted to address the concept of freedom by restricting it to their own 
traditional framework.  
The politics of freedom provided the ulema opportunities to increase their 
views and opinions to a larger audience. One could argue that the interaction with 
non-ulema Muslim thinkers and Ottoman thinkers by and large created an 
environment in which the ulema themselves would able to express more refined 
positions on a wide range of subject areas. Mûsa Kâzım Efendi was one such ālim 
who published two articles which are worth of note in 1908/1326. In the 
Sırâtımüstakīm he first published an article titled ‘Hürriyet ve Müsavat’ (Freedom 
and Equality) and the second was a pamphlet titled ‘Islam’da Usul-Meşveret ve 
Hürriyet’ (The principles of Consultation and Liberty in Islam). In both pieces Mûsa 
Kâzım attempted to address questions regarding the concept of freedom. In Hürriyet 
ve Müsavat, Mûsa Kâzım argued that although the concept of ‘freedom’ was not from 
Islam (meaning an Islamic ideological construct), however the way it was declared 
was acceptable, as it didn’t go against Ottoman and Islamic norms and traditions. 490 
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This was thus not an open endorsement of the concept of freedom, but a cautious 
attempt to curtail the expectations and euphoria that was becoming attached to the 
slogan. Mûsa Kâzım also added that human beings are subject to laws, both natural 
and legal, and points that both humans and animals are not free to their own will to do 
as they please. He thus continued to argue that no system in the world provided 
absolute freedom, as this concept itself requires regulation. He pointed to a rhetorical 
point of whether people feel they have the right to do as they please, and that in 
essence absolute freedom means to be free from the laws of the state, religion and 
society – to some degree suggesting that absolute freedom leads to criminality – of 
which chaos is a natural consequence.491 Mûsa Kâzım pointed to a verse in the Quran 
to stake his claim in which it said “Does Man think that he will be left uncontrolled, 
(without purpose)? [Al Kiyama 75/36].492  Thus, it is clear that for Mûsa Kâzım 
‘freedom’ required regulation and that ‘Freedom is to be free from the İstibdat of the 
previous form of governance in which [everyone] was squeezed under pressure and 
that this was neither legitimate nor the right way.493 Furthermore Mûsa Kâzım added 
that freedom be interconnected with the concepts of justice, equality and consultation. 
This is rather reflective of most of the ideas of the ulema at the time: that the concept 
of freedom was interlocked with the concept of justice, and consultation by lifting the 
restrictions that had been placed upon people to express their views and opinions, in 
society, intellectual discourse and political advice. This type of freedom to express 
opinion was placed within the Ottoman moral framework.  
Although to societies today this may be perceived as a reductionist position 
regarding the ideal of freedom from Mûsa Kâzım, what must be taken into account is 
his target audience at the time. This type of caution and scepticism was not unique to 
Mûsa Kâzım as we can see this in the works of Azhari Shaykh Husayin al-Marsafi in 
Egypt in 1888/1305 (possibly after the Urabi incident) who argued in his Risalat al-
Kalim al thaman “ Essay on Eight Words” that the issues of hürriyet requires some 
level of caution. Although he accepted that in the social sense the need for freedom, 
he was reluctant to attribute it in the political sense. Instead he raised his concerns 
that absolute freedom would lead to bad manners, attaining money illicitly, people 
stealing and cheating one another and committing adultery. His concern for some of 
the opinions he was hearing on the street by some of the youth was that this would 
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lead to a breakdown in morality in society. His solution was a strict adherence to the 
Sharia, to safeguard the youth from this possibility of moral decay. 494 Like Mûsa 
Kâzım, ulema positions on freedom were to be solely placed within the remit of the 
law, which was in conformity to natural law and the Sharia, and this positions on 
freedom later be instituted in the Ottoman Constitution.  
In a pamphlet written in 1908/1326 Kolcali Abdülaziz Efendi titled ‘Kuran-ı 
Kerim ve Kanun-ı Esasi’ (The Noble Quran and the Constitution) explained how 
freedom and equality are tantamount to the basic needs of all people and that they are 
a part of human nature. He explained how every legal system is obliged to guarantee 
that individual and social freedoms and rights are protected against violation and that 
the traditions of all peoples are protected against ridicule and mockery. If a legal 
system could provide that, then that society would prosper.495  He concluded his 
pamphlet by explaining that he was quite hopeful for the Muslims because they had 
adopted the constitution and the principles of hürriyet, müsavat and usul-i meşveret, 
and that there was no doubt that with the help of Allah and the Prophet Muhammad, 
the Islamic and Ottoman society would return to its past glory, progress and 
industry.496  
 
Also, Al-Alami wrote in great detail on the concepts of freedom which is worth of 
note here: 
 
I have witnessed a lot of people asking about the consultative Mab’uthān Council; whether it is legal or 
not—and also about freedom, whether it is compatible with the honorable Sharia. And as a lot has been 
discussed and requests for clarification made in this regard, it is imperative to write on the matter and 
bring to our attention the applicability of the question according to the Sharia and its principles such as 
the Glorified Book and the incessant Sunna.  
 
This is why I intended to write on this matter while inferring on the legality of the consultative 
Mab’uthān Council and freedom as much as I could get access497 through the verses of the Glorified 
Book, the correct Sunna and whatnot. Then I read in a volume of an Egyptian gazette—I have a copy 
of but don’t want to explicitly mention its name—that freedom contradicts the spirit of the Quran, may 
Allah keep it in a lofty position. And I found in a speech given by some eloquent folks that Islam was 
“created” along with absolute authority, may Allah safeguard it against this abjectness. This is why, I 
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am compelled to pen a letter explaining to the dignified readers that all kinds of freedom and the 
consultative  Mab’uthān Council are legitimate according to the glorified Book’s verses and that Islam 
was created along with authority restricted by the glorified Book which is a divine law and obligatory 
consultation. And I also explain in it what freedom is, and how many of its kind exist. I do this by 
inferring each kind from many verses from the Book, not from a Hadith, nor by consensus (ijma) or 
analogy(qiyas). This strategy, despite its difficulty, is the one I learned about from that gazette. It 
taught me to approach this difficult matter. This is in line with the true sayings from the Book “We 
have mentioned in this Quran for each question an example,” and “We have sent down to you this 
book explaining everything.” Thus, if I had asked “Are there in the Book verses referring to freedom 
and the consultative  Mab’uthān Council—until it is easy to do so—I would have answered “yes.”498 
 
The pamphlet was an attempt to emphasise why parliamentary structure in particular 
was from the precepts of Islam, which Alami went into great detail to find in the 
Quran. His also attempted to explain the concepts of freedom but marries it with what 
the other ulema have mentioned above. Alami probably mixed in a network of 
scholars that belonged to what is described as the Salafist movement. We see a 
similar sentiment in the ideas of the Manarist writers, as well as Jamaluddin al Qasimi 
in Damascus. Jamaluddin al Qasami explained how the Constitution not only 
provided a return to consultative governance but it also provided people with 
freedom. For Qasimi it meant the freedom to practice ones religion, it did not mean 
that freedom was to go against the law, and for Muslims to move outside the Sharia. 
Qasimi also undertook to explain the meaning of freedom to his listeners, some of 
whom equated freedom with licentiousness: 
If the word freedom has nearly intoxicated the people . . . they have a right, for the joy of release after 
bondage and of freedom after enslavement is a joy surpassing description and definition. However, the 
rational one knows that freedom, if not circumscribed by religious manners and protected by a bulwark 
of effective morals, is not the long-sought goal. Therefore, it is obligatory to observe the manners of 
religion, to cling to the bonds of certainty, to be rightly led by the prophets' and the messengers' 
guidance, and to follow sincere, wise men.499 
The ulema’s attempts to address the issue of freedom was based on the fact that the 
new found Ottoman conception of freedom needed to be distinguished from French 
Revolutionary conceptions of freedom. With there being confusion and a lack of 
clarity of how this slogan was being reflected in mainstream society, the ulema who 
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took to explain the concept of freedom were well aware of the apprehensions and to 
some extent outright rejection of the ideal of ‘freedom’ by certain segments within 
Ottoman Muslim society. It was bearing this in mind that some ulema in favour of the 
new constitutional movement attempted to toe the line of on the one hand propagate 
the concept of freedom but then restrict it to the freedom to practice ones religion, 
opinion and provide advice. These activities were not alien in the Hamidian period, 
but when hürriyet was being pitted against İstibdat it indicated that the ulema’s 
explanations were not overtures to the West or the Young Turks, but instead in many 
ways they were also skeptical along with their conservative colleagues. The ulema’s 
interaction with the concept of freedom was not as dynamic as other thinkers in the 
devlet. Although willing to endorse Ottoman citizens right to have more political 
freedom than what was provided by the Hamidian regime, nonetheless, they were still 
unwilling to endorse a Western conception of either personal or political freedom. 
Much of the ulema’s thoughts were framed either within the arguments that emanated 
from the Gülhane regarding a citizen’s right, or in conformity with the ulema 
scholarship that was extracted from their discussion of the universal ideas that 
emanate from natural law. Thus, they were willing to concede that freedom 
maintained a universal component that was independent from religion, a concept that 
all societies could establish. But nonetheless, with ulema ideals entrenched in the 
superiority of the idea of law, both natural and the Sharia, the concept of freedom 
would be restricted within this, and although the ulema would continue to debate in 
an ever increasing intellectual environment regarding the merits of freedom, 
nonetheless, as central figures of the constitutional construction of 1876/1293 and 
then in 1909/1327, they propagated the concept of freedom to the Ottoman public in 
the way to be instituted in the constitution, in the form of law: the fundamental law as 
both natural and the Sharia.  
Uhuvvet ve Müsavat (Equality and Fraternity), the Ummah or Ottoman 
Ummah? 
 
From the nineteenth century there was a steady increase of non-Muslims in the state 
apparatus. This was a result of the changing social and political circumstances and 
increasing bureaucratisation to improve the state apparatus. During the nineteenth 
century the Ottoman devlet went through a multitude of structural transformations 




refugees from Russia, and evolving and moving borders and boundaries meant that 
the Ottoman centre attempted to construct an Ottoman ideal of belonging. There is no 
doubt that this policy had ideological undertones if viewed from the perspective of 
the intellectuals such as the Young Ottomans, but on closer inspection this process 
had practical implications as well. This new ideal was based on two main factors, the 
first, was citizenship in belonging to territories that were recognised under Ottoman 
authority, and the second, of loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty as rulers of the devlet. 
Shifting boundaries made this imagining ever more difficult, but appeals were made 
to a shared tradition, history and heritage, however vague. Intellectuals such as the 
Young Ottomans attempted to conceptualise the ideal of Osmanlilik (Ottomansim) 
which provided equality in the eyes of the law and created a universal sense of loyalty 
from all citizens to the ruling dynasty. Conceptually it was felt that loyalty could be 
obtained so long as governance provided justice and prosperity. In the case of 
Muslims, what has often been problematized by academics is the possibility of a 
contradiction by belonging to the ideal of ‘vatan’(motherland) which eluded to 
belonging to a patriotic identity with non-Muslims, and that of ‘ummah’ which was a 
transnational identity of belonging to the Muslim community that transcended the 
boundaries of the Ottoman dominion.  There is no doubting that Muslims felt a 
belonging to the Muslim fraternity, of belonging to the ummah, however it was also 
evident that Muslims felt an affinity to their cultural, linguistic and spaces of 
residence. How does one then reconcile on the one hand the exclusivity of belonging 
to the global Muslim ummah and on the other hand the belonging to the ‘Ottoman 
ummah’ that started to become popularised after the constitutional revolution of 
1908/1326? 
As part of their revolutionary zeal in 1908/1326, the Young Turks declared 
the call for ‘equity and fraternity’ as part of their ‘avant-garde’ slogans for social 
change. The Hamdian state never outwardly undermined the independence of the 
millets, and stressed on interfaith tolerance between the communities as well as 
loyalty to the Ottoman government. Ottomanism was the inclusive patriotic ideal to 
attain loyalty from the subjects towards the state, and tolerance between faith 
communities. But more pressing concerns regarding independence attained by 
Christian states mainly in the Balkans was feared of destabilising Ottoman hegemony 
and suzerainty. Recognising that the Muslims now comprised large parts of the 




authority with its main Muslim social base, and at the same time not antagonising the 
non-Muslim populations. During the constitutional revolution the Young Turks also 
applied a similar strategy by appealing to the Muslim masses for support while 
declaring universal slogans to attain the backing of the non-Muslims of the Ottoman 
domains. This had been a common feature during the nineteenth century, but by 
1908/1326 the Young Turk call for equity and fraternity, would present challenges of 
a different kind as the revolutionary euphoria attempted to create emotional bonds 
between the various religious groups and ethnicities based on a shared ideal of 
belonging to the Ottoman world. Ottomanism was seen as the counter ideology to the 
rising nationalism in the region, a reaction perhaps, but it is worth noting what 
consequences this had on the Islamic notions of communal identity as the ulema and 
Muslims thinkers alike were strongly against the idea of nationalism. What made 
Ottomanism distinct was that it attempted to encompass different religions, ethnicities 
and linguistic groups, under an Islamic state. These tensions were no doubt 
challenging to balance and reconcile, but the process was a formative one, in which 
many thinkers and ulema alike were attempting to find an ideal arrangement. On the 
one hand there was the theorisation of the ideals of Ottomanism, Islamic unity and 
Islamic political authority, and on the other practical, ever-changing relationships and 
realities of the Ottoman domains. The idea of belonging to an Ottoman identity was 
not presented as an ideal that contradicted religious identities but one that was 
complimentary in theory and necessary in practice. 
  In Benedict Anderson’s work on nationalism he opines that press capitalism 
was one of the tools that consolidated a consciousness of what he described as an 
‘imagined community’ along national lines that constructed a shared identity based 
mainly on linguistic aspects. For Anderson the print press in particular had managed 
to use an ‘official’ language that facilitated this imagined collective consciousness 
along the new national lines based on ethno-linguistic identities. According to 
Anderson vernacular dialects lost their agency as the chosen language of print 
dominated the vernacular when nation-building took place. Modern state 
centralisation was to foster this identity along shared borders and boundaries, and 
while Ottomanism was different from nationalism in one sense, it nonetheless 
facilitated a national consciousness that was a reaction to the dominant culture of 
nationalism in the region.500  While the Ottoman press was reflective of multiple 
                                                        




ethnic identities, such as in the case of Armenians, nonetheless there was a 
complexity in the Muslim identity or the Arab identity for example. Although much 
of Arab identity had become synonymous with Islam, the non-Muslim contribution to 
Arabism cannot be denied. While Anderson’s premise may shed light on the non-
Muslim experience, the Muslim experience prior to the construction of the nation 
states was somewhat ambiguous. The ulema press were far more reluctant to endorse 
nationalism as this can be seen in many of their works.501 A case in point can be seen 
from the works of Şeyhülislâm Mûsa Kâzım and ālim Ahmed Naim Baban who 
heavily criticised ethnic nationalism, whether it be Turkish, Kurdish, Albanian or 
Arab. Mûsa Kâzım argued that the only one nation for Muslims was the ummah and 
that was based on Muslim brotherhood502, while Naim considered ethnic nationalism 
as a deadly disease that could destroy Muslim unity.503  
But what was equally evident is that the ulema like intellectuals were 
contributors to the ideas of multiple identities. The ulema on local levels may have 
used rhetoric of more local markers of identity, but in their literature they spoke of 
the Muslim ummah as a universal, inseparable block. While it is true that multiple 
formations of identity would seem to be in conflict with the transnational notion of 
ummah, it seems quite evident that these alternative identities were perceived to be 
only partially in contradiction with the supranational identity. Another point worth 
noting is that while Anderson has rightly highlighted that the printing press helps 
facilitate the idea of belonging to a nation along lingua-ethnic lines, the ulema also 
used the printing press to consolidate the older foundations of identity of belonging to 
the Muslim ummah by balancing newer formations of belonging to the Ottoman 
ummah. It is noticeable that the Muslim press in fact shaped and consolidated an 
intra-national Muslim identity of what Nurullah Ardiç has coined an ‘imagined 
ummah’504 or what Jan Peter Hartung has called ‘communication community’505 but 
at the same recognising that their audiences were many facilitated a decentralised 
identity to local consumption.  
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Although Muslims belonged to their distinct linguistic groups, it is 
nevertheless fair to assume that they also shared various commonalities that 
transcended national boundaries, uniting them to a communal bloc. In the Ottoman 
case Muslim trans-localism was not simply attached to belonging to the Muslim 
ummah, but also the Ottoman government which considered itself the only Caliphate. 
An objective of the Caliphate in Islamic political thought was to safeguard the 
interests of the ummah. The ummah and Caliphate were political concepts, but 
whereas the Caliph’s authority laid within the remit of the domains he governed the 
global Muslim ummah transcended those boundaries. Ottoman policies appealed to 
the concept of ummah, a transnational idea, as part of its foreign policy as well as 
local when necessary. It seems that Osmanlilik was not perceived in contradiction to 
the concept of Ittihad-ı Islam. But in the Second Constitutional Period some members 
of the ulema were aware that the primary objective of the Caliph was only to 
safeguard the citizens of his own territorial domains.506  The complexity of politics 
that centred on the emotion of Ittihad-ı Islam was that while the Ottoman state’s remit 
was simply within its confines, nonetheless, appeals for global Muslim unity also 
emanated from the political culture of Islam and seemed natural. What was stressed 
however is that the Ottoman devlet could not provide the tenets of what was inscribed 
in the Ottoman constitution to Muslims outside the Ottoman domains. In this sense, 
the constitution was not simply establishing a relationship between ruler and ruled 
within the Ottoman domains, it was also establishing the nature of relationship 
between the Ottoman Caliphate and the global ummah.  
In the Ottoman Muslim press, the consolidation of traditional identities of 
belonging to the transnational exclusive identity of ummah were being married to the 
forging with the translocal inclusive Ottoman identity based on shared experience, 
loyalty and boundary. The point here is to consider that on the one hand the concept 
of ummah was being further consolidated in the Muslim press but at the same time 
concepts of equality and fraternity were also professed in the revolutionary slogans. 
As a result, was there any potential risk of increased tensions between Muslim and 
non-Muslims? Anderson continues to suggest that the official imperial nationalisms 
were a response of the continental empires fear of the increasing domestic nationalist 
threat. He states that the official nationalisms were an effort to “stretch……the short, 
                                                        




tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of Empire”.507 I would stress that 
identities in general were fluid indicators. Nation state narratives have insisted on 
clearly defined and demarcated expression of identities, yet belonging to a religious 
empire, upholding loyalty to an Ottoman devlet and at the same time belonging to a 
global exclusive community may not have drawn up the types of contradictions that 
we choose to feel today. Although critical on the ideas of nationalism and disunity, 
the ulema never sought to clarify the ideas of ummah from the conception of the 
Ottoman-ummah. In that sense, belonging to the ummah and at the same time living 
in a state that was a religious devlet and demanding equality in the eyes of the law 
may not have been as problematic as historians who have chosen to emphasise on the 
schisms have stated.  
It wasn’t simply the Muslim community that found equality and fraternity 
incommodious; non-Muslims such as the Jews and Christains in various parts of the 
Ottoman domains themselves required enlightening that they weren’t to lose their 
distinctive religious independences. If this was a period of ‘imagining identities’ and 
histories due to the formation of new nation state developments, it also signified the 
possible cessation of nuanced religious identities. During the advent of the revolution, 
the Armenian patriarch of Istanbul explained: “I believe an Ottoman nation with one 
soul and one heart can exist, but the different elements constituting that nation can not 
be identical. Each one of them should bring its peculiarities”.508  
The concepts of equality and fraternity provided a different set of ideological 
and practical complications than the concept of freedom for the ulema in 1908/1326. 
The Kulali incident in 1859/1276 in reaction to the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856/1273 had 
already indicated that forces within Ottoman Muslim society, led by certain ulema 
figures, were afraid of losses in stature and status if absolute equality were to be 
attained. During the promulgation of the first constitution, there were factions as well 
as ulema voices that also raised concerns regarding the concepts of equality among all 
subjects as well as non-Muslim participation in the first parliament. 509  Although 
debates were vigorous, nonetheless, in 1876/1293 the policy to apply equality in the 
eyes of the law, and allow non-Muslim parliamentarians was accepted, as can be seen 
in the Ottoman constitution of 1876/1293, the Ottoman parliament and the Mecelle. 
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The European powers (especially Britain) were indeed unconvinced of Muslim ability 
to cater for non-Muslim participation, but as Ahmet Midhat Efendi had pointed out, 
the Ottoman devlet had a far more nuanced position towards non-Muslim 
participation within the state apparatus than the colonial powers themselves.510  
Leading from the front, the Şeyhülislâm Cemaleddin Efendi was one of the 
first to enact in this symbolic gesture that the Ottoman Constitution was not only 
Islamic but its designs were not to marginalize any other Ottoman subject but to bring 
all Ottomans closer together, in loyalty to the Ottoman state. As noted, news of a 
famous hug between the Şeyhülislâm and the Greek orthodox patriarch in Istanbul 
spread down through the common crowds in the Ottoman domain’s mixed towns and 
cities. Sheikh Rashid Rida cited the Şeyhülislâm’s behaviour as a model for his own 
as after this incident, he too embraced Armenian priests at a public event at the 
Armenian Church in Cairo to the applause of the crowds.511  Sheikh Rashid Rida 
further explained: 
 
They say that France is the mother of liberty and equality, yes and no, but the Ottomans are worthier 
than the French in the glory of equality. France is one nation, one race, one religion, one sect, one 
language, and one civilisation. So what is strange in the demand of their workmen for equality between 
their individuals, after honouring what their government demands and what they owe it and [that] they 
will agree on its unity? 
 
But we Ottomans have already united from the different nationalities in a way that has not yet 
happened in any other kingdom. We are different in race, descent, languages, religion, sect, education 
and culture, or we can say we differ in everything that people can differ in, but despite that we demand 
equality and celebrate its granting in general covenant and in places no doubt and no doubt in this 
magazine512  
 
Rashid Rida recognised the complexities of the Ottoman project, and did not hesitate 
to print the term ‘Ottoman-ummah’ in his publications. He believed that both 
Muslims and non-Muslims could co-exist and rather better the French experience of 
co-existence. Supporters of the new constitutional change also viewed the Western 
powers arrogance towards Ottoman success with real contempt. Abdullah al-Alami 
also addressed the concept of Ottoman-ummah to his Muslim readership. Although 
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this appeal was to the Muslim readers, he nonetheless was not simply creating a 
distinctive Ottoman Muslim identity, but was referring to a wider citizenry that 
included all Ottoman citizens.  
There is no doubt that most if not all peoples belong to more than one identity. 
This can also be said about people in the Ottoman devlet, as people would have 
identified themselves in a host of ways. The construction of ideological terminology 
can often overlook the blurring of lines of reality. Thus, our rendering of the concept 
of equality and fraternity should not be an assumption that people of that period 
perceived the introduction of these ideals as simply sharp identity markers. It is very 
possible to assume that people already practiced a sense of fraternity and understood 
equality in their own terms. What problematized the reality was Young Turk ideology 
towards manifesting the ideals into the public arena, which might have then forced 
the hand of religious authorities to address their communities in explaining that these 
were not in contradiction to the identities they already held. Thus, we see such 
responses by the ulema in attempting to explain to its Muslim audience what was 
expected from them.  In 1869/1285 the Ottoman Law of Nationality legislated that 
“all subjects of the devlet without distinction be called Ottomans, irrespective of the 
religion they professed”. This was further endorsed in the Ottoman Constitution of 
1876/1293 in which Article 8 stated “All subjects of the Empire are called Ottomans, 
without distinction whatever faith they profess; the status of an Ottoman is acquired 
and lost according to conditions specified by law” and Article 17 “All Ottomans are 
equal in the eyes of the law. However, these positions required much debate and 
discussion as the ulema and Muslims attempted to come to terms with the legality of 
allowing non-Muslims into the parliament.  Ömer Ziyâeddin Dağıstânî explains this 
point in his published pamphlet on the Ottoman Constitution titled Miraat- Kanun-ı-
Esasi that Article 8 of the Constitution states “All subjects of the devlet are called 
Ottomans, without distinction of whatever faith they profess; the status of an Ottoman 
is acquired and lost according to the conditions specified by law.”513 He reinforces 
the article by providing a hadith where the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) said to the 
Muslims regarding the Zoroastrians: “Treat them as you treat the People of the Book 
(Jews and Christians also referred to as Ahl al-Kitab)”. Subsequently, he explains all 
the Ottoman subjects, without any exception, regardless of their religion and sect, are 
subject to this provision. Apart from their religious beliefs, life, property, and honour 
                                                        




all Ottoman subjects should be guaranteed protection from; gossip, slur, and evil 
tongue which are forbidden by the religion.514  They [non-Muslims] have the same 
rights, and owe the same duties towards their country, without prejudice to 
religion”.515 Dağıstânî was in no way a supporter of the Young Turks, rather a strong 
supporter of the Abdülhamid II, yet his views nonetheless reflected that of the 
Ottoman constitution of 1876/1293. While there may have been agitation by some 
conservative circles regarding the merits of equality, nonetheless Dağıstânî’s effort 
would curtail conservative proclivities.  
While in rhetoric the revolution proclaimed the call for equality and fraternity, 
it also created a destabilising factor. With the absence of any real clear central 
authority, the first few months of the revolution were glossed over with the 
revolutionary celebrations. Nonetheless, under the surface the possibility of discord 
and violence remained, especially in some of the rural and nomadic provinces of the 
devlet. Kolcali Abduülaziz Efendi expressed his concern when he warned his 
readership to refrain from causing division within society, citing that social freedoms 
and rights of all are protected against violation and that the traditions of all peoples 
are protected against ridicule and mockery. According to Abdülaziz Efendi, if a 
society could guarantee these, then that society would prosper and last forever.516  
Knowing full well of the potential agitation that could occur simply due to the 
destabilising nature of the revolution, many ulema, either by pen or by action, took a 
leading role in attempting to normalise the situation and to establish peace and 
tranquillity in the devlet. This delicate balancing act of stressing the importance of 
interfaith co-operation and the fear of Muslim sensibilities regarding their decreasing 
authority was indeed a tricky one at times. More importantly, while agitation was 
perceived from the conservative elements in Muslim society such as some ulema, 
Sufi sheikh, students, and even military officers , it was rather bolstering to hear that 
even conservative voices recognised the need to rally both Muslims and non-Muslims 
around the banner of Ottoman unity. While the ulema would continue to stress on 
Muslim superiority, they were still actively supporting an inclusive Ottoman civil 
identity that encompassed all Ottomans. Nonetheless, the ulema’s insistence on 
equality and fraternity was restricted within a legal framework which was to be 
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institutionalised through the constitution.  The constitution was not simply a 
document aiming to curtail the Sultan’s authority, it was also intended to highlight to 
both Muslim and non-Muslim what their role within Ottoman society would be. 
While one could believe that the Ottoman ummah was simply an Islamic justification 
for Ottomanism, in reality it was also an appropriation of interfaith toleration. 
According to both the constitution and the efforts of the Mecelle, there was indeed 
relative equality between Muslim and non-Muslim, though ultimately Muslim 
advantage was not to be compromised.  
 
The Drafting of the Constitution - Muaddal Kânûn-ı Esâsî ve İntihab-ı 
Mebûsân Kânûnu 
 
The culmination and proof of the ulema’s influence on the constitutional ideas can be 
assessed from their role in constructing a draft document of the constitution for the 
assembly titled Muaddal Kânûn-ı Esâsî ve İntihab-ı Mebûsân Kânûnu. The document 
was split into two main sections with the first part written in the style of the proof 
pamphlet like the essays discussed in this section. What it reflected was the 
prominent thoughts adopted by the ulema who were a part of the political class in the 
Ottoman devlet. The second part of the document was a rationalisation of each article 
in the Ottoman Constitution that needed amendment as well as an explanation of the 
reasoning of those articles. It was unlike Dağıstânî’s Miraat-ı Kanun-ı Esasi which 
was a document that only used hadith to legitimise the articles of the constitution of 
1876/1293. The discussions of the amendments of 1909/1327 were a reflection of 
why the decisions were taken to make the proposed amendments. Of importance was 
the amendments on the Caliph, law and his government. It continued with the 
Ottoman tradition of the late 19th century of having both civil servants and members 
of the ulema in the committee. But it was clear from the style of the writing of the 
document that although opinions were indeed taken from civil servants nonetheless, 
the ulema were vested as the main authority to construct the style in which the 
document was presented and written.  
What is worth mentioning is that not only were the ulema of the committee 
from a wide range of backgrounds which formed a consensus among themselves, they 
were also part of a greater body to form a consensus that was reflective of the 




matters to do with administration and the executive were no longer going to be 
invested in the authority of one person whether that be Caliph or Şeyhülislâm. 
Instead, this authority would be vested in the parliament which the Caliph and 
Şeyhülislâm were a part of. While independence was permitted in matters to do with 
independent scholarship and law, ijtihaad was institutionalised within the structure in 
matters to do with the transformation of the political structure where ijmaa included 
the politicians and the ulema. Thus, laws would have to be passed through the 
parliament in which a general consensus could be attained where all parties were 
involved. In this sense, the ulema were neither neglected nor solely depended upon, 
but nonetheless were integral. 517 It was clear that in the Ottoman devlet, decisions 
were placed in the hands of committees, a development that culminated with the 
establishment of a parliament in 1908/1326, whereby the parliament became the most 
powerful institution within the political structure. 
At a basic level the draft document was concerned with addressing the law 
and its relationship with people. This should come as no surprise as the document was 
perceived as the fundamental law and the proof pamphlets written earlier had also 
attempted to address the issue of the relationship of law and people. The document 
however, was not a fragment related to universal Islamic discourse, and was more 
related to specific issues that were unique to the Ottoman experience. Hamdi Yazır 
Efendi was the delegated writer of the document and the members of the ulema in the 
committee were predominately members of the Cemiyet such as Mustafa Sabri Efendi 
and Mustafa Âsım Efendi.518 Whereas Hamid Yazır was indeed the main writer of 
the document, it would be a simplification as Gunasti has suggested that the 
document was a deliberation of Hamid Yazır’s own thoughts, alluding to him being 
the chief architect of the document.519 Instead it looks rather plausible that Hamdi 
Yazır had presented the ideas that were dominant within the ulema who were in 
favour of constitutionalism.  The draft document began with a philosophical 
reflection on law and the different types of government. It stated that Mankind, 
through their fitra, have organized their affairs through some form of government. 
The form and kind of government differs with time and place, but the need for law 
does not. It continued that the need for laws is universal and that the need to propose 
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laws is also part of man’s fitra.520 According to the draft document, one’s (fiṭra) is 
compatible with the Sharia and an Islamic natural law leads people to realize the need 
for the Sharia. The two strengthen one another to create a constitutional government 
that enacts and enforces laws and maintains equilibrium between its different 
branches.521 Thus, the Sharia and one’s nature were in perfect harmony with one 
another and that the constitution was a reflection of both the supreme Sharia and its 
conformity with human nature. Mûsa Kâzım had explained in an article on ‘Adâlet’ 
(Justice) that both the natural law of the world and the Sharia do not contradict one 
another and that they are in conformity with the Quran, and the customs and rules of 
Ottoman society. Mûsa Kâzım’s worldview presented the position that human beings 
inherently do not wish ill for one another but rather if given the choice human beings 
universally create laws for the safeguarding of humanity. For Mûsa Kâzım there 
seems to be a premise at least that there is some form of commonality between all 
human beings. A clear point in his article is his position of natural law and that all 
beings whether animals or humans although free, follow a law of nature in which 
there is a hierarchy.522 It is worth noting how the concept of natural law which was 
written into the debates of the Muaddal Kânûn-ı Esâsî were also evident in the works 
of Egyptian scholars Tahtawi, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida.
  
 
The Muaddal Kânûn-ı Esâsî was reinforcing the ideas of the ulema at the time 
as Sheikh Kolcali Abdülaziz explained in his Kuran-i Kerim in 1908/1326, the 
universal role of natural law, by explaining that freedom and equality are basic needs 
of people and are part of human nature (fıtri and cibilli). He continued that
 
there are 
certain rules and laws that govern the way man satisfies those needs, and these rules 
and laws also govern society and its leaders. These rules and laws are called natural 
law, laws of history, civil law, and the Sharia law. The progress and happiness of 
humanity depends on the degree people follow these laws. In the eyes of these laws 
all people are equal. He continued that before Islam, there were two great empires, 
the Roman and the Persian, and savagery and cruelty were common in their realms. 
In the Roman Empire savagery and cruelty took the form of laws and regulations. 
While humanity was suffering in such horrible conditions, Islam emerged in Mecca 
and illuminated humanity.
 
He quotes the verse [Hucurat, 49/13] and comments: 
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“[O]nly those of you who follows the natural law, laws of history, civil law, and 
Sharia law will be honourable”.523 The draft document also alluded to the idea that 
there are various types of governments, but the need for laws is universal, and the 
right to propose laws is associated with one’s fitra.524
    
 
But the main focus of the proposal was to clearly provide justification for 
curtailing the authority of the Caliphate from ever becoming arbitrary. The document 
stated that the Caliph enforces the Sharia according to the conditions of the times and 
he receives his political guardianship from the ummah through the general assembly. 
By virtue of the beyat given upon his investiture, the Caliph becomes the deputy of 
the people.525 This was a worthy point as no mention was given of the Caliph being 
the deputy of Allah or the Prophet, but instead only of the ummah. It continued that 
the Caliph should act according to Sharia and he should not stray from the advice of 
the ulema and the jurists.526 This point indicated the increased position of the ulema 
after the 31st March incident in which the ulema openly declared their importance to 
the political process. The document would instill the importance of the ulema not 
only as advisors but also recommend a greater status for the Şeyhülislâm in the 
cabinet. 527  The caliph is subject to the supervision of ahl al-ḥall wa’l-‘aqd (the 
people who loosen and bind) in the general assembly, consolidating that the people of 
the ‘aqd’ were indeed the parliamentarians and not the ulema or select few. This 
indicated that the parliament was not simply a consultative assembly but it was also 
the authority that endorsed the Caliph, elected the Caliph, supervised the Caliph and 
more importantly held the Caliph to account. The two main objectives of the Caliph 
were to implement and protect the law and safeguard the interests of his citizens. The 
Caliph was not above the law and his authority was restricted to the territories he 
ruled over. This idea was consistent with the ideas of the ulema in favour of 
constitutional governance at the time that was now written as a draft document. This 
was not simply the opinion of the ulema in the drafting committee or the Cemiyet, but 
a reflection of a wider opinion of members of the ulema who were in favour of the 
new political order.  
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Chapter 4 -The Ulema and Increased Visibility – New and the Old – 
Cami and Meclis-i Mebusan
 
 
In this chapter it will be discussed how the ulema’s visibility increased as the 
Constitutional Revolution facilitated the ulema to exert the use of their privileged and 
traditional spaces, such as the mosques, medressas and traditional means of 
publications. At the same time, the ulema showed from the inception of the new 
conditions and opportunities that the new constitutional environment provided that 
they were neither slow nor reactionary to the spaces created by the elections, 
newspaper culture and parliamentarianism. In fact the ulema had managed to use the 
privileges of their traditional position as operators of the apparatus provided by the 
state and amalgamated that with the new. In this sense, in the face of unrelenting 
changes due to the introduction of the modern, the traditional class were far from 
redundant. As the state structure transformed the ulema adapted accordingly. The 
ulema continued to respond to the introduction of these new changes, not always 
successfully, but nonetheless, the traditional class displayed that they had a 
transformative ability.  Thus, rather than asking whether the ulema were able to adapt 
to the new conditions it would be better to ask which ulema were able to use the new 
spaces that were created. As it was shown in the previous chapter the Sultan did have 
his supporters, but a new group of ulema were starting to use the new mediums of the 
new conditions. Other ulema who had become marginalised during the Hamidian 
period were able to also ride the new wave to re-entre the fold, while another group of 
ulema who had managed to balance their positions during the Hamidian found ways 
of continuing this skill in the new reality. Hence the next chapters shall show how the 
new conditions did not only allow the ulema as a whole to become more visible, but 
also created spaces of ulema contestation as new versus old and young versus senior 
challenged each other where the marginalised managed to become visible and those 








Visibility and Invisibility 
 
A unique status of the ulema was that they were both state actors and non-state actors. 
It is for this reason that the conceptualisation of the ‘politicisation of the ulema’ has 
left many commentators conflicted regarding the ulema’s political role. Ideal ulema 
political activity has been presented as political quietism. There is a tradition in 
Islamic history that this be done by abstaining from involving oneself directly in 
politics. However, the reality was that the ulema were always part of the political 
structure in some form. Some members of the ulema did indeed refrain from direct 
political involvement, whilst other indulged in political activity. The styles were 
different, but the objective the same, to serve religion, state and Muslim community. 
While those who abstained have been presented as holding a principled position, 
those who worked in the state apparatus didn’t believe they were unprincipled. Jacob 
Scovgaard-Peterson has pointed out that although the state Mufti is often perceived as 
the state’s Mufti, this is a rather simplistic manner of viewing the official who worked 
in the state bureaucracy.528 Scovgaard-Peterson continues to point out: 
State Muftis tend to see themselves as something more than – if not indeed opposite to- the instrument 
of the State. What they tend to stress is their role as spokesmen for the religious sector of society, as 
defenders of the Shari’a and its norms in a society………they contend that it is they themselves who 
use the state as an instrument for the pious and devout religious policies, a claim that has some element 
of truth in that very often the State Muftis have the budget and the authority to convene conferences, 
publish information, instituted policies and in other ways influence the public and the society on issues 
where they perceive a threat to religious norms and values and rules. And there is also the rare 
occasion where a State Mufti actually stands up against the government and demands that it changes 
its policy on a specific point. This dual role of the State Mufti is similar to that of the ulama at large, as 
it has been described in earlier Muslim societies.529  
 
The ulema’s mediation functioned within the state structure and outside of it, and in 
moments of discord their visibility depended on the severity of the conflict. When 
required as mediators the ulema’s visibility was conflated, sometimes sought, often 
pushed. During the advent of the revolution the ulema’s visibility certainly increased 
as the calls of unity required the agents of religion to come to the fore. But much has 
been made of the ulema’s so-called decline during the Hamidian period, yet ulema 
                                                        
528 Scovgaard-Peterson, “A Typology of State Muftis.”pp. 81-98 




withdrawal from public life was also a political act during moments of discord, 
especially when religious fanaticism was declared. In this sense, it is important to 
understand that in Muslim societies the ulema’s visibility and perceived invisibility 
was not simply a matter of the increase or decrease of ulema authority, but instead a 
role where the ulema became visible and withdrew depending on the circumstance.  
 
The Festivities of 1908/1326 and Increased Visibility 
 
No sooner had the return of constitutional governance been declared then all the 
different actors of political authority began to situate and juxtaposition themselves for 
the change in style of governance. The Sultan was still in authority - although it could 
be argued nominally, the statesmen within the Sublime Porte became invigorated, the 
streets of Istanbul were under military presence, as the official introduction of the – 
although still clandestine - Committee and Union and Progress (CUP) was made to 
the existing political order. These changes in events were indeed a transformation 
from the existing political status quo. Islam as the ideological political framework of 
the state apparatus was not attacked, nor was it questioned, the Sultan as Caliph still 
remained on his throne – for now. With the streets ornamented with euphoria the 
ulema were also not attacked, but instead, their visibility and dependency increased 
during this moment of change but also upheaval, as it so often did and still does in 
Muslim societies. With the CUP – in unconstitutional fashion– remaining to operate 
in a clandestine manner, possibly unsure of the success of their own actions and 
authority, and aware of the possibility of repercussions still conceivable, remained 
inconspicuous to the mass Ottoman public by and large.    
 However, the Revolution expressed in Islamic rhetoric, had presented 
conditions for the ulema to become prime candidates on shaping and orchestrating 
mass Muslim public opinion from the transition to one ideological regime (Hamidian- 
Islamically autocratic) to another (Islamic- Constitutional Monarchy).530 With such 
circumstances the ulema were thrusted into the visible spaces created by the new 
conditions established by the revolutionary culture. It must be stressed the ulema 
were well aware that their audience were many, both the leadership and the lay, both 
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Muslim and non-Muslim.  In fact so were the ulema in many, both in leadership and 
lay, both educated and learning. The transition from ‘Constitutional autocratic 
monarchy’ to ‘Constitutional parliamentary monarchy’ did not create an 
instantaneous sharp break, neither in the political structure nor in the minds of the 
mass public. 531  But the change in condition did provide an opportunity for the 
increased prominence of the ulema that had been under some level of constraint 
during the Hamidian period. Thus, once Pandora’s box was opened it should be of no 
surprise that the ulema once again became the visible organ in the public space in 
relation to the constitutional change to elucidate how and why this new change was 
legitimate and should be celebrated.    
The success of the Revolution had been presented as a success for the 
Ottoman people, religion and Sultan. The vanguards of this success were the Young 
Turks, mainly the ‘noble’ military personal who risked all for the safeguarding of the 
Ottoman domains. In reality, much of the constructed festivities on the streets of the 
urban centres where simply attempts of either justification or facilitation of the new 
political change, as narrative building by the new political order begun by the use of 
new symbols such as coins, flags and articles. Apart from the imperial centre and the 
Balkan provinces, much of the devlet was alien to the manner in which the 
constitution was promulgated. Scepticism in Anatolia, Mesopotamia and the Arab 
provinces still loomed in many of the conservative areas of the empire as confusion 
griped many of the provinces as news gradually trickled by telegram to enjoin in the 
festivities of the proclamation of the constitution due to the favour of the Sultan.   
 Although the given public holiday was not religious, the festivities reflected 
religious symbolism, as religious actors of all faith groups once again became the 
visible mediators of the legitimacy of the constitution in the guise of the festivities. It 
took two days before celebrations were publically declared in the streets of Istanbul 
suggesting that many of the masses were unaware of what the return of the 
constitution entailed. The Ottoman government had experimented in ‘constitutional’ 
governance before - albeit for a brief while. So what was so different in 1908/1326 
that required festivities, sermons and celebrations? There was a dichotomous problem 
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that also arose. Was the constitutional change from the will of the people or did the 
Sultan sanction it? Presenting the revolution as a ‘popular’ revolution indicated that 
this was the will of the people. This entailed the problem of the Sultan being 
subjugated by his subjects.532 If we learn anything from the meetings in Firzovick we 
clearly realise that the removal of Sultan would have been deeply resented, a charge 
continually aimed at the Unionists by their political opponents. This would then lead 
one to explore the argument that the constitution was provided by the Sultan. 
However, suggesting that this was an initiative given by the Sultan begged the 
question of why the need for a revolution. We thus witness a complex case of 
legitimising the revolution as a transformation against the Sultan but not humiliating 
his authority, as we view how this complexity played out in the public sphere. The 
ulema became central to the debates, either as forerunners or curtailers of Unionist 
zeal. The change in conditions in 1908/1326 allow one to take a glance at the 
complexity of the state of affairs for the agents of authority whether of state, religion 
or society, as new political protagonists attempted to attain the reigns of the state 
machinery and gradually deploy a discursive narrative regarding the ‘revolution’, and 
need for constitutional change.   
Revolution, or inkılap became a loaded term that needed to address this 
complex sensitivity of the change in governance whether mass orchestrated or 
permitted by the Sultan. It thus must be asked; did the term inkılap refer to mean 
‘revolution’ in what we understand in the modern sense? The qualification of such 
words became significant in regards to legitimating the ‘change’ as all the terms and 
slogans during the revolutionary process such as inkılap, hürriyet, müsavat, uhuvvet, 
nizam, adâlet and meşveret came out in the main public domain. No sooner had the 
change been declared that a plethora of ulema activity both traditional and new 
increased the visibility of the ulema as important agents during the revolutionary 
period. Traditional; in the sense that the ulema intensified their use of the mosques, 
the Friday sermons and works in pamphlets and commentaries. New; in the sense that 
the ulema managed to become journalists, activists, and parliamentarians. The 
positions of the ulema thus requires investigation as it was their position as mediators 
that provided legitimacy for the change from one form of governance to another as 
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the reign of the ‘pious sultan’ had been transferred to represent the ideals of the ‘spirit 
of the constitution’.  
 
The Ālim as a Representative of Religion, Community and State 
 
When festivities where amassed throughout the devlet, the festivities represented a 
multi-faith dimension. The appeal of revolutionary change couldn’t simply appeal to 
the mass Muslim audience. The devlet was indeed a multi-ethnic/religious one, and 
thus the need to include rather than exclude was a central theme adapted by the agents 
of change once the promulgation of the constitution was made public. Public gardens, 
public squares, and even churches became spaces of celebration and festivities for the 
masses irrespective of faith. Bedross Matossian rightly explained that public 
festivities and parades are public dramas of social relations in which social actors 
decide what subjects and ideas are available for communication and consideration.533 
Additionally, the visuals of hürriyet also shaped the impression of popular support 
which continue to shape our vision of the revolution and their celebrations as being 
popular celebrations.534 Thus the discussion of the return of the constitution was 
presented as the main reason for the euphoria. However, how much the masses 
resonated with this feeling in an eclectic and multi-ethnic devlet that spanned three 
continents is difficult to tell. Although many actors were indeed sincere to the 
emotions created by the celebrations, but what cannot be refuted is that much of the 
celebrations were indeed fashioned by the new forces of change so that there was an 
aura of legitimacy for subjugating the Sultan both to the Young Turks and the 
Constitution.          
 The open civic spaces were apt for public gatherings; the churches were used 
for a multi-confessional purpose where peoples of all religions including Muslims 
would attend the public declarations for celebrations. Once the proclamation of 
festivities was declared these types of stories can been cited all over the devlet such as 
the Balkans, Beirut, and even in provinces in Anatolia. However it must be stressed 
that this was not the case ubiquitously, as some ulema feared that such an 
environment was to encourage an end of Muslim superiority in the devlet. There had 
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always been fear that since the Tanzimat onwards there was a continual compromise 
in favour of the non-Muslims. This indeed could be suggested as a baseless fear by 
more conservative elements within society who felt that Muslim exclusivity should be 
the main identity of the devlet.         
Nonetheless, overall, the ālim was seen shaking hands, embracing as well as 
standing side by side with his fellow Ottomanist brethren in a sign of public solidarity 
representing the ‘new’ ideals of the Constitutional Revolution. The precedent started 
by the then Şeyhülislâm Cemaluddein Efendi as the state mufti represented the 
position of the official of the state. The ālim thus entered the space of the church as a 
‘state official’ religious and political representative/dignitary of the state/religion. His 
presence was to legitimise the solidarity between all the subjects of the devlet. This 
was not simply a show of multi-faith gathering; it was a sign of the political and 
social role of the ālim that transcended purely his religious function to the mass 
Muslim public. This would however have been a generalization to assume that the 
ulema were merely acting as the state’s agent as their role was far more complicated 
than that. It seems more plausible to assume that they were indeed invested in the 
new governmental project.         
 The ālim was indeed a symbol of state ideology, but not exclusive to the state 
as can be seen in regards to some of the opposition by official state ulema to Sultan 
Abdülhamid. They were intertwined by the very nature of the fact that the state 
ideology was based on Islam which further complicated their role. The absence of the 
ālim in the celebration and the invitations of the churches and public squares would 
have been perceived as a rejection either by the state towards its minority citizen or a 
rejection by the ulema of the devlet’s minorities. This would have reflected not only 
an inability to live side by side with the other faith groups in the devlet, but also a 
tacit rejection by the ulema of the non-Muslim citizens. In fact it could be stressed 
that throughout such multi-religious celebrations, the ālim retained his position as a 
essential figure who embodied the state and religion and how it interacted with the 
mass public, not only Muslim.  Whereas, the ālim had entred the spaces of the 
churches in the Ottoman devlet the same is not reflected of the Jewish Rabbi or 
Christian Priest in accordance to their entering of the masjid, although there were 
indeed exceptional circumstances permitted. The masjid represented a different space, 




mosques as sacred spaces were used during the revolutionary celebrations and 
elections.  
 
The Masjid (Mosque) as a Political Space 
 
In the Ottoman devlet the role of the masjid as a space did not simply carry a religious 
component as much of the architectural spaces lent to the various functions the ulema 
conducted, especially the political symbolism and role of the Friday sermon. The 
Friday sermon was perceived as a central purpose of the monumental Ottoman 
mosque. So much so that Ebussud the Şeyhülislâm to Sultan Suleiman the 
Magnificent suggested that the sole purpose of the monumental mosque was 
primarily for the Friday sermon. Moreover, it has been said that the courtyards of the 
masjids in the Islamic cultural cities had replaced the agora of the cities for the spaces 
for communal declarations.536 This is not to dispute that the maydan (public square) 
was relegated as a space for political importance, but the maydan was a ‘civil’ 
communal political space, whereas the mosque was exclusive for the mass Muslim 
population. Although the maydan sometimes doubled as an open-air marketplace or 
was even appropriated by the populace for public protest, it was always the privileged 
space of the rulers and was never considered a civic space, one that is related to the 
city and its citizens.  
But what of the masjid?  Throughout the Ottoman period it can be argued that 
the masjid, especially the Friday camii (mosque) complex functioned as both a 
religious space and political one that was opened to both ulema and lay Muslim. In 
1991, al-Sadiq al-Nayhum, a Libyan thinker exiled in Geneva, published a book of 
collected essays in Arabic with the provocative title Islam in Captivity: Who Stole the 
Mosque and Where Did Friday Disappear? The thesis of the book was not novel. Al-
Nayhum posited that modernity had failed to take root in the Arab world because in 
large part it had grown out of Western history and developed in a Western cultural 
and epistemological context, which is incompatible with the culture and knowledge 
nurtured by Islam. Al-Nayhum, predictably, advocated a return to a pure, 
foundational Islam to rebuild the battered and confused Arab societies. Al-Nayhum, 
however, differed from other like-minded thinkers by attending to the role of space in 
                                                        





framing, sustaining, and ultimately molding the Islamic political tradition.537 His 
focus was of course on the quintessential Islamic space, the mosque, hence its 
appearance in his title. His understanding of the mosque was both historical and 
spatio-functional. He recognized both the simple but effective original layout of the 
mosque—its undifferentiated and nonhierarchical space that could serve for prayer, 
communal congregation, learning, and even political gathering.538 It is the last point 
that al-Nayhum emphasized in his book; the mosque was the premier public space in 
the Islamic city.  
In the late Ottoman period, especially in the case of monumental masjid 
structures, we see an existence of a host of Muslim power dynamics wherever and 
whenever the mosques existed. Masjids became a visible symbol of Islam, at times a 
declaration of intent by the patent/commissioner in which it drew a mass Muslim 
public to it. Both during its construction and completion it lent itself to the 
configuration and reconfiguration of the urban fabric of the area wherever it was 
built. Along as a space for worship it was a place of gathering, a place of teaching and 
learning, whether in the form of classes, circles or by sermon. The monumental 
masjid structure was an evident visible symbol, possibly a symbol of the soft power 
of Islam as a presence in the Ottoman devlet, but not designed to agitate but a simple 
fact of state authority, as the official religion of the state.  
 
 
The Ottoman Ulema in 1908/1326 and the Masjid 
 
During the Hamidian period the function of the masjid as a political space was not 
eliminated, simply heavily regulated, still used to praise the Caliph Abdülhamid, 
nevertheless the culture of the spy network and censorship regarding the press law 
meant that once the constitution was proclaimed and the spy network was abolished 
the pressure valve was removed for political activity and discussions by the ulema 
independent from state repercussion. Hagia Sophia was a central space of protest 
regarding the removal of the Hamidian spy network in which many ulema felt some 
degree of pressure, knowing that their words and actions were under the scrutiny of 
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the state apparatus. But once this was abolished, the space became a dynamic area of 
much political activity. On Sunday, July the 26th a crowd of madressah students made 
a demonstration in Yildiz in which the cry was raised for the first time in the Sultan’s 
presence, “Down with the spies!”. The Şeyhülislâm and other leading ulema were 
present, as the demonstrations left their mark. 539  
But while the masjid was a place to rally populist support, when used by the 
official state ulema it was also a form to support state objectives. This was also the 
case in Hagia Sophia as in early August, a week after promulgation the Şeyhülislâm 
instructed in the mosque to the hocas of the masjids to preach regarding the merits of 
the constitution.540 It was also in August that in the Beyazid Camii in Istanbul that the 
ulema of the imperial city came together to discuss the merits of the constitutional in 
accordance to Islam in which hundreds of ulema and students had attended. 541 
Another example of this was in Smyrna where a British observer noted “A service 
was held in the chief mosque, attended by the vali and all his officials, when a sermon 
was pronounced on the benefits of council and its harmony with the tenants of Islam 
as shown by the example of the Prophet himself”. 542 When visiting Istanbul even 
Sheikh Rashid Rida conceded that he noticed in Istanbul that he didn’t notice in 
Egypt or Syria which was political preaching.543 
During the revolt in Macedonia Hoca Şaban Efendi explaining to large crowds 
in the masjid of the importance on the constitution and on one occasion was seen 
brandishing the Holy Quran before the crowd and declared in the Firzovik mosque 
after the prayers that demanding the restoration of the constitution was equivalent to 
demanding the Sharia. When the constitution was declared during the first Friday 
prayer in Damascus at the Umayyad mosque, it presented celebrations by the leaving 
congregation where the ulema and the congregation chanted with Fuat Pasa, “Long 
live freedom; long live the constitution; long live Fuat Pasa!”544 But it wasn’t simply 
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in favour of the constitution; even in contestation the ulema were able to use the 
mosques as a space to gather loyal supporters to march in protest. This was the case 
during the Kör Ali incident, similar activity also took place during the Counter-
revolution in 1909/1327 when two imams at the Valide Han Camii denounced liberty 
and equality to incite the crowds.545        
 The ulema naturally utilised this space during the advent of the revolution as 
they had done so in the past. The Friday sermons all over the Ottoman domains were 
ordered to preach to the mass Muslim public about the constitution. The sermons 
were coupled with circles and talks to all those who were interested in listening. The 
interest was encouraged as if it was a duty for the Muslim of the public to engage in. 
This can be seen by the proclamation of such activity in the Islamic journal 
Sırâtımüstakīm where Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı Imam of the Hagia Sophia published 
his Mevâ’iz (sermons) that were used as a Friday sermon on the ideas of Islam and 
constitutional governance. Manastırlı’s series of talks on a host of subjects which 
included the constitutional form of governance were printed in the journal nearly 
every week in the start of the journal. 546  Bereketzâde in another article also  
exclaimed to the masses to attend Manastırlı’s circles on the concept of 
consultation.547 He stressed in his article to explain to the masses that a detailed circle 
would be held by Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı in the Hagia Sophia Camii(mosque) every 
Friday. As Nasser Rabbat has explained “The mosque provided the space in the city 
where the adult male population exercised its political rights, particularly on Friday, 
when the community reconfirmed its allegiance to its leader or withdrew it in vocal 
responses to a formulaic oath included in the sermon.”548 And while the ulema were 
using the Friday sermon to disseminate ideas, not longer after the proclamation of the 
constitution did the Islamic holy month of Ramadan arrive- the best month for 
communication par excellence, further providing the ulema the much needed and 
opportune moment during this seminal circumstance of political change. But 
Ramadan was also a tricky situation for the ulema, as during this period of freedom, 
women were pushing the boundaries of Islamic dress code, and some people thought 
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they could openly eat in public during this month, forcing the ulema to address these 
issues.549 
 
Figure 3: The demonstrations for the boycotts outside Hagia Sophia. Picture provided by IRCICA 
 
Hagia Sophia in particular as a central masjid became a space used by the new 
government to rile the masses especially after Bosnia was annexed in 1908/1326.550 
An example of such can be seen in Istanbul when outside in the Hippodrome of 
Sultan Ahmet, Mustafa Âsım Efendi, Imam at the Hagia Sophia Camii and elected 
parliamentarian for Istanbul along with Kozmidi Efendi of the Greek community, 
Haliciyan Efendi of the Armenian community, İshak Efendi of the Jewish community 
along with İsmail Hakkı Bey a member of the CUP along with major Mahmud Bey, 
all called for collective boycotting. 551       
 The traditional masjid space became the premier space for the ulema outside 
the Unionists orbit. This was their space, five times a day, every Friday in every 
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religious festival. The muezzins just like the church bells, would invite the 
worshippers to the religious space of worship, but also of forewarnings of danger, 
invitations and calls for festivities. In 1908/1326, the ulema used the mosque to 
educate the masses, assert their authority as agents of the call, and defend the 
constitutional order. There was no doubting that the mosques had provided the ulema 
a perfect space, unique to their tradition.       
     
Elections and Parliament in 1908/1326 
 
The ‘modern’ political change after the re-instatement of the constitution was the re-
opening of the Ottoman parliament. İstibdat was now to be circumscribed in the name 
of Şura by a two-tier chamber that would reflect a well-organised institution enacting 
the provisions in accordance to well-defined rules and procedures. 552  The 
representative chamber provided an environment for inclusive representation of all 
peoples of the devlet, regardless of religion or ethnicity. The ulema would once again 
exploit the new spaces the parliamentary chamber provided by increasing their 
political participation within the new political structure. The broadening of the 
political apparatus to a wider-political group allowed local provincial actors to 
become significant to political activities in Istanbul. It was hoped that the parliament 
would create a political culture of inclusivity to establish efficient governance that 
would curb authoritarianism. Ideologically it was hoped that by developing a 
representative chamber it would also consolidate the concept of Ottomanism in the 
political structure echoed in the diversity of the political decision-makers of the 
devlet, in doing so, it was hoped that this would feed into Ottoman civil society.  
 The parliamentarians are worthy of note, as many of the actors were indeed 
part of the new intelligentsia class of society, enjoying the educational benefits of the 
Hamidian period they were able to exploit the new networks that came into existence. 
It is both testimony of the Tanzimat but more markedly the Hamidian period that 
although many of the intellectuals criticised Hamidian İstibdat, nonetheless were also 
products of the Hamidian educational policies.553 As well as parliamentarians many 
undertook additional professions such as journalism or activism and were able to use 
their multi-political platforms to strengthen their positions in the new political 
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structures that the new spaces provided. The new educated class were able to exploit 
the new technological transformations and use it to their advantage as the state 
evolved. Although by 1908/1326 the avenues were many, they were still being 
monopolised by the few.554 In many ways 1908/1326 was a period of contestation 
between the old and new, an amalgamation as traditional actors were elected 
alongside contemporary actors, as the Hamidian state reflected the ways in which 
modernity and tradition interacted with one another, sometimes in conflict and 
sometimes together.  
An example of the new class can be seen in the case of the Talin journalist 
and elected parliamentarian of Istanbul Hüseyin Cahid. Another example was the 
Young Turk intellectual in exile and journalist of the oppositional journal Mechveret, 
Ahmed Riza who became the Deputy Speaker of the parliament. Not restricted to 
Istanbul Ruhi al-Khalidi the elected parliamentarian of Jerusalem was a historian and 
journalist, and educated in French, Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. From the Albanian 
provinces Necib Draga represented the same. These were just a handful of individuals 
who made their way into the parliament in 1908/1326, but there were many like them. 
They would all combine their roles by using the press and parliament together to 
evolve an Ottoman civility in society. This was not simply restricted to an Ottoman 
educated intellectual; members of the traditionally educated too, such as the ulema 
reflected the same prospects, as Mustafa Sabri Efendi and Hamdi Yazır Efendi, were 
members of the ulema, journalists for the Beyan’ül-Hak journal, activists and 
parliamentarians. This was the same of the ulema of the Arab provinces such as 
Abdulhamid Zahrawi from Hama who was also a journalist and parliamentarian. It 
was clear that being elected a member of parliament provided this new generation 
with the types of political voices that could impact change, or in some cases maintain 
tradition.   
But it wasn’t simply a new ‘Young Turk’ generation that came through the 
new spaces the revolution created, as older statesmen and members of the ulema also 
found their ways into the novel parliamentary structure. The parliament in many ways 
revealed Ottomanism in the guise of an umbrella of different actors from the three 
continents of the Ottoman devlet that enjoined in the new parliamentary activity. The 
parliament was a reflection of the hybrid of multiple identities, cultures and traditions 
the Ottoman political system had to contend with, in many ways the parliament 
                                                        




represented the hybrid nature of the Ottoman devlet. Thus, it must be stressed that the 
Ottoman parliament of 1908/1326 was indeed a eclectic mix of all the various 
political actors the devlet echoed, with old and new, nomad and newly educated, 
Turk, Arab and Albanian, Muslim and non, all in the new political structure. It was 
this intense culture of inclusive Ottomanism that the ulema were functioning in, 
which the parliament would on the one hand allow them to become deeply engrained 
in the decision-making processes, but also expose their privileged position to critique 
in an open public domain. However, whereas the parliament attempted to consolidate 
the various identities under one political structure in the name of unity, parliamentary 
politics also created spaces of contestation and created fissures between existing 
identities. As euphoric as the opening of parliament was in the name of Ottoman 
unity, it also had divisive repercussions, one which the earlier parliament of 
1876/1293 had experienced. 555  The press and the parliament created spaces for 
freedom of speech and political opinion, which the educated elites and political actors 
of society exploited, but they also created an environment of hostility never witnessed 
before in late Ottoman history.  
 The increased visibility of the ulema during the advent of the revolution, 
placed the ulema in an advantaged position regarding the parliamentary elections as 
they would use their moral standing in Muslim society and surviving role within the 
traditional political structures to continue to become engrained within the 
transforming political culture of the late Ottoman devlet. However, it also left them 
much exposed to criticism as they came up against a new political calss. In this 
section it will be explained how the importance of the elections and 
parliamentarianism created a new opportunity, and consolidated older positions of 
authority. There is no disputing that even among the ulema themselves the parliament 
was indeed a space where a new generation of ulema contested with members of the 
ulema who had enjoined patronage from the old political order. The role of the ulema 
in the new political order did not diminish but rather increased as both new and old 
actors found ways of exploiting the new structures. The ulema illustrated in 
parliament that they were not a homogenous block, nonetheless, they did manage to 
function as a regulatory group in parliament.556 It is also worth of note that one of the 
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reasons why the ulema were able to mobilise in the elections and parliament could be 
based on their involvement in the previous electoral practice and representative 
governance on a local level which indicates that electoral practice and representative 
governance were not as novel as some historians have pointed towards,557 but in fact 
a culture which many traditionalists were accustomed to, and in particular the ulema 
were an inherent part of. 
 
The Origins of the Parliamentary System in the Nineteenth Century 
 
Hüseyin Yılmaz discussed that the Ottoman devlet had practiced what he deemed an 
inherent constitutional tradition prior to the discussions by some historians of the 
Ottomans imitation of European constitutionalism during the reformation from the 
nineteenth century onwards.558 It was argued that while the Ottoman polity practiced 
institutional checks and balances to absolutist Sultanic power, it wasn’t until the 
promulgation of the Gülhane decree of 1839/1255 that a transformation towards a 
‘modern’ political structure was initiated. By 1876/1293, the Ottomans had made 
their first steps of introducing a constitutional system with a two-tier parliamentary 
format, along the lines of many of the Western European governments. Yet, while 
Ottoman reflections on Western governance cannot be denied, what also requires 
some recognition is that Ottoman traditions inherently had mechanisms that catered 
for the transition towards a constitutional monarchist parliamentary system. Ottoman 
endeavours into constitutionalism did not simply emerge from a vacuum in 
1876/1293. 559  It has been suggested by one British observer that Grand Vizier 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha had considered the introduction of constitutional governance as 
early as 1839/1255, only to reject it in the belief that the Ottoman people were not 
ready for such a venture560, a claim made throughout the late Ottoman period by 
political conservatists including Sultan Abdülhamid II.561 With this in mind some of 
the ideas of the constitutionalists such as Hayreddin Pasha or the Young Ottomans 
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should not come as a surprise nor be seen as alien to the Ottoman polity, but in fact a 
consideration of intellectual discourse reflecting political realities of the time.  
Participation by the people in government or elections was not an unfamiliar 
concept to the Ottoman experience in the late nineteenth century. As Jun Akiba has 
noted elections and assembly were not a novelty. During the Tanzimat those living in 
the provinces, had already been participating in local political life based on the 
principle of representation for forty years prior to the promulgation of the first 
Ottoman Parliament in March 1877/1294.562 Local elayets later to become vilayets 
(provinces), sanjaks (districts), and kazas (sub-districts) elected local officials to form 
local committees/councils. These committees played an intermediary role between 
government and people. The 1849/1265 regulations for the provincial councils 
introduced changes where the president and a member of the ulema class would be 
appointed by central government in addition to the mufti and kadi. Each of these 
councils had at least one member of the ulema in it, with the sanjak requiring a mufti, 
and a kaza requiring a mufti and kadi. The formations of the representatives lists were 
usually drawn up by the local mutassarif or imam and heavy pressure was placed 
upon them when selecting members and representatives, as they supervised in the 
neighbourhoods the running of the ballots.563 This practice would continue during the 
elections of 1908/1326.   
The councils were also regulated by a council of elders (ihityar meclisi/majlis 
al-ikhtiyariyya), one could argue similar to the house of senate.564 The assumption 
that most of the political reformation towards the construction of committees was a 
top down approach during the Tanzimat is also misleading as ventures in Baghdad, 
Damascus and Aleppo indicate councils were formed prior to the execution of the 
Tanzimat edicts. 565   By the 1860’s the election procedure by the local councils 
members under the Vilayet Law vested substantial power to the local governments. It 
was local authorities that would elect members of the councils. It was also common 
that non-Muslim were in these councils, and in areas where non-Muslims were a 
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majority, non-Muslim assistance was sought. However, it cannot be denied that 
during the Tanzimat period, reform by central government was being introduced to 
make the processes more inclusive and transparent. This indicated natural local 
practices supplemented by central government regulations as a natural interaction 
took place between local and central authority. By December 1875/1292, a new 
directive was made to provide more independence to the local populace over the 
power of the local authorities. Its preamble declared that the council members 
“should not be elected under the government’s influence but by [the Empire’s 
subjects] themselves”.566 Whether this was practiced uniformly or practiced at all is 
hard to say, nonetheless, the principle was there. By 1875/1292 there was an attempt 
to increase the role of the ulema into the electoral processes and councils, although 
there was some form of objection to non-Muslim clergymen.567  
As for the elections it was stressed from the regulation of 1840/1256 that the 
“most clever, moral, honest, and honourable, and well informed about state 
administration and local situation” be elected. 568  Although this can be open to 
interpretation, the stress on common wisdom by those in authority is worth of note. 
The point of stress is that the Ottomans on a provincial level were practicing elections 
and council structures regarding political accountability and inclusive decision-
making, and the politically competent of the principalities were central to the process. 
An important development regarding the councils was to place fixed terms so that one 
couldn’t remain in his post indefinitely, but that he would need to be elected again 
once his term was over. With already a culture within the legislative of a council 
called the Sura-yi Devlet, and with the practice of local councils, it seems that the 
Ottoman political tradition of the nineteenth century was already reflecting a basis for 
parliamentary politics, albeit at a local level. What must be stressed is that this served 
as a constituent body for the parliamentary elections. As Musa Çadirci had indicated 
this experience points of local councils preparing the groundwork for the Ottoman 
parliamentary system.569 It is thus fair to assume as Jun Akiba has that the Ottoman 
constitutional effort was a culmination of the interaction of Western constitutional 
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thoughts, restructuring of the non-Muslim millet constitutional practices as well as 
Şura and council mechanisms within Ottoman political traditions. 570 
When Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha had promulgated the Ottoman Parliament in 
1876/1293, although disagreements ensued regarding its hasty implementation and 
the involvement of non-Muslim participation on governmental affairs, nonetheless, 
there was general acceptance of the practice of representative politics in principle, 
including non-Muslim participation as these concepts were reflected at a local level. 
The ulema too were supportive of the constitutional changes, and it has been argued 
that Midhat had won over the softas who pushed for the deposition of Sultan 
Abdülaziz in favour of a constitutional system. 571 By 1876/1293 in the first Ottoman 
Parliament of the 103 parliamentarians 13 were members of the ulema. In the Meclis-
i Ayan (House of Senate), 4 members of the ulema were chosen by the Sultan, they 
had also been on the drafting committee of the first Ottoman constitution. 572  In 
1908/1326 however, that number increased, there were more seats available thus the 
upsurge of regular parliamentarians, the ulema numbers also increased in 
proportionality as 66 members of the ulema became elected members. Whereas the 
members of the ulema were elected by a committee in the first parliament, in the 
second the ulema were elected by the voting population. The primary function of the 
local councils was to serve as some form of mechanism to control government 
officials both regarding the budget and abuse of power. The Ottoman parliament was 
to do the same, but this time to the Caliph and Sublime Porte and although it was 
unable to maintain its weight in its first session, by 1908/1326 it was in full swing 
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The Ulema’s Ability to Become Elected - Both New and Old 
 
The ulema were greatly placed to maximise opportunity from the introduction of the 
new parliamentary order. From 1876/1293 onwards many ulema had argued in favour 
for the merits of constitutional governance and parliamentarianism against Hamidian 
İstibdat, by suggesting that the new constitutional structure was best suited to the 
change in fortunes of the devlet. In particular, the ulema argued that they had to be 
part of the new structure, especially as they claimed that the parliament was a council 
of advice and consultation, and by stressing on Şura, the ulema had not only 
suggested that they had supported the constitutional regime, but needed to be a part of 
it. But how many members of the ulema were to be elected depended on their local 
conditions. The formation of the Cemiyet, had turned the ulema into an organised 
group in Istanbul, as they used their ilmiyye networks in the Balkans, Istanbul and 
Anatolia. The Cemiyet had managed to progress with key personnel in the parliament. 
In this way along with their journal mouthpiece the Beyan’ül-Hak 573, the Cemiyet 
had managed to some degree function as a political block by way of election, and 
although many members were elected on the CUP ticket it seems that their election 
was able to apply pressure on the CUP, which would lead to a fissure after the 
counter revolutionary events.574 In the Meclis-i Ayan two members of the ulema were 
recommended. The Sultan usually chose these posts –although it seems they were 
elected on recommendation of the CUP - and were for life. It is unclear why the ālim 
Mûsa Kâzım and ālim Manastırlı Hakkı Efendi were chosen apart from speculating 
that they were seen as supporters of the Unionists agenda. In the Arab provinces and 
the more conservative regions of the devlet, ulema were elected due to their standing 
in the locality. Voting patterns continued to function in the manner local councils had 
been established during the nineteenth century. Being part of the municipal council 
opened doors to other governmental institutions in the locality.575 In many of the 
provinces, members of the ulema rather than being directly elected formed local 
relationships where they placed their support for religious notables or landowning 
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families.576 In this way the ulema either were directly elected due to their privileged 
position in the municipal committees, established roles in the ilmiye structures or 
being part of new organisations such as the Cemiyet, or by joining forces with interest 
groups such as Muslim notable families to forward their agendas. Where as the CUP 
tried to influence who was elected and who wasn’t, in reality on the ground the ulema 




Rather than going into detail how each ālim was elected, and the contestations that 
took place within the electoral process, what is worth of note is that the ulema were 
elected as an authority of trust. To become an elected parliamentarian one needed to 
be above the age of thirty, of good character, an Ottoman citizen and hold a position 
either in a state institution or own land. In that sense this shows how the ulema were 
continuing to benefit from the conditions of the late Ottoman period.  
After the promulgation of the constitution, there were a series of incidents that 
continued to place the ulema in the public eye, and created much difficulty for the 
CUP to consolidate their authority in government and locality. No sooner had the 
CUP declared the festivities for the constitution, they faced a diplomatic crisis 
regarding the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, and the 
independence of Bulgaria. The ulema went to the streets in many of the provinces to 
encourage the boycott of Austrian goods. The annexation of Bosnia was far more 
troublesome for Muslim sensitivities than Bulgarian independence; even though 
politically the CUP had more cause for concern from the Bulgarian issue. During the 
month of Ramazan, the first murmurings of oppositional activity reared its head in 
Istanbul where a hoca named Kör Ali, urged a congregation to reject the constitution 
and the new parliamentary regime. A Sheikh by the name of Kör Ali, spoke against 
liberty and equality as negative sentiment towards the Şeyhülislâm Cemaleddin 
Efendi became vocalised for the first time since the revolution. 577  The Kör Ali 
protestation had similarities with the Kuleli incident during the Tanzimat period, on 
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both occasions the government suggested a coup was being plotted by religious 
fanatical leaders and the government on both occasions took strong action, as the 
CUP also swiftly dealt with Kör Ali and hanged him, but the first signs of discontent 
were becoming visible. The CUP were still struggling to grasp the reigns of 
government and much of their electoral activities were limited to the campaigns 
restricted to the press. The use of the press indeed did have its advantages but older 
networks were a lot more effective for the electoral process in many of the provinces 
of the devlet. The CUP were failing to sustain the euphoria and support due to the 
waning of revolutionary appeal and its failure to take charge of government despite 
their apparent strength in government.578 In actuality the CUP were still unable to 
take the reins of government and had hoped that they could do this via the parliament. 
The ulema unlike the CUP were not an organised group and didn’t function as a 
modern institution, so they used their traditional networks, added to that their 
increased visibility during the revolutionary upheaval and boycotts, as well as the 
arrival of the month of Ramazan which created and transferred their visible local 
authority into electoral importance, which would become parliamentary influence.  
In Istanbul and the Balkans, the CUP were at their strongest, becoming 
elected as agents of the Revolution. An alternate party called The Ahrar firkası (The 
Liberation Party) led by Prince Sebahattin were not as organised as the CUP and 
made very little impact upon the elections, especially as people could not make 
distinction between the two organisations. The ulema too, did not endorse themselves 
as a block, nor used the newspaper platforms in 1908/1326 to forward their electoral 
agenda. Members from the Cemiyet were elected but either as CUP members or 
independents. The ulema appealed to their moral authority and religious authority 
within the Muslim community. The elections were not contested elections regarding a 
political program or between parties. In that sense the Ottoman elections of 
1908/1326 were unlike any European elections. Communal politics did not translate 
into party politics in 1908/1326; local prestige and governmental endorsement were 
far more important considerations for the voters than any party program.  The task of 
the elections was complicated due to the speed in which the elections and results were 
to be attained to open parliament. There was indeed confusion of how deputies were 
to be elected, and elections were not held across the devlet at the same time with 
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some regions voting months apart from one another as elections ran from August 
through to December. The central government stressed to the local provincial 
authorities to make haste in the election making process to meet the deadline of 
opening parliament by mid November.579 The municipal councils became central to 
the electoral process, as the mutasarrif and ulema as well as other religious 
dignitaries prepared the ballot stations and regulated the votes and voters. The 
problems were not simply restricted to the provinces, even in Istanbul there were 
great difficulties as there was no census, statistics or trustworthy data, men didn’t 
even have surnames. Much of the elections were done on trust. 580 Although the CUP 
guided the conduct of the elections, it was not possible without the help of religious 
authorities and Islamic symbolism. 581 Some of the Muslim public were still sceptical 
of the elections, as the elections indicated a populace that was still wary of the CUP 
and their revolutionary aspirations. As a result the CUP sent emissaries, including 
ulema to the various provinces to talk to the populace to not simply vote, but to vote 
in favour of the CUP. This thus suggested that the elections of 1908/1326 were not 
heavily contested in all the regions, many agents simply functioned together to get the 
process up and running, this would change by 1912/1330 however, when the CUP 
would first taste bitter defeat in the Municipality elections of 1911/1329, and then 
face organised oppositional parties such as the Ahrar firkası and the new party 
established by Mustafa Sabri known as the Hürriyet ve itilâf firkası ( Freedom and 
Alliance Party). 
It cannot be doubted that in 1908/1326 the CUP had still managed to get many 
of their members elected into the parliament. But evaluating a membership count to 
political authority was slightly misleading as many elected members had simply 
placed their name in the ballot of the CUP as that was the only option, and many 
didn’t see representing the CUP as a contradiction to their own principles. The ulema 
were voted in virtually every major province of the devlet including Istanbul. In 
Istanbul that elections were surrounded by great fanfare. The election took place at 
the Port and Telegram Administration which was decorated with carpets and flags for 
the occasion. The voting took place in preserve of Ziver Bey the Prefect of the city, 
the members of the committee for controlling the election and representatives of the 
Şeyhülislâm and the Chiefs of all the religious communities. When the ballot box was 
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closed it was done in the presence of the representative of the Şeyhülislâm and the 
ulema, Osman Cavit Efendi. He offered up prayers and delivered a speech saying that 
the there was a difference between the elections in the Ottoman devlet and Western 
Europe which often gave rise to violent conflicts whereas in the Ottoman devlet they 
were carried out in good order. Muslims and non-Muslims continued to demonstrate 
that they fully understood their political role and were able to carry out their duties.582 
 
 
Figure 4: Picture of the Ottoman Ballot of the first Elections in Istanbul. Picture taken from the front 
cover of Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities 
 
Most of the ulema elected in the elections of 1908/1326 were members from the CUP 
including Mustafa Âsım583, a member of the Cemiyet who had received the second 
highest votes in the list of members elected in Istanbul, out numbering CUP members 
Ahmed Riza, Kirkor Zohrab and Hüseyin Cahid, with Hüseyin Cahid only just 
scrapping through. 584  Cahid had attempted to convince many of the Muslims of 
Istanbul that they needed to vote in the elections, as the non-Muslims according to 
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him were far better organised.585 Indeed the Muslims did vote but not for Cahid but 
other candidates. Cahid was not a popular candidate and was even criticised in the 
Armenian press by Hovhannes Asbedini.586 
 If anything it reflected that the ulema candidate that was elected had either 
taken much support from the mass Muslim voting public, or due to the large presence 
of the ulema in the imperial capital. Hamdi Yazır, Mustafa Sabri, Ömer Fezvi were 
just some of the other ulema members of the Cemiyet who resided in Istanbul but 
where elected in absence in Tokat, Antalya and Bursa respectively. In Tokat Mustafa 
Sabri was elected with the support of the Armenians who voted together with the 
local Muslims.587 Bursa being a religiously conservative area voted in three other 
members of the ulema Hoca Hafiz Ahmed Efendi, Ömer Lutfi Efendi and 
Abdulvehab Ömer Efendi. The Mufti of Sinop Hassan Fehmi collected his votes as 
the people of Sinop, Gerze and Ayancik voted as a block. In Konya the ulema easily 
won their seats as Müftizade Hoca Salim Efendi, Hoca Mehmed Vehbi [Celik], Haci 
Şeyhzade Zeynelabiddin Efendi and Kürdzade Haci Mustafa Efendi were elected by a 
conservative Muslim population. In Anakara Haci Mustafa a CUP ālim was elected, 
and Mehmed Emin Efendi the Müfti of Trabzon easily won his seat.588 In the Arab 
provinces there were orchestrated celebrations in Palestinian territories whereas in the 
Syrian provinces there was somewhat quite. In Hama Abdulhamid Zahrawi was 
elected as a member of the CUP and in Gazza the Mufti of Gazza in his sixties Hafiz 
al-Said was elected on a conservative ticket. Sheikh Ahmed Khammash was elected 
as another conservative sheikh due to a political deadlock between principle 
candidates in Nablus and Sheikh Asa’d Shuqayri in Akka. 589 In the case of Jerusalem 
the large Muslim majorities voted Ruhi al-Khaldi, although not a member of the 
ulema by profession, nonetheless was part of a religious family of scholars, of which 
his brother Rageb al-Khalidi, an ālim would open the first library in Jerusalem. If the 
ulema were not directly elected, they made sure they had Muslim representatives, that 
catered for their interests. Ruhi al-Khalidi was well aware of the Muslim sensitivities 
in the environment he lived and worked in. Ruhi would usually time his visits to take 
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place on Fridays, he started his tours in the towns and central mosques where he 
participated and met with as many people as possible and then usually went to the 
local notable and ālim’s house.590  
The elections indicated firstly the diverse nature of the Ottoman devlet and 
ulema, secondly that many individuals were being elected on religious grounds, as 
can also be seen in the Hijaz and what is now known as Libya. 591 More importantly 
that ulema and religious elites and families were working together. The electoral 
processes represented less of a contestation between Muslim notable and ālim but 
rather a collective effort was made. In the Arab provinces in particular people were 
voted from three groups, the landowner families, the ulema or families that had some 
government relationship. The press had provided the new generation with a platform 
to put their candidacy forward, however in the regions where local allegiances and 
patronage was still strong, traditional actors used their local networks to become 
elected. The elections preserved and re-inforced these patronage relationships. Many 
voters placed their vote in the ballot on trust, and on the process for both Muslim and 
non-Muslims centred on ecclesial representations on behalf of their religious 
communities, the ulema were in an influential position.  
The Ottoman domains were still a religious one and when the members of the 
parliament were elected it was suggested in the Arab provinces that it was to serve the 
public good (al-masalaha al-amma) and providing a holy service to the ummah and 
beloved homeland (khidma muqaddasa lil-umma wal-watan al-aziz).592 These terms 
were entrenched in Islamic symbolism and whether the ulema were a powerful group 
or not they would certainly work as a pressure group within parliament. When the 
elections had been completed in 1908/1326, 281 members from all of the Ottoman 
provinces were elected. 593  The ulema totalled approximately as 66 members in 
parliament. They were a sizeable block, whose presence was evident. 
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The Parliament Opens 
 
On December the 10th the Ottoman Parliament re-opened with much celebration. The 
orchestrated festivities were a common feature in 1908/1326. There wasn’t a single 
time where people were not on the streets. 594 The ulema had become elected in the 
Ottoman Parliament, the reasons varied, but their visibility was apparent. A simple 
reading of the parliament would lend the support towards a CUP landslide, however 
the reality was much more complex than that. Likewise the ulema were also 
representatives of their local constituencies but soon the politics of Istanbul became 
part of the life of the ulema parliamentarians. The historiography has suggested that 
the ulema were tepid in their roles as parliamentarians, based in two camps: 
reformists and traditionalist, but in reality the activities in parliament by the ulema 
were far more complicated, as people sometimes acted on loyalty, sometimes on 
ideology and sometimes on personal interest. However, it cannot be denied, that 
many members of the Ottoman Parliament, both ulema and non, both Muslim and 
non, took their responsibilities seriously.  
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Figure 6: First Meclis-i Mebusan. Taken From Atatürk Library 
 
 





The assumption that the ulema simply interacted in matters to do with religion was 
not the case. The ulema had become fully committed to the practice of consultation 
and council on all matters when they saw fit. But while the ulema were now engaging 
in parliamentary activity there were also concerns that the ulema’s privileged position 
in society would also become criticised in parliament. This had already started to take 
place in the Ottoman press, where the open press campaign at times created 
undesirable environments. 595  In the parliament an example was on March 13th 
1909/Safar 21, 1327 where the Chamber of Deputies subjected Hasan Lutfi Efendi, 
acting for the Şeyhülislâm, to a gruelling interpellation. The Şeyhülislâm, Ziyâeddin 
Efendi who had only just taken the role was said to be vigorously criticised for 
allowing corruption in the provincial religious courts and for permitting irregularities 
in the appointments of religious judges (naibs) in the Sharia courts. The previous 
Şeyhülislâm Cemaleddin Efendi was also attacked for following corrupt procedures in 
making appointments. Nonetheless, the Chamber passed a vote of confidence in 
Ziyâeddin Efendi, the Şeyhülislâm on the condition that he accomplish the required 
reforms. 596 Two days later on March 15th / Safar 23rd the deputies again subjugated 
the religious hierarchy to pointed criticism regarding a bill dealing with complaints 
about the Evkaf Ministry. The bill proposed that the Evkaf Ministry be abolished and 
a commission under the Şeyhülislâm undertake responsibility. 597 This was a period 
where the Şeyhülislâm was not absolved from criticism as the ulema too made such 
gestures. 598 However, this was an unprecedented moment in which the office of 
Şeyhülislâm was to be subjugated to such vigorous public criticism. 599  To also 
suggest that the Meşihat permitted corruption was also an embarrassing state of 
affairs to be presented to a chamber of so-called secularists and non-Muslims. But in 
reality this was the very culture that many of the ulema themselves had demanded, 
and if the ulema were to critique positions outside their professional jurisdiction, the 
same was to happen to them.  
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The ideological backing for this argument was given by Hamdi Yazır who 
provided the idea of explaining what the role of the Şeyhülislâm was. He argued that 
the Şeyhülislâm cannot be the representative or vekil with the Caliph and has no 
attatchment to spirituality. That is why the Şeyhülislâm cannot be a part of the 
cabinet. This is an important issue as the draft constitution which was supposed to 
have been written by Hamdi Yazır stated that the Şeyhülislâm should be a part of the 
cabinet. The Şeyhülislâm cannot be considered leaders of spirituality and his respect 
is taken from their ilm and education. The Şeyhülislâm can be held accountable and 
people [cabinet] is obliged to do that and in the eyes of Islam. The ulema have the 
biggest responsibility, so the Şeyhülislâm being called to the Meclis (Parliament) is 
not in contradiction with Islam. 600 
 Hamdi Yazır went one step further that surely would have concerned the 
Sultan and pleased the CUP. He continued that according to the Sharia even the 
Caliph is subservient to the ‘will of the nation’. A representative of the Caliph such as 
a Şeyhülislâm or minister who only has relative authority (cannot act as if he has 
authority) as he is only a memur (civil servant) not an amir (leader). If he 
(Şeyhülislâm or minister) is a person worthy of his position he will be respected both 
for his position and personality. But if not worthy for his position, he will only be 
respected for his personality. 601  He also addressed the issue of non-Muslims in 
parliament by saying the Caliph can hire various vakils both Muslim and non-
Muslims.602  
 
The Mecelle and the Constitution 
 
Between 1908/1326 and the Counter-revolution there were two matters in parliament 
in which the ulema became central. They were the discussion on an initiative to 
expand the Mecelle (Ottoman Civil Code) and constitutional amendment. Both these 
topics are of importance as not only were they in the jurisdiction of the ulema but the 
two topic matters became intertwined with the debates surrounding the Counter-
revolution of 1909/1327 in which the extension of the Mecelle and the application of 
the constitution to more Islamic lines were demanded within the slogan “Şeriat 
                                                        






isteriz” (We want the Shariah). 603 While the blame regarding the Counter-revolution 
and the slogan has been levelled at the conservative organisation the İttihad-ı 
Muhammedi  (Muhammadan Union), on closer inspection the slogan was a deeply 
contested idea among other segments of the ulema which suggests that the essence of 
the demand was more complex than simply aiming reactionary proclivities either at 
the Muhammadan Union or ‘traditionalist’ ulema,604  
There was debate said to be initiated by Mustafa Sabri to launch a legislative 
initiative to restart work on expanding the Mecelle.605 The Mecelle was presented as 
a law code that emanated from Hanafi jurisprudential practices on civil matters, but 
the Mecelle commission was abandoned during the Hamidian period and so it was 
discussed that a new commission be opened. 606  On February 24th a proposal 
supported by one-third of the deputies in the Chamber was brought to the floor by 
Ajlinizade Muhammad Efendi from Damascus. The motion was to address the Sharia 
courts and the Mecelle and called for the creation of a unified code. It was then sent 
to the ilmiye and the justice committees for deliberation. 607   Whether the whole 
process was initiated by Mustafa Sabri or not, on March 22nd nonetheless a proposal 
was introduced to create a new Mecelle committee. The parliament approved such a 
request. Ibrahim Ferit Bey suggested that the Ottoman law should be combined with 
Fiqh.608 The Chamber once again approved such a motion, and the President of the 
Chamber sent the subject to the constitutional committee. 609 The Cemiyet also made 
calls for the Mecelle project in their journal the Beyan’ül-Hak and the discussion also 
found their way into the Volkan press. The Volkan published articles on the 
relationship between the Sharia and legislation and on March the 4th the Volkan had 
already argued that there should be a concentration in efforts to draw up a Sharia 
based criminal code similar to the likes of the Mecelle.610 Halit Sabit Efendi asked for 
the issue to be delayed as it required the need of more qualified ulema. Parliament 
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had endorsed the bill with a majority in both February and March in 1909/1327 and 
works towards its realisation were to take place in the office of the Şeyhülislâm. 
While the delaying of the activities were seen as an attempt by the ‘secular’ within 
the CUP to stall the Mecelle initiative proposed by the ulema, on closer inspection the 
position of Halit Sabit Efendi deserves some attention. Hamdi Yazır had also 
suggested in that period that the proposals required specialists from the local schools 
of jurisprudence gathered from everyone. 611  Hamdi Yazır was a member of the 
Cemiyet and close ally of Sabri, thus it seems more plausible that rather than viewing 
the stalling of the bill as an indication of the first antagonism between the CUP and 
Sabri, that in fact this matter indeed required much expertise of which the Cemiyet 
and ulema also recognised. It also points to the matter that Hamdi Yazır was indeed 
also requesting a comprehensive devlet wide review similar to the first Mecelle 
process in which an ulema consensus could be attained.  Susan Gunasti was correct in 
mentioning that the mention of fiqh in parliament served to raise the issue of legal 
reform and it continued to be presented in parliamentary motions.612  
The second point between 1908/1326 and the Counter-revolution of March 
31st 1909/1327 was the need to amend the constitution. It was highly accepted that the 
constitution of 1876/1293 was no longer fit to fulfil the new conditions of 1908/1326. 
As a result the issue of the constitution became a matter of urgency. Albert Vitali 
Efendi who was a non-Muslim submitted a proposal to amend the constitution of 
which he also included article 7 which dealt with the prerogatives of the Sultan. The 
proposal was sent to a committee of 30 members of which 6 were known members of 
the ulema. It is true that in the drafting committee in 1876/1293 the number of ulema 
were greater in number than in 1908/1326 and that key members of the committee in 
1876/1293 were of Kazasker standing at the time. However, the members of the 
ulema of 1908/1326 were of some standing and understood the complexities of 
Islamic constitutional discourse. The fact that many of them were members of the 
Cemiyet and wrote extensively on constitutional discourse should not be ignored. 
During this moment also the members of the Cemiyet, such as Mustafa Sabri, Hamdi 
Yazır and Mustafa Âsım Efendi also were nominally members of the CUP at the 
time. In the thirty man committee Gunasti argued that ‘the ulema became brothers of 
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choice’ between the differencing factions, playing a pivotal role in the process.613 It 
was argued by one Turkish scholar that the role of the ulema in the parliament 
enhanced their political profile.614  
No sooner were the ulema deliberating on the constitution, did the Counter-
revolution expedite the matter. After the Counter-revolution, it became of even 
greater urgency to address the issues of the constitution, as a vote in parliament was 
made to depose the Sultan. When the Sultan was deposed it was the first time that 
political legitimacy was used in conjunction with a constitutional principle. As a 
result due to the nature and demand of the constitution to be in line with the Sharia 
and the removal of the Sultan, the constitutional committee intensified its effort to 
make the constitution more in line with Islamic principles. The ulema’s role in 
parliament was not simply of bowing to the CUP but in fact the ulema became central 
during this formative moment. 
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Chapter 5 – The Counter-revolution 
 
In this chapter what shall be examined are the activities of the ulema in Istanbul 
regarding what is popularly known in English as the ‘Counter-revolution’ of April 
1909/1327 also known in Turkish scholarship as the 31st March incident.615 It shall 
also examine the subsequent consequences regarding the Counter-revolution with the 
dethronement of Sultan Abdulhamid II and the constitutional amendments in 
1909/1327. The Constitutional Revolution was a culmination of a prolonged 
oppositional intellectual campaign by the Young Turks and oppositional ulema in 
exile as well as dissident activity in various parts of the Ottoman provinces, reaching 
its apex in the guise of a revolutionary movement from the Macedonian provinces in 
the summer of 1908/1326. The reactionary ‘Counter-revolution’ however, didn’t 
seem to reflect an ideological movement in the same vein that the revolutionaries of 
1908/1326 presented to the Hamidian regime, the reactionary movement also was 
neither initiated in the provinces nor abroad but emerged from the discontent felt in 
Istanbul which then facilitated an outbreak of reactionary activity in some of the other 
provinces. Thus, the Counter-revolution was not a culmination of prolonged 
intellectual oppositional activity – in this case in opposition to the new CUP 
government, but rather a sporadic emotional reaction to the haphazard policies of the 
CUP leadership. I would argue that the Counter-revolution was the result of 
inconsistent government policies added by the toxic atmosphere facilitated by the 
newly recognised freedom of press on the back of a sensitive populace still emotional 
from the events of 1908/1326. Thus, the Revolution of 1908/1326 and Counter-
revolution have been shown to share very little, both in form and ideology.  
The ulema’s significance during the Counter-revolution is based on the idea 
that earlier historians had categorised the incident as an ‘Islamic reaction’ to the 
‘liberal’ Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326, thus placing the Counter-revolution 
within the ulema’s remit. Much of the historiographical focus had been based on the 
rhetorical Islamic slogan of ‘Şeriat isteriz’ (We want the Shariah) as the proof of the 
religious nature of the revolt. Also, much attention was paid to the ‘reaction’ of the 
conservative religious populist organisation the İttihad-ı Muhammedi  (Muhammadan 
Union) and blurred distinction by placing the ulema as either religious actors 
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supportive of rebellion or docile supporters of the new CUP government.616 Even at 
the time a report in the British Times newspaper suggested that the CUP were facing 
opposition from a new rival organisation which was made up from the ulema. 617A 
more recent study by Nader Sohrabi has made distinction between the Muhammadan 
Union and the ulema of the state apparatus by placing the ulema as reluctant 
adversaries of the new CUP government.618 Sohrabi has also explained that narratives 
on the Union were simplistic and that the movement’s leader Derviş Vahdeti had also 
became a victim of the events that transpired. Sohrabi just like earlier historians 
pointed to the idea that the ‘Counter-revolution’ spoke in the name of religion, as he 
positioned the Muhammadan Union as the religious protagonists in opposition to the 
CUP. This narrative although separated the state ulema from the ‘reactionary’ 
attitudes of the Union, it nonetheless continued to maintain that the Revolution of 
1908/1326 was inspired to emulate Western political liberalism while the ‘Counter-
revolution’ of 1909/1327 was a religious (Islamic) reaction to it.619 Sohrabi stressed 
that the reaction by and large was in retaliation to the revolution of 1908’s/1326’s 
strong advocacy for Westernism, which was considered [by the CUP] the only valid 
civilizational framework for the modern world.620 While Sohrabi’s position is a shift 
from previous authors in separating the ulema from the ‘religious reaction’ of the 
populist Muhammadan Union, it however, places the ulema as advocates of CUP 
Westernism which then supports the premise of the ulema’s quietist position towards 
governmental secularisation. This paradox places the ulema either as reactionaries or 
submissive to state Westernisation restricting any independent agency they may have 
exercised. It also does not explain how the ulema as a mediatory group, balanced to 
listen to the demands of the mutineers and at the same time stress on the Islamic 
constitutional merits of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326, thus suggesting 
that the ulema were neither reactionary nor bystanders, but instead key negotiators 
between mutineers and the state and were attempting to institute a reflective process 
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of Ottoman modernisation along the lines of Islam which was expected by the ulema 
and demanded by the Muslim masses.  
It is my view however that both the Revolution of 1908/1326 and Counter-
revolution spoke a similar language but from different factions and reasons. While the 
initial revolution in 1908/1326 spoke of hürriyet, müsavat ve uhuvvet (freedom, 
equity and fraternity), in 1909/1327 the reactionaries didn’t reject these ideals nor the 
constitution. In 1908/1326 the revolutionaries also used the Islamic slogans of justice, 
order and consultation. Likewise in 1909/1327 the slogans of the Sharia as justice 
were once again appealed to. The ulema were a part of the revolution of 1908/1326 
and the ulema were both a part of and victims in 1909/1327. If anything as 
mentioned, this revolutionary phase of 1908/1326 and 1909/1327 were part of the 
same revolutionary phase where Islamic language was intermeshed on both 
occasions. So what’s to suggest that the people at the time didn’t see both the 
revolution and counter as Islamic? If the Counter-revolution tells us anything is that 
the appeals were being made to the language of Islam because it was the language 
used to mobilise them in 1908/1326. Throughout the press campaign the Muslims 
were told that the revolution was in conformity with Islam and for its sake. Thus, 
1909/1327 simply appealed to this environment. It is thus my belief to argue that the 
dichotomy presented by earlier historians fails to appreciate how Islam was both part 
of the ‘spirit of the revolution’ of 1908/1326 and the ‘essence of discontent’ in 
1909/1327. 
 In this chapter I shall explain how although the ulema attempted to distance 
themselves from the ‘reactionary’ sentiments of the mutineers on the ground, they 
nonetheless were also privy to the Islamic demands of the mutineers. The ulema in 
the state apparatus were also aware how the Muhammadan Union had managed to 
take centre stage and succeeded to encourage religious sentiment as the Union’s 
position shifted and changed as the conditions did. In addition the ulema continued to 
uphold constitutionalism as an Islamic ideal, and managed to consolidate their vision 
of constitutionalism from their traditional Islamic framework, by stressing this point 
to the mutineers, and also government by maintaining the centrality of their authority 
during the constitutional amendment process after the failure of the Counter-
revolution in 1909/1327. On closer inspection the constitutional amendments made in 
1909/1327 were part of the ulema discourse of restricting absolute authority, but at 




protested in Istanbul. The so-called Counter-revolution might have failed with its 
slogans demanding the Sharia, but its sentiment was reflected in the new constitution 
of which the ulema were the key architects suggesting that the Ottoman government 
and ulema did make concessions to the demands of the protestors. The attitudes of the 
ulema in Istanbul from the Revolution until the Counter-revolution can be seen as 
consistent in upholding constitutionalism as the Islamic ideal for governance, and 
maintain their importance in the governmental structures. 
Although this chapter shall re-examine the role of the ulema in the Counter-
revolution, the role of the Muhammadan Union also requires some attention as much 
of the religious sentiment and rhetoric overlapped the remit of both the Union and the 
ulema. There is no doubting the Union’s role in the events on the Counter-revolution 
but the Union’s activities requires evaluation, as they ultimately became victims of 
the portrayals of the CUP who themselves needed to present the agitation as anti-
constitutional and reactionary as they had lost much authority in Istanbul, thus 
obliging a response from the military. The Counter-revolution was used to vindicate 
the CUP, as the opposition could no longer denounce the CUP’s alarmist position.621 
If the CUP had not presented the Counter-revolution as anti-revolution, military 
action and involvement would have been improbable. As for the state ulema, it is 
evident that they had attempted to subdue the revolt, and although much of the 
literature does indicate such, nevertheless the ulema’s involvement has been framed 
as pragmatic during the events, similar to the Revolution, in which they only 
supported the CUP once it was evident that the rebellion in the capital was to be 
defeated.  
A secondary point worth investigating is the impact the Counter-revolution 
had on the position of the Caliphate and the ulema, especially the ulema that 
functioned as state-actors in Istanbul. Although brief mention of members of the 
ulema and their opinions shall be explained, nonetheless it was the importance of the 
ulema in Istanbul that determined the course that the government was to take and the 
manner the new constitution would be implemented. Due to the religious rhetoric 
used by the mutineers, the Sultan and ulema shared much accusation as supporters of 
the ‘reactionary’ activities across the devlet. In reality ulema positions were indeed 
diverse, but even those who clearly attempted to separate themselves from the revolt 
would be viewed with an eye of suspicion, as paranoia from the CUP towards men of 
                                                        




religion became ever stronger. Mustafa Sabri Efendi claimed how the events of 
1909/1327 created an environment that perceived the ulema with much distrust, as 
many withdrew from outward political activity that they had enjoyed from the 
inception of the Revolution. 622  However, while within some quarters the ulema 
became criticised over the events, nonetheless the pragmatism of the CUP conceded 
the importance of the ulema who remained integral to the political traditions of the 
devlet as they continued to use the apparatuses of the state unlike any other faction to 
supress the revolt and restrict its spreading across the devlet as well as remaining 
central to the constitutional ideals. The narrative of the ulema and Sultan’s collusion 
has been much discredited over the years, nonetheless the complexity of the role of 
the ulema regarding the varying factions amongst them based on hierarchy, 
education, political affinity and ideological inclination, is further complicated due to 
the blurring of lines regarding the religious demands from the protagonists 
proclaiming ‘Şeriat isteriz’ (we want the Sharia) added to that the Counter-revolution 
had indeed many softas and hocas which for the untrained person would naturally 
have looked as though the ulema had revolted. The demand for the Sharia was no 
doubt within the remit of the ulema’s jurisdiction, as the call was indeed made to both 
the government and the ulema. The centrality of the Sharia to the ulema’s authority 
has made it challenging for historians to make distinction between the ulema’s 
religious proclivities and the rhetorical proclamation by the mutineers.  
With the Sultan’s authority used as a symbol of veneration by the mutineers 
which would have been natural as he was still assumed to be in charge, the Counter-
revolution would have consolidated the notion among the ulema in authority that 
dangers of an absolute Caliphate. Thus the Counter-revolution provided further proof 
of the dangers of Sultan veneration. For many ulema in parliament Hamidian 
veneration had to be restricted, and whilst Islamic history would serve many 
examples of authoritarian Caliphates, the Constitution of 1909/1327 for the first time 
as a document would restrict the executive nature of the role and institutionalise legal 
restrictions to the Caliph’s authority, never instituted before in Islamic history. While 
the ulema may have been placed in a precarious position during the events of March 
31st 1909/ Rabial-Awwal 10th 1327, nonetheless their authority as the guardians of 
faith didn’t diminish, as the ulema within the state apparatus via the medium of the 
Constitution of 1909/1327 would change the role of the Caliphate forever. 
                                                        




The final part of this chapter, shall examine the constitutional amendments 
made by the ulema in order to position their standing vis-à-vis state and society as a 
response to the Counter-revolution and more importantly the greater narrative of 
ulema support of constitutionalism. While the ulema’s ideological ideas have been 
mentioned in chapter three, this chapter shall focus on the processes the ulema 
underwent regarding the drafting of the new constitution as integral if not central 
actors of the constitutional amendments. The drafting process of amending the 
constitution of 1876/1293 was already in session in parliament prior to the Counter-
revolution but given greater urgency once the revolt was suppressed so that the role 
of the Sharia, Caliph, revolutionary slogans and constitutionalism be clarified to 
society. The ulema continued to play an essential role in the constitutional process by 
amending the constitution in accordance with the conditions of the Ottoman devlet of 
the twentieth century. Additionally, in the final segment of this chapter it is worth 
scrutinising Susan Gunasti’s assumption that the ulema became further influential in 
1909/1327 and consolidated their influence in the drafting of the constitution of 
which Gunasti called the ‘Islamicisation’ of the constitution, which would thus 
suggest that the document of 1876/1293 was not Islamic and needed to be made more 
so in 1909/1327.623 My contention is not with the idea that the ulema became further 
influential in this period but to examine the idea of ‘Islamicisation’. It is better not to 
view the constitution of 1909/1327 as an Islamisation of the document of 1876/1293, 
as both emanated and reflected Islamic principles. It is my view that both 
constitutions were Islamic but reflective of the needs of their respective times. As 
mentioned earlier, neither authoritarianism nor constitutionalism is seen in 
contradiction to Islamic politics, as the Sharia has maintained fluency over the style 
of governance. It would be better to view the transformative ability of the 
constitutional needs to re-appropriate Islam to the novel conditions of its time. This 
was similar to the Sharia’s ability to adapt to novel conditions to new realities, thus 
pointing to the transformative ability of Islamic political theory, law and late Ottoman 
political culture and consequently the ulema’s continual worth regarding state 
transformation. 
 
                                                        




Background Events that Led to the Counter-revolution - Deconstructing 
the Narrative 
 
Before examining the actual Counter-revolution and the role of the ulema, it is worth 
first examining some of the conditions that led to the revolt. This is because during 
the success of the Constitutional Revolution, by and large the ulema of the state 
apparatus faced no real incriminations by the CUP as they had profited much from 
the new conditions. This then points to the question why the ulema would react 
towards facilitating a Counter-revolution by wanting to abolish the new constitutional 
order, especially as it was many of them who wanted the constitution in the first 
place. It is worth addressing how the revolt came into being and then placing the 
ulema within this narrative, which should clarify the ulema’s role in the revolt. The 
revolt that lasted nine days materialised not from a vacuum, nor can it be proven as a 
pre-organised co-ordinated action. 624  The demonstrative movement presented no 
spearhead or distinct ideology, and its spontaneity caught many by surprise, 
especially the Unionists. As for who was to blame, some blamed the Sultan directly, 
although much evidence now suggests otherwise, nonetheless the events were a 
catalyst that became the motivation for the CUP that later led to the Sultan’s 
deposition. The main charge was aimed at the Muhammadan Union of which there 
were members from the ulema – although of a conservative disposition.  
By March 31st 1909/Rabi al-Awwal 10th 1327 the government’s 
transgressions had managed to unify a multitude of oppositional actors not only 
religious, indicating that the revolt was less to do with religious fanaticism but rather 
an agitation created by the policies of the CUP, added by a hostile press environment 
that impacted a wide range of actors.625 It should have not come as a surprise to the 
CUP of the possibility of unrest, but the events did indeed catch the CUP unawares. 
What is apparent is the events had undeniably surprised the CUP, both by its speed of 
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escalation and its anti-CUP position. The emergence of the incident doesn’t equate to 
conspiracy on this occasion, but instead implies that the CUP were insensible to the 
feeling of discontent their actions, rhetoric and policies were causing among a mainly 
conservatively religious empire and that the common denominator of the mutineers 
was not the return to religion but in fact a demand of curtailing the CUP’s authority to 
the justice inscribed from Islam and the constitution. If the Sultan was not to escape 
criticism the CUP were sure to be equally judged on the Islamic requirements of 
justice also. Bedross Der Matossian confirms: 
 
The Counterrevolution was not a manifestation of religious fanaticism, as scholars have generally 
supposed. Although it spoke in the language of religion, it nevertheless was forwarded by diverse 
groups – the most important of which were lower-ranking soldiers and officers who had opposed the 
indiscriminate, massive purges initiated by the CUP after the Revolution. When the lower-ranking, 
populist religious organizations asked for the implementation of the şeriat, their aim was not to abolish 
the constitution but rather to implement the constitution in accordance with the principles of the 
şeriat.626 
 
The discontent manifested into greater agitation towards the CUP’s governance in 
Istanbul, as news of the assassination of the editor of the Serbesti journal Hasan 
Fehmi Bey with little recrimination acted as the tip of the iceberg that pushed many in 
Istanbul finally over the edge. This then manifested in sporadic outbreaks of derision 
as the lack of the new regime’s centrality on some of the provinces indicated that the 
CUP had still not managed to totally rein authority both in the centre and provinces.  
Historians have seen Hasan Fehmi’s death as the catalyst for the events of 
1909/1327. An ardent critic of the CUP in his liberal journal, his assassination, 
indicated to many that the CUP were behind his murder as thousands attended his 
funeral in Istanbul. Such was the shock that an opponent of the CUP was killed in 
cold blood in broad daylight, that many feared that this type of recrimination would 
be used against other opponents. It is unclear whether the CUP had indeed sanctioned 
such an action, but the government’s tepid response was perceived by the voices on 
the street to be tacit acceptance of his murder. A palace aid was also assassinated, and 
Derviş Vahdeti the leader of the Muhammadan Union made accusations of receiving 
death threats himself, as the CUP were accused of conspiracy. 627  Prior to the 
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assassination the CUP had brought the Avcı troops from Salonika in Istanbul in 
October of that year, creating a tense atmosphere in and around the capital. Especially 
as many of the troops were station outside of Yildiz. It is difficult to explain why the 
CUP would facilitate an environment of assassinations at the risk of encouraging 
revolt. Encouraging such activity would have done nothing but compromise the 
CUP’s authority; by bringing bloodshed to the streets of Istanbul. In fact the manner 
in which members of the CUP escaped the capital further indicates the precarious 
position the CUP were in during the revolt as their dependency on the ulema and 
more importantly the All Action Army became evident. The CUP’s rather haphazard 
reform had initiated a culture of marginalisation and the purging of those that were 
perceived as supporters of the Sultan had further exacerbated matters. With wide-
scale military and bureaucratic purges, the freeing of political prisoners that included 
convicts, and the abolishment of the Hamidian spy network in Istanbul, created an 
environment that lent itself to disorder. While the CUP surfed the waves of 
revolutionary euphoria, by March 31st 1909/Rabi al-Awwal 10th 1327 their political 
stock was unravelling in dramatic fashion.  
  The Revolution of 1908/1326 had promised much, and yet by 1909/1327 
much of the euphoria began to diminish, as revolutionary rhetoric and promises failed 
to transpire into projected realities. In order to maintain popular support, the CUP 
continued to submerge revolutionary euphoria with incessant celebrations, festivities 
and elections, as the newfound printing press attempted to take this emotion and 
generate public opinion that would perceive more favourably the introduction of 
constitutional government and presented the CUP as the bastions of the new fortunes 
of the devlet and its peoples. However, with the relative freedom of press and 
parliament, there was an air of toxicity established in the new criticism cultures of the 
printing press and parliamentary debate. Also the average layman cared little with 
political transformation; that was the domain of the educated and statesmen. The 
people’s concerns related more with matters such as the reduction of taxation, the 
improvement of the general economic situation and matters of security. The average 
person of the Ottoman devlet had very individual concerns; they were made to believe 
that the constitution would address such. Instead, while the CUP and other political 
factions were wrangling over authority, the masses saw no real change in their lives 
that actually mattered to their interests. The new culture of populism was built on the 




deliver. The streets of the Ottoman devlet as a result were high on emotion and the 
possibility of collective remonstration where evident.  
Government reformation was indeed a tough and strenuous process as the 
CUP found it difficult purging conservative elements within the political structure. 
While many newer actors benefitted from the new means of political practice, the old 
guard still used their traditional methodologies to remain politically relevant. The 
forced transformation between Hamdian to Meşrutiyet created a hybrid situation 
where new and old had managed to immerse themselves into the political structure 
and thus create a environment of contestation. However actors who benefitted from 
Hamidian policies were evidently acknowledging the shift that was taking place in 
internal policy.  
Added to that, as the Unionists decided to make governmental reform their 
primary objective, such changes failed to resonate with the masses. The Unionists 
were about to face the ill effects of the populism they created, as oppositional 
religious actors to the CUP were far better in stirring mass emotive feelings. Upon 
achieving their aims during the Revolution the CUP along with many state ulema 
continued to emphasise that authority was in the hands of the masses. Ottoman 
thinkers and ulema had not only mobilised the masses to celebrate, boycott and vote, 
they had also mobilised an intellectual consciousness that the masses were part of the 
new political change. As mentioned, although the masses cared very little for the 
technocratic implications of constitutionalism, nonetheless they were made to believe 
that constitutionalism was the reflection of the ‘national will’, furthermore that the 
masses had some stake in the decision-making process. The ulema in particular had 
stressed on the concept of authority belonging to the ummah, that the 
parliamentarians were representatives of the masses and Ottoman nation, and that 
decision-making was inclusive.  
Although the constitutional movement of July 1908/1326 was not a popular 
revolution, however, motifs and symbols were constructed to make the masses 
believe that they were central to the new political change. More importantly, after the 
Revolution the new political culture of protest was indeed fashioning a newfound 
populism. Populism when used by the CUP was to take complex problems and 
simplify them within the rhetorical slogans of freedom, equity and fraternity. Further 
more Young Turk populism had simplified the complexity by suggesting that the 




populism equally failed to address the complexities of the CUP’s time in government 
by attacking the CUP at every turn. In appealing to the masses for legitimacy, newer 
formulations emerged within the population wanting to invest in political activity. A 
host of organisations and unions would become established during this period of 
which the Muhammadan Union was such a populist religiously inspired movement. 
While the CUP initially attained a level of support from many of the differing 
political factions regarding state transformation, the attempt to transform public 
opinion and mass culture was to be far more challenging. If the CUP were to appeal 
to emotive symbolism regarding Ottoman fraternity as well as Islam and its symbols, 
then religious actors, especially the ulema and Sufi sheikhs were far better in 
interacting with this arena than the CUP.  
 The ulema and Sufi sheikhs were an inherent part of Muslim societies whose 
authority in Muslim societies was as old as the ummah itself. While it has been 
claimed that the Unionists enjoyed much popularity in the printing press, it is yet to 
be determined what the mass reading patterns were or how people resonated with 
CUP ideas. However from the letters sent to the Islamic press such as the Beyan’ül-
Hak, Sırâtımüstakīm, al-Manar or the Volkan, it can be assumed that the Islamic 
press was indeed popular, not solely in the devlet but around the Muslim world. As 
for the traditional spaces such as the pulpit, this was still the domain of the people of 
religion. Much of CUP success was still dependent on ulema co-operation.  
It should come as no surprise that the CUP were to be contested by elements 
in society once the euphoria of the revolution subsided and reality of the revolution 
became apparent. The CUP was about to realise that revolutions rarely – if ever – 
simply transpire over night. Revolutions are processes and phases, they involve post 
revolutionary contestations, anti-revolutionary sentiment and a fluidity of changing 
alliances once an aim is achieved, in this case the subjugation of the Sultan. The CUP 
was about to face the greatest threat to their authority since the discovery of their 
activities by the Sultan’s forces in Macedonia in the summer of 1908/1326. However, 
it wasn’t until the revolt was overpowered by the military that the CUP eventually 
managed to establish authority in the executive branch of governance and re-establish 
a programme of political change that included deposing the Sultan, purging Kamil 
Pasha the ex-Grand Vizier’s influence, eradicating conservative religious opposition 
as well as attaining ulema co-operation for drafting a constitution to curtail Sultanic 




The Counter-revolution highlighted the impact of the haphazard actions of the 
CUP, their weakness in government and their inability to grasp the influence of 
religious emotion as an oppositional tool in the hands of Muslim conservatives such 
as the Muhammadan Union. The state ulema’s position would determine the outcome 
of the confrontation. If they supported the new government during the revolt they 
could aid in subduing the agitation, however support for the mutineers would have 
left the new government in a precarious position. On closer inspection as will be 
examined the ulema’s sole aim was to safeguard the devlet from chaos and call for 
unity and their positions were rapidly changing as were the conditions on the ground. 
The problems were many when the Counter-revolution took place. CUP 
purges, the freeing of prisoners, the abolishment of the spy network, the feeling of 
discontent by many segments of society was compounded by the war of words 
between some members of the CUP, like Hüseyin Cahid and oppositional activists 
such as Derviş Vahdeti, which created a web of discontent both in the public sphere 
and intellectual. It was the combination of these elements that created the conditions 
for the Counter-revolution in 1909/1327. While the rhetoric was religious, it was not 
inspired however by a religious movement or religious reaction, but instead an appeal 
to the universal slogans of justice and the Sharia. The Muhammadan Unions success 
was on the back of the CUP’s many failures. The ulema within the state apparatus 
attempted to balance the difficult task of holding government to account while also 
making distinction from their aims and that of the Muhammadan Union. The 
Muhammadan Union in the press and the mutineers on the ground appealed to the 
slogans of Islam which were evidently within the remit of the ulema’s authority, it 
was only natural that they would be the people of mediation, but at the same time the 
ones who would fall victim of the use of religion by the mutineers.  
 
Muslim Contestations – The Ulema, the Softas and the Meşihat 
 
The Counter-revolution was not the first time CUP authority was challenged in 
Istanbul under the guise of religion. In December 1908/1326, Kör Ali, a conservative 
dervish had reacted by rioting regarding what he considered to be social 
infringements in society. Kör Ali and his followers believed that the CUP had 
facilitated an environment emulating Western culture and one that would diminish the 




relaxing laws in regards to alcohol and women’s clothing, a charge denied by 
CUP. 628  Conservative Muslims in Damascus also criticised that the newfound 
freedom was impacting negatively regarding women in the devlet.629 Even Sheikh 
Mûsa Kâzım a Senator and alleged CUP affiliate mirrored conservative religious 
opinions on the dress code of women in Islam as he attempted to use his influence to 
apply pressure on the CUP via the journal Sırâtımüstakīm.630  
The Kör Ali incident had brought violence to the streets of Istanbul for the 
first time under the CUP, and had willing sympathisers from some conservative 
elements in the Ottoman domains. It was the first time that the CUP’s authority was 
so openly challenged. When arrested, Kör Ali pleaded insanity, however, the CUP’s 
response to such agitation was swift and harsh.  As a result, Kör Ali and some of his 
followers were arrested, swiftly tried and hung in order to suppress any reactionary 
activity to the new governments authority as the CUP set the tone of governmental 
retribution as the term mürteci (reactionary) started to become an accepted discourse 
by the Unionists towards religiously inspired protestations irrespective of the internal 
differences and by the end of the failed Counter-revolution became part of the legal 
language also.631  The complexity of the Kör Ali incident was it raised very pressing 
concerns sensitive to members of the ulema. As mentioned, matters of the religious 
code of women’s clothing mattered to many ulema, as it was part of a larger 
discourse of Islamic morality. The fact that Kör Ali and Mûsa Kâzım Efendi 
resonated the same belief indicated that ulema of different leanings could still 
correspond shared ideals as they drew their opinions from the same texts and sources. 
While the ulema may have been part of the reformation process, the main point of 
reference was still the Sharia and opposing factions would continue to resonate 
similar ideas on a host of matters. In that sense although the ulema would contest 
over matters among themselves and the ulema may have had differences regarding 
class, social status and education, nonetheless there was a feeling of belonging to a 
fraternity. In this sense, although the Kör Ali incident had nothing to do with the 
ulema of the state apparatus, it nonetheless would have still impacted upon the 
fraternity.  
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Authority was easily expressed by those who were part of the state apparatus, 
while those outside, were left with protest as the main style of applying pressure on 
government. While the likes of Mûsa Kâzım chose the printing press, private council 
or the parliament as a medium to express their concerns, Kör Ali chose protest which 
very easily transformed to violence. It was evident that the Union had no dominant 
authority within the parliamentary structure and parliament became the main arena to 
exercise ulema authority upon government. This indicated the difference between the 
ulema who benefitted from the use of the state apparatus and those considered as part 
of the political periphery. Both applied pressure on the governing authorities but used 
different methods available to them. Jacob Scovgaard-Peterson has pointed out that 
the ulema in the state apparatus usually have the capital to hold authority to account 
and implement policy.632 Ulema outside the state structure, although could attain 
much influence in society and even in the scholastic world, nonetheless those outside 
the state apparatus were marginalised when it came to the state building and 
transformation process. This was true of the conservative ulema who had supported 
Sultan Abdülhamid II. During the Hamidian period the conservatives enjoyed the 
favour of authority as they managed to propagate their vision of Islam while the 
ulema who called for the constitution struggled as they were simply reduced to 
oppositional activity in the hope that they could attain military support to change the 
political situation. When the Revolution succeeded those that had supported the 
Sultan had now become the opposition and became the marginal voices in the 
political sphere. While in opposition protest was the main method to apply pressure, 
as the newspaper culture had added a new dynamic to the protest, while those in 
governance have all the tools of the state at their disposal.  
Further blurring of lines took place when the ulema led by the Cemiyet had 
placed a proposal for the extension of the Mecelle regarding criminal law to 
parliament; the Volkan had echoed this point also. The slogan ‘Şeriat isteriz’, was a 
concept that was discussed by both the Beyan’ül-Hak and the Volkan which was 
taken as a slogan of the mutineers.633 What all the ulema and Muhammadan Union 
had in common was the desire to not only support the constitutional regime but to 
make it more in line with the principles of the Sharia. In that sense the ulema and 
Muhammadan Union had similarities. It is for this reason easy to understand why 
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many historians had placed the ulema with the Muhammadan Union when discussing 
the events of Counter-revolution. But there were evident differences on the role of the 
Caliph. The state ulema by and large propagated the idea that the Sultan as Caliph 
was an executive authority, that the culture of veneration was to be discouraged, 
whereas the Muhammadan Union endorsed the centrality of the Sultan as the supreme 
leader.  
While there was a contestation between the ulema of the state and those on the 
periphery there was also a contestation between the ulema within the state apparatus. 
The Cemiyet and Meşihat had a vested interest in curtailing religious conservatism 
towards an understanding more suitable to their own. The Cemiyet had also made the 
claim that they took it as one of their objectives to educate the masses towards the 
correct understand of Islam.634 But during the Counter-revolution the state ulema all 
aligned themselves to protecting the CUP who were the only authority who could 
protect the upholding of the constitution. As a result, both the Meşihat and Cemiyet 
aimed words of harsh criticism towards any activity perceived as ‘reactionary’ that 
could destabilise government. In doing so in this complicated web of relationships 
clear demarcations of allegiances were made thus bringing the CUP and the state 
ulema ever closer than at any other time. As a result the CUP and ulema agreed to an 
uneasy alliance that safeguarded CUP authority in government and the state ulema’s 
aims in implementing their programme. 
Political and social conservatism still maintained a deep core within political 
and social life in the Ottoman devlet. Many of the grievances made by the mutineers 
in the preceding events of 1909/1327 had sympathetic ears within some ulema 
circles.635 In fact there were also sympathetic ears for the disenfranchised from non-
Muslims as well. 636  CUP reformist activities had created ruptures within certain 
segments of the Ottoman polity, the reforms lacked much tact and more so, emotion. 
The ulema were privy to the complaints of the devoted senior soldier to the Ottoman 
devlet who was removed from his post for being a Hamidian loyalist, the young 
officer who still awaited his pay, the softa being forced into military service, or the 
peasant who was yet to reap the benefits of the constitution.  In this sense, these 
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feelings coupled with religious sentiment had created the highly charged emotional 
agitation towards the new regime.  
 
The Islamic Opposition Movements 
 
It is worth evaluating the role of the Muhammadan Union, its leader the Nakshabandi 
Sheikh, Hafiz Derviş Vahdeti and its journal mouthpiece the Volkan. Much blame 
regarding the Counter-revolution was aimed at the Muhammadan Union. After the 
suppression of the revolt, the Muhammadan Union was immediately dissolved, the 
Volkan banned and Derviş Vahdeti and some of his close supporters were executed 
by the state similar to Kör Ali. It wasn’t until Nader Sohrabi’s detailed work on the 
events that a more considerate depiction of the Muhammdan Union has been 
presented in which Sohrabi revealed that the Union was a self-proclaimed mouthpiece 
for the disenfranchised, but it lacked the ability, clout or personnel to deliver Counter-
revolutionary change.637 The feeling of discontent was coupled with the haphazard 
nature of oppositional activity, which had no clear vision, leader or ideology.  
The Muhammadan Union was established in February 1909/Muharram 1327 - 
though the full manifesto and code of rules did not appear in the Volkan until March, 
which was formally announced during the mevlud638 of the Prophet Muhammad the 
following month. According to its manifesto it was established to ‘protect the notices 
of conservatism and Islam’.639 It is indistinguishable whether the Union was indeed a 
viable oppositional force to the CUP’s authority as Sohrabi has suggested, but there is 
no doubting that the Muhammadan Union’s rapid and mounting popularity was 
increasing, as the CUP failed to familiarise the initial stages of their reign of the 
conservative nature of much of the devlet. It was suggested that when the 
Muhammadan Union opened its membership that thousands applied to join.640 This 
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was not simply confined to Istanbul as the Muhammadan Union expanded its 
recruitment efforts to Anatolia and the Arab provinces, and especially organised itself 
in Syria, where many conservative ulema felt threatened by the CUP and Salafist 
agenda.641 In Damascus it was said that it had many members, and a 1000 signatures 
were attained in support of a petition led by the Muhammadan Union in support for 
the application of the Sharia.642 Some prominent members of the ulema included 
conservatives such as ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaylani and Sheikh Badr al-Din, and that 
Sheikh Salih al-Tunisi and Abdul Qadir al-Khatib were the leaders. 643  But the 
Muhammadan Union unlike the CUP was not a political party, with a political 
programme; instead a fluid organisation that had neither clear structure, nor 
hierarchy. The Muhammadan Union represented a different objective over the 
membership culture of the CUP in which the Union chose to function as a protest 
organisation that could hold authority to account. Unlike Kör Ali’s protestations, the 
Union presented a far greater challenge to the CUP as its aims were better integrated 
into the aspirations of the Sufi tarikats and their conservatism. It was also no 
coincidence that many of its senior members were affiliates with Sufi tarikats and 
ulema.  
As membership was fluid, membership to multiple organisations was not 
perceived as a contradiction. Said Nursi had mentioned that he was an affiliate to 
multiple organisations.644 Nursi consistently had his works serialised in the Volkan 
press suggesting that he had close connections to the Muhammadan Union. Also, 
Nursi had supported the CUP during the Revolution both in the Balkans and the 
Kurdish regions of the devlet in which he propagated the merits of 
constitutionalism.645 Nursi gave many classes in the madressas of Fatih of which 
many members of the Cemiyet came from. Thus, Nursi interacted with all these 
groups and organisations of which no contradiction was perceived initially. The 
Muhammadan Union unlike the Cemiyet was not exclusive to the ulema, and was a 
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bottom-up grass root movement that was inclusive to the masses. Its journal organ the 
Volkan also permitted various writers to write for them such as the Ziya Gokalp.646 
This made the Muhammadan Union’s activism in direct conflict to the space that the 
CUP had carved regarding populist activity. It also reflected that whereas the CUP 
had fostered much populism in introducing constitutional politics to public opinion as 
a way of curtailing Sultanic opposition, nonetheless, forces such as the Union, were 
far better suited at rallying the masses on emotionally religious slogans. During the 
Counter-revolution the large numbers that are often quoted regarding Muhammad 
Union membership do require some scrutiny as the Muhammadan Union had made 
itself visible during the celebrations of the mevled and it is not clear if the crowds 
attending these events were indeed members of just attendees of the event. I would be 
pressed into thinking the latter.  
What is also worth of note is that from the ideas of the Volkan journal it is 
evident that the Muhammadan Union was in favour of the constitution. However, the 
serialisation of Dağıstânî’s Miraat Kanun-ı Esasi clearly indicates that the Union’s 
impression of constitutionalism was still within the conservative purview of unlimited 
Sultanic authority, a position challenged both by the CUP and the Cemiyet.  However, 
while the Volkan press positioned itself as a journal representing the interests of the 
conservative elements within Ottoman society, it also aligned itself with the other 
journals in opposition to the CUP. Although ideologically different, and its objectives 
also being different, the Volkan nonetheless worked co-operatively with liberally 
inclined journals to maintain pressure on the CUP. The Serbesti, Ikdham, and the 
Volkan had become increasingly critical of the CUP mirroring similar arguments to 
one another, thus applying collective pressure. 647 On closer inspection the idea that 
the Volkan was presenting articles of an inflammatory nature are also somewhat 
exaggerated, as its style of opposition was no different than the other oppositional 
voices in the print culture.648 The Muhammadan Union also didn’t present an anti 
non-Muslim position. It recognised that the constitution was for all citizens including 
non-Muslims and stressed that it understood so. The Volkan press explained that the 
Muhammadan Union was a small but active group who were moderate in their 
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outlook but would uphold the haqq(truth) and if the haqq were to be attacked then it 
would erupt like a volcano (Volkan).649  
According to Sohrabi, to counter the CUP’s influence in government the 
Muhammadan Union attempted to separate the links between the CUP’s stronghold in 
the Macedonian branches and the branches elsewhere. 650  The Volkan press was 
bidding to create a distinction between the CUP and the actions of the soldiers during 
the revolution. It was attempting to appeal to the revolution from the position of the 
masses, and in many ways was more effective in understanding general public 
opinion. 651   The Volkan didn’t present itself as a voice of the elite in Ottoman 
society, on the contrary, the Volkan’s appeal was in the premise that it represented the 
voice of the layman on the street, in particular the regular Muslim. The CUP found 
this sentiment the most challenging as some of the intellectuals of the CUP, used 
patronising terms when condemning the masses in their print literature, whereas the 
Volkan turned to the masses, recognising the sentiment on the ground. The Volkan’s 
appeal to the Muslim masses in particular was going to ears that were willing to 
listen, and those disenfranchised ears were many. Said Nursi, a regular writer for the 
journal, when criticising the CUP, made it clear that he was not against the heroes of 
the revolution Niyazi or Enver, but that there were indeed some in the CUP whose 
manner and ideas ‘he did not agree with’.652 Nursi chose to downplay his contempt 
for some of the Unionists unlike other authors who were much harsher in their 
criticism of the CUP. Members such as Hüseyin Cahid were much detested within 
religious circles but within liberal circles too. The likes of Cahid were not only the 
scion of the Union however, as ulema himself took issue to Cahit’s outspoken 
opinions.  
Upon its inception the Muhammadan Union took it upon itself to defend what 
it believed to be excessive and over zealous reforms by the new government. Its 
populist appeal, and loose membership requirement meant that members of the ulema 
could fluidly interact on the same platform facilitated by the Muhammadan Union. 
However, on closer inspection it is worth noting that the triumvirate in Istanbul of the 
Cemiyet; Mustafa Sabri, Hamdi Yazır and Mustafa Âsım did not lend their support to 
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the Union, nor did the office of the Meşihat. As the environment became increasingly 
tense in the capital and the ulema were trapped between recognising the appropriate 
complaints of the Union and the mutineers, but also maintaining order to safeguard 
the government.  
The activities of the ulema during the events can be perceived as between two 
main groups. The first group were the ulema in the state apparatus, and were mainly 
in the senior membership of the Meşihat, and the ulema who had newly become 
members of the Cemiyet. The second group comprised of those either agitated by the 
direct policies of the CUP such as the softas from the medressas, or hocas of a 
conservative disposition who were convinced that the new government was indeed 
attempting to tarnish Islam and the Sharia. It was the second group that the 
Muhammadan Union was able to appeal to as the softas showed some level of 
frustration towards the state and the ulema associated with it. The ulema that 
functioned as state-actors were well aware of the complex political situation at hand, 
as they worked with the new CUP government to reconstruct the new order. There is 
no doubting that this relationship was a difficult one, but nonetheless, the ulema in 
the state upheld the authority of the state to implement their agenda of maintaining 
influence and the application of Islam. The positions on the ground however, where 
mainly of the ulema that were not part of the state structure and thus chose protest to 
have their voices heard. This was basically a distinction between the haves and the 
haves not, as the ulema of the state structure appealed to the ulema on the ground, 
many of whom would have been their students and colleagues to trust in their 
position in government. There is also no doubting that opinions and positions 
changed as the events unfolded, where some members of the ulema may have 
supported the critique presented by the Union initially, then however distanced 
themselves from the Union once the protestations transformed into violence. The 
Union itself attempted to distant itself from the ‘reactionaries’ but so engrained was 
the Union’s attack on the CUP and open protestation and support for the 
disenfranchised softa and solider, that when state recrimination proceeded the 
Muhammadan Union and its mouthpiece the Volkan press were considered as major 
agitators towards the state, a charge where only a extreme punishment was likely.  
It is easy to see why the softas were drawn to the Volkan press and the 
Muhammadan Union. The Volkan’s complaints stressed that by reducing the number 




needed to uphold the religion and social fabric of society, this was a point many 
ulema also supported. In February and March of 1909/1327 the first protests of Sharia 
students was felt in the capital, where the students surrounded the Chamber and 
demanded for the Sharia. The CUP in response presented the protests as reactionary, 
and supporters of absolutism.653 The Volkan had responded that Islam should not be 
equated to fanaticism, and had never been against progress.654 This was an important 
point as the Volkan press was situating the common argument of Islam and progress 
being compatible, and that they too were adherents to such. The Volkan continued 
that all that was needed was to revert back to the origins of Islam, and that the use of 
[only] European technology (not ideas), together with Islam, this would return the 
grandeur of Islam.655  
Mustafa Sabri later stressed that he took exception that the ulema and the 
medressa students were being called reactionaries. 656  Hoca Ahmed Rasim Avni 
would later explain when giving his thoughts and accounts on the revolt by saying 
that the term irtica (reaction) was being used as a stick to whip people into shape and 
in fact many simply spoke about the 31st March incident as an event, it was the CUP 
who had called it a irtica.657 Said Nursi also explained by saying that he had observed 
the events and at the time there were indeed patriotic devotees calling for a better 
alignment between the Sharia and the Constitution on a clearer line of justice. But 
then people who couldn’t distinguish between their right or left started “shouting like 
parrots” that they demanded the Sharia, as a result the objective had now been lost or 
even blurred with the demands to the chants of the populists on the streets. Nursi goes 
further by suggesting that he felt that there were agitators among the crowds, who 
wished revolt. 658 It is very possible that the likes of Sabri and Nursi were attempting 
to absolve themselves from blame, but it is also worth investigating not only the 
ulema’s claim that it was they who had continued to support the constitution, 
appeased the crowds, and explained that the revolt and those involved had been 
unfairly misunderstood but also that the revolt was agitated by ‘outside’ forces as this 
was a claim repeated by ulema.659   
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The Volkan was well aware of the labels of fanaticism and reaction to 
progress was being aimed at the conservative Muslim elements in Ottoman 
society.660 This was a failure of the Unionists, who gave much press space to the likes 
of Hüseyin Cahid. By doing so the CUP rather than listening to the demands of the 
populist rumblings, instead marginalised a rather large segment of society in the 
capital, it would then come as no surprise that the CUP were unable to deal with the 
events that transpired on the 31st of March, it also goes some way of explaining how 
the CUP themselves missed the complexities of the disenfranchised, and instead 
viewed the problems as binary with themselves as the bastions of the revolution and 
those in opposition as reactionaries.  
The Volkan managed to mobilise the softas and hocas and had a willing 
audience within the medressa. Their activities not only undermined the CUP’s 
authority but also the ulema that were in the state apparatus. When the Muhammadan 
Union was implicated as one of the main actors of instigating the revolt, the ulema 
especially in Istanbul were put in a precarious position. Dağıstânî and Nursi were 
contributors in the Volkan, or at least had works serialised in it and would get arrested 
due to this affiliation, Hoca Ahmed Rasim Avni would also be trailed and sent into 
exile for simply being in the parliament building and being asked to present the 
demands of the mutineers.  Ālim Adanalı Hayret was an earlier contributor for the 
Beyan’ül-Hak and was also arrested and sent into exile as he had written showing 
sympathy towards the conditions of the softas in his new journal El Islam. 661 
Whereas many ulema may not have been active writers for the Volkan or members of 
the Muhammadan Union nonetheless, ulema in Istanbul were still viewed with some 
suspicion once the CUP purges took place. During the outbreak the leaders of the 
Muhammadan Union would try to distance themselves from the mutineers, while the 
Cemiyet would make a clear statement deploring the actions of the mutineers. It was 
the first time in the Second Constitutional Period where the ulema would be drawn 
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into Muslim contestations over authority. It was clear that Muslim unity was just as 
difficult to maintain than unity between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
Initially the ulema of Istanbul failed to consider the Muhammadan Union a 
threat in the manner presented by CUP, as many members of the ulema understood 
the frustrations on the streets of Istanbul. The ulema held a rather passive position to 
the criticism culture aimed at the CUP as they themselves were increasingly 
becoming frustrated by the CUP and felt that the CUP authority was stifling the very 
thing they had promised – freedom. Said Nursi who had supported the CUP during its 
constitutionalist activity in Salonika would later be arrested and trailed due to his 
association with Hafiz Derviş Vahdeti. Nursi’s affiliation was not simply with the 
Volkan press as he wrote in other journals, including Mizan and Serbesti. However, 
any affiliation with the Union or Volkan press were presented in negative terms. After 
the All Action Army crushed the mutiny the sensitivity of the ulema’s position can be 
seen when the Beyan’ül-Hak suspended publications for a few months while the 
Sırâtımüstakīm did the same for a week or two as a gesture of their support to the 
government as the ulema in Istanbul regrouped. Mustafa Sabri, would later present a 
scathing attack on the events of 1909/1327, as many ulema vented their frustration at 
the softas on the street. In total 237 people were executed by the state, many of whom 
were softas. 662  It must not be missed that governmental retribution towards the 
mutineers had hit the two most dominant institutions in the devlet - the military and 
ulema. The impact of the retribution would leave a lasting legacy of CUP reign 
during this period.   
Hafiz Derviş Vahdeti became the major scapegoat as the leader of the 
Muhammadan Union even though he stressed much that he had no involvement in the 
incident. Derviş Vahdeti continues to this day to be an unknown quantity as he is 
presented as the protagonist of the reactionary activity of the Muhammadan Union. 
During the environment of agitation, much of the animosity was created due to the 
bitter and at times excessive war of words between the newspapers, especially 
Vahdeti and Hüseyin Cahid, editor of the Tanin. The struggle between Vahdeti and 
Cahid is worthy of note as the mutineers were after Cahid’s blood due to the 
depiction of Cahid in the oppositional press. Cahid became a representative of the 
views of the CUP even though his views probably were not, and he along with his 
battle with oppositional activists such as Vahdeti and other members of the ulema 
                                                        




confirmed the tense environment in the capital. Opposition to Cahid would create a 
problem as along with Vahdeti the ulema also viewed Cahid as a scion towards Islam 
as any opponent of the CUP could be viewed with suspicion. The relationship 
between Cahid and the ulema was expressed by one British journalist who was 
willing to express that it was in fact the ulema that were the men of toleration. The 
article said: 
 
During the parliamentary elections there presented himself for election a Turkish journalist, Hussein 
Djahid Bey, who took no pains to conceal his hatred for the Greeks and his conviction that the Turk 
must remain top dog in the Ottoman Empire. Had this man the support of the mullahs? On the 
contrary, he was strongly opposed by them.  
“The entry of such a fanatic into Parliament,” said one Mohammaedan ecclesiastic, “would be a 
calamity for the county”. 
Djahid Bey was elected, it is true, though by a very narrow majority, but he has now become a much 
more moderate man…….He has learned his first lesson in toleration and true liberalism from a 
Mohammedan mullah and a Mohammedan electorate.663 
 
When the unrest took place in Istanbul, Ahmed Rıza and Hüseyin Cahid were 
presented as the main figures for religious agitation. Rıza was the symbolic leader of 
the CUP, although much of his role was increasingly becoming nominal but 
nonetheless in 1909/1327 he was still a symbolic figure within the CUP ranks. His 
passive inactivity towards the more radical elements in the CUP left him culpable in 
the eyes of the opposition. Hüseyin Cahid on the other hand was far more aggressive 
in his protestation towards religion, the ulema and the average layman. His attitude 
was not only inflammatory towards the religious class however, he was also critical 
of the non-Turks in Ottoman society, in particular the Greeks. If the new found 
freedom had given the religious class the opportunity to express its voice, it had also 
provided Cahid with the platform to ridicule the men of religion in the mot 
contemptuous ways. Cahid and his follower’s role should not be understated in the 
unrest that transpired in the capital, as the mutineers where after his blood more than 
anyone as he became the symbol of the anti-religious element within the CUP, which 
was much of his own doing.  
 
                                                        




The Counter-revolution Begins 
 
The Counter-revolution which lasted for nine days would become the catalyst of the 
start of the strain in relationship between the CUP and the state ulema. Although the 
incident was a culmination of the frustration of the previous six months, it 
nonetheless took everyone by surprise. As the streets of Istanbul descended into 
chaos, the CUP withdrew from visibility, especially after the killing of the deputy of 
Lattakia with the mutineers thinking he was Hüseyin Cahit. News of the events 
travelled to other parts of the Ottoman provinces as supporters of the new regime 
were shocked as oppositional actors used the chaos as an opportunity to reassert their 
diminishing authority after the elections.  
Incidents were not restricted to Istanbul, as agitation between Muslims and 
Armenians in Adana led to massacres, increased agitation in Biregik, Diyabekir, and 
Damascus led to appeals by the Şeyhülislâm to asked the ulema to address and plea 
for calm in the provinces. 664  Some actors affected by CUP reprisals used 
opportunities to punish the new government by facilitating discontent towards the 
new government in other provinces of the devlet. In October 1908/1326 and then 
again in April 1909 oppositional factions in Damascus had attacked groups and 
people who supported the local CUP.665 In the Balkans the CUP had very early on 
attempted to dismantle authorities that were deemed hostile to the new regime, as 
governors were often replaced by CUP loyalists or military men.666 Death threats 
were used to curtail resistence and the Counter-Revolution was used as an 
opportunity to use security to curtail freedom. 667 The CUP was still weak in large 
parts of the Ottoman domains and their zeal had upset much of the stability achieved 
during the Hamidian period, and the nature of replacements of some of the officials in 
the provinces was a painful process, that left much distaste as it created at times 
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ruptures in established local political cultures. 668  The Hamidian state was a 
pragmatic one, the new regime, with its valour of idealism was at times haphazard in 
its interaction in more politically conservative areas. Feroz Ahmad noted in his study 
of the CUP that it took several years before the CUP consolidated its authority 
throughout the devlet. Ahmad continued that the CUP’s authority in this period was 
more illusionary than an actual point of strength.669  
As the crowds gathered, the confusion in the commanding ranks was clear to 
witness. On the 29th of March, the commander of the army issued condemnations of 
the Muhammad Union and warned the rank and file against joining it. Such was the 
confusion that the ulema complained that the officers were being mentally prepared 
to kill members of the ulema on orders. 670 Instead of turning to the Şeyhülislâm and 
the ulema of the Cemiyet to counter the reactionary agitations of the soldiers and 
softas, the army unable to make distinction on the ground viewed the ulema with 
suspicion. General Mahmud Muktar Pasha, the Commander-in-chief of the garrisons 
in Istanbul is said to have issued to the troops a general order forbidding any member 
of the ulema from entering the military barrack, and he also forbade his soldiers from 
associating with the ulema. This rash action however, simply raised further outcry 
and was consequently withdrawn immediately. 671  At the public square the most 
prominent people visible from the several groups were thousands of religious 
teachers, students and lower-ranking imams and preachers. It showed the confusion 
on the ground as both military personnel and ulema were unable to determine who to 
trust, as the ulema felt the insurrection was military led and the army thinking it was 
instigated by the ulema and their religious fanaticism. 
The newly appointed Şeyhülislâm Ziyâeddin Efendi had entered the Ministry 
of Sulaymaniyya gates in Istanbul with the objective of calming the insurgents by his 
exhortations; the fetva-emini Nuri Efendi was also at the scene trying to calm the 
situation. Ali Cevdat Bey described that “the Şeyhülislâm and I went out but there 
was no place where we could be seen above the crowd. A couple of chairs were 
passed hand in hand from a nearby coffeehouse. We placed them side by side next to 
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a lamp post and got on them.”672 The Şeyhülislâm harangued the soldiers that the 
Sharia was permanent and the Sultan was Caliph. He urged them not to listen to those 
who were diverting them.673  A delegation of ulema at an instant advanced in the 
direction of the crowds that they would quieten the public so that no bloodshed would 
take place. All the military and the cabinet could do was wait and hope that the ulema 
could subdue the mutineers. The cabinet had been criticised for its tepid response but 
it was bloodshed and further chaos that everyone feared. A western observer’s 
account of the time explained what the ulema did.  
 
When we were at Monastir we saw the assassins of our relatives walking about unmolested. We put up 
with all this as the Absolutist regime prevented us from doing anything to remedy it. Our officers said 
to us : ' Absolutism will disappear. The Sheriat will be applied and all the commands of the Sacred 
Book will be executed.' We listened to them and thus it came to pass that we established, at the risk of 
our lives, the Constitutional regime. But to-day we see that the Sheriat is far from being carried out. 
People are killed and the murderers are concealed." This was a reference to the murder of the Serbesti 
editor. " Where is the Sheriat ? Why don't they discover the murderer and execute him ? Does not the 
Koran ordain the punishment of death in such a case ? It is, then, the Sheriat and justice that we ask for 
to-day. If we must stay here a month in order to see the Sheriat applied, we will stay. We have enough 
money to buy food for ourselves "—(here the orator drew from his pocket a handful of gold pieces 
which, with all due respect to him, I don't think he managed to save out of his pay, while another 
soldier remarked with conviction that " Our good father will not let us go hungry ")—'* we are ready 
to sacrifice our lives for the Sheriat and for justice." Meanwhile, however, the soldiers cheered for the 
Constitution, and cries of " Yashassin Millet .' " (** Long live the Nation ! ") were sometimes heard 
amid cries of " Yashassin Sheriat Peicamberi ! " (" Long live the Law of the Prophet! ") and " Sheriat 
Isteriz !" ("We want the Sheriat ! ") 674 
 
Francis McCullagh explains: 
 
Not only were the ecclesiastics (rendered conspicuous by their turbans and their flowing robes) 
numerous in the Square itself, but a turbaned head seemed to project out of almost every one of the 
innumerable little windows in the medresseh or ancient theological colleges attached to S. Sophia's. 
The great bulk of the ecclesiastics present had joined the troops in the Square towards 1 p.m. and their 
entry had been one of the most dramatic events of the day. First a single trumpet sounded, then began 
the solemn march of the ulemas, who, starting from the neighbourhood of Sultan Mahmuds tomb, 
slowly directed their steps towards the mosque of S. Sophia. They marched in a close column, their 
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attitude was imposing, as befitted that of religious chiefs, and they were escorted by troops who paid 
them the greatest reverence. On the outskirts of S. Sophia's Square another trumpet sounded, 
whereupon the mutineers prepared to receive the ulemas, who now advanced chanting sacred hymns 
and followed by the students of the medresseh Bayazid and of several other institutions where 
Mussulman theology is taught. Most of these ulemas seemed to have come in order to persuade the 
soldiers to refrain from murder and pillage (at least they said so themselves after Shefket Pasha had 
captured the city). But being at the time under the impression that they had joined the reactionaries.675 
 
With the crowds still remaining in the streets of Istanbul the Cemiyet issued a 
statement affirming that the constitutional government was in line with the precepts 
of the Sharia.676 The ulema stressed on heeding the advice of the competent ulema 
and pointed to the deputies in Parliament to continue with their task. In a further 
manifesto published the next day the Ulema criticised the Volkan's statement that it 
was 'within the authority of the Sultan to close Parliament today or abrogate the 
Constitution'.677 The ulema accepted that indeed the decrees of the Sultan as Caliph 
were to be obeyed but that these rules should not be contrary to the Sharia, and that to 
abrogate the constitution was contrary to the Sharia.678 The ulema of the Cemiyet had 
at this point clearly distanced themselves from the Muhammadan Union and its 
position, and secondly insisted that the constitution was above the prerogatives of the 
Caliph. By stressing that the abrogation of the constitution was against the Sharia the 
ulema had made clear that the constitution was never to be abrogated, unlike 
1876/1293. On April 17 the Cemiyet made heir first declaration: 
We are informed that certain deputies, fearing for their lives, wish to resign, while on the other hand, 
the public fears the return of despotic rule. The committee of the Ulema, which has never doubted that 
the constitution is in entire conformity with the sacred law, and has not forgotten the burning of 
Islamic books at the Gülhane in the days of absolutism, will defend the Constitution, which is in 
conformity with the Sheriat, to the last, aided by the army and Parliament. Its members confidence of 
the Deputies, Moslem and non-Moslem alike, save such as have resigned of have fled , and are thereby 
considered to have resigned. Deputies, therefore, are informed that henceforth those who resigned will 
be considered traitors. Let them do their duty justly and honourably, and they may be sure of the 
support of the nation and the spiritual aid of the Prophet. We beg the glorious army to maintain order 
and discipline, following the counsels of the Ulema, for the country and happiness in this world and 
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It is worth of note how the idea of the burning of religious books is mentioned in the 
first decleration of the Cemiyet. Ahmet Midhat also criticised the burning of books in 
which he said; “Even religious books were not spared, the cruelty of the old regime! 
A lot of books like Mülteka (Fiqh books, mainly Hanafi) were banned or not given 
permission to be re-printed and the exisiting copies were collected. It was obvious 
that cruelty does not last forever and the regime would collapse”. While the point of 
book burning may seem trivial, its importance is that this complain appears in the hal 
fetvası to remove Sultan Abdülühamid II.680      
 In a manifesto issued by the Cemiyet in Edirne on April 17, the Cemiyet said 
that the consultation (Meşveret) was the right of the Muslim Community vis-a'-vis its 
government. The depraved actions of the soldiery in Istanbul, aided by the Sultan's 
spies disguised as ulema, had caused Istanbul to be turned into a 'second Kerbela'. 681  
The idea of the spies disguised as ulema would also be mentioned again in Hamdi 
Yazır’s accounts in the commotion that occurred in the parliament. On April 18 the 
Cemiyet, at the request of the All Action Army attempted to speak to the soldiers to 
put an end to the revolt and made a second declaration: 
... Our country has been greatly weakened by the severe illness of the period of tyranny. Now, in the 
present situation, when the sick man is practically dying, you must not disturb him while using the 
most sanctified words.... Let us display the ability and strength to entrench the position of the Şeriat 
when the Homeland reaches a safe haven. Indeed, without upholding the Şeriat it is impossible to 
reach such a haven.... Hence if you want Şeriat, that is a good thing. We want the same thing as you: 
why else do we toil day and night? Why did we spend our lives in medreses? Have we not made great 
efforts to enhance the standing of religion and defend it since the emancipation from oppression? Have 
you not seen the campaign that our paper Beyan’ül-Hak is waging? O God, did the Ulema ever venture 
to publish a newspaper in the period of oppression? . .682 
In a manifesto published on April 20 the Cemiyet openly called for the banning of the 
Society for Muhammedan Union, since it had arrogated to itself a task with which it 
had not been charged, namely, the defense of the Sharia. The ulema forbade the 
reading of Volkan. Two days later on April 20th the Cemiyet once again openly called 
for the banning of the Muhammadan Union. The Cemiyet in its manifesto had staked 
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the claim that it was the guardians of the Sharia, the fact that the Muhammadan 
Union made the claim also naturally created a clash.683 For the ulema it was only they 
who could indulge in matters of the law. But whether the Union implied the law or 
simply the idea of the Sharia as a value system is hard to distinguish. But the Cemiyet 
was unwilling to allow anyone outside the ulema ranks to make such a claim as they 
also forbade the reading of the Volkan. The Cemiyet had clearly staked their position. 
The Cemiyet with Mustafa Sabri as its figurehead clearly distanced themselves from 
the Union and from this moment onwards their criticism of Sultan Abdülhamid 
increased.  
 
The Chaos in Parliament Building 
 
While on the streets of Istanbul the ulema were working effortlessly to defuse the 
situation which had created much chaos, a second important event was taking place 
within the parliamentary building. Many of the parliamentarians had fled, especially 
the members of the CUP, with Hüseyin Cahit and Ahmed Rıza, singled out by the 
mutineers. As the Şeyhülislâm Ziyâeddin Efendi had ordered the ulema to pacify the 
crowd he along with other members of the ulema were to deal with a group of 
mutineers who had stormed the parliament building taking their demands to the 
Şeyhülislâm to relay to the cabinet and Sultan. The situation like the streets was 
covered in confusion as Hamdi Yazır another key member of the Cemiyet and 
parliamentarian relayed his accounts in the Beyan’ül-Hak regarding the events in the 
parliament building. Hamdi Yazır explained that the ulema were invited to the 
parliament building to ask the soldiers what their demands were. The ulema who 
totaled about 80 were on one side of the building and the MP’s on the other. It was 
felt that the soldiers would not attack the ulema and that they were the brokers of 
choice.684 However as Hamdi Yazır explains the ulema themselves were unsure what 
the soldiers were going to do as many of the ulema were in a state of fear.685 There 
was an element of surprise by the MP’s and soldiers of the ulema’s presence in 
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parliament, as the ulema themselves were confused on their invitation to the 
parliament as confusion and mistrust was set into the minds of everyone. Some 
members asked whether they should do nothing, as discussions were taking place on 
the next course of action. Hamdi Yazır stressed that the ulema were not at the 
parliament in opposition of the assembly but simply to calm the soldiers and hear 
their demands.686     
The ālim Rasim Efendi was asked to state the claims of the mutineers. There 
was a sense of confusion in the air, especially as Hamdi Yazır stressed that there were 
‘strangers’ in the building.687 Hamdi Yazır continued that the mutiny was in fact a 
coup attempt against the constitution, as it was stated that to not want the constitution 
is to not want Islam, a claim that resonated with the opinions of the CUP. According 
to Hamdi Yazır who was present, Rasim Efendi who had spoken on behalf of the 
mutineers, was not a member of the mutiny, but was trusted by the soldiers to put 
their claims across.688  But as frustration grew, even he was shouted over as the 
soldiers started to suspect everyone. One bearded soldier optimised the resentment 
created by the CUP’s reforms as he proclaimed “ many injustices have been enacted 
upon the soldiers after the constitutional revolution. Although I fought for the Sharia 
in wars, I have lost my position [as cadro]”.689      
 The Şeyhülislâm, and the ministers hurried to the parlaiment to learn of the 
demands, which were presented in five articles. The first, second, and fifth of these 
asked for the resignations of Minister of War Rıza Pasha and Prime Minister Hilmi, 
which in effect meant the fall of the cabinet; the expulsion of five prominent Unionist 
statesmen and journalists (according to Volkan, these were Ahmed Rıza, Hüseyin 
Cahid, Rahmi Bey, Talat Bey, and Şakir Bey); and a guarantee of immunity from 
punishment and responsibility for the incident. The third demand which was 
restoration of Sharia, however it wasn’t mentioned what that entailed. The fourth 
asked for the banishment and change of their superior educated officers the 
reassignment of the fired ranker officers who were treated unjustly. Also heard were 
cries against the harsh new Prussian style of discipline and training, which had forced 
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soldiers to ignore the call for prayer and religious ablutions, time honored rites.690 
Not once were any of the demands of the mutineers against the constitution. It was 
clear that the mutineers were simply complaining about their conditions and 
treatment. One would have to conclude that the movement in actuality was never a 
movement that was anti-constitutional in any shape. Nor did the demands of the 
revolt resonate with some of the ideas that the Volkan press had been accused of. 
Instead the only thing that was linking the Volkan press with the mutineers was its 
anti-CUP stance and the demand for the Sharia. With justice being a slogan of 
religion, the mutineers were attaching their felt injustices to equate that religion was 
not being applied. Much of the ulema press had suggested that the new consultative 
government would equate to ‘justice’. Much of the literature also pointed to the 
justice emanating from the precepts of the religion. In this case, if people were feeling 
a sense of injustice, what was it that wasn’t being applied? Was it the constitution or 
the religion? With the constitution now firmly entrenched within Islamic discourse, 
the charge was that even though there was a constitution and that consultation was 
being applied, nonetheless, if it was unjust then surely that would suggest that there 
was an absence of the ethos of religion in the constitutional order. It was the return to 
this order that we see the appeal made. The soldiers’ demands were in actuality 
mobilised for the link between Islam and the constitution.     
After the arrival of the All Action Army to the imperial capital, the mutiny 
gradually defused its aggression as the stakes became high and no actor in actuality 
wanted civil unrest in the capital. The rebels had already conceded defeat and had 
somewhat surrendered once they were promised by both cabinet and the Sultan that 
their demands would be met. In particular, they were also promised that no reprisals 
against the mutineers would be made, however this promise was not to be fulfilled. 
Once the CUP returned with the knowledge that the support of the military and 
mainstream ulema was in support for the constitutional government and no change 
would be made regarding the dissolvent of parliament the CUP went on a campaign 
to arrest all those who had participated in the events. The writers of the Volkan were 
swiftly arrested, in which Derviş Vahdeti, Said Nursi and Ömer Ziyâeddin Dağıstânî 
were all arrested for hearing. It wasn’t simply members of the ulema aligned with the 
Muhammadan Union who were arrested, such was the environment that the policy 
was wide sweeping and members of the ulema were all viewed with the eye of 
                                                        




suspicion, such was the blurring of lines and more significantly CUP paranoia. More 
importantly a host of soldiers and softas were rounded up as many were either 
executed or sent into exile. Derviş Vahdeti was executed, even though he had 
continued to stress his innocence, while Nursi and Dağıstânî were freed, nonetheless, 
they were no longer to continue their political activity in Istanbul. In the provinces the 
government also presented a harsh tone, many of the rioters in the Adana province 
were also detained and executed including the hocas.691 In Damascus many members 
of the old ulema class were to face recriminations. The events in Istanbul caused the 
dissolution of the Muhammadan Union in Damascus, and its supporters became 
weakened as the leadership either withdrew from activity or were arrested. At the end 
of May the Union’s leadership in Damascus was also arrested and sent to Istanbul to 
have their day in court. In particular Salih al-Tunisi, an old supporter of the Sultan 
and Muhammadan Union fled after being arrested. The Muhammadan Union was no 
more in Damascus. 692        
 The incident didn’t leave anyone unscathed. Hoca Rasim Efendi who had 
become the unofficial spokeman for the mutineers was arrested for his part in the 
incident and sent into house arrest and exile. While he was probably caught up in the 
events, the CUP were unwilling to take any risks as many ulema were brought to the 
tribunal as much confusion continued. The term irtica became widespread as many 
were simply considered as reactionaries. It is from this position that much of the 
narrative has been presented. Rasim Efendi’s account is also worth of note. He 
explained that while the CUP was trying to blame everyone else, the religious, 
political and social conditions of the 31st March incident happened under the 
conditions of the Meşrutiyet. According to him this is why the CUP placed much 
emphasis on ‘irtica’. Thus the CUP needed to be vindicated condemning any 
opposoition as reactionary, especially citing that this was a return to Hamidian 
istibdaat. Hoca Rasim Efendi also provides insight into his court proceedings and 
how Mûsa Kâzim’s testimony to some effect saved him. But he didn’t hesitate to 
criticise Mûsa Kâzim as it becomes clear in his writings the strain the events had 
placed upon unity within the ulema ranks.      
 Hoca Rasim Efendi writes that while being interogated in court Mûsa Kâzim 
had told the authorities he was a friend. Mûsa Kâzim continued that Hoca Ahmed 
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Efendi was a hero of the 31st March incident of which Hoca Rasim Efendi was 
grateful. But he also had words of criticism for Mûsa Kâzim as he couldn’t 
understand why he had remained silent on many occasions and was particularly 
frustrated that Mûsa Kâzim called the events an irtica. He felt only in the eyes of the 
CUP were the events an irtica.693        
 His attack on the CUP was the most stinging in which he says that the CUP 
acted illegally out of the three branches of the state and that their acts and actions 
could not be scrutinised or criticised, as they changed the way the state was being 
managed. He stressed that the CUP brought an oligarchy to the Meşrutiyet. He 
continued that when the soldiers came to him complaining about not being able to 
pray and that training was prayer he gave his infamous speech in defence of the 
soldiers hwo were complaining as he argued it was this that forced him to ask what 
was happening regarding the Meşrutiyet.694       
  The All Action Army had consolidated order, but the environment continued 
to be tense and the ulema, fearing of further recriminations were caught up in a 
reactionary campaign of a sorts of the CUP as no ālim felt safe in the streets of the 
capital. In order to pacify aggression towards the ulema, many ulema withdrew their 
visibility once more from the activism of the last seven to eight months. The 
Beyan’ül-Hak stopped publishing so that the ulema could consolidate and the 
government could appreciate that the ulema were not behind the events. So frustrated 
had the ulema of seniority become by the events that their opinions of the mutineers 
had become extremely harsh. The CUP on the other hand felt that reprisals were 
indeed necessary. If the events had proven anything it was that the CUP had still not 
consolidated authority. It is indeed true they had become the most dominant and 
organised faction during the last eight months, but nonetheless, this dominance was 
simply based on the weakness of other political factions to deal with the new political 
environment as many actors were still coming to terms with the new political culture. 
Not only this, many actors who held views contrary to the CUP had also joined the 
CUP ticket as that was the only viable option of the time. Many members of the 
ulema, especially those who were members of the Cemiyet and had become elected 
parliamentarians had also been elected as CUP members. This alliance was not out of 
some strong conviction, but rather an alignment of necessity and reality that was soon 
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to change after the events of the Counter-revolution. If July 1908/1326 had re-
orientated networks and factions to come together for a common cause, 1909/1327 
would once against re-orientate newer political relationships as the ulema and CUP’s 
relationship not only in the capital but also in the provinces started to become 
strained.           
 For the CUP the prosecutions were deemed necessary if they were to be 
perceived as a viable authority. But the executions and mass exile had left a bitter 
taste in the mouths of many. The CUP were worried about continual contestation of 
their authority, more importantly never again could they allow such a scenario to take 
place. Thus in the coming months the CUP would pass laws that would curtail the 
new found press freedom, the opportunity to strike or protest. The Sublime Porte was 
weakened, as Kamil Pasha’s faction was marginalised along with the Liberal Entente. 
It was simply a matter of time that the Sultan himself was now to become the next 
victim, as although it was accepted that the Sultan was not the originator of the revolt 
nonetheless he was a symbol of it. 695 
 
The Sultan Deposed 
 
According to a British report a publication by a Mustafa Âsım in the Hilal newspaper 
would make the claim that the Sultan was no longer fit to lead the devlet.696 It had 
been argued earlier that the constitutional regime was not against the Sultan and that 
these were simply rumours to weaken the constitutional cause. Rumours they may 
have been, but there was merit in this fear as many CUP members had voiced opinion 
in the Western press and to the British of wanting to remove the Sultan. As the events 
of April had drawn to an end, the emotion was still rife, and the Hilal newspaper 
article provided Quranic evidence to suggest that ‘His Imperial Majesty had never 
been Caliph of the Faithful.’697 So aggressive and forceful was the language that the 
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writing was on the wall and the fait of the pious Sultan was probably sealed. The 
British ambassador had noted the events such: 
 
An anonymous but very significant paper appeared to-day quoting portions of the Coran against the 
Sultan’s claim to the Caliphate saying that prayers for him cannot be offered by any Moslem. It is 
inferred by some from this that at Friday’s prayers there may be objections to mentioning the Sultan’s 
name. The paper in question is supposed to emanate from a khodja member of the Committee and 
Parliament.698 
 
As both chambers met there was much accusation against the Sultan as the President 
appealed to the Assembly to adhere to the religious and civil law. The arguments 
presented against the Sultan were as follows.  
 
1. That His Majesty had withdrawn an immense sum of money from Europe 
only a few days previously, suggesting that the Sultan had paid the mutineers.  
2. That the revolted soldiers were notoriously well supported with money, and 
3. That no authority but his could have sufficed to restrain the troops, who were 
for two days absolute masters of the town, from committing all kinds of 
excess. 699 
 
The only way to depose the sultan was with a signed fetva by the Şeyhülislâm, 
Ziyâeddin Efendi who had been only Şeyhülislâm for six months. He was personally 
recommended on a three-man shortlist by the outgoing Şeyhülislâm Cemaleddin 
Efendi. It could have been for this reason that Ziyâeddin Efendi received much 
critique in parliament regarding the corruption of the office of Meşihat.700  It was 
widely accepted that the Şeyhülislâm was a good man. However, in his six months he 
became exposed to the culture of parliament and the critique of his position, the 
Counter-revolution and then the matter of deposing Sultan Abdülhamid.  It would 
have been unthinkable for the generation of ulema who were senior statesmen to 
move to depose the pious Sultan of the last three decades. Indications were already in 
the air that preperations were being made to depose the Sultan. First Sahib Molla a 
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deputy and ālim presented to the President of the National Assembly the draft of a 
legal question concerning the deposition of the Sultan.701 A great deal of pressure 
was first placed on Nuri Efendi to construct a state fetva, but he protested, claiming to 
be sick, and then he outright refused to do so. Nuri Efendi had been the fetva-emini 
who had rejected the Sultan’s appeal to crush the rebellion in the Macedonian 
provinces; it was a reflection of his independence that also resisted the CUP and the 
Cemiyet to simply oblige to their overtures. Talat Bey along with Mustafa Âsım and 
Hamdi Yazır visited Nuri Efendi and insisted that Nuri comply, instead Nuri Efendi 
rather claimed that this was the job of the Şeyhülislâm. Finally, in a last ditch effort, 
Nuri Efendi resigned from his position, thereby preventing anyone from drawing up a 
fetva and presenting it to the Şeyhülislâm. Hamdi Yazır asked Nuri Efendi what he 
would do if an ordinary Muslim came up to him and asked him if it would be legally 
permissible to depose the sultan, not asking him in his capacity as fetva-emini, but as 
a famous member of the Ottoman ulema. At this point, Nuri Efendi continued to 
protest, but it was clear that Hamdi Yazır had won Nuri Efendi over with skill of the 
juristic culture: the fetva-emini could not prevent a Muslim from seeking a fetva from 
the Şeyhülislâm  regardless of its contents.702 It seems however that the Şeyhülislâm 
was still reluctant to pen the fetva.703 Nonetheless, with the pressure from Talat Bey 
and the insistence of Hamdi Efendi the Şeyhülislâm and Nuri Efendi knew this was a 
struggle they were not going to win. The members of the CUP, Talat Bey and ulema 
of the Cemiyet, Hamdi Yazır and Mustafa Âsım, reflected the change of guard in 
authority. The seniority of the Şeyhülislâm and fetva-emini was now to be curtailed 
by the new power brokers of the ulema class, the Cemiyet. Along with Mustafa Sabri 
Efendi, Hamdi Yazır and Mustafa Âsım all graduates of the Fatih medressa network, 
were about to become key to the constitutional amendments after the deposition. 
Ziyâeddin exhausted and probably mentally traumatised would later step down, to be 
replaced by pro-constitutionalists Molla Sahib Efendi and then CUP loyalist Mûsa 
Kâzım Efendi as the new Şeyhülislâm. One of Molla Sahib Efendi’s first jobs was to 
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prepare for distribution in every town and village of the devlet a manifesto 
demonstrating from the Quran and from the traditions that it was a duty for all good 
Muslims to treat Christians with justice, and regard them as fellow citizens with equal 
rights.704 A new era of state bureaucracy was about to enfold, but a new era of state-
ulema relations was also to transpire also as the Cemiyet became the go to group for 
the Islamic matters pertaining to constitutionalism.     
 Prior to the opening of the session the religious and political officials met at 
the office of the President of the Chamber to prepare a draft. The Şeyhülislâm, Nuri 
Efendi, Mustafa Âsım and Hamdi Yazır, along with the Grand Vizier and the 
President of the Senate were all in attendance. The draft stated that according to 
traditional Islamic usage the decision by the ahl al-ḥall wa’l-‘aqd (the people with the 
power to loosen and bind) the Sultan was deposed. Nuri Efendi however, took 
exception to the outright deposition of the Sultan. 705  It was clear that Sultan 
Abdülhamid still maintained much respect among the seniority of the Ottoman 
political and religious class. It goes some way of explaining that irrespective of the 
critique that he was facing, his person still was surrounded by an aura of inviolability. 
After Nuri Efendi’s protestation a new fetva was drafted which provided the choice of 
deposition or abdication and left the final decision to the Grand National Assembly. 
Along with the phrase, “the people that loosen and bind” the qualifier, “and the 
administrators of public affairs” was added to the final version of the fetva thus 
empowering the parliament as the institution of the ahl al-ḥall wa’l-‘aqd. 706 The 
fetva was written as such: 
Question: If Zeid707, an Imam of the Moslems , removes and causes to be removed from a book of the 
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Sheriat certain questions of the law of the Sheriat, and prevents the circulation of the aforesaid book 
and causes it to be burned and destroyed by fire; 
And if, after, slaying and imprisoning the persons of his subjects without legal cause, and after having 
exiled them and committed other acts of injustice, he swears and takes an engagement to return to the 
way of peace, but nevertheless perjures himself; 
And if he causes bloodshed, and the Moslems succeed in destroying the despotism of the said Zeid, 
and from many regions of Islam come tidings that they consider him dispossessed of the Throne, and it 
be proved that his existence as Imam is harmful, while the country will gain peace and concern by his 
deposition; 
And if, in consequences, those in whose hands is the power to bind and to loose and those in whose 
hands is public affairs consider it preferably to propose that the said Zeid abdicate the Throne and the 
Khalifate, or if they decide to dethrone him; 
May they put into practice one of these two alternatives? 
Answer--- Olur (It is permitted) 
Written by the humble Syed Mahomed Zia-ed-Din, God be gracious unto him.”708 709 
The fetva was provided but now Talat Bey took the fetva as one final last act to the 
National Assembly. When the preposition was put forward to the house of the choices 
to allow the Sultan to abdicate or for Parliament to depose him, there was a chorus 
amongst some who chanted in chorus “depose, depose!”.710 However the role of the 
ulema was unclear and many either supporters of the Sultan or in respect of him as 
Caliph remained silent. Talat Bey then suggested that those in favour to stand. 
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Beyan’ül-Hak even though the Cemiyet had endorsed it due to the fact that the Beyan’ül-Hak had 
stopped publishing for two months due to the controversy surrounding the 31st March incident. The 
fetva read. But it is worth of note that the Cemiyet members were behind its writing.  
ABDÜLHAMÎD-İ SANÎ’NİN HAL’İNE DAİR, TARAF-I MEŞÎHAT-I CELÎLEDEN VERİLEN, FETVA-YI 
ŞERÎFENİN SURETİDİR: 
Imâm-ı müslimîn olan Zeyd  ba’z-ı mesâ’il- imühimme- işer’iyyeyikütüb-işer’iyyeden tayy ü ihrâc 
ve kütüb-i mezkûreyimen ’ ve hark u ihrâk ve Beytü’l- mâldeteb –zîr ve isrâfla mesûg-ı ser’î hilâfında 
tasarruf ve bilâ sebeb-i §er’î katl ü habs ve tağrîb-i ra’iyye vesâ’ir gûne mezâlimi i’tiyâd eyledikden 
sonar salâha rucû ’ etmek üzere ahd ü kasemetmişken yemîninde hânis olarak ahvâl ve umûr-ı 
müslimîni bi’l- külliyye muhtell kılacak fitne-i azî-me ihdâsında ısrâr  ve mukatele îka ’ etmekle 
mene’a –i müslimîn Zeyd-i mezbûrun tegallübünü izâle etdiklerinde bilâd-ı Islâmiyye ’nin cevânib-i 
kesîresinden mezbûru mahlû ’ tanıdıklarına dâir ihbâr-ı mütevâliyye vürûd edip mezbûrun bekasında 
zarar muhakkak ve zevâlinde salâh melhûz olmağın Zeyd -i mezbûra imâmet ve saltanatdan ferâgat 
teklîf  etmek veya hal’ eylemek sûretler inden hangisi erbâb-ı hall ü akd ve evliyâ -yı umûr tarafından 
ercah görülürse icrâsı vâcib olur mu ? 
el- Cevâb : Olur .--- Ketebehu ’l-fakir es-Seyyid Mehmed Ziyâeddîn- ufiye anhu 
 




However both members of the Meclis-Ayan and many members of the ulema 
remained seated. It is said that when Talat showed the assembly the fetva a number of 
the ulema remained seated, so Talat directed an indignant and direct glance in their 
direction and they stood up. He did the same to the Senators and they too arose. The 
consensus was reached, with a little persuasion, but with the assistance of the 
Cemiyet, and coercion of the Meşihat the Sultan was deposed, as a delegation of four, 
two non-Muslims and none from the ulema class told the Sultan the news of his 
fate.711 The new Sultan and Caliph was sworn in by the Şeyhülislâm as a new dawn 
of politics had began.         
 The full fetva that was read to the assembly and was also published on May 
9th for the Ottoman public in the Sırâtımüstakīm. The article constructed by the 
members of the Cemiyet published the fetva in the name of the Şeyhülislâm in the 
Sırâtımüstakīm. The journal would also go on to explain the need for the deposition 
and the events that followed during the incident. The article explained that during the 
fifteen days of the uprising that the Ottoman devlet during that moment had returned 
back to the period of İstabdat. The article argued that the ulema were indeed split 
with some supporting the mutineers and others clearly supporting the constitution. 
The critique was aimed at some of the ulema who were ignorant and demonstrated 
outside Hagia Sophia chanting that they wanted the Sharia (Şeriat isteriz!). However 
the journal gave special praise to the Cemiyet and the centrality of their action. The 
journal stated that when the army had not yet arrived the ulema’s [Cemiyet and ulema 
supporters of the constitution] action was instrumental. The journal recognized that 
the Cemiyet had published declarations, but it recognized that the ulema were 
divided.712 The journal had reflected the mood at the time, as it too harshly criticized 
the Muhammadan Union and the Sultan. It asked whether the Union were demanders 
of the Sharia or sarcastically wanted ‘Hamidian Sharia’ which they called ‘Sharia 
Hamidi’.713 The article continued that the Sharia had always been implemented and 
under the new constitutional governance it would flourish, but the Muhammadan 
Union wanted to return to despotism and the Sharia Hamidi. They were not 
demanding the true Sharia but the perceptions of the Sharia of the Hamidian period. It 
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was clear that the Sırâtımüstakīm was drawing a line between Hamidian İstibdaat and 
the Meşrutiyet. The article laid the ground to legitimize the purge of the ‘reactionary’ 
elements in Istanbul as they were supporters of the Hamidian, referenced as 
Hamidians. It was clear that in order to never allow such a situation to arise in the 
capital again both the support base of the Sultan and the Sultan needed removing. 
Much of the Ottoman popular press started to support the deposition of the Sultan. 
The al-Manar and al-Hilal journals in the Arab provinces approved of the fetva on 
the grounds that Abdülhamid had not ruled by the Sharia.714 Thus whether it were 
true or not, the Sultan’s days were numbered, and he himself would have recognised 
this. On April the 27th the political situation would reach its apex as the Sultan was 
dethroned. The central figures that day were the Şeyhülislâm, Ziyaeddîn Efendi, and 
the fetva emini the assistant to the Şeyhülislâm, Nuri Efendi. But the other key actors 
seem to be the representatives of the Cemiyet. The Cemiyet had managed to become a 
new force within the political and religious structure of the devlet and became central 
to all the events during the earlier period of the Second Constitutional Period. It was 
clear that throughout the Counter-revolution that the triumvirate of Mustafa Sabri, 
Mustafa Âsım and Hamdi Yazır had wielded much authority in the short period 
between the Revolution and Counter-revolution and in his opinion he probably 
thought the Counter-revolution was indeed an attempt to suspend the constitution. He 
would later argue that to contest the constitution was like a coup d’état, most likely 
being affected by the conditions of the Counter-revolution.715  As the main actors of 
the Cemiyet, parliamentarians and authors in their journal the Beyan’ül-Hak they 
would effectively use the new tools of the changing state apparatus. They became 
critical of the Sultan and in particular the Muhammadan Union and Volkan press and 
it was there support that allowed the CUP to recriminate the Sultan and the Union. 
They would now take centre stage from this moment onwards.  
From this moment onwards the CUP recognised the importance of the ulema 
and Islam. After the Counter-revolution, a trend of CUP politics recognised the 
importance of the mosques, and Muslim nature of the Ottoman domains which would 
have become ever more prominent during the Tanzimat and especially the Hamidian 
period. Around the Ottoman domains pledges of allegiance were given to the 
constitution and the Sharia, this was especially so in the Balkan provinces where the 
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Sharia’s compatability with the constitution especially as this language was cited 
during the inception of the Revolution of 1908/1326.716 The CUP had started to 





Most of the ulema had recognized that the Constitution of 1876/1293 was in fact 
politically conservative in nature. Although first initiated in 1876/1293 it could no 
longer cater for the new conditions of the devlet. The Muslim world as a whole had 
grown a consciousness that was no longer willing to adhere to authoritarian politics. 
The Constitution of 1876/1293 had provided a basis for authoritarian Sultanic 
authority and thus required some form of clarity and amendment. The constitution 
also needed to clarify the relationship between the Muslims and non-Muslims and the 
remit of the freedom the law was providing. The Constitution of 1876/1293 was 
indeed a conservative document, it was reflective of both the Tanzimat and Hamidian 
eras, even if the likes of Hamdi Yazır attempted to define the Hamidian as a break.717 
But by 1909/1327, both the world and the Ottoman devlet had changed considerably. 
The Şeyhülislâm Cemaleddin Efendi had earlier stressed in 1908/1326 that he 
believed the Constitution of 1876/1293 was a ‘sham’.718 The Sultan himself had 
continuously legitimized his actions based on the constitution, and that abrogating 
parliament was also his constitutional right. This was a prerogative supported by 
members of the ulema who were his supporters. The Sultan had understood the fine 
details and wasn’t incorrect in his claims as the document of 1876/1293 did indeed 
provide him with such powers.        
 As early as January 1909/Dhul-Hijjah 1326 the parliament had made it clear 
of its desire to see the constitutional regime evolve, thus the procedure for the 
revisions of the Ottoman Constitution had been initiated before the Counter-
revolution. In January the parliament asked Vitalis Ferarci Efendi to draft a report. 
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The report was accepted for the need for constitutional revisions, with a second report 
following on the 3rd of May 1909/Safar 11, 1327.719   
  It was clear that permitting absolute authority in the hands of one person – the 
Sultan, was not only arbitrary but it also restricted the sole objective of the 
consultative process invested in parliament, it also undermined the idea of basing 
governmental post on a merit-based system and instead continued to reflect a system 
of patronage that so many had come to despise. By the end of the Counter-revolution 
any doubts of constitutionalism were finally suppressed as the question no longer 
evolved around a discussion of the merits of the constitution, but rather what type of 
constitution. These discussions on the constitution would also lead to the questions 
surrounding the nature of the Caliphate and Islam as the Hamidian state had centred 
its policy towards Muslims in and outside the devlet. Susan Gunasti expressed that 
the Constitution of 1909/1327 was an ‘Islamicising’ of the constitution by adhering to 
increase Islamic precepts during its construction.720 Ileana Moroni explains that it 
should be noted that the revisions of 1909/1327 strengthened the Islamic character of 
the Ottoman state.721 It seems evident that the ulema who had managed to become 
part of the new state apparatus where attempting to strengthen the image of the 
Ottoman devlet within the precepts of their scholarly tradition of their time and 
worldview. 722 An ulema committee was given the responsibility to re-evaluate the 
constitution and make the necessary proposals and possible amendments among more 
Sharia compliant lines.723 724 It should not come as a surprise that the ulema were an 
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integral part of this process as they were during the construction of the first 
constitution, the constitution was deemed as the fundamental law (Kanun-i Esasi) 
which was part of the ulema’s jurisdiction. A closer examination of the members of 
the ulema on the drafting committee also points to mainly members of the Cemiyet 
and only ulema members of parliament such as Mustafa Sabri, Hamdi Yazır and 
Mustafa Âsım. The three were an integral part of the drafting committee in 
1909/1327. For Moroni many of the Committee’s members including the ulema had 
opposed the Hamidian regime. Thus for her when they made arguments even from 
the position of religion theirs is probably not the most standard/conservative 
interpretation of Islamic precepts.725   
However, it is a simplification to simply place this notion within the standard Islamic 
against non-Islamic binary. It is not clear if in fact the Constitution of 1909/1327 was 
indeed an ‘Islamicising’ attempt from the Constitution of 1876/1293. In 1876/1293 an 
emphasis on a strong Sultan pointed towards a system that was justified from Islam as 
such. By 1909/1327 the ulema now positioned an emphasis on consultation. Both 
indeed have their merits from Islamic texts. The notion of Islam being a discursive 
tradition requires mentioning. When examining the constitution Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır 
himself stressed that there are two forms of laws, those that are unchangeable for all 
times, thus will be the same until the end of time, and those that are changeable based 
on space, time, people and conditions. He himself placed the constitutional 
amendment process within this paradigm. 726  This question requires further 
investigation and discussion on the merits and nature of the constitutional 
construction of the first constitution and a comparison to the second. Studies on this 
point are scarce and this thesis is not at the liberty to examine the two here. However, 
it is worth stressing that due to the ulema’s involvement and central roll of the 
constitutional amendment process one shouldn’t naturally make the assumption that 
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the constitution of 1909/1327 was indeed becoming ‘Islamicised’ or that the ulema 
were pandering towards the ‘liberal’ as that simply feeds into the secularization linear 
narrative that lends to the assumption that the constitutional process of 1909/1327 
was simply a anomaly to the narrative of secularization. Instead a broader discussion 
is required on the very nature of Islamic constitutionalism and the Ottoman effort 
requires greater attention in both Ottoman studies and Islamic studies academic 
circles. I would argue that the constitutional process was a formative one, in which to 
assume that the constitution of 1876/1293 was any less or more Islamic then the 
second are not helpful. Instead it would be better to view the constitution as a 
continual transitory process of transformation addressing the needs and conditions to 
a changing Ottoman polity and world. What it does point to however, is that the role 
of Islam and its actors was indeed an integral part of the process, and while some may 
argue that the ulema were becoming marginalized by the CUP, nonetheless this 
process points to otherwise. This is because maybe viewing the ulema within fixated 
paradigms of either with the central authority or against as a reflection of ulema 
authority is a rather simplistic deduction of ulema authority in Muslim societies. As 
both state actors and non-state actors, the ulema’s role is a lot more fluid and nuanced 
when understanding their authority.      
 Notwithstanding this, the need to provide a clearer reflection of the 
constitution along Islamic lines was indeed a demand of the mutineers of the Counter-
revolution. It was thus required that a greater synthesis be evidently displayed in the 
constitutional document that the constitution was evidently in line with Islamic 
precepts and that this meaning not be simply implied or left to ambiguity. It was 
probably the ambiguity of the first document that left many confused about the 
authority of the Sultan. Added to that, the slogan of the constitutional revolution of 
1908/1326 was dressed in Islamic rhetoric and language. Many of the mutineers of 
1909/1327 believed in the rhetoric of 1908/1326, especially from the ulema and 
Islamic thinkers. Their frustration that the constitutional government had simply 
replaced one arbitrary form of governance to another left many bewildered of how the 
new constitutional regime, that promised much, was in fact different from the regime 
before. As a result one of the last acts of the outgoing Grand Vizeir Hüseyin Hilmi 
was to stress on the demands of the mutineers that the constitution should be more 
reflective regarding the precepts of the Sharia.727 Thus the spirit of the constitution 
                                                        




needed to reflect the spirit of justice transpired by the Sharia.    
 Ulema ideas and works had already pointed to during the inceptive period of 
the revolution that the role of the Caliph was one that was executive. The ideological 
contestation had come to a political apex due of the Counter-revolution. While more 
conservative elements had not contested the ideal of constitutionalism, what was 
being contested what the prerogatives of the Caliph. However, among many of the 
ulema class it was clear that this culture of veneration stifled any possibility even 
within the ulema ranks to critique the Sultan let alone hold him to account. The ulema 
had already been laying the foundations in the minds of the general public that a shift 
from the Hamidian conception of the Caliphate was what was required. The point of 
pointing to the Caliph as simply an executive authority was not a new one in Islamic 
political thought, but for the Ottoman devlet, the implications of placing in 
documentation this idea was seminary. It would institutionalize the executive role of 
the Caliph and restrict his authority to the consensus of the General Assembly.  
 After the 1909/1327 Counter-revolution the political basis of conservatism 
was uprooted from the centre, with members of the ulema either executed or exiled as 
the ideological basis of conservatism was also weakened in the imperial capital. 
Conservatisms in the various provinces also faced reprisals although not as harsh as 
Istanbul. Some conservatives simply consolidated what they had and waited to fight 
another day, others on the other hand lost out to the supporters of the new political 
order. Salafist thinkers however themselves where not to benefit from the change, as 
the ulema who exerted real authority were those in the parliamentary structure. It was 
clear that the ulema who aligned themselves within the state apparatus whether with 
the CUP or against had benefitted the most regarding the cultivation and 
implementation of the new constitutional regime. During this venture although ulema 
intellectual discourse is of importance, it is nonetheless important to stress how the 
ulema’s role in the construction of a new political entity was not simply restricted to 
abstract intellectual ideas. Most of the ulema thinkers were also men of practice. 
Istanbul was no doubt the centre of the Muslim world as the members of the ulema in 
parliament would now make a significant contribution to the amendment process of 
the constitution and put into reality the new political order.     
 The vagueness of the document regarding the role of the Sharia in itself 
required better clarity. In many ways constitutional documents are designed with an 




time and space specific and so require continual amendments as conditions change. 
However, this point also then leaves room for contestation as often different political 
actors contest over terms and their meanings. What was clear was that many 
conservatives who revolted against the CUP in 1909/1327 demanded the Sharia, the 
fact that this central ideal of the Ottoman state was left to ambiguity required 
immediate attention. A draft constitution was produced with immediate effect as the 
new era with a new Sultan had come into play. If July 1908/1326 was a period of 
euphoria, it was clear that April 1909 was a period of unrest, but with the era of the 
new Sultan, once again the Ottoman devlet with great optimism hoped for a turn for 
the better.           
 As mentioned earlier On January 11 1909/Dhul-Hijja 19 1326, proposals were 
put forward for amendments. While most amendments centred on parliament and the 
role of the minister, however articles 7 and 113 were directly related to the 
prerogatives of the Sultan. Article 113 was especially problematic as this gave the 
Sultan the right to exile whomsoever he wished. On February 4 1909/Muharram 14 
1327, the thirty man committee from the parliament including six members of ulema 
were thus asked to examine the constitution and make it in line with the new 
conditions of the new Ottoman political order. The fact that there were no military 
personal in the committee is also a reflection of increased importance civil authority 
was being given over the military and that the ulema were also collaborators with the 
civilian political class.  In many ways it was not a new concept to have the ulema in 
the drafting committee or the parliament, as that had been an established tradition in 
Ottoman politics.         
 Due to the events of the Counter-revolution, parliament was asked to speed up 
the process of making the amendments placing special attention to emphasizing the 
role of the Sharia. The members from the ulema on the commission were Fazil Arif 
Bey (Amasya), Hamdi Yazır Efendi (Antalya), Sheikh Mustafa Efendi (Aleppo), 
Mustafa Âsım Efendi (Istanbul), Tevfik Efendi Kengiri-Cankırı), and Mustafa Sabri 
Efendi (Tokat) Sheikh Mustafa Efendi was a member and writer for El Islam, an 
organization whose identity was closely linked to the rebels of the Counter-
revolution.728         
 Although the ulema only made up six members of the drafting committee, 
what is worth of note is that since the increased role of the Sharia was demanded by 
                                                        




the mutineers and since the constitutional document was presented as a the 
fundamental law, the ulema’s involvement was no doubt greater than what has been 
presented. Hamdi Yazır has been accredited as the main catalyst behind the nature 
and style of the draft amendment. This is because it was Hamdi Yazır who penned the 
new document.729 But it is also evident that Mustafa Sabri and Mustafa Âsım were 
also part of the drafting committee, placing the Cemiyet at the centre of the 
constitutional process. It was also relevant that even a member from the conservative 
group was present at the drafting committee. This would suggest that although the 
conservative elements had been dispatched and weakened in Istanbul, nonetheless 
that the political establishment was aware of the need to listen to the multiple voices 
of the plural Ottoman devlet, and also that the drafting project was indeed an 
inclusive one, of both the various Islamic inclinations and elements of civil society.
 The Muaddal Kânûn-ı Esâsî was split into two sections and presented to the 
parliament. The first section was a philosophical tract in line with the works of the 
ulema regarding the nature of constitutional governance explained in chapter three. It 
is clear that the ulema’s leading role in constructing the ideology of synthesizing 
Islamic thought with the constitution was the main influence of the first section of the 
draft. The second section of the draft were the amendments of which an explanation 
was given of why the amendments were made. It was clear by examining the 
amendments that the instilling of the term Sharia, and fiqh not only addressed the 
demands of the mutineers but also a continuation of a culture established during the 
Gülhane edict. The document not only highlighted the increased role of the Sharia but 
by documenting and instilling the idea of the Caliph within the document it was 
institutionalizing the executive nature of the Caliphate for future generations. It was 
an indication of the consensus culture within the ulema and its tradition of adoption 
which was aligned political authority. There is no doubting that the consolidating of 
the ideal of the new Caliphate modal that differed from the Hamidain was based on 
the ulema in political authority. Susan Gunasti’s thorough study is a worthy 
contribution of the details of the constitutional amendments that were made. As a 
result a detail analysis of each article shall not be made here, but simply I shall 
highlight a few articles that consolidate the point of how the terminology of the 
Sharia were emphasized and how the ulema’s stamp in regards to their ideas and 
political role was conceived in the guise of the Ottoman constitution of 1909. 
                                                        




 The first issue that was addressed was the Sultan/Caliph’s authority in Article 
3 in which it was stated that “Sultan, “Supreme Caliph” “ The Ottoman 
sovereignty, which includes in the person of the Sovereign the Supreme Caliphate of 
Islam, belongs to the eldest Prince of the House of Osman, in accordance with the 
rules established ab antiquo.”  The proposed amendment read, “The Imperial 
Ottoman sovereignty, which carries with it the Supreme Caliphate of Islam, falls to 
the eldest Prince of the House of Osman, according to the rule established ab antiquo. 
On his accession the Sultan shall swear before Parliament, or if Parliament is not 
sitting, at its first meeting, to respect the visions of the Şeriat and the Constitution, 
and to be loyal to the country and the nation.” 730 It is important to note on the 
emphasis on loyalty to the Sharia, Constitution, the Vatan and Millet.731 In article 
118 the modification stressed that when new legislation is prescribed that it has to 
take into consideration the position of religion (Islam). Thus, making clear and sure 
that the Caliph, state and legal system was under the remit of Islam   
 The amendment first stressed on the role of the chamber as being the authority 
that legitmised the Sultan. It further stressed that the oath would entail that the visions 
of the Sharia and the constitution were to be followed. This meant that the 
constitution and its vision in line with the Sharia came before the concept of the 
Caliph itself. The constitution was to determine in line with the Sharia what path the 
devlet would take, not the Caliph, in that sense the Caliph’s authority as an individual 
was curtailed to the vision ordained not simply by the constitution, but the drafting 
constitutional committee which emanated from the parliament, this included the 
ulema. This meant that parliament had now instilled that an inclusive decision-
making process had become institutionalized from this moment onwards as the new 
dawn of ‘Meşrutiyet’ had begun.        
 But it is also worthy of note that the division of powers that were being 
transcribed in the constitution and in practice were not as sharp as many historians 
have pointed out. Instead the Ottoman elites were clear to stress at this point that 
rather than the division of power it was better to view the process as the balance of 
power of which the Caliph was the head. Thus a clear authority is required to regulate 
the needs of society. Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır explained that the Caliph is both the 
representative of the ummet/ummah and Allah. The job of the Caliph was to consult 
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the jurist regarding the needing of laws that needed to change due to changing 
cirumstances. For Hamdi Yazır, society consisted of the ummet/ummah and 
hukemut/hukumah (Muslim community and governance). It was the role of the 
Caliph to balance the two and it was the objective of those ‘who loosen and bind’ 
(parliament) to support the Caliph in doing this.732    
 Thus, the separation of powers was still quite ‘soft’ in this initial period. This 
could have been due to the fear of not wanting to antagonize the complex relationship 
between the legislature and executive powers. The parliamentary report stated that the 
three powers of the state ‘are not totally separated from one another’ and that talks of 
an ‘orderly unity’ among them, points to the ‘unity’ of the soul and concludes that the 
three powers are meet one another for the unity of the devlet. 733 At no point in this 
period is it stated that the new regime is a parliamentary one, rather still stressing on 
the centrality of the Sultan as Caliph.734 
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Not until recently has scholarly attention in English started to reveal the 
importance of the ulema to the political transformation processes of the Ottoman 
devlet in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Prior to that, studies continued 
to focus on the ‘secular’ inclination of state actors and consequently state policies, 
relegating the ulema as either simply reactionary or politically passive to the change 
process. Such was the binary in the earlier historiography of the ulema that very 
rarely, if ever, was the importance of the ulema’s contribution given proper 
recognition. In this thesis I have argued that in fact the ulema were neither reactionary 
nor passive but integral to the political transformation of the Ottoman devlet in the 
revolutionary period. As a result, this thesis has not only re-examined the role of the 
ulema in late Ottoman politics, but it has also challenged the meta-narrative of the 
secularisation of the Ottoman devlet during the transition from ‘Islamic’ Hamidian to 
‘secular’ Second Constitutional Period. 
While throughout Ottoman history the ulema along with the military were 
seen as two fundamental pillars of state authority, by the nineteenth century the 
ulema’s influence was unreasonably written out of Ottoman history by emphasising 
that the late Ottomans were uninterested in Islamic political thought. This had been 
the major discourse regarding both the ulema and Islam by Ottoman historians 
studying the nineteenth and early twentieth century Ottoman devlet. The ulema were 
often presented as the internal other where very few works presented state 
reformation from the ulema’s ideals and perspectives. This thesis however, has 
argued via the actions and thoughts of the ulema that both the ulema and Islamic 
political thought had vitality and mattered in politics up until the end of the Empire 
and more significantly that the ulema’s relevance was integral to Ottoman statecraft. 
In particular the re-instatement of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876/1293 via the 
Constitutional Revolution in 1908/1326 was a key milestone period in modern 
Islamic constitutional practice in which the ulema’s relevance as political actors and 
political theorists was central to the implementation of a modern Islamic 
constitutional caliphate system with a representative parliament.  
When works on the ulema and Islamic reformation of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries were studied – mainly by Islamic studies or Middle Eastern 




works of Salafist thinkers such as the Egyptian Mufti Muhammad Abduh, his disciple 
Sheikh Rashid Rida and those of a ‘Salafist’ inclination. While recent scholarship is 
also challenging these narratives, nonetheless the ulema as an intellectual 
transnational community has not been studied greatly, where the ulema of the 
Ottoman centre were the most integral to the global discourse of Islamic revivalism. 
While there is an acceptance by this author of the importance of the contribution of 
the Salafist thinkers in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman devlet, nonetheless what 
this study has attempted to present is although the likes of Sheikh Rashid Rida were 
indeed exceptional scholars, however, they were not exceptions. In fact ideas 
regarding state transformation was part of a larger Muslim discourse that transcended 
the boundaries of the Ottoman domains. What makes the Ottoman devlet important is 
that the Muslim world continued to perceive the devlet as the centre of the Islamic 
world in this period, and while many Muslim thinkers and ulema deliberated state 
transformation within abstract theorisations, the ulema that interacted with the 
Ottoman state structure had practiced the ideal as a reality from the Gülhane of 1839 
up until the constitutional movements from 1876/1293 onwards. With the Ottoman 
devlet as the last caliphate, political transformation in the centre had political and 
intellectual implications around the Ottoman provinces as well as the Muslim world. 
Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire constructive deliberation within ulema scholarly 
discourse has seized to discuss modern formations of Fiqh al-Siyasa. The ulema of 
the Ottoman devlet were the last most noteworthy actors regarding state 
transformation and Islamic political thought, a point also accepted by Rashid Rida, as 
this thesis has not simply attempted to include the ulema but reasonably place them 
within the greater narrative of Islamic reform of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  
The view of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been built on the idea 
of a secularising world; religion being relegated aside as political rationality took 
precedence, as people and governments in the modern world started ‘living in the real 
world’. This view is indeed undergoing some revision but is still dominant from the 
works of Niyazi Berkes and Bernard Lewis, to Şükrü Hanioğlu. But since these 
works, revisions started by Butrus Abu-Mannah and recently Frederick Anscombe, 
stated that the key landmarks of the secularization of the Ottoman Empire such as the 
Gülhane Decree or the introduction of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876/1293 were 




resonated with the Islamic ideas of medieval ulema thought, but also Ottoman 
political traditions in conjunction with modern political formations. Just as this thesis 
began by questioning the linear depiction of the gradual secularisation of the Ottoman 
devlet, on the same token this thesis has not attempted to present the opposite either, 
where political transformation was a linear Islamic process. Instead this thesis has 
attempted to present the negotiations the Ottoman government undertook in 
attempting to balance complicated realities with Islamic ideals in an ever changing 
new world order.  
It has been widely accepted that the Reform Decree of 1856/1273 was a 
digression from the centrality of Islamic thought and Muslim expectations as well as 
the neglect of the ulema who were central to the Gülhane Decree. By 1876/1293 
however, prior to the initiation of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the Mecelle and Ottoman 
Constitution of 1876/1293 were a response to align Ottoman legal and political 
traditions back in line with Islamic precepts. It was during this period that Muslim 
intellectual thought was articulating an amalgamation of ‘modern’ political structures 
in line with traditional Islamic concepts to multifaceted Ottoman realities. While the 
Hamidian regime emphasised state policy on Islam and conservatism, at the same 
time, two years after the promulgation of the first Ottoman Constitution, the newly 
established Ottoman Parliament was closed and the Constitution suspended. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that constitutional debates continued during the Hamidian 
period within ulema and Muslim intellectual circles, as was seen during ulema 
activity in opposition to the Sultan and then during the Constitutional Revolution of 
1908/1326.    
By the end of the Hamidian reign there was an increase of ulema discontent 
towards the authoritarian nature of the Sultan Abdülhamid’s authority. This was not 
restricted to the Hamidian regime, as a global Muslim consciousness was starting to 
reflect an increasing support of consultative governance in many parts of the Muslim 
world – Iran is a noteworthy case. Although there was many ulema who supported the 
Sultan and his style of governance, but the last decade of the Hamidian reign 
presented a contestation of two political Islamic ideals which included the ulema who 
supported the regime and wanted to uphold the status quo against those who 
demanded a conditional, (Meşrutiyet) consultative (Şura) Caliphate system. The late 
Hamidian period presented inter-ulema contestations regarding the two Islamic 




state authority - were able to use the state apparatus to support their claims of political 
orthodoxy while the ulema in favour of constitutionalism remained in opposition and 
where restricted to protestations and propaganda campaigns to have their positions 
heard.  
However, by 1908/1326 the call for constitutionalism had gathered much 
momentum, and the tide had turned in favour of those who supported 
constitutionalism when the Young Turk movement attained both military and Muslim 
support from the Balkan provinces. But military strength although important - 
contrary to the opinions of earlier historians- was ineffective without ulema assistance 
in both the Macedonian provinces and the imperial capital. What this also showed 
was that Turkish nationalism was not at the heart of Muslim involvement regarding 
revolutionary activity, neither in the Balkans nor later in the centre but rather it was 
the religious markers of state and society which were the main reasons for agitation. 
Furthermore, much of the historiography was centred on the military activities in the 
Macedonian provinces when the call for rebellion by Niyazi and Enver Bey was 
made. However, the turning point for the callers of constitutionalism was due to the 
large Muslim gathering in Firzovik, which was the element where civil society had 
enjoined in the revolution, added to that the loss of support from senior statesmen in 
Istanbul once the demand for constitutionalism was made on July 24th 1908 which 
turned the tide in favour of the Young Turks. The ulema became central agents in 
which much debate and discussion took place in the Balkans regarding the Islamic 
merits of the new constitutional order where the ulema arguments resonated with the 
opinions of the ulema in opposition to the Sultan in Cairo in 1895/1312 or even the 
Iranian Revolution of 1905/1323. This first indicated that Islam as the basis of 
political activity continued to remain central to the Muslim population and the ulema. 
It also indicates that the connectivity within the translocal ulema circles was evident 
during the Hamidian period as the debates supporting the merits of constitutionalism 
reflected the same arguments made by the ulema throughout the Hamidian period. 
While the Hamidian state may have restricted public discussions of constitutional 
governance, it is clear from the consistency of ideas and thoughts throughout the 
Ottoman domains that the ulema scholarly networks continued to interact with the 
debates surrounding modern Islamic constitutional theory.    
While the ulema had managed to convince the Muslim masses in Firzovik that 




was the office of the Meşihat along with the pressure of the senior statesmen of the 
Sublime Porte that insisted to the Sultan that the re-instatement of the constitution 
was both the only pragmatic answer to the situation at hand and that it was in line 
with Islamic and Ottoman tradition. There is no doubting that the office of the 
Meşihat was significant in applying pressure on the Sultan to uphold the new 
constitutional order. When the famous telegram was sent from Firzovik to the capital, 
it was signed by the ulema of the Albanian provinces, sent to the Grand Vizier and 
the Şeyhülislâm Cemaleddin Efendi. Among the ulema circles it has been explained 
that Cemaleddin Efendi became a central figure in persuading the Sultan to re-instate 
the constitution of which the Sultan eventually obliged.  
The Young Turks provided the muscle to re-instate the Constitution, but as 
they continued to operate as a clandestine organisation their standing within Muslim 
society was non-existent and their intellectual output was simply restricted to a few 
ideologues of a Westernist inclination. It is from these thinkers that much of narrative 
of the Young Turks has been written, yet once the Committee of Union and Progress 
had taken the reins of the Islamic devlet, they were quick to realise that the ulema as 
mediators between religion, state and society were a essential institution within 
Ottoman officialdom. The ulema used their traditional spaces such as the pulpit of the 
mosque and medressa to support the new constitutional regime. But it wasn’t simply 
the spaces of the old that the ulema were using, they had also become exposed to the 
new mediums the constitutional government brought with it such as the parliament 
and the printed press. It was also via this medium that the ulema helped to consolidate 
constitutional governance, as the ideal Caliphate structure. The Şeyhülislâm 
encouraged the ulema to increase their visibility to propagate the merits of Islamic 
constitutionalism. The ulema duly obliged as in the mosques, sermons were given, in 
the public squares the ulema openly rejoiced with non-Muslims as they also now 
openly debated in the public spaces and the printing press regarding the merits of the 
constitution and its permissibility along the lines of Islam.  
The arguments and testing of ideas regarding constitutionalism was left to the 
ulema in the public domain, thus highlighting the moral standing the ulema continued 
to uphold within mainstream Muslim society. On the same token it also somewhat 
exposed the Young Turks’ intellectual weakness in not being able to translate their 
ideas to the mass Muslim population. This in particular was an important point as the 




system, of which the ‘national will’ was a fundamental component. The ulema’s use 
of Islamic terminology and their attempts of edification of state and society, meant 
that not only were they as integral as the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) for 
the new state transformation project to succeed, but in fact their contestations with the 
CUP would also further complicate the situation. The notion that contestation was 
over the ‘progressive pro-CUP ulema against the reactionary anti-CUP was also a 
simplification of the web of factions and interests of the ulema at the time. The 
plethora of pamphlets and newspaper articles firmly placed these discussions in the 
public domain. But while during the early Hamidian period there was a contestation 
between ulema that supported the authoritarian sultanate system against the 
conditional consultative one. After the success of the Revolution, such was the 
consensus in ulema circles regarding the merits of constitutionalism that the 
contestation between the ulema was rather on the style of the constitutional order as 
those who had earlier supported the authoritarian system expressed for the Sultan to 
maintain his unlimited prerogatives against those who wanted to place conditions on 
them.  
While the CUP failed to make much inroads in mainstream Muslim society, it 
was during this period that the ulema’s visibility increased. Their popularity in the 
mainstream Ottoman press had created a greater connectivity around the Muslim 
world as their ideas on the new constitutional order was presented as a universal ideal 
for all Muslims around the world. There is no doubting that the printing press made 
the Muslim world smaller, in which the so-called ‘imagined ummah’ could now learn 
of each others plight around the world. But more importantly the printing press 
served to consolidate ulema authority within the intellectual realm. While many had 
argued that this was a period of contestation between a rising Muslim intellectual 
class and the ulema, in fact the reality suggested that although their was indeed a new 
educated group that could challenge the ulema’s authority in the religious sphere, 
however these two groups more often collaborated more than competed. It was 
presented in earlier litereture that there was a contestation between ‘reformist’ ulema 
against ‘traditionalist’ ulema, but in fact what was evident is that many ulema from a 
host of factions were collaborating together to uphold the constitutional order.  
 It was during this period the ulema started to organise themselves into 
organisations. An example of this was the ulema organisation the Cemiyet-i 




itself to support the CUP and safeguard the interests of religion, state, the religious 
institutions and Muslim society. The Cemiyet formed a powerful organisation and the 
triumvirate members of Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Hamdi Yazır Efendi and Mustafa 
Âsım Efendi were much influential in applying pressure on the Meşihat, other ulema 
and especially the CUP. The relationship with the CUP was a sensible one in which 
the ulema of the Cemiyet enjoyed the use of the state apparatus. As many members of 
the ulema were also elected parliamentarians, that influence was also to be transpired 
within the new parliamentary order. With the Beyan’ül-Hak as its journalistic 
mouthpiece, the Cemiyet managed to use the new tools of the print press, its standing 
in parliament and their ulema networks to form a significant voice within the 
Ottoman political scene. Although they had mentioned that they were to support the 
CUP, in fact the ulema of the state apparatus in Istanbul would balance their 
relationship with the CUP as one of tolerance and coexistence just as they had 
previously before with Sultan Abdülhamid II.  
But the Cemiyet was not the only religiously motivated group that came into 
existence. By February 1909/Muhrram 1327 a religiously conservative populist 
movement was to also establish an organization called the İttihad-ı 
Muhammedi  (Muhammadan Union). Its membership was not restricted to the ulema, 
as it also saw itself as a ‘guardian of the faith’. While debates about Meşveret, Şura 
and accountability of the rulers were on-going, as indications appeared of an erosion 
of Hamidian authoritarianism, the agitation among some circles was now the CUP 
were becoming unanswerable to anyone. Haphazard CUP policies and a toxic press 
environment between the CUP and their opponents facilitated a reaction to their 
policies in April 1909 known as the Counter-revolution in English and the 31st March 
Incident in Turkish. The Counter-revolution, which spoke in the name of religion, had 
left government powerless and placed the new constitutional order under much threat. 
The Muhammadan Union had used much religious rhetoric in its media organ the 
Volkan and as a populist force came to be presented as a ‘reactionary’ movement. 
Although much evidence suggests that the Muhammadan Union was not anti-
constitutional nor was it interested in a Counter-revolution, nonetheless its populist 
religious rhetoric resonated with the disenfranchised soldiers and softas on the street 
as the chants for ‘Seriat isteriz!’ (We want the Sharia!) became the main slogan of 




So delicate had the situation become that outbreaks of discontent emerged in 
Adana, Diyabekir and Damascus as actors who had either lost or whose authority was 
weakened since the emergence of the CUP and new constitutional order, responded in 
reasserting their influence in some of the provinces. It indicated the precarious 
position the CUP were in as their dependency returned back to the two important 
pillars of the state – the ulema and military.  
The office of the Meşihat along with the Cemiyet had encouraged the ulema to 
go to the streets of Istanbul to mediate between the masses and government. The 
Şeyhülislâm had even sent telegrams in the troubled areas demanding ulema call for 
restraint and mediation. When the mutineers presented their demands in Istanbul it 
was the ulema who they turned to, and while the mutineers were severely punished by 
the state once the Counter-revolution was swiftly controlled with the introduction of 
the All Action Army, nonetheless, the ulema and government took into account of 
making the new constitution visibly more Sharia compliant. The Meşihat and Cemiyet 
had also openly denounced the Muhammadan Union thus providing the CUP the 
legitimacy to disband the Union and close its mouthpiece the Volkan. But while it 
was presented that the ulema were simply subservient to the demands of the CUP, 
this was not the case. The ulema of the state structure were just as agitated by the 
Union as it compromised their own intentions of state transformation along their 
traditionalism as mass populist activity had created an environment of chaos.  
In May 1909/Rabi al-Thani 1327 the ulema led by delegation of the Cemiyet 
which included Mustafa Sabri, Hamid Yazır and Mustafa Âsım, as well as the 
conservative Sheikh from Aleppo Mustafa Efendi who was a member and writer for 
El Islam, an organization whose identity was closely linked to the rebels of the 
Counter-revolution, convened to amend the constitution of 1876/1293 to the new 
conditions of 1909/1327. It indicated that after crushing the doubters quite ruthlessly 
in an attempt to set a tone of challenging CUP authority that the CUP then took notice 
to put faith in the parliamentary/legal reform of the constitution in the hands of the 
ulema. When the constitutional amendments were made the text presented resonated 
both in philosophy and language of ulema legal discourse. It was evident that the 
ulema were central to the amending process, as it was known that Hamdi Yazır was 
the designated writer of the constitution. When the draft was presented to parliament, 
the parliament without hesitation accepted the ulema’s proposal of the new conditions 




Throughout all the major milestone moments during the Revolution of 
1908/1326 to the Counter-revolution of 1909/1327, the ulema maintained their status 
as the mediatory group between state and society. It also consolidated its authority as 
the intellectual agents of political change of the Ottoman state structure. When 
examining the constitution of 1909, one sees the ulema’s influence within it. But not 
only that, the ideas within the constitution reflected a greater discourse of discursive 
activity that resonated with ulema idealism towards constitutional governance. There 
is no doubting the internal contestations that took place between the uelma factions, 
and what it indicated is how much of political transformation was based on the 
support of authority. The ulema in favour of constitutionalism were only able to 
achieve their objective once that authority of the state was willing to do so. However, 
in order to attain the support of the state, the ulema recognized that they would have 
to be part of the state structure not outside of it. It was within the state apparatus that 
the ulema were able to execute political change. It was also within the state apparatus 
that the ulema were able to coerce and account central authority. In that sense being 
part of the new state structures was imperative for the ulema to maintain their title as 
‘guardians of the faith’. One final point worth mentioning is that while there were 
indeed intellectual and political contestations among ulema regarding the execution 
of the executive order, what was evident is that by 1908/1326 the ideal of 
constitutionalism was accepted by way of consensus both among the ulema and by 
parliament. The rhetoric of Meşveret and Şura had become synonymous by 
1909/1327 that it was clear that neither the Sultan nor the CUP were the real 
adherents to constitutionalism, but in fact it was the ulema, from their own projected 
idealism. In that sense the experimentation of Ottoman Constitutionalism, even after 
1909/1327, could be argued to being a central experiment to the ulema rather than the 
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